Notice: This page represents a project in development, and perhaps a very slow development at that; and does not yet represent a settled opinion as of 4/12/03. It is more a musing and wondering at this stage. For more current essays see Kant.

Introduction to (the Teaching of) Ethics

in the State University

by Philip McPherson Rudisill

Humans, whatever else they may be, are traditionally thought of as "rational animals' the term initiated by the Greek philosopher, Aristotle. We are people who think, both about the world we live in in an effort to understand this world, and also in order to rationalize our behavior in that world for the attainment of goals, both personal and socially.

Every science has an object, without which it would not be a science, for science means no more than the systematic understanding of an object.* The question then arises, i.e., is ethics a science? and if so, what is the object of this science and if not, how does this relate to the objects of the engineer and technician, i.e., why is this being taught in the technical school?

[* Even mathematics, the "purest" of the sciences and without an empirical object, is based on the pure pantomimics figures of space (in geometry) and the accumulation of spaces (in arithmetic addition). Those who think that mathematics is a totally logical science without reference to the object called space have not considered the incapacity of the sheer intellect to make such obviously synthetic statements as that of 7+5, for example. In arithmetic it is necessary to accept the axiom that a+b = b+a in order to discover the least truth. That this is an axiom and not a logical identity is easily proven in this way: if it were a logical identity that a+b = b+a, and not synthetic, then it would be absolutely impossible to distinguish 4F+1T from 1T+4F (except as an ordering of the elements), but when you consider that four fingers plus one thumb is not necessarily the same as one thumb and four fingers is proven by the comparison of the left and right hands, or that the sides of equal sized and identically shaped spherical triangles may be substituted for each other and yet the triangles remain incongruent, it becomes clear that a+b = b+a is not universally valid, and so therefore is an axiom and requires a sighting, but which sighting, since it must be untainted by empirical considerations, can only be given in the envisagement of space, e.g, in the pantomimics. Without the sighting which comes from spatial inspection, it would simply be impossible to explain how it is that a glove (say the left) will not always fit the hand (say the right). Thus mathematics essentially is based on an inspection of space, and space is a sheer envisagement.**]

[** Likewise the object for the physical sciences is a result of a particular envisagement which is directed by the so-called categories of pure thought, such that we imagine and posite an enduring object, for example a table (though more generally: a nature), such that what we then spy is also (at least partially) a function of our own sighting, which is not at all intuitive, for the other, more "natural" envisagement would be that things do not remain uniform at all, but rather get larger and smaller. Thus here too an object is provided by the mind for the purposes of having experience with these objects.]

The object of the technical sciences is given by the theoretical sciences, and it is the function of the technician to apply the knowledge of the theoreticians for practical purposes. And so it is in the technical schools that we encounter also what may be called practical reason. And it is then in this milieu that we will consider ethics.

The object of practical reason is the will. In fact it might even be said that the will is practical reason, reason applied not to the theoretics of understanding through experiential observation and trial and error, but to the application of the results our understanding. The use of reason for practical matters is not the exclusive domain of the technical sciences, of course, and these are only a special case. Generally we use reason to accomplish what is commonly called rationalization, i.e., an effective and efficient arraying of inputs and outputs, be that in the construction of a bridge, or a computer, or a computer program or of an individual's own life. We will look at the ways that reason accomplishes this with us humans and then we will look also at anything that reason might say to us independently of the various goals that we must normally presuppose in order to have something for reason to focus on and to tackle.

On an individual basis, we assume a human being, i.e., that "rational animal" and so that creature which can use reasoning for the accomplishment of goals, and where the goals are given by the "animal" component, i.e., by our desires and inclinations. As we grow from childhood and perhaps at the point of puberty (when we become more concerned of how others feel about us as opposed [a juvenile, and thus more mature, character] to how we feel about them [which characterizes childhood behavior]) we begin to rationalize our lives by developing maxims from which our actions are then to be derived. These maxims in the first instance will be based on the generally accepted (and theoretically needed*) axiom of pursuit of personal happiness. We find ourselves, for example, learning not to drink and drive, or to get a good night's sleep before an exam, or studying during the quarter in order to be at ease during examine time, and so forth; all of which can be conceived of as means of providing some stability into our lives in order to avoid being tossed about by the inclinations of the moment, e.g., a sudden hatred, or a sudden desire to drink (even though we must continue to drive).

