Notice: This page represents a project in development, and perhaps a very slow development at that; and does not yet represent a settled opinion as of 4/12/03. It is more a musing and wondering at this stage. For more current essays see Kant.

The form of human understanding is derivative, i.e., we understand only when we can derive a matter from a condition. For example we see ice, and we remember that in the same place earlier we saw water, and then we incorporate the cold into the equation and conceive of an object which is affected by cold such that when it is cold the object is solid and frozen and cold, and when it is warm, the object is fluid and warm. In this way the sighting of ice is that of a coming-to-be, i.e., an event, i.e., something which follows upon something which is not the ice, i.e., the water. When this concept is attained to, then we look at the ice with understanding, for we have derived its existence from the character of water and the fact of the cold.

It is the form of human understanding that all events are considered to be caused by a previous condition and this too, in sequence, is caused by an even earlier condition, and so on. The cold that freezes the water is a result of the tilt of the earth relative to the sun and to the change in the relationship to the sun during the orbit of the earth. This is turn is a function of the manner in which the earth was captured in an orbit around the sun. And so on. And in this way is our understanding increased.

The further that we are able to take this discovery of conditions, the greater is our understanding.

This process is tedious and time consuming and frustrating to our human nature, which seeks to jump immediately to the end of the process of finding the conditions. It is here that reason enters the fray and asserts that it is reasonable to think that all the preceding conditions are actually given (for if not, the reasoning goes, then the present conditioned would not be given); and since all are given, we might try considering them all together and see if we might not come up with the very first of the conditions (the thinking also being that if all conditions are given, then the very first is also given).

But then once this very first condition, the unconditioned condition, is conceived of (in a very abstract, merely verbal way), then the understanding demands of reason to know how it is that this first condition just suddenly appeared or arose when it did and not earlier. The conclusion is that there must have been something to prompt this first condition to arise, or else it would have arisen at a different time. Reason is totally inadequate to answer such a question, and is forced to retreat to its earlier assertion that regardless of what else might be said, this much is true, since the conditioned exists, all the conditions leading to that also exist (are given) and therefore the very first also.

Thus we come to the great standoff between the understanding and reason.

In the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason Kant seeks to explain this dialectic of reason (reason in conflict with itself) with regard to the concept of causation. Since the understanding demands a condition for every state of being, and since reason conceives of all conditions as given, and therefore also, of course, the very first, the question arises as to which wins this argument, understanding (there is a condition [cause] for the first cause) and reason (the first cause is free and conditioned). [This problem and its solution is critically important also for reason in its practical sphere where it asserts the capacity of beginning an action without reference to any prior condition in general,i.e., not merely with the absolute first in time, but at any time, e.g., now.]

The general solution of any antinomy arises when we consider that the object is always understood in two different ways: as specter (for the understanding) and as a thing on its own (for reason), the former denoting a coming to awareness and the latter independently of the awareness.

Originally the understanding conceives of an object such that what is sighted is a result of that object,i.e., the object is the condition of the sighting. For example, in the case of the water and the ice, the object is water (considered now without regard to its state) and the appearance or specter of this object is steam, liquid (commonly called water) and ice. The reason for the diversity of the appearance is given in the conditions of the existence of the object, e.g., it being cold or hot. Thus an object is conceived of which is a part of nature, i.e., which interact with other objects in accordance with laws. By means of this we understand how it is that ice appears to our eye at one time and steam at another, etc.

This conceived object is called the thing on its own, and is understood entirely in an empirical way. The object that I see before my eyes is actually only a specter, i.e., the appearance of the empirical object. Thus the table which gets smaller in my eye when I get further away from it is considered merely an image of the real table which suffers no such diminution. Now we look upon that image as the object on its own, but only when speaking of specters (which is normally merely understood to be the context of our discourse) ; and thus the table that I spy I say is the real table on its own, although, more precisely considered, I know that it is merely the specter of the table, i.e., the table as it appears to me. This is the very basis of all recognitions and of human discourse concerning objects (for otherwise what would be large to me, my hand close to my face, would be small to you, and all meaning of language would vanish).

The notion of the spectral object comes to mean the object as sighted in all possible ways, but always through the senses, e.g., close up, far away, in bright light, in blue, light, from the top, from the insides, etc., ad infinitum. We then speak of sighting of the object from this or that perspective and understand a single, unchanging object which merely appears differently to different perspectives or sightings.

