Sagan's "Agreement" with Kant

In his The Varieties of Scientific Experiences Sagan thoughtfully brings to the fore pretty much all that is to be considered when “proving” the existence of God, and in so doing provides us with an important consolidation and consideration of all of the various arguments.

Each of these proofs Sagan seeks to encapsulate and then to show its flaws. One of these proofs is the “moral proof” by Kant. He states in his The Varieties Of Scientific Experience:

“Then there is the moral argument for the existence of God generally attributed to Immanuel Kant, who was very good at showing the deficiencies of some of the other arguments. Kant's argument is very simple. It's just that we are moral beings; therefore God exists. That is, how else would we know to be moral?

“Well, first of all you might argue that the premise is dubious. The degree to which humans can be said to be moral beings without the existence of some police force is open at least to debate. But let's put that aside for the moment. Many animals have codes of behavior. Altruism, incest taboos, compassion for the young, you find in all sorts of animals. Nile Crocodiles carry their eggs in their mouths for enormous distances to protect the young. They could make an omelette out of it, but they choose not to do so. Why not? Because those crocodiles who enjoy eating the eggs of their young leave no offspring. And after a while all you have is crocodiles who know how to take care of the young. It's very easy to see. And yet we have a sense of thinking of that as being somehow ethical behavior. I'm not against taking care of children; I'm strongly for it. All I'm saying is, it does not follow if we are powerfully motivated to take care of our young or the young of everybody on the planet, that God made us do it. Natural selection can make us do it, and almost surely has. What's more, once humans reach the point of awareness of their surroundings, we can figure things out, and we can see what's good for our own survival as a community or a nation or a species and take steps to ensure our survival. It's not hopelessly beyond our ability. It's not clear to me that this requires the existence of God to explain the limited but definite degree of moral and ethical behavior that is apparent in human society.”*

[* The Penguin Press, New York, 2006, pp. 159 - 160.]

There is reason to think that in this particular case Sagan was taken by a peculiar understanding of Kant which cannot withstand close scrutiny.

In the first paragraph of this passage it is assumed by Sagan (and wrongly so) that Kant taught that we could not be moral without the idea of God, when actually Kant's teaching was that we would not be moral without this idea, at least not many of us. In fact Sagan comes much closer to Kant's thinking in the second sentence of the first paragraph and seems here to actually support the conclusion of Kant's moral reasoning, but without considering the particular moments of that reasoning. We will try to present our own encapsulation of Kant's reasoning.

First of all Kant observes that the notion of duty, which is universal, could never have arisen through any empirical means, for the notion of duty rejects any and all empirical input, e.g., a reward, and cannot be provided by experience.* What it is is a function of our own rationality when applied to a society, i.e., practically.

[* What experience can provide is the notion of reward. But that appeals quite independently of all moral considerations; all animals will act for the sake of reward.]

This “functionality” is very well presented by John Rawls in his notion of a “lottery”. Rawls conceives of a convocation of all souls before birth. They are informed of their impending birth and that some will be born lords and others servants. They are then permitted time to decide on any rules for their common conduct. Without knowing its own specific destiny as lord or servant, each soul is willing to adopt either of two supreme maxims, either “I am supremely important” or “all souls are equally important”. It is then obvious that the only code that is common to all is that of the universal dignity of all the souls. This then is the basis of the moral law.

Now several things follow from this conception when applied by humans. There appears within the human a certain feeling, which arises from the recognition of a compliance of duty (actions required by the rule of universal dignity), and another which arises from the recognition of a dereliction of that duty, both feelings being mutually exclusive. This is called respect for the moral law. We humans are so constituted that we respond to the moral law via these two feelings, which together might be called the “moral feeling”. As a consequence we seek by default to comply with the moral law, and always would unless we have some reason not to (per the play of prudence).