[* Needed in the departments of psychology and sociology.]

And it also so happens that as we begin to make these axioms for ourselves we find that we are drawn to consider the maxims of others and then to compare these with our own and, finally, to imagine (in a sort of reversal) how our own maxims would result (relative to what is important to us) if they were utilized by others vis-à-vis ourselves. This consideration is often prompted by such questions as "how would you like it if others did that to you?" or: "what kind of world would it be if everyone acted like you do?"

This consideration is a product of pure reason when applied to practical matters, for it has to do with actions, but where the inclinations and desires of any given individual are abstracted and we examine how a rational being, devoid of any inclination, would act. The result of this is something which the moral philosopher Immanuel Kant has declared to be the strangest thing in all human experience, namely that even though this consideration is entirely imaginary, nonetheless we are affected by it to the extent even of either changing our maxims in order to make them accord with this determination of pure practical reason, or else at least find some excuse for our insisting on doing the contrary anyway, but without acknowledging a general right of others to do that (which is a morally untenable position, of course).

In order to more thoroughly examine this practical phenomenon we will now take a look at the procedures of reason in general and then at practical reason.

The first thing that we need to consider is the reconciliation of science with its requisite necessitation of all things and the notion of freedom as the capacity to act independently of the necessitation of nature. This discussion now follows.

The Third Antinomy

In the Critique of Pure Reason, our task was to investigate the capabilities of pure reason in its speculative mode, i.e., with regard to metaphysics, for we (as human thinkers) are mystified that it fails to give us the clear insights that we seek of the really important things concerning: God, freedom and the immortality of the soul. Kant discovered the reason for this failure, namely pure reason, independent of any concern for the objects of the senses, was seeking to be immanent out beyond the bounds of experience, for it is only in experience that objects are given to us, and rationality, apart for objects, when cognizing, becomes transcendental and dialectic. More generally Kant investigates the question of how a priori and still synthetic statements are possible, and finds that in mathematics this is accomplished through the pantomimic drawings of space, and in the empirical sciences through the provision of an object, a mere conception of the mind, such that specters (retinal objects and, in general, objects of our sense organs are subjectively converted from things on their own (where tables get larger and smaller on their own) to images of things. But then where this is missing, i.e., metaphysics, there reason falters and falls into a dialectic.

One important part of the dialectic is the Third Antinomy. Here we are concerned with the concept of transcendental freedom, and we found (in our investigation) that as we sought further back for the condition of any given condition, which is based on a principle needful for experience, we could never reach any beginning; and we found that reason was necessitated to demand and assume such a beginning for "without it things could never have gotten started." And yet upon the positing of such a beginning, immediately the principle validated in experience (and without which experience itself would be impossible) required us to look for the condition of that condition, even though we wanted to call it the unconditioned condition, for "this condition (beginning) suddenly arose [for otherwise, if it had always been, it would have been earlier], and so something must have prompted this."

The question of this antinomy was reformulated by Kant into a more general form: is it possible that at any time there could be an absolutely free action, or must all actions follow as part and parcel of nature? His solution was of this sort: while it was impossible to prove the existence of freedom, he found a means of being able to think freedom which were compatible with the conception of nature which, with its necessitation, would otherwise exclude such as utter nonsense.

The grasp of the solution of this antinomy requires an examination of the procedure of rationality when dealing with objects, which we call "understanding." The categories of thought, which are necessary for the recognition of objects, find their validation in the treatment and differentiation of specters. Specters are objects of our sense organs. For example Hume spoke of discerning that what he took to be his table was really only the image, and thus only in his eye, of that table, for otherwise, if he had taken it for the table itself, this would mean that his table itself would get larger and smaller on its own, even in conjunction with the movement of Hume with respect to that table (getting closer and then also further way). The category is the means whereby we conceive of a something, X, which is existent and independent of the sighting and "really there", the table itself (in Hume's case). By means of this conception then we are able to derive our specters as manifestation or effects of this thing in the sighting organs of a sensitive being like the human. And so the specter of the table is really then an image of the table which is in the human eye as a result of the way the eye itself looks, and not the way that the table looks (to use look in two different senses here).