Now since this empirical object is actually merely a conception of the human mind for the express purpose of having experience, and since it is nothing apart from the human mind, we come to distinguish the empirical object, i.e., the empirical thing on its own, from the thing on its own without reference to the human viewer. This latter is now a product of reason which must go out to the unconditioned. And it is in the comparison of these two that the antinomy arises, the third of which is now our concern.

A brief review will be helpful. We are confronted with sheer specters, i.e., objects residing on our eye-balls (and other sense organs). These could be treated as things on their own (as doubtlessly the animals do) in which case the world is meaningless and disorderly, i.e., Hume's famous table gets larger and smaller on its own. We conceive of an object such that what we see is the effect of that object on our sense organs, e.g., the "real" table which then only seems to get larger and smaller because it is sighted from a distance, and indeed from varying distances. Reason is dissatisfied with this situation and goes to consider the object as a thing on its own without reference to the human viewer, e.g., the table as a thing on its own. Here no predicates of human sighting and human understanding apply, and reason is able to imagine a table which appears the way it does because that is the way that it chooses to appear. Thus a conflict arises between the table appearing to us the way it does because it has it,i.e., our sense organs and their interaction with the table are so constituted that we see as we do, e.g., the apparent change in size of the table; and the table existing on its own without reference to any sighting whatsoever.

the distinction here is subtle: the empirical object is a conception of something which is independent of the viewer, and it is by means of this that we are then able to conceive of the specter being an image, i.e., being that object in time and space. But we forget that time and space are our modes of looking, and that they are not conditions of things on their own at all.

When we consider the table as a thing on its own with reference to the human viewer at all, i.e., transcendentally, then we find that we are still applying to that object the categories of human thought, e.g., causation, as though they were empirical object. And it is here that our problems arise. For our modes of thinking only have application to specters, for the purpose of "manufacturing" objects out of the specters such that the specters appear to us as images of the actual object itself. For example, we find that the table has a broken leg. With regard to our empirical understanding we realize that something has happened, i.e., that the leg has come to be broken, i.e., that it is an event and it will exhibit some cause. Thus is the justification for coming to search for the cause, the necessary presupposition that makes us look for it. This Kant calls the Transcendental Object = X (TO=X).

But if we look at it from the stance of pure reason alone, i.e., divorced from the human condition, then we find no such necessity, for as far as we might tell, the table could have decided on its own to break its leg, or the leg could simply have decided to break without there being any cause further than that. This will have no meaning to the understanding, for we will still be compelled to ask: why did the leg decide just at this moment to break and not before or later? But when we remove the constraint of time and space, then this question becomes meaningless and we are left with the possibility of a free action, namely the leg just decided to break on its own, without reference to any temporal condition.

The solution to this problem lies in the illusion of the transcendental and absolute reality of time and space. If the table were in time and space on its own, then it is certain that for every condition, there will be a preceding condition such that the given condition must ensue. And this is the way the understanding must think the object. Fo the table, when sighted, is in time and space, but the sighting itself is predicated on time and space being independent of the viewer and objective. And this is the unavoidable impression of any sighting (much like the proverbial refrigerator light which is on every time an inspection is made, but not otherwise, and thus appears to be on continuously).

The form of human understanding is that of what we might call derivation. It is when something can be derived from some premise or fact that we say that we understand. For example, we conceive of an object called a two-eyed perceiver, and attribute this characteristic to ourselves, and utilize this to derive the phenomenon of the single finger splitting into two "ghost" fingers when it touches our nose.

The example is suggestive, for before we can make this derivation, we must first make a connection such that this derivation will follow. Hence the human understanding is synthetic and connective. Therefore the human understanding is ever dedicated to looking at every fact as conditioned, e.g., as an event, and looking then for that condition such that this fact might ensue. For example, the experiment to examine the split finger will be predicated upon an observation of the fact, and that upon an interest in such matters, and that upon the nature of the knowing human being, etc.

Earlier draft.

If intuition were our mode of knowing, then we would be able to know immediately that we were free, and would not have to work our way to that realization as a conclusion. But we do not have an intellectual sighting, for all our sighting in sensitive; and so we have no intuition nor, for that matter, any instinct. All our knowledge is based on a sighting (theoretical knowledge) or on an immediate conclusion from the fact of the moral law (practical knowledge).

