Notice: This page represents a project in development, and perhaps a very slow development at that; and does not yet represent a settled opinion as of 4/12/03. It is more a musing and wondering at this stage. For more current essays see Kant.

Two Necessary Inventions of the Human Mind:

The Object of Experience, and Freedom of the Will.

by Philip McPherson Rudisill

October 14, 1997

Surely nothing is so clear and intuitive than the common recognition of objects that surround us in all of our lives (and one of which is ourselves) and with which we interact in several ways, one of which is learning about these objects. And a close second is the recognition of the exercise of freedom in the deliberations we undertake, among us severally or within each of us individually, at least from the age of puberty on. And yet, due to the contradictions which have been thought to exist between these two notions, science (in its theoretical employment) has traditionally felt necessitated to reject the latter as unsupportable by experience and to dismiss freedom as an invention of the human mind and to relegate the term to denoting merely a form of manners which, due to certain associations developed in a societal setting, has been ingrained on the human psyche.

It was one of the most profound insights in the history of human thought that led Kant to a justification of the validity of the notion of freedom in a meaningful, transcendental sense, and it came about curiously enough as an inadvertent byproduct to his denigration of the objects of humans experience to a synthetic and a priori conception and construction of objects of experience such that the universally recognized synthetic and a posteriori learning might be developed from them. For in his effort to thoroughly expose the presuppositions underlying our recognition of objects (as well also as the experiences that we develop with this objects), Kant discovered that there were two ways of considering these objects, such that the scientific assumption of a contradiction vanished entirely and left a basis upon which then the assured, albeit only felt, fact of freedom were then established.

In the course of this essay my goal is to make clear to the informed student of Kant's work how this reconciliation of experience and freedom is accomplished and then how it is that the (occasionally questioned) assumption of freedom, which is universal in the psyche of all humans, is no more unreasonable than the unquestioned assumption of the enduring reality of objects of experience.*

[* Other than the idealism of Bishop Berkeley which, as Hume stated, was neither refutable or could it be seriously entertained.]

Objects of Experience We turn first to our understanding of the objects of experience. In this regard it will be profitable to distinguish the thinking of Kant in his Inaugural Dissertation from his ten-year later Critique of Pure Reason. In the former work Kant (as is eminently reasonable) assumed the existence of objects as things on their own and which were intuited by the human through the senses and which then appeared to us as phenomenon, i.e., objects of human sighting. This we shared more or less with the animals, perhaps, although our form of sighting these objects, space and time, may very well be unique to the human. Then Kant was able to justify the intellectual in its act ivies regarding these objects by using it to press upon these objects the form of unity which is the work of understanding and reason (and presumably then would not be contradictory with the notion of freedom which would arise from the moral sense).

It was then shortly after the publication of this rather important work that Kant himself saw its shortcomings in the skeptical writings of David Hume of Scotland, with whom cause and effect, which Kant had used to bind the objects of experience together into a world whole in time, turned out to be merely a customary procedure of the mind in relating commonly associated depictions together in associated, mental mirrorings. Kant's solution of this dilemma took the unexpected and, for his purposes, very advantageous turn of denigrating the objects of experience themselves into independent specters (Erscheinungen) which could not be unified into the objects that we are so certain surround us except by a mental gymnastic such that the actual sightings that we have of objects, e.g., the table that Hume himself cited as uniform and independent and yet which always appeared, with no exception, as varying and dependent and which Hume was unable to explain, and which he admitted justified his own "academic skepticism", were synthetic constructions which were also a priori and which arose as a result of the application of certain categories of the mind (one of which was cause and effect) and which resulted in a mental differentiation of the sense in those that which was caused by an object, and which was called a view of that object, and that which, while caused, was a product of the observer himself, and which would otherwise be falsely ascribed to the object as a thing on its own, e.g.,the apparent variation in Hume's table. Thus the intuition of the Dissertation had become the envisagement (Anschauung) of the Critique, and in one fell swoop Kant had both doubted and then justified the very objects of experience which Hume was so certain of, though never able to explain.