Now having established the absolute necessity of this conception (of causation) in the necessitation of all specters (in order to have the least understanding of things about us), we are now free to play with our thoughts if we so choose, and to write novels, if you will. We are free to say that the table actually does change its size and shape, along with everything else in the universe, and indeed because it simply wants to, and that this desire, coupled with the freedom of this table to do and be as it wishes, is manifested in the manifold appearances that form on our eyes and other senses organs (for example, the apparent softening of sounds from objects as those objects get further removed from us*). I notice that all objects in sight seem to move even as I move my eyes, or look with only the left eye and then the right (especially when done so rapidly). I discharge all meaning to the term "seem" and instead assert that they do so move, and by virtue of their consciousness and freedom.

[* which recognition were impossible were we not able to disregard the immediate impression as a thing on its own and to consider it as a product of human hearing and so in space, i.e., were we not able to conceive of a world in which things remained the same but took on a different effect in the ear of a hearer, e.g., sounding softer due to the longer distance between the object and the perceiver.]

Now while this thinking is immediately pointless, it is not for that reason absurd, for it is conceivable that the world actually existed in that way.* Now if it were true that the world were actually of this sort, I would still be able to discern the patterns of the alterations of these things, e.g., that they expanded balloon-like as they approached me, and so would be able to subscribe to all that science and our understanding requires, only I would see everything as the result of a free volition, i.e., nothing would change in the science except I would add "because it wanted to" every time a scientist asserted some occurrence, e.g., that the struck billiard ball moved and indeed in the direction of the impact with the striking ball.

[* Although, if it did so exist, and if we thought that, we would never have made any sense out of the world, although, on the other hand, we might have become very skilled in our movements about, and dealing with, the objects of that world, even as the birds learn to fly amongst trees that get larger as they approach them. All this follows a pattern and we would become acquainted with these patterns without for that reason having to assume that they are merely specters (in our eyes) and not things on their own.]

The simple conception of this antinomy might be expressed thusly: while it is of absolutely no value to science whatsoever, it is also absolutely irrefutable that we could maintain of each occurrence that it reflected a character which were freely chosen by the thing. It is true that a thing must be presupposed in order to find something to attach the specters in thought such that a given specter might be an image of that thing (Hume's table, for example) and not a thing on its own, but that thing that we conceive of is conceived of as independent of our sense organs and our sensing, and we can no more accept the notion that there is no more to it than our sensations reveal than we can accept the blind man's assumption that there is no more to his objects than what his own, deprived senses reveal. And so we can imagine easily that we stand in relationship to this thing, even as the blind and deaf (I am speaking of those born so) stand to the object of experience. And we can go further and imagine there are aspects of this thing which can never be sensed by any being, e.g., rationality and understanding (which can only be inferred). And so there is no reason* that some (or even all) things have the capacity of choosing how they shall relate to the conditions of nature, e.g., that the water has chosen to freeze whenever the temperature drops to 32 degrees Fahrenheit, and so that what the scientist and the understanding human sights is merely the empirical manifestation or character of that intelligible character (as we might call it).

[* Except the demand of our understanding nature that things comply with laws, for it is only by means of laws that we understand. We don't understand that a triangle sums to a straight line, rather we see that. But we don't see that water freezes in the cold, we understand that.]

And so the scientist and the libertarian (if I may use that term) are in a stand off: the scientist has no need of the prattle (as he may consider it) of all this freedom stuff, while the libertarian stands on an equally sound footing with regard to the status of things considered as things on their own, which the scientist must assume (as the basis or foundation for the specters which strike his eye and sense organs), but which he then also must ignore, at least to the extent of any assumed properties which do not manifest themselves in human sight, i.e., as specters.