When I hold my finger to my nose, I can notice that it seems to split. Now this is a very interesting situation and which will be helpful in understand our task and objective in this essay. It is interesting that I say that the finger seems to split, for, as a specter, it most certainly does split and I see the split plainly before my eyes.

Now what I do as an understanding being is to engage is certain experiments. For example I notice the degree of the split as the finger approaches the nose, and that it can be avoided by looking directly at the finger (until it gets very close) and then also that the finger can be sighted differently by closing each eye alone and observing that the finger is then without any split.

Now this is the sort of experimentation that we undertake the explain these phenomena that we happen to notice. The principle underlying this recognition that the finger only seems to split is two fold: first of all we see that the finger is in space and are able to make meaningful such assertions that the finger is getting closer to the nose. Secondly we conceive of a world of perception, i.e., a world of objects which are viewed from without, and so that what we actually sight in our vision is not an object per se, but only the image of an object. The actual object on the retina* is called specter. Therefore, given this conception of the object as being in space (and also in time), we conceive of the specific object, e.g., the finger is sighted by two eyes which are united in the brain into a composite picture, and therefore only seems to split; but the finger itself does not split but is singular.**

[* We speak most commonly of the visual, for it is the most important of the sense. But the object might also be on the audio organs, i.e., a sound, or on the feeling organs, i.e., a touch, etc.]

[** The experiments for such insights as this are primitive and the most primitive, perhaps, is the correlation and mutual calibration of the worlds or realms of touch and sight. This is accomplished by conceiving of a single world (the work and function of the capacity of understanding, which seeks always and only to unite via synthesis and connection) which appears diversely to diverse senses. We then notice the change in the shape of the fist or hand as we move it towards and the away from our eyes, and that there is no change in feeling, and then that we have a certain sensation (feeling) when the visual hand touches another visual object, etc.]

Those objects in the eye which are said to be caused by objects in space are called images of those objects, e.g., the rain that I spy in the distance. Those objects on the retina which are said to be only in the eye and not in space are called specters,* for example the rainbow that I see in the rain (but which is actually only in my eye) or the actual split of the finger.*

[* And this term is used, transcendentally speaking, i.e., before any empirical distinction has been ascertained, to refer to all objects on the sense organs in general, i.e., the rain and the rainbow.]

[* This split finger is very helpful in considering the meaning of the term: space. We say that the finger splits, or seems to split, because it is in space, along with our two eyes, and that therefore each eye takes a different image and are melded into one by the brain. And so we say that in space the finger itself does not split. But the only space that we are really aware of us this very space that we sight when we open our eyes and look at the finger or other objects. But that space, the space of the split finger, is obviously only in our mind. And so we dream up another space, the so-called real space, and assert that our visual space is actually a representation of this space, limited, however, by virtue of it being a particular view point in that space (each eye, actually, being such a view point). Essentially and conceptually speaking, the human conceives of a infinite series of concentric spheres with a common center and calls that a viewpoint. And then conceives of that again, but with a different center. Those two centers are points of the surface of one of the spheres of the other system, i.e., the center of system A is a point on one of the spheres of system B and vice-verse. In this way we orient ourselves in space. So then we conceive of a space and place these viewpoints in that space, and are able to look at another person and see that that person is facing us and therefore that the right hand of that person is the hand that is most closely situation to the left hand of ourselves, etc.***]

[*** It is easy to see how this conception lends itself to the certitude we have of the figures that we draw in geometry and that they can become the basis of the synthesis which is so thorough and sound that they are called mathematical, e.g., that 7 and 5 render together 12.]

With regard to the human, who is himself also merely a specter, we conceive of a character to represent that is "really there" (even as the non-split finger was conceived as "really there" in the example above). The empirical character then is dreamed up by the understanding in order to have a basis for the derivation of our actions. If I steal when I have a chance and then avoid doing so when discovery seems probably, then I am considered to be a prudent man, and the diversity in my actions is based on my perception of convenience in the circumstances.

Now that empirical character is really the Transcendental Object = X (TO=X) as applied to the human with regard to his actions. so this is simply the Analytic of Pure Reason. So this much is certain and easy.

But now the trick will be to see the empirical character as the specter of the transcendental character. First of all, it was the concept of character is the TO=X that enable us, as understanding beings, to search for a fixed and uniform character such that the actions might be derived from that (somewhat as the empirical character of water is to freeze when it is cold enough).