I think it advantages to take a moment to consider a certainty which every human of language age knows and to show 1. that it is synthetic and a priori, and 2. the means necessary to come to this certitude. This will also reveal something of the problem which traditionally plagued the notion of freedom as well as the solution that Kant found for that problem. I am referring to the insistent and undoubted recognition that when we (at least those of us who sight with two eyes) touch our finger to our nose the finger does not actually split into two spectral fingers, but only seems to.

[Note to Philip: Here I will insert an examination of the experiments of the "split finger", including such things as our noticing the pattern of the split, how it becomes more acute the closer our finger comes to the nose and /or the further we aim our sight through the finger to objects behind it. We will find that such patterning is a function of our envisagement, i.e., of our sightings in time and space. The biggest component of the solution of this problem, besides the fascination that such a split finger has for us, lies in our invention of space (as also of time) in order for us to distinguish specters from views of objects, and whereby we come to realize that we are dealing with these specters and not with things on their own. If we were dealing with things on their own, then the impressions of our senses would never be differentiated from these things and Hume would never have thought that his table did not varying according to his own sightings of it (as he states in Sec. 118 [back button to return here] of his famous (or infamous?) work on Human Understanding). For this purpose I will present the concept of the "infinite onion" to show that space itself is a construction (as is time) and that the category of understanding then is utilized in the same a priori and synthetic way (that it utilizes to conceive of that onion) in order to delimit that space (and time) into objects as the table of Hume.]

As a preface for the reconciliation of freedom and the necessity which the understand requires and finds in nature we need to consider more closely the notion of the thing on its own. In an empirical sense the thing on its own is what we commonly mean with the object, e.g., the table which remains the same while the views that we have of it vary, and indeed from which these views are derived and thereby justified as views as opposed to things on their own. Now we will make a two stage development in this idea for our purposes of this reconciliation. In the first place, using the blind and the deaf as analogies, we see that while we are limited in our knowledge to what can be sensed in general, we do not presume to think that our senses are all possible senses. And even if they were, we do not presume to think that these empirical things on their own are nothing more than what we sense. And so we are led by the example of the blind man to realize that it is one thing to speak of a sighting or perception of an object and it is quite another thing indeed to presume that that perception is identical with all that makes up that object.

But even assuming this limitation on our knowledge to matters of the sense, we can also easily imagine that there are aspects of things which are not subject to any sense, for there is no reason at all to think that things are so constituted that all of their being are susceptible to some sensing device, even if we are willing to admit other sensing devices besides the human. This consideration of an object in this way gives us the means of speaking of intelligible aspects of the object, and to mean by that term those aspects which are not subject to sensation at all. In this vein Kant develops the contrast of the empirical and the intelligible character of an object. The intelligible character of an object would be its reasoning and understanding capacities and its inherent freedom (although we are speaking now only conceptually and without meaning to ascribe actually freedom to any object); and the empirical character of that same object would be the effects of that intelligible character which are manifested to human sighting and which are unified into that empirical character by the understanding even as the object of experience is conceived such that certain specters can be derived as views and effects of that object and which conception is also in that way itself validated, i.e., as the basis of this derivation of the specters in this way.

By way of a rather inane, but perhaps for that very reason, especially illuminating example of this sort of thinking, we imagine a leaf falling from a tree as a free being which is not at all determined by the vicissitudes of nature and which then chooses to fall at a certain time, perhaps merely coincident with the coming of cold weather and blustery winds, and which then only seems to be necessitated by that weather and wind. The scientist of nature cannot possibly accept such a view, but the libertarian (if I may be permitted that term here) is free to make such assertions, realizing that it is of no benefit, but also of no harm, to the predictions and assertions of science.

Now to escape for the realm of the absolutely untenable, we might just as well have imagined a person who is fully capable, at any moment of his existence, to cast off the determinations of the past, e.g., his developed inclinations and the presentation of favorable occasions for their fulfillment, which were sheer folly, and to act entirely independently of these circumstances by means, let us say, of a rule of conduct which takes not account of such subjectively seated components of our existence as our desires and inclinations. While we would not at all be justified in asserting the factual existence of such a creature, nonetheless we see that we could assert this condition for the purpose of contrasting it with the necessitation of the empirical character of the scientist and not find ourselves refutable. If this rule were a moral law of true, transcendental meaning, then the scientist would be happy enough to incorporate our penchant for complying with this rule into our general behavior equation with the comment, perhaps, that the subject (ourselves) is taken with the notion of a moral order where certain actions have to be done, whether one's likes to do them or not, and these notions tend to have such and such a weight in his behavior equation. he might, as an icon, refer to the glass man of John Locke who was quite rational in his behavior and who always demanded of others that they not confront him with sharp blows for, as he put it, "I might break."