Thus there is no actual conflict of reason with itself (and indeed cannot be), but rather a difference in what we are talking about, i.e., in the subject-matter. The scientist assumes the thing on its own in order to derive the images and effects from that, and ascribes to that thing on its own no more than is needed in order to warrant such derivation. The libertarian goes further and states things of the thing on its own which cannot be proven in the theoretical realm (for it is at odds with the assumptions that science must make in order to undertake its greatest task [the demotion of specters from things on their own to images]), but also do not conflict with the effects of the necessary assumptions of science, but only with the conception of the causation of those effects.

All of this is highly subtle and only goes to liberate reason later to be able to think of a causality which is necessary in the practical realm.

Practical Reason

Now when we come to practical reason we are in an entirely different realm from theoretical reason, for now the object is not something apart from us that we wish to cognize, but rather is something entirely different: here the object is the determination of the will which is a component of the faculty of desire and which is entirely within us.

The psychologist will examine the faculty of desire and draw his conclusions which are designed to necessitate all actions of the human, but we are dealing in the realm of the use of reason for practical purposes. The psychologist will take all our ruminations here as part of nature and as necessitated, but we are looking now from the standpoint of the libertarian and so are unaffected by the thinking of science. We are not bothered with the need of the psychologist to understand this and that drive and urge and inclination in order to conceive of us as things such that our actions would be effects of the interaction of that thing and the environment in which we find ourselves; rather we are to decide what we are to do, regardless of all this theoretical "stuff." We will now get practical.

The question in pure speculative reason was how far can reason go in discerning truth on its own. The realm was metaphysics; and the answer was: not far; for the wonderful results of experience were made possible by the application of the categories of thinking to the specters of our sense organs, and are of no help apart from us specters. And so reason fell into a dialectic between the extension of these otherwise (in experience) invaluable principles, and the principles of the unconditioned which reason must of necessity also think and require.

But now since we are not dealing with objects, we want to examine merely how far reason can take us in the determination of our actions, i.e., in the practical realm.

And here (again) since we are dealing with our own home turf, i.e., the determination of the will for our actions and not the cognizing of objects which are independent of us, we can expect a more satisfactory result than with pure speculative and theoretical reasoning.

The purpose of the critique is two fold: in the first place we are to establish the fact of freedom (which, we will see, is another term for "pure practical reason"), and secondly we are to establish the limits of empirically conditioned reason.

In the recognition of freedom we take the following tack: we come (about the age of puberty) to "rationalize" our lives, and we do this by formulating maxims which are the principles from which our actions are then derived. For example, I learn that I lose control when under the influence of alcohol, and so I make a principle (maxim) of drinking only on my day off; in this way I find some pleasure (drinking) in a relationship to more general pleasures (being free of jail and attaining happiness, etc.) Later I make the maxim of not drinking more than a certain amount, in order to balance the pleasure of drunkenness with the pain of a hangover. And so on generally.

Now it so happens that when I make my maxims, since I am using reason to do so, i.e., since I am formulating actions (in a generalize way, as maxims, as principles for these actions), I come to think how my maxims stack up with the maxims of others and to see if there is some standard which reason, which is enabling me to make these maxims, would itself call upon me to formulate. In thinking in this way I come to the notion of what Kant calls a pure will, i.e., a rational system of action which is independent of the inclinations and urges of any individual.

Practical freedom, by the way and as a sort of preface to this discussion, is the capacity of acting in a way which is independent of the urges of the moment. For example I may find that I am turned on sexually by a certain person, but am able to control myself in public in order not to embarrass myself in front of these others or in front of this very person. This is where we differ from the animals (whom Kant characterizes as arbitrium brutum in opposition to the human arbitrium liberum). But this is merely a negative characterization, and the question must arise: can reason actually determine the will in a positive sense to some action which would then be undertaken unless there were some reason not to. It will be helpful to make this clear. Negatively seen we say that the human can act in a way which is independent of the urges, but only then in pursuit of a more remote goal, e.g., personal happiness, but then which would have to be posited in order to find the basis of the action (contrary to the urges).

