Sagan and Kant on Atheism and Morality

Sagan's "Refutation" of Kant on the role of God in the moral act

In his Varieties of Scientific Experiences Sagan conveniently brings to the fore pretty much all that is to be considered when “proving” the existence of God, and in so doing provides an important consolidation and consideration of all of the various arguments.

Each of these proofs Sagan seeks to encapsulate and then to show its flaws. One of these is the “moral proof” by Kant. Regarding this he states in his The Varieties Of Scientific Experience:

“Then there is the moral argument for the existence of God generally attributed to Immanuel Kant, who was very good at showing the deficiencies of some of the other arguments. Kant's argument is very simple. It's just that we are moral beings; therefore God exists. That is, how else would we know to be moral?

“Well, first of all you might argue that the premise is dubious. The degree to which humans can be said to be moral beings without the existence of some police force is open at least to debate. But let's put that aside for the moment. Many animals have codes of behavior. Altruism, incest taboos, compassion for the young, you find in all sorts of animals. Nile Crocodiles carry their eggs in their mouths for enormous distances to protect the young. They could make an omelette out of it, but they choose not to do so. Why not? Because those crocodiles who enjoy eating the eggs of their young leave no offspring. And after a while all you have is crocodiles who know how to take care of the young. It's very easy to see. And yet we have a sense of thinking of that as being somehow ethical behavior. I'm not against taking care of children; I'm strongly for it. All I'm saying is, it does not follow if we are powerfully motivated to take care of our young or the young of everybody on the planet, that God made us do it. Natural selection can make us do it, and almost surely has. What's more, once humans reach the point of awareness of their surroundings, we can figure things out, and we can see what's good for our own survival as a community or a nation or a species and take steps to ensure our survival. It's not hopelessly beyond our ability. It's not clear to me that this requires the existence of God to explain the limited but definite degree of moral and ethical behavior that is apparent in human society.”*

[* The Penguin Press, New York, 2006, pp. 159 - 160.]

Kantian Analysis and Treatment

Sagan has Kant thinking like this: how would we know to be good except God tells us? From there Sagan reasons that we have a sense of animal pity and then we have intelligence and by means of those two we have been able to figure out on our own what is good for our species, and (as I presume he wants to conclude) that is how we could know to be good without God having to tell us and that is why we establish police departments (to serve as a proxy God).

If my reading of Sagan here is correct, then Sagan's reading of Kant is incorrect. I will seek now to correct it.

Kant reasons so: we conceive of a free realm and realize that the law of such a realm would be the moral law of universal human dignity.* When we conceive of this law we are affected in our emotions in a way which is not animal pity as rather a respect for the moral law (called a moral feeling**) and in this dual way: on the one hand we are humiliated by this law for disregarding our own interests and desires and, at the same time and on the other hand, we are exalted by the thought of compliance with this rule of freedom. It is at this point that we are made to be moral beings and without any need of God whatsoever and without any need of any sympathy or compassion.

[* Essentially the moral law requires us to universalize our maxims (personal principles of action). If we can do this, they are moral; if not, they are not moral. To have a maxim of lying anytime it is safe and advantageous would not be universalizable because no one could trust anyone]

[** Kant makes much of this feeling and declares it is the only feeling that arises by virtue of an idea (the moral realm) alone. I may discover feelings which could only be aroused through some exposure, e.g., the response to a great symphony or a drama. The moral law is similar in that it needs to be aroused, but it is different in that the arousal is only by virtue of an idea of pure reason.]

How then does God enter the equation for Kant? It is by means of God that we are able to find a purpose to this moral law which imposes itself so emphatically upon us. We know rationally and morally that there must be a purpose to the moral law in order to avoid having it be inane and farcical. As rational beings it is impossible for us to disregard our natural and individual drive for happiness which so often is at odds with the moral disposition. The only way these two can be unified is via a common purpose called the Highest Good which calls for moral perfection by the individual which is then linked with a happiness commensurate to that perfection. So the Highest Good is a necessary and final purpose of the moral law. The only way this purpose can be accomplished with respect to the individual is a future world for the sake of attaining both moral perfection and the happiness that belongs to that. And the only way this happiness can be expected is via a omnipotent moral judge (God) who can force nature to provide the deserved happiness.