But now we are speaking of a transcendental character in much the same way that we speak of the transcendental character of water, which (concept) is worthless as far as the understanding is concerned. It is a misuse of the term. In order to make use of it in the same way we would have to speak of water actually wanting to freeze when the whether got cold, and that water could choose to freeze at a different temperature, but simply has not chosen to do so in the past. This would remove all certitude to the object and in fact make the object disappear and leave us really merely with the alterations as things on their own.*

[* For in this case we would see the finger as actually splitting on its own, and not merely appearing to do so.]

But with the human we are dealing in a different realm, namely one of depictions and conceptions. Here it is possible for a human to be conceived of as utilizing his intelligence to make decisions which are then implemented in the actions.

In the first place we need to remember that this depictionary capacity is incorporated already in the concept of the human (by means of the TO=X) such that his actions are derived from this. This man, for example (and utilizing an example of John Locke), thinks heshe is made of glass and therefore is very resentful of people who push him and seeks to protect himself perhaps quite vigorously. This would make perfect sense, and we need go no further than the empirical character to explain the behavior. The only point that would call for explanation is how heshe came to think of himself as made of glass. Once done, then there is no problem, and the understanding can rest secure in its grasp and its sighting (via the senses).

But this same logic also holds, of course, for a person who considers himself to be a moral person and who seeks to follow and conform to a moral principle. This is no different from the glass man of John Locke, and all that is missing is the explanation of how it is that the person came to the conclusion that heshe were a moral man.

With regard to the actions themselves, they would be thoroughly derived from the empirical concept of the moral man, i.e., from the self conception of a man who thinks of himself as a member of a moral realm where people treat each other in a certain way. This man might even utilize the Golden Rule (or some other empirically based expression of the moral law) to formulate his actions and refuse to do things that would be otherwise sufficiently desirable to invigorate an action toward their procurement because heshe would find, intellectually, that these things would be a violation of the principle of universal love and/or respect.*

[* The will, according to Kant, is the capacity to derive an action from a principle. Thus there is a reasoning component. E.g., I wish to treat others as I wish to be treated. Well, then, I would not want someone to push be down if I were made of glass, and so I should not do the same here.**]

[** The dynamic is, of course, much more involved and goes back to my own understanding. for example, I might think it therapeutic to push the glass man down in order to prove to him that he is not really made of glass. The action ensuing from this decision and concept might or might not be fruitful and accomplish the desired end, but that is not a matter of consideration when we are looking at things morally; that being merely an incidental result of the moral law, and not a factor in the determination of the will.]

And so therefore the glass man and the moral man would be both thoroughly explicable with regard to all their actions. They both live in a conceptual world and view things from the vantage of that concept and act accordingly.

The only question remaining, in both cases, is how it is that the individual came to think of himself as encased in that concept. With the glass man we might imagine a short circuit in the brain such that a strong association took possession of him and that his behavior reinforces that.

With regard to the moral man, his upbringing will play an important role as well as the physiological make up,i.e., the way that heshe puts things together, e.g., temperament and emotional state.

And so in both case there is a complete explanation of behavior (either in fact or in presupposition)* and no need to consider any other factor, certainly nothing as elusive and fantastic as freedom.

[* The presupposition is called the Transcendental Object = X and is given in the Deduction section of Kant's Pure Reason.]

Given then that grasp of the moral man, and that his behavior is thoroughly explicable in light of his conception, we can turn to the man and examine him as heshe seeks to make a decision with regard to his behavior. We might even incorporate the glass man with this so that we have a moral man made of glass, i.e., a man who seeks to incorporate the moral law as the supreme maxim of his life and who, at the same time, and incidentally, is made of glass and therefore is very fragile.*

[* This is not far fetched, for there are many people who do not think of themselves as made of glass, but who are still as so constituted that they are fragile is some respect. The normal, non-glass man, for example, can easily get dizzy when walking close to the edge of a high building and if heshe should fall, could break quite as disastrously as the man made of glass. so in this regard the glass man varies from the non-glass man only in degree. The elderly can easily remind us of people who are made of glass and who must walk with enormous care.]