But now we are asserting that reason may have the capacity of forming and determining the will to action even when no object of desire is posited; and which would be a positive conception of freedom.

Briefly formulated then: in the Third Antinomy we saw that we could conceive of a human as complying with the "don'ts" of "do's and don'ts" but not necessarily with the "do's." I.e., the human can refrain from compliance with any urge, but only if he has a reason to (refrain); while now we want to see that he must do something in the absence of any urge, or even in the face of any urge, (as prescribed by pure reason) unless he has a reason not to.* And so we come to a positive conception of freedom as opposed to merely the negative conception of the Critique of Pure Reason.

[* This is exemplified very clearly below in Kant's famous example of the gallows.]

In its examination of the maxims rationalizing the actions of a given human being reason looks not only at the practical effect with regard to the goals of the individual, namely his personal happiness (which makes perfect sense and which is covered in psychology, a theoretical science) but looks also to the pure will, i.e., what reason would dictate of all rational creatures independent of any inclination. And here we find that while no maxim could be given, for these always require an object of desire, we can formulate a general form of maxims which would be valid for rational creatures in general, and not merely a given individual or even humans in general. And so here we find that pure reason can determine the will independently of the inclinations and thus of objects of desire by requiring that all maxims be suitable for universal legislation. In this way then the human is able to evaluate his own personal, actual maxims with the form of maxims and can tell if they are right or wrong, for right means "suitable for all rational beings" and wrong means the opposite.*

[* and not just "not so suitable" for it might not be suitable for all persons to have the maxim "eat all the vanilla ice cream you can" without it necessarily for that reason being wrong. The wrong is that which is contrary to duty, ** and not merely indifferent.]

[** Reminder to Philip: you have not at all developed the notion of duty.]

Now it is one thing for pure reason to be able to determine the will to an action, even in cases where there is no object in mind, or even in opposition to an object of desire in mind, but it is another thing entirely for this to be practical. For it is a synthetic a priori assertion to say that we are to do something absolutely without there being any goal to be accomplished (which characterizes all of the maxims in general, ranging from: to: draw a circle you have to draw a straight line, etc., to: to be happy you should work hard in your youth, etc.)

And there is absolutely no sense to this notion from a theoretical standpoint, i.e., the law of universal applicability of the maxims (an invention of pure reason, but a natural invention) does not promise the least thing, for we are not saying that if we act in a certain way we will be happy or that others will treat us in a certain manner (which would be a product of theoretical reason, i.e., cognizing the motives of the human), but rather that we are to act in a certain way regardless of how we feel and regardless of what effect we might anticipate.

[* Some religious groups get this mixed up. They think that the human is basically amoral, i.e., simply not able to make the least sense out of a true moral dictum, and so they seek their motive from the empirical realm and positive a God which is always watching and which gives rewards and punishments in accordance with how well a person complies with certain laws that are handed down in a more or less clear fashion and which every person is then needful of discerning, but always merely for the sake of personal happiness. And so the conversion of a heart, as some like to talk, becomes here nothing more than a wise choice to follow the dictates of this powerful, all-seeing god, in order to avoid the pain that is coming with regard to deviations and also to attain to the pleasure which attends upon compliance. And so then we see that the only reason that a person would comply with the Christian God, when conceived of in this way, and Adolf Hitler is simply because it would be though more advantageous due to the greater power that would be associated with this God.**]

[** Those who think in this way, by the way, are never able to make any moral sense out of things, and do not question the morality of the destruction of the infants of the city of Jericho, for example, for that is considered ipso facto as an integral part of the moral code, i.e., the commands of this God. And so for the question of the rightfulness or justice of that command for the desolation of this city are no more meaningful than reciting "one two buckle my shoe . . . three four shut the door, etc., and when discussion of justice arise, these people are unable to connect in any way and must seek to guess how to talk, even as the Japanese must often be couched as to the "punch line" of an American joke, and vice-à-versa.***]

[*** The scriptures of the Jewish faith have a very interesting sort of twist to them. For in one section it is asserted that the human has the capacity of discern good and evil as well as the God himself (Genesis 3:22), and in other section we are give what must be considered to be evil actions on the part of the god, and so which can only be conceived of as challenges to the human to assert the evilness of the action in the face of the fear that is to be natural in the face of God.]

