Notice: This page represents a project in development, and perhaps a very slow development at that; and does not yet represent a settled opinion as of 4/12/03. It is more a musing and wondering at this stage. For more current essays see Kant.

1/31/97 6:50 AM

I don't think we should call a 3-legged bear an object any more than we should call a 4-legged bear an object. A bear is a four legged animal with fur, etc. Therefore when I think of bear and analyze the concept I find that I am dealing with 4 legs. That is the concept (like a 7 has a 6 and a 1). That is what every bear must be in order to be a bear. That is the empirical necessity that the concept demands, without which you have something like this: a bear is a something which has sometimes 4 legs, some times 5, some times 3, etc., and sometimes has fur and sometimes does not. Or else you have distinct object: a 3-legged bear and a 4-legged bear, but in which case it would absolutely impossible to notice that a bear was missing a leg; for instead of the 4-legged bear that we saw before (and which has now gone out of existence under the veterinarian's knife, let us say) a new creature has arisen to view, namely a 3-legged bear, and in the same sort of way that a magician's egg is transformed suddenly, before our very eyes, into a chicken.

The more reasonable approach, it seems to me, is that of empircial necessity. A bear does in fact have and must have 4 legs (which is, of course, based on a synthesis conducted earlier and by means of which this concept comes into being [and the object which it represents, the real, live bear, sighted]). Therefore when you tell me that you have a bear which has only 3 legs, then I say to you, "well then, something has happened--an event has taken place" [which (assertion) would be impossible otherwise (if 3-legged bears and 4-legged bears were things on their own)], namely a bear has lost a leg (due to disease, a trap, or who knows what). [For "event" does not refer to a perception, but rather to something which is entirely independent of a perception, i.e., in the object; although this distinction is not at all clear in empiricist circles and is entirely lost on the animals (I wager!)]

In my Circles essay I utilized the notion of the traffic signal which were broken, but which (brokenness) were impossible to ascertain and recognize according the empirical position, since it might simply be a long cycle, e.g., taking several days to change, or a life time, or all eternity, for all I might know. And (also) indeed, with the rationalist, since the traffic light is a signal of a certain pattern, and since this thing before us (the broken traffic signal) does not exemplify this pattern, this thing is obviously something different.

That gives a quick overview I think to the three positions of the empiricist, the rationalist and Kant. The empiricist looks at the 3-legged bear and says that since bears are obviously things that sometimes have 4 legs, and sometimes 3, we have every right to expect even to spy one with 40 legs. Who knows!?

The rationalist says: a bear is 4 legged (per the definition). You have something which looks like a bear, except: when you count the legs you have only 3. Then you obviously (logically) have a different object entirely. We shall name this objet a 3 legged bear. Now there will be a problem in explaining how 4 legged bears go out of existence just at the moment when a 3 legged bear comes into existence (onthe veterinarian's table, for example). But that is the task of science. [Perhaps there is a mystical realm where the 3-legged bears are located with the 4-legged bears (this sounds like Plato talking!) and God has a rule (rational, I am sure) which says that a three legged bear must not appear with a 4-legged one. But look! there is a three-legged bear over there with a four-legged one. Hmm .. you're right! OK, there must be another rule. We will just have to keep working on it to figure it out. It must be logical!]

And Kant comes along as tells us that bears are bears, and there is no such thing as a 4-legged bear and a 3-legged bear. What seems to be a 4 legged bear is merely a bear, and what seems to be a 3 legged bear is merely a bear in time, i.e., where a leg was shot off. Thus this view allows us to have experience with bears, namely, and for example, that a bear can lose a leg.

Logical problem with Kant's position: when does a bear stop being a bear? Like when does a table stop being a table?! When I remove the top from the legs, then I no longer have a table but merely the parts, i.e., a disassembled table (like a disassembled bear?). Likewise, when I remove the leg from the bear, strictly speaking, I do not have a bear, but what I call a "reduced" bear, if you will, where a leg is missing. But if I continue to remove parts, then eventually I lose the bear. But I cannot tell you where that is, but I can see that it makes perfect sense to talk about a bear (with all legs) and a bear with only 3 legs, and then merely the parts of a bear; and so I suppose it goes back to the sighting as when we can sight a face in a cloud. Here the logic must follow the sighted reality, i.e., even though it does not follow perhaps logically, it makes perfect sense when you take a look. [And (it does make sense) in the same way, Kant would say, as the finger touching my nose does in fact split as a perception, but does not really do that as a thing. Or in the same way that I can image that my right hand in the mirror were a real, 3-D hand, and thus would be perfectly, in every respect, the same as my right hand, except that it would be left and could not possible be substituted for my right one (and could not wear my right hand's glove) . It doesn't make sense logically, but can be easily understood by taking a look [assuming you have the capacity (Anschauung or envisagemental capacity) to sight things spatially, e.g., the ability to distinguish five fingers from fingers in general].)