Thus the scientist looks to a man's actual behavior and conceives of an empirical character such that this behavior is necessitated, even as the empirical character of water is such that it solidifies in very cold weather, and all the while the libertarian goes his own merry way of asserting that this empirical character is actually a freely chosen mode of relating to the empirical world and reflects a transcendental freedom, but in an empirical world.

Having now cleared the ground (through the conception of the empirical thing on its own [which is thoroughly spectral] and the transcendental thing on its own [which is intelligible, but unspeakable in the Wittgensteinian sense] for the fact that freedom can (under certain circumstances) be reconciled with the necessitation which is an integral and indispensable part of nature, Kant is ready to enter the realm of freedom and see if it can be established now as a fact, for so far he has been able to speak of it merely negatively, i.e., it is possible to think of a being which were not necessitated by the conditions of the past, but who is able to act independently of all that, but without being able to say how this being could so act. And so Kant is now ready to tackle the problem of freedom,i.e., how it is that we are so certain that we, individually speaking, are free of the necessitations of nature and therefore subject to blame or praise with regard to our actions.

Freedom of the Will I think it is advantageous at this point to pause long enough to examine the meaning we attach to reason and rationality.

When we rationalize something we either make it more simple, or else we derive it. We rationalize production by make all the parts work together; and we rationalize our prejudices by dreaming up reasons such that they might be derived and thereby becoming morally acceptable. When we rationalize production, for example, we make sure that the diverse inputs to the process are in balance. Here rationalizing has to do with proportionality of inputs. We might rationalize our legal system by discarding extraneous steps.

I wish to smoke a cigarette and am trying to quit, but then I find a reason to continue, e.g.,I need one tonight because of the unusual stress I am facing now and I cannot kill to vices at once, or some such. Here rationalizing seems to have a practical orientation.

How about in the theoretical sphere, where we merely want to understand objects of the world?

Here reason seems directed toward unification, e.g., conceiving of an object such that certain specters might be derived from that object and considered as its views. I might conceive of a table, for example, so that what I have been spotting as diverse, albeit similar, depictions can be relegated to views of that table, e.g., some close up, others far away, some when clutter with household effects, others we cleared, some when newly painted, etc., etc.

This aspect of reason is called understanding and it results in an object of experience which is the focus of our understanding. It work of reason here is not complete with merely objects, however, for its objective (and it is driven!) is a world which may be called nature. And so in the same way that the specters are unified into these objects (which we dream up for this purpose), even so are these objects unified in a single object called nature. And so the object table, for example, is turned up side down, we come to see in some situation, due to the fact that the workman is going to paint it, and he is going to paint it because he has been ordered to do so by the owner of the table, and he complies with these orders in order to eat, for he is a being of hunger and is unable to get food without money, etc., etc.

Reason is not satisfied even with this empirical world, where all specters are unified, but strikes out for the unconditional unity which is merely an idea that it dreams up. And here reason begins to falter. In its understanding mode of going from conditioned to condition, it always presupposes a prior condition which it is seeking. But reason, demanding to be free of this gradual and under ending approaching, wishes to leap to the ultimate condition which, as it is said, is itself unconditioned, e.g., a first cause. And then the conflict becomes apparent with reason itself, in its understanding mode,which insists upon a condition for that so-called first condition, and in its pure mode, which insists upon a condition-less condition.

The arena of this is the so-called antinomy of pure reason and which itself is part of a general dialectic of pure reason, where reason proves itself unable to definitively draw any conclusions except the one that emanates from the critique of this process, namely: reason has no proper ground except the understanding which limits it to experience. The result is,for example: that by means of reason we are unable either to assert or to deny the answer to certain weighty questions, e.g., is there a God, is there immortality, is there freedom?