This fact is undeniable. In the name of consistency scientists really ought to treat a person who acts under the idea that he is free in the same sort of way as a man who thinks that he is made of glass (as Locke's famous “glass man”). But they don't and they make a distinction here, and the reason for this is because of the respect they also (as humans) possess for the moral law.* The necessary conclusion from this is that we are free to comply or not to comply as we see fit. Likewise we spend much time justifying to ourselves why did were derelict in our duty, which we would not do except for the respect we have for the moral law and the freedom which the knowledge of our respect for the moral law necessitates.

[* It is important to stress that for Kant the "moral feeling" only arises upon (and thus after) the recognition of the moral law, and does not precede it as exposures to certain acts which render the feeling. This feeling is unique and cannot arise in any other way. It cannot arise in a being which is not rational and which is not free.]

And so Kant establishes this fact of the moral respect that possesses the human, and then wonders as to the purpose of such a thing as this respect. Does the feeling aimlessly drive us to do moral acts for no other reason than doing moral acts and without any expectation of an effect other than the immediate act; without a purpose to be achieved?*

[* This might be likened to doing anything purely for the sake of doing it, e.g., making donuts for the sake of donuts, i.e., not to eat them or to improve one's cooking expertise, but merely to make them.]

Unless this can be solved, Kant faces a quandary, where moral reasoning tells us to do moral acts, and prudent reasoning tells us to do prudent acts and where obviously then can be a split in practical, action-oriented human rationality.

The only way this unification of practical rationality can be achieved is by means of the notion of the Highest Good, where morality is connected to happiness where happiness is a function of the degree of moral perfection. By means of this idea we are able to see our moral actions as efficacious in the achievement of an actual projection of this Highest Good.*

[* There is an imperfect approximation of this conception in both the legal systems and the market systems. In the former we punish people (reducing their happiness) who break the law, although we do not reward them for compliance (which is expected). In the market systems we reward and punish by means of the profits and costs of an enterprise, and where effective actions, for the sake of analogy, might be likened to moral actions, i.e., doing the right thing.]

But we have to follow Kant's reasoning all the way. We cannot expect to attain to moral perfection in our lifetime (and so must have eternal life) and we cannot expect nature to provide the rectification between moral perfection and happiness (for which God is required), and for which reason we would have to say: not there is eternal life and God, but rather there must be eternal life and God; what Kant calls “postulates of practical reasoning.”

It is a reasonable assertion, I think, to put into Kant's words something like this: if you admit that you are morally inclined, then you must either assert the necessity of the existence of God (and preserve thereby both morality and prudence in a reconciliation), or else you must renounce morality or else you must renounce prudence, or else you must renounce rationality.*

[* This touches on that portion of Sagan's argument where we humans will have come up with “moral” actions based on feelings related to those of the historic species who found some delight in doing good, e.g., taking care of young people, and whose descents have survived until the present (and where, presumably, those without this delight will have not survived via descendents). And, continuing with Sagan's argument that we could have figured out what is best for our community, nation or species to survive, this just goes back to Rawls' “lottery argument” which is merely a simplified expression of Kant's conception of the moral law.]

Now we can return to Sagan. His reasoning goes like this: Kant argues that without God man would not know to be moral. That argument is confused; Kant argues rather that without God man would have reason to consider the moral act as aimless and inane. Even knowing the moral law and wanting to comply because of the feeling of respect, the moral act could appear as pointless and thus vanish. Without the postulation of God there would be a justification to a morally inclined person to seek medical therapy to rid himself of the feeling we call respect (and which even justifies self-respect).

Accordingly Kant concludes: we are morally obligated to assert the necessity (though not the actuality) of a God. And this is his moral “proof” of God: we are not required to assert there is a God, but we are required to assert that there must be a God; for without God a moral man is an insane man.

In summary, we see that by means of the moral law we know to be good, and by means of the Highest Good (predicated on eternal life and God) we know that being good is not vain and inane and senseless. We also see that the moral law and the conception of moral duty cannot arise by virtue of any feelings associated with some action (which can only be pleasure or pain), but rather the moral feels arise first as a result of the moral law.

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