And yet we find that this is immanent for the human and moves him in the direction of this form of maxims, i.e., it is what we unfailing do, unless there is a reason not to, and in which case we find that we are ashamed of not having complied with this law of laws (which is called the moral law due to its absolute command) and seek justification, but the essential presupposition being that we are free to comply or not. And so it is by virtue of this moral law that we come to recognize our own freedom, and indeed in that transcendental sense that is required by pure speculative reason (as opposed to the theoretical sense [practical freedom] which is the object of the department of psychology).

The proof of this may be stated as follows: no one would ever have thought to consider ethics in a technical (scientific) school (since it would be normally thought of as belonging to the behavioral sciences), since it makes absolutely no sense on its own (as we have just indicated*), except that practical reason forces this idea upon us and we recognize thereby our obligation and thus our own freedom. The fact that all members of the science department, students and teachers alike, assuming only that they think about the matter thoroughly, agree that ethics must be covered (and we don't say: taught, but only covered) in the science department.

[* There is no sense to the notion that my own action would be influenced by how I would like others to act toward me, but rather only by how I actually expect others to respond to my action. Indeed the mark of the amoral man is his honest inability to make sense out of the first formulation. If, when he hears this propounded as a meaningful guide for his action, he can only shake his head (in truth) and wonder and try to accommodate himself to people who think that way, especially if he thinks that his accommodation will result in some desire effect, e.g., getting him out of an asylum for the criminal insane, then that man is as amoral as an animal, and can be kept in check only through the expectation of pleasure and pain as was the case with Pavlof's dogs.

[Kant uses the following example to make the point clear in experience (but which, he says, is not a proof proper): suppose someone averred that he could not resist the temptation to his greatest sensual desire if it were to become available to him. Suppose further we tell him that his desire can be satisfied in a certain house at a certain time, but then that on the way to that house he will find a gallows being constructed upon which he will be hanged immediately upon the satisfaction of his lust. Ask him if he would then be able to control his desire. We don't have to guess long what he will think (or say). But this only proves that his desire for life is his greatest goal. But ask him further: suppose you were required by your sovereign to bring a false testimony against an innocent man whom the king wanted to destroy, and that you would be hanged on that same gallows if you refused to comply with this unlawful and unjust demand; ask him whether he would be able to refuse the king and rather face death. Now he may not be able to answer for sure what he would actually do in midst of the situation, but he will have to admit that it is possible that he might chose death, and this admission would be impossible except that he is in fact conscious of his own freedom, but which he would not have been able to be conscious of except for the moral law.]

Conclusion

The possibility of the conception of freedom in a nature of necessitation was established in the Critique of Pure Reason, and so, without there asserting the fact of freedom, or indeed even of the possibility of freedom, we did remove the fear of any incompatibility between freedom and necessity (and indeed by virtue of the consideration of the object in two, different ways: on the one hand as an object of experience, and then also as a thing on its own, independently of any concern of, or consideration for, the object of experience). Then in the Critique of Practical Reason we established a positive comprisal of freedom, namely the necessitation of acting in accordance with the moral law, so much so that deviations must be explained or excused by the perpetrator (when engaged in rational discussion of his own maxims), but whereof the law itself cannot be denied, or even seriously wished to be denied!! It is for this reason that ethics is to be covered in the Technical Education. The object is the will and there is a law which covers the determination of this will, such that deviations can be recognized and accounted for, which is no different than any other object, e.g., water which freezes at 32 degrees and when not, a deviation is recognized which must be explained, e.g., that the water is salty, etc.

Discussion Materials

I shall argue (in the sense of a debate, i.e., not necessarily believing what I am asserting) that Adolf Hitler is to be compared most accurately with Don Quixote, as a man who was entirely rational and who acted on a fundamental premise which itself constituted an illusion, and for which reason is to be innocent of any moral impropriety. Hitler was taken by the evolutionary arguments which had gained considerable currency, and he saw himself as an awaken Germany.