Now we enter the mind of the moral glass man and find that he is facing a decision which he sees as impinging upon his self conception as a man who conforms to the moral law, perhaps an opportunity to enrich himself at the expense of another person and without any chance of getting caught. We can easily imagine him seeing that someone dropped some money and did not notice it and is walking away and that no one else is around and certainly no one sees that he noticed that the money fell from the pocket of the stranger, now receding in the distance, and that while it would still be easy to "correct" the situation, he does not have to.

This is a so-called moment of truth, for it is now that the soul (or transcendental character) bares itself to view.* Regardless of what might have been his background and experience up to this point in his life, he stands now facing a dilemma, should he take and keep what can be his and very helpful to him, or should he call out and tell the person that his lost money (unknown to him) has been found and here it is.

[* The sighting of this transcendental character is always in the guise of the empirical character, for that is always only what can be sighted (and actually presupposed such that the actual actions derive from it under the diverse circumstances and conditions of the empirical situation.]

Let us say that he chooses to call out and to help the stranger recover his lost money; then there will arise in him, if he thinks about it, a good feeling of having done the right thing, even though it called for sacrifice (with regard to what he could have had), and a good feeling also for having made the sacrifice for the right reason, namely for the sake of the Golden rule (or the Kingdom of God, or simply the "right thing", depending upon how heshe is empirically oriented).*

[* It is interesting to note that the good feeling arises only after the good deed, and is based upon the compliance with the moral law and not merely upon the depiction of that conformity. I.e., the feeling cannot arises merely in the imagination where we think of this happening and are proud of ourselves, much as though we were seeking to earn the acclaim of others and were willing to give the money back or climb a pole or run a race, indifferently, in order to obtain that acclaim.]

[Editor's note: this paragraph is probably detractive, for it already reaches out to Practical Reason, and for which reason should probably be eliminated and held until the discussion of that aspect of Kant's thinking. This probably also holds for the next paragraph, too.]

Suppose the man keeps the money. Then given his commitment to the moral law he is ashamed in his own eyes and seeks to rationalize his behavior with such explanations as: the other fellow didn't look like he would miss it, or: I really needed it. Or some such. And even here, in the throes of self recrimination, the man knows that he has done wrong and that the moral law is valid and universally binding and that he has merely violated it once, and will not do so again; and that the circumstances were such that he felt that it would be alight.*

[* For example, if the amount of money were small, I might also not bother to rescue the stranger,although, given my Scottish make up, I would probably want to pick it up, and perhaps rationalize it as meaninglessly small or else that I would utilize it for good; or some such.

But in both cases the man looks at the situation as unconnected to the past, i.e., regardless of my make up and regardless of what my experience has been, here I am facing a situation where I could either return the money or keep it, and I must make up my mind what I am going to do. The fact that I might even need the money is not a consideration in light of the moral law; for here I recognize that there is a mode of behavior which is called for by the moral law and that I can comply or not and entirely as I choose at this moment.

And so there we have it: Kant's reconciliation of the necessitation of the understanding and the possibility of freedom. The former is fundamental and the basis for understanding anything at all; the second is meaningful only from the standpoint of the actor and then only at the moment of decision.

An image may help in solidifying our thinking here. We can look at any situation either as an event or as a fact. As an event, we look at the situation as having come to be, i.e., we see it in time, that it was not and now that it is. And then we are able to search out those circumstances which promoted this coming into being. Thus the ice is an event, having come from the water by means of the cold; and the return of the money is an event, having come from the commitment to do the "right thing" and the perception of an opportunity of implementation (and where the "right thing" is not so costly as to over ride the "wrong thing", i.e., keeping the money, but which might occur in more severe circumstances, e.g., need to buy food for children, or whatever.

As a fact we look at the situation as simple being what it is: an opportunity to apply the moral law, and without any concern or care about the circumstances that led to the fact as an event.

Editor: here we need to add an appropriate closing and summary, and along the lines of:

we see that all our behavior can be considered to conform entirely the the necessitation of nature, and where we need merely to remember that the man is a depictionary or depicting being who is able to attain to a conception of himself which then is reflected in life and in actions, e.g., the man who looks upon himself as made of glass or as being a moral man. Thus all his behavior is explicable. And at the same time, but from a different perspective, we can conceive of the individual actually being conscious of making a decision with moral connotations, e.g., the moral man in making his decision, is conscious of actually doing just that, making a real decision and thus is thereby conscious of his freedom (although, on an objective basis, this recognition is meaningless).