

## Kant's Third Analogy of Experience

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I am taken again, necessarily (for my purposes), by the Third Analogy. It has been the most difficult of all three of Kant's analogies for me. I read some in the *Prolegomena* about community and simultaneity and am ready to tackle this third analogy again and see if I can fathom it.

First I see the First Analogy leading us to the notion of an on-going existence which is unchanging with regard to its material quantity (expansion). And this substrata is what represents time for us in the empirical perspective (*Anschauung*). The substrata continues always unchanged and hence represents endurance and continuation.

Now we are ready to investigate what are the different ways of an existence in this substrata of time (representing endurance). I try now to rethink Leibniz in this regard. Leibniz would have time as a function of the existence of some monad and so where there would be an infinity of nows, a now for each of the infinite count of monads. And for him time would have no existence at all except for the fact (per a creation) of a something, by means of which time would exist as the mode for expression of that something, ultimately that something being a monad. And since for Leibniz the intellect represents existence and so where logic rules, he declared that succession meant two existences in a single time (in the individual monad, coordinated by God for a uniform time among the monads). Both of these existences are in time, but when one is, the other is not. When one is present in that time the other is not, that is called successive, both are real and when one is present the other is not. Then there will be simultaneity which is an existence in time of two things which are *not* successive.\*

\* How else can we understand simultaneity? We could say: it is two things at the same time. But that might not make sense in

Leibniz's thinking, for time was diverse anyway, the expression of the manifold of a monad, and thus being merely a coordination of the individual times of many monads, a coordination imposed upon one and all by God.

Now back to endurance. There are two ways of existence, succession and simultaneity. Time is given substance in matter (First Analogy) and there are two ways for this matter to exist, things come after each other, or they come at the same time. How do we express such objectively?

In succession we look for that which proves the non-being of a certain state, namely its cause (the Second Analogy), and we tie the perceptions together in this fashion, i.e., an objective succession. With simultaneity then we look for that which binds the apprehension of a manifold objectively. When we have that, we necessitated the state or condition of the other thing and make a community. What makes B exist in succession with A is that A is the cause of B. That's the way we provide an objective apprehension and not settle for the possibility of A and no-B, or B before A. This is made objective, this way of connecting different perceptions, i.e., A has to come first because A is the cause B, e.g., the air had to get cold enough so that the water was turned overnight into ice. And so while here we see first water and then note the colder air and then spy the ice, that is a subjective apprehension and, at that point, we might expect ice and then colder air and then water. When the perceptions are necessitated via the Second Analogy, that of causation, then the apprehension is made objective and we have water and then colder air and then ice.

And we know that with simultaneous things the apprehension cannot be objectively given for the simple reason that it doesn't matter what the order of apprehension is because what is at play is the fact that we are dealing with a community in reciprocity with each other (and not merely a divine coordination à la Leibniz). So for science the things apprehended exist together, for they are affecting each other (again unlike Leibniz's independent, albeit coordinated, monads) and so, of course, it doesn't matter how I apprehend and bring them to mind, for

they cannot stop affecting each other anymore than water can stop freezing at 0° centigrade. They objectively determine each other (in a free order in the viewing) with the same force as the objective determination of a cause and its effect.

Thus, it would seem, here is a case for understanding the Third Analogy. Time is represented by matter/substance itself, thus via the First Analogy. The necessity of matter expresses time itself, that which is enduring. It is that which can be changed and expressed and so can become an expression of our own pure perspective/viewing of time, giving a framework for the objective determinations of this substance, according to the predicates which are made available to us through the senses. So we have time. What we need next is the representation of the ways of existing in time, and there are two: succession and simultaneity. The objective determination of the apprehension of two states of being calls for the necessity of the one before the other. This calls for the Second Analogy. The Third Analogy then looks to the second of the two modes of existing (expressing) in time, simultaneity.

Here the objective recognition is that the apprehension is not determined, or rather is determined in any number of ways, and the order does not matter. They are a unity with respect to mutual affectation. A B and then C, or C B and then A, or C A and then B. It doesn't matter. Objectively there is no order to the apprehension of the manifold, for they are simultaneous and hence, we see, of mutual affectation or reciprocity, for that is the sole way objectively for things to have to be present together at the same time, i.e., they mutually affect each other.

In a word: the First Analogy, and time and matter as the substrata. Then causation as the objective determination of two things at different times, the Second Analogy. And finally community or reciprocal affectation as the objective basis for different things at the same time, the Third Analogy (for they can't be apprehended at the same time, e.g., something in front of me and something behind me).

What follows are some earlier ruminations on this subject and which I leave for anyone interested in the development of expression and clarity.

My problem with the Third Analogy lies in my understanding of the First and the Second. The first analogy has provided a substrata to the visible world that is called endurance, and so there is no change in the total. This is the proxy for time here, that the things do not go in and out of existence, but rather endure always, and thus represents time itself.