So then the role of God in Kant's equation is not in order for us to know that we are to be good, but rather to rationalize the moral act (which we know in advance of any knowledge of God) by unifying it with the natural demand for happiness by making the moral act the most prudent act possible, and with God serving as the necessary condition for such a morally necessary state.*

[* Thus the Kantian declares that he is “morally certain of the existence of God”.**]

[** Critique of Pure Reason, Canon, Third Section, Par. 17]

Now Sagan himself reveals the fallacy of his system of morality, for he shows that it is dependent upon the police and that without the police we could not be expected to be moral. And this is not the case at all for Kant. To make this clear I want to leave the realm of public morality where we can all easily recognize and acclaim the work of the police and where we can make popular judgments about the immorality of other people, e.g., Hitler and Stalin and Mao, and instead enter the private, secret arena and consider how we would act given Sagan's conception and then also Kant's.

Consider Kant's case of a man who is in a position to safely cheat another person and enrich himself.*

“If an intimate friend, otherwise endeared to you, thought to justify himself in your eyes regarding a falsely rendered testimony by first pleading the--as he put it--holy duty of personal happiness, then by enumerating the advantages he acquired by doing this, mentioning the prudence he observed in securing himself against any disclosure (including that on your part even, to whom he reveals his secret only because he is able to deny it at any time); but then allowing in dead seriousness to have performed a true human duty; you would either immediately laugh in his face, or cringe with abhorrence; even though, if you had guided your principles solely by personal advantage, you would be unable to say anything at all against your friend's measures.”

[* Critique of Practical Reason, Section 8, Par. 4. See also lottery cheat.]

Here the Saganian atheist would have no fear of the police, and so the only reason that he might resist the allure of this situation is if it had to do with animal pity, i.e., that he would feel sorry for the victim enough to withstand the temptation to cheat. If we assume that the victim would never know that he is being cheated (which is the clear implication here)* and if we could conclude that he would not suffer as a result, namely that he had enough to get by without the benefit of what the perjurer was taking, then we see that it would be impossible (irrational) for the perjurer not to have done as Kant has described.

[* It is easy to imagine situations like this. Perhaps you and a friend have purchased lottery tickets and he has left his in his desk drawer. You get the results while alone and discover that he has won, but then by switching tickets you are able to collect the full reward, and without him knowing that he has been cheated.]

Now from a Kantian point of view this immoral cheating would be an impossibility. Since the moral act is no longer simply a moral act, but rather is one aspect of a larger purpose, i.e., the Highest Good, and where personal happiness is already included with that moral act, the Kantian theist (ideally speaking) would have no reason for duplicity. In fact, if we can discount the element of the feelings of animal pity (which will vary from very great to zero depending on the make up of the individual), it is certain that the Saganian atheist will perjure himself. If we do not discount the animal pity the situation comes down to this:

1. It is not certain that the Saganian atheist will obey the law against cheating because while he may have a reason to comply (his animal pity) he also has a reason not to comply (enrichment and personal happiness). And so it is not clear which of these contradictory incentives will have the upper hand, concern for the victim's welfare his own.

2. It is certain that the Kantian theist will reject this opportunity for enrichment by cheating because he has no reason to act otherwise, for his happiness is not in play here by virtue of the Highest Good. In other words, the theist is not giving up his happiness (except temporarily) by being moral. Thus the theist has no incentive for cheating.*

[* We need to keep in mind that here we are speaking conceptually with respect to both the atheist and theist. Hence conceptually (examining what we mean with the terms) we can say that the atheist has an incentive to cheat while the theist does not. That any given theist or atheist might cheat is a different matter.]

Animal pity and the police are insufficient for producing a moral world (thinking here primarily of the private, secret morality), while the moral law and God are sufficient for that moral world. Sagan may be able to account for a public moral world (of the police and media), but not a private one; while Kant can account for both. The practical aspects of this have to do with the trustworthiness of an atheist and a theist when making and keeping promises, e.g., regarding such things as a contract or a marriage or keeping a confidence.

Getting back to Sagan's original assertion, we can now say that we know that we are to be good by virtue of the moral law, and that we remove all incentives not to be good and "rationalize" that moral law (unifying it with personal happiness) by virtue of the Highest Good, the conditions of which are God and an immortal soul, and which is a production of pure reason itself when applied to a practical situation. As Kant puts it:

" . . . since, therefore, the moral precept is simultaneously my maxim [practical rule of conduct] (as also reason commands that it be), I will invariably believe in the existence of God and a future life, and am confident that nothing is able to shake this belief, because otherwise my moral foundational principles themselves would topple, which I cannot renounce without being worthy of abhorrence in my own eyes."*

[* The Critique of Pure Reason, Canon, 3rd Section, 16th paragraph.]

Kant's Observation

"Two things overwhelm the mind with constantly new and increasing admiration and awe, the more frequently and intently they are reflected upon: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me."*

[* Critique of Practical Reason, Conclusion, 1st paragraph.]