We have looked at theoretical and speculative reason (the former directed toward an empirical object or situation and the latter being willing to jump apart from all that and to swim in he sea of sheer ideas). There we see a drive for unity, such that everything which is recognized is a derivation from some object, be that an empirical thing or the conception of something which is supposed to be empirical, but which passes beyond all bounds of the empirical.

How about practical reason? What does reason do in its practical realm?

With practical reason we are looking for the same unity that reason seeks in all its endeavors, but here we are looking for unity in life. And it is here that the notion of rationalizing is so much more meaningful.

Without the use of reason, we will find, the human functions entirely on an animal level of response and reaction to impulses and inclinations. These lead us in one direction and then in another. We throw down warm clothes in the middle of a winter day because it has become warm, and then we freeze during the night. We discard food on a journey through a desolate land because it is too heavy and we would rather pick up a pretty rock.*

[* I am trying to come up with examples of childish irrationality.]

Here reason too, as with the theoretical realm, dreams up means of unification, and these are called maxims of action. We find ourselves exploding with anger in small situations and having this become very dysfunctional, and so we think of the maxim that results in this action (even if there is no conscious derivation earlier, for there is now such derivation, upon this very consideration) and find it to be: slap any one who gets in your way. Further consideration helps us realize that this is irrational (causing us to be killed, perhaps) and therefore the maxim must be formulated differently, e.g., revenge is a dish which is best enjoyed cold.* With this maxim we find that we are much more effective.

[* which was enunciated in a speech by Dr. Paul Josef Goebbels, Nazi Germany's Minister of Propaganda.]

Interesting observation, by the way: "we are much more effective," for the whole point of practical reason, from an individual's standpoint, is to make life more effective, i.e., enable certain presupposed goals to be achieved more efficiently and effectively, which is the central meaning of rationalization. Thus my hatred of an enemy is tempered by rationality such that this hatred is more effective and/or more safe to my future happiness, and instead of striking out against him in the midst of his friends and when I am alone, due to an anger and hatred that he awakens in me about him and which might well up into a fit or rage, I bid my time and seek a more advantageous moment in order to harm or destroy him. We (as adults say to ourselves) are not to be fools.

The presupposition with all this, by the way, is that as rational creatures we are free to resist the inclinations of the moment, although it is not clear immediately that we can resist the inclinations of existence, e.g., we can put off gratification for a while, at least for this instant, although we may not be sure that we can do that indefinitely.*

[* This is an interesting consideration, for it does provide a sense of real freedom, because we exist only in the moment, and so if in any given moment we are able to control our inclinations and whims, we are thereby able to avoid the vicissitudes of the moment; and if at this moment,then why not at every moment? Kant actually uses this consideration to show how the human always in fact knows that he is free of the necessitation of the senses.]

When we begin to fashion our maxims* we find that we always presuppose some object or some goal to be obtained. Immediately we see two sorts, namely some specific object where the means are known, e.g., drawing a circle, fixing a shoe, killing an enemy by poison, healing a person by medicine (which might be the same drug as the poison,but administered in different doses), etc.; and then where the object is not so clear and so where the means are not so clear, and this is the object called personal happiness. With the specific object and means, we speak of "rules of skill" and with the imagined object of happiness where, accordingly the means are not clear, we speak of "counsels of prudence." The former are definite and the latter are more indefinite and depend a great deal of experience, e.g., it is a very good idea to learn a trade while you are young so that you can support yourself later, and since we cannot tell for sure what trades will be in demand, it is a good idea to learn some general skills, e.g., arithmetic and languages, and then specialize later, e.g., accounting and journalism. This is a good counsel. This is an objective principle, but its utilization as a maxim depends upon one's expectation as to its utility, e.g., a person who has a short expected life span might not be taken by that principle, and would reject it.

[* This occurs around the age of puberty, I would think. Jean-Jacques Rousseau indicated that it was at this age that we quit worrying so much about how we feel about others and instead begin to wonder how others feel about us.]

And so here reason, in its practical sphere, seeks to bring unity to a person's life and actions and to avoid conflicts. Models of expected value are useful and can give good and logically consistent advice, but there is no necessity with regard to these for the individual, for it all depends on whether the individual thinks that the goals posited are meaningful and desirable; and if not, the principles are ignored as meaningless.