This is necessary for the Second Analogy, for here we want to go from the subjective apprehension of a succession to an objective, determined apprehension of a succession. By virtue of the continuation of matter per the First, we can now focus on the changes in that matter and are able to look at a perception and see that it was the perception of a change in the object, apart from the perception, and are enabled to question what marked the beginning of that change, its arrival in the spectral world of appearances, and to seek that something out. Thus upon perceiving now the ice where last night there was water (and assuming the continuation of matter per the First Analogy), I recognize a new development in the object (and not just as it appears to the perception), i.e., something has happened, and search it to be in the cold air that arose during the night (itself an event and requiring a marked boundary, and at first merely a theory which would have to be tested by some observation again). In brief according to our understanding an event is an effect of something.

And so far we are quite unified and the thought fits together. Now here is where my own problem with the Third Analogy begins. Kant seems to be saying that without the Third Analogy we would not be able to say that things are simultaneous. According to Kant when you negate succession you do not derive and conclude simultaneity, but merely that particular negative, i.e., it is not successive. And yet it seems to me that by virtue of the First Analogy we know that things don't go out of existence and come into existence, but rather endure always, and so therefore wouldn't that mean that all things are simultaneous? And if so, then why the Third Analogy? The information would be derived

analytically from the understanding and import of the information from the First Analogy. So, it is not yet clear to my mind and will require further consideration. Per 2/21/17 I now realize that it is not the existence of the object, but rather its state or condition which is reflected in other objects existing at the same time.

12:12 PM It seems so intuitive that the two relationships in time are succession and simultaneity. And so if something is not successive, it would be simultaneous. That seems so obvious. And we know then that everything stays as it is unless something happens, and so unless something has happened, everything as remained the same, and so they are all simultaneous. That seems so clear.

OK, let's go to the perceptions. When we examine a series of back and forth perceptions from perception A to perception B and then to perception A (indistinguishable except that it is later) we know that perception A, as a perception, cannot exist upon perception B, and vice-versa, but that's all we can recognize by looking. There is nothing else given to suggest simultaneity. Based on the looking alone you could make only a guess, but not judgment. In order even to suggest the idea of simultaneity you must first make clear what you mean and you do that, it seems, by means of this Third Analogy. The Third Analogy gives us the idea of the interplay between all objects at any given point in time and whereby then we can know that the things behind our backs are still there just as they were when looked at a moment ago, or else something has happened (and going out of existence is not a happening), and that something happening will be reflected in the objects of the present perception.

And so I face East and then I face West, and while facing West I know that the East is just as I saw it or else is just as I would see it now if I were looking the other way, i.e., looking at the East. And that understanding is made possible by the assumption of the Third Analogy concerning the interplay among all things.

Now can we come to this conclusion by first of the First Analogy where the quantity of matter remains constant. When facing the West I would think to myself: things cannot simply go out of existence, and so that means that what I saw earlier cannot have gone out of existence, for that is impossible, and so that means that the East is as I saw it, or as it is now and as I would see if I were looking back toward the East. I would insist: it has to be still there, i.e., all those things, those mountains and such that I saw just now. They have to be really there. Per 2/21/17 I realize that we are not dealing with the existence of the object behind our back, but rather with its state and condition.

Somehow this logical conclusion doesn't seem very convincing, and I could not turn around and be sure as I turned, but at most be not surprised to find the East looking pretty much as I remembered. For, I mustn't forget, it really has to still be there, and just needing a look. Logically speaking.

What does it mean to say that two perceptions are in one and the same time? The only way that can take place is successively. And so A and B are put into the same time (a span of succession) when A is the cause of B. And so what does it mean to say instead that A and B are at the same time? this would put a point on time and declare that A and B are at that point. But what does that mean? I think then Kant wants to say that the only way that a positive meaning (and not just: not successive) can be given here is by virtue of the Third Analogy giving expression to simultaneity through the interplay and reciprocity among all existing things. Otherwise we would not be able to understand what was meant by things continuing simultaneously. It would simply be: not successive; but would have no positive meaning.

In his *Prolegomena* earlier Kant illustrated the notion of simultaneity by drawing a straight line to represent time, and then at every point on that line to draw a perpendicular line and then positioning on all things at the same time as points on that perpendicular line and then considering the surface which is created as a result as a representation of existence both

as substance and as accident, as object and mode of existence of that object, e.g., in motion or blue.

And so, as I muse, it is not enough to picture an East while facing West and thinking that East exists right now as it was while I am looking West or even to picture them both from a different vantage point, which is always contingent. In order to recognize what is meant by simultaneous I must be able to conceive of the East and the West in an ongoing interaction through space, and then I know the East is there when I am looking West. And in my imagination I can picture them together in a *necessary* way, i.e., in the interactive way.

And so things existing at the same time are in a state of mutual affectation. In this way we come to understand what is meant by “same time existence” besides just "not successive." And so we think of regularity not only successively but also simultaneously, and both are ways the mind considers the existence of enduring objects as appearances in time and space. There is a continuation of matter (First Analogy) and a successive affectation (Second Analogy) and a simultaneous affectation (Third Analogy), i.e., endurance, causation and reciprocity, respectively.

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