"How could great Germany have been defeated in the First World War? We had defeated Russia and our soldiers were in France? How did victory elude us? The answer is simple and compelling: we were stabbed in the back by a vermin which had burrowed into the Germanic soul and make imbued us with a respect for trash. I am speaking of the Jew. Through the insidious efforts of the Jew, Paul, the Germans were given the promise of a heavenly bliss if we would treat the Jews as brothers. We bought into this idea and put down our weapons and took this task upon us in our typical thorough way. Martin Luther is an example of the goodness of the German who had bought into the Jew idea of equality and sought to be brother to all. Although even he recognized something amiss with the Jew and his refusal to buy into what he had himself fostered upon us Germans. The law of evolution tells us that there is a great struggle for supremacy of the planet and that it is our destiny to be the rulers and bring order and decency to the world. I see now clearly the task before us: we must size the moment and determine ourselves to utter victory or utter annihilation. Our cousins in England are already weakened by the Jewish pest and our cousins in America, likewise weakened, are taken up the habits of the nigger with jazz and other forms of decadence. We will succeed because of my own will, which will lead the Germans to this victory, for I shall never surrender and I shall never submit myself to personal interests, but shall in all circumstances work totally and only for the good of the Germans. Away with the democratic crap that has shackled our hands too long with its divisiveness. We will be united behind me and I shall make sure that we are victorious. No defeatist talk will be permitted any where in the German realm; such talkers are traitors and shall be shot. The only talk will be the application of sheer rationality to the purpose at hand which is the immediate destruction of the Russians and then the wimps of the West. When the Russians advance, we will not be deterred in the least, but will apply ourselves with rational vigor to the task at hand and will determine what must be done and will do it. Under the cover of the war, we will defeat the Jewish virus which still infects our people and we will destroy these Jews so that when the war is over we shall also be clean and able to develop as nature intended, the masters and rulers and manages of the world."

Now with such an Anschauung (and Hitler himself used that very expression, stating that the Germans must have a new and different Anschauung) Hitler enters the realm of Don Quixote and sets about to destroy the windmill giants who threaten decency and the natural course of events, namely the eradication of all vermin such as small pox, Jewish thinking, etc.

Thus Hitler is freed of moral condemnation, for he acts rightly in accordance with his vision (which itself, however, is a horrible monster, but not unlike that which infected the mind of Don Quixote or, in a different context, from Locke's glass man). But it is the Germans underlings who are responsible for there is no reason to think that they actually believed in Hitler's vision, but saw that as an opportunity for personal gain. Thus if captured and put on a fair trial, Hitler would have ended up in the asylum for the insane, while his underlings, like Eichmann, would have ended up on the gallows, for they had no intellectual reason to buy into the illusions of Hitler.

End of argument

To fully comprehend this phenomenon it would be very advantageous for an ethics class (especially in the Technical University) to review and discuss the film entitled The Wannsee Conference where the members of the diverse branches of the Germany government and Nazi Party came together to rationalize the eradication of the Jewish problem. The thoughts of corralling all Jews on the island of Madagascar had faded as impractical, as desirable as it might have been to be the Jews all together in the same boat and observe them like a museum. The solution then, rationally speaking, had to be their elimination. Many technical problems had already arisen. The representatives of the German Railroad complained about how the transport of Jews in passenger cars had resulted in many being frozen to their seats with the result that the seats were damaged when the dead Jews were removed. The solution: cattle cars. And on and on. The sense here seems to be the need to bring about the reality demanded by Hitler, and that the Germans would be lost to the allies if this were not accomplished. Hitler, as the solitary savior and Buddha of the Germans, must be followed without question, without quibbling, as good soldiers in defense of the Germanic people, wherever they might be found. Etc.

For discussion purposes it might be helpful to compare the attitude of these functionaries with the thinking of the American public with regard to the blacks. The minority was to be treated humanely, but always kept in its place to avoid pollution of the American soul which was elevated by God for certain purposes. Etc.