Now in the same way that reason in its theoretical sphere reaches out into the speculative in order to find the greatest possible unity (and does so in its unification of specters into objects and these objects into worlds), reason in its practical sphere does the same thing,first in unifying the actions of a individual into an acceptable and consistent whole (as we have just seen), and then also the lives of these individuals into a unified whole of rational beings.

Now reason here, in its practical realm of instructing with regard to actions, and likewise independently of the inclinations of any given individual, dispenses with the content of the maxims of any individual (for all inclinations are here in this unifying work ignored) and instead speaks independently of the inclinations,i.e., speaks categorically. The procedure of pure practical reason is to demand of all maxims of individuals that they have a certain form, namely that they be suitable for universal application to all rational creatures* such that all rational creatures could be directed by the same maxims, and in which case they come to be called laws. And so in this way reason continues its process of unification not only by finding the maxim needful for some action to be integrated into a unified life of a single individual (where a college student or worker, for example, makes it a rule to party only on weekend in order to study or work adequately during the week, and thereby to check the excesses of unbridled pleasure), and here jumps out, as it does in speculative reason, and finds a rule which would unify the common lives of all rational creatures. But here, unlike speculative reason (which collapses in a dialectic), reason is much more effective, and finds a rule which is unfailing in its effect,namely: I must so formulate my maxims that they can likewise serve as universal laws, i.e., I must imagine a world in which my maxims were the law of nature (that everyone would function by nature in the way that I function by deliberate choice [and which is expressed in my maxim], and then I must make sure that I could bring such a world into existence by my will, assuming that I had the power).**

[* I suspect this consideration first arises at the age of puberty, as Rousseau suggests, and in response to the question: how would you like it if someone did that (whatever the action in question is) to you? This question requires a mental gymnastic of looking at another person following a maxim, from which the action in question is derived via rationalization (here meaning finding the practical reason for an action), and how the actor would be affected in that case. For example, I promise a friend to meet him, and then later have an opportunity for some enjoyment and am prepared to forget my promise, and I am asked this question, and I come to see that I would not like it at all if someone were to promise me, and I were to make plans in accordance with that promise, and then that promise were merely broken because the other found some more fun to do at the moment.]

[** This is an excellent formulation of the law, by the way, for the individual is then put in a position of actually willing such a world by virtue of his own maxim, e.g., if he believes that it is OK for him to cheat whenever he feels that he can get away with it, then in complying with that maxim (and even in the serious intention to do so, which is the automatic presupposition of any maxim anyway), is actually doing just that, i.e., seeking through his will to bring that world into existence by engaging in it himself. Now when he abstracts himself such that he can formulate the maxim as: anyone may cheat upon every safe opportunity (as is required by pure practical reason), he can tell that he could not will that maxim as a universal law for all, and that therefore action in conformity with it is wrong, and that to do it nonetheless is a justified reason for a bad conscience and personal shame.]

Now the result of the application of this insistence upon universality on the part of the reason in its practical and yet pure activity is to produce the categorical imperative, namely that we are to so act that our person is seen to be of inviolable importance for the simple reason that all persons (all rational creatures) are so seen.*

[* There are several ways that the moral law can be expressed, but all of which are identical in individual result, as Kant takes some pain to show in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (GMM).]

Now Kant has accomplished one very interesting thing by his identification of the rational realm (although it is just an idea) for it is by means of this that all human duties can be derived and so also that we can unfailing discover the moral law and the right (and wrong) thing to do.

But a powerful and disquieting question arises here: even though we are able to utilize pure reason in its practical sphere to come up with this idea and this absolute command, and thereby to unfailingly distinguish right from wrong, why should that be of the least interest to us? Is it not just an idea? a dreamed up thing which is thoroughly imaginary? Why should any one care if his maxims were suitable for universal legislation, any more than he might care whether the Peter Pan's nemesis, Captain Hook, wore a black hat or a dark gray one, etc.?

Now it is true that the object of experience is actually dreamed up also, but it had a validity by virtue of the fact that we are able to derive specters from that as its views and effects, and so thereby make experience itself possible. But here we dealing with dreaming up a world, just as a novelist might do, in which everyone utilized my own maxim as their own, and so which has no reality anywhere.

It is this question that called for Kant to formulate his monumental Critique of Practical Reason.

As a general premise in that work, we imagine to ourselves free beings who are not torn by inclinations of any kind. Then, as free, since they must be determined by something in order not to be random like quarks, which is an expression of lawlessness, they would be determined by the moral law such that their actions would unfailingly conform to the moral law in all cases. Now if we add to this conception the fact that the individuals are torn by inclinations, then the moral law takes on the form of a categorical imperative, and we are told that we must do such and such (which would be any maxim which conformed to the moral law), but would retain a reason not to, i.e., our inclinations and desires, and so while we might or might not comply, if we did, we would have a clear conscience, and if not then a justifiably bad conscience, i.e., a conscience which would be seen objectively as bad.

Now even though it is true that if individuals knew that they were free beings and whereupon indeed it would follow that they would be bound by the moral law and would be able to see the justice of a bad conscience for all cases where they did not comply,* it would remain a fact that such freedom would violate the tenets of our understanding (necessary for the origination of all objects, including our own souls, as objects of recognition), we simply cannot assume freedom. And we certainly have no intuition of our freedom such that we could see it like we can see that my cup is on the table and to the right of my computer (and that it is to the left of my computer from your vantage point, seeing that you are sitting on the other side of the computer form me and are facing me).**

[* This bad conscience must be carefully distinguished from embarrassment or a violation of some rule of manners which might result in punishing pain if discovered and hence which is a source of fear and cowering. The latter arises by violation of societal manners; while the former is a result of the moral law and cannot be imagined apart from that. For in the latter, embarrassment, I am concerned solely about how I appear in the eyes of others; but with a bad conscience I see that I must appear badly in the eyes of others for I must appear badly in the eyes of all, including myself, for I see that I deserve that disapproval, for what I did was not merely unmannerly but evil, a term which is meaningful only by virtue of the moral law. The Christians,for example, are concerned about the morality of the command of Joshua, leader of the Israelite forces, chosen and anointed by the Moral One, their God, to kill all the inhabitants of a city in an aggressive conquest of a the land of another. But this concern would be impossible if the Christian were to have derived his notion of right and wrong from the scriptures as such per se, for then Joshua's command would be one of the ingredient of a "rightful" action which would go into the morality equation. It is only by virtue of the fact that their so-called Golden Rule (which is an expression of the moral law for humans) precedes in their understanding that they are able to find this slaughter of the innocents curious and shocking in the least bit. The difference between right and wrong are very clear, and this is only possible by virtue of the moral law; and so, if nothing else were to be accomplished, we would have accomplished a great deal by this clarity.]

[** Note to Philip: this example (of the other facing me) is more than is needed, but leave it temporarily to remind me to make clear above that the "infinite onion" construction is necessary in order to make sense of this turned about world, where my left if to your right (when we face each other) and to your left (when we face the same direction) which is an intellectual abomination and must be seen in order to be understood. ]

And so the question arises: what could cause any one to have the least interest in this moral law, as to what would be the case (and effect on me) if others were maximed as I am, since they manifestly are not and since if I change my maxims there is not the least reason to think that others would follow suit?*

[* Now if I thought that others treated me in the way that I treat them, when we are back in the world of understanding, and I would find that I would need to give away more to others, in other words, in order to get more for myself, which is a tenet of many of the so-called scientific churches in the modern world. And here then it would be impossible for the individual not to make such gifts and engage in such "right behavior" for it would be merely the combination which unlocks personal enrichments, and I would be indistinguishable from the most selfish man in the world, only I would be better equipped as to how these riches are to be procured, while the other might be swimming in ignorance.]

Here Kant is at the end of his rope; for he can find no reason for this interest. It is true, as he observes,that we do in fact necessarily presuppose our own freedom, for else we would not be able to be conscious of deliberating making decisions, nor would it ever have occurred to any one to introduce the notion of freedom into human discussion, for we like the religious scientist of the previous footnote, be scurrying about after our own advantage and seeking the best way to do that, and so since the notion is contrary to the principles of experience (and, at most, would denote someone who were deranged); none of this except that we feel that we can implement moral decisions. But we have no intuition as to this freedom, and so have dreamed it up.

But in the course of his examination of practical reason he finds that people cannot avoid answering to the moral law, and that they never cease to justify their actions in light of that moral law, and so even the bad conscience which plagues all people is a result of the moral law and cannot be imagined without it (for then we would be limited merely to embarrassment and thus public disapproval, but never personal, individual disapproval).

This is a critically important point, I think, and calls for elaboration. In a purely empirical world, where reason were merely the slave of passion, as Hume maintained, it would not be possible to be ashamed of one's actions. At most we would be fearful of being found out and put to public disapprobation and shame, which is called embarrassment, and so fear would reside with us; but never moral shame and personal condemnation. That would be no more possible than it would be to imagine another envisagemental form other than time and space. But people are constantly internally making excuses for their behavior. And this would simply be impossible were it not for the compulsion of the moral law.

And so we know for a fact, individually and subjectively, but not objectively (for we cannot point right and wrong out in the things of the world, but only in the volition and the maxims of our actions), but still as objective, i.e., as unfailingly correct in judgment, that we are compelled by this moral law (even though we cannot understand it). And it is this compulsion that first makes us realize that we are free, for we would never have thought to have dreamed up something called freedom, when empirical liberty (a form of internal necessitation, but which is no different from any other necessitation of nature, i.e.,w here the past determines the present) is adequate for all purposes of understanding, had not the moral law preceded and made us do so. And so we come to the factual recognition that we are indeed free, and it is this that now explains how it is that we have always presupposed that we are free, and now it is understandable how it is that we are bound by the moral law, for the moral law is the law of the free creature, i.e., the categorical imperative is the way that freedom is manifested in the realm of necessitation, for it is by reference to the absolute rule of the pure practical reason that we know that we can disregard the inclinations (which are a product of our inclinations and the awakenings of our past and experience) and walk a straight line, as it were, regardless of the pull of the inclinations.

[Note to Sam: I must stop at this point and consider that actually none of this is required for a course on ethics, but rather only in a course justifying the freedom that is necessarily (and automatically*) presupposed by the students of an ethics class. I will have to consider this point more carefully later and see what sort of introduction would be proper for students of ethics.]

[* Unless corrupted by "popular philosophy" in which case this essay and the Critique of Practical Reason would be required to rectify the misdirected thinking in that philosophy.]

Having established the validity of the moral law (but only on an individual basis, but which can be seen as valid for all individuals, but still without for that reason breaking out into a perception of that validity, i.e., still not adequate for the purposes of the world of science), we have also established the validity of the universal presupposition of freedom* on the part of each individual. The result is a reconciliation of the drive and need for personal happiness and imperial commands of the moral law which (two together) is given expression in the Highest Good, where morality is seen as the qualifying factor for happiness. And then, since the human is compelled by the moral law, even though he may even resent it, and since actions in accord with the moral law have no promise of happiness contained in the demands of the moral law, but even disregard it entirely, it follows that this insistence in moral conduct and moral maxims is matched by a rational insistence in a life beyond the grave where the reconciliation can be achieve in the Highest Good made manifest, and furthermore that a God must also be presupposed so that this reconciliation can be effected.

[* Here we are reminded that while freedom does violation to the principles of human experience, in the antinomy related to this conflict, we find that freedom can be imagined as the intelligible character of the individual such that the empirical character is derived from that. For example, the moral law, we will say, rules each person and makes him answer to the court of his conscience and thus deny him the full pleasure that comes with a mind at peace with itself; and yet this same moral law and this same desire for a good conscience, as deprecated as it might be in the eyes of science, is still calculated in as another factor in this humans' drive for happiness. And so it is merely accounted for and quantified like everything else by the scientific observer, while it is overarching internally when seen by the actor himself, for he sees thereby all this actions as truly free and his bad (or good) conscience as objectively valid, even if he is unable to explain how this is possible to another person nor can introduce it into his own work as a scientist (if he happens to be one).]

And so we end up the critique of practical reason with the three objects needful for religion and of the greatest interest to pure reason in its speculative mode: freedom, God and eternal life.

The way is now open to an examination of rational religion and then finally to the hope that is conveyed by any revealed religion which is morally based.