Sagan's "Agreement" with Kant

I want to try to isolate and identify elements of his reasoning.

1. Sagan has Kant saying, “Without God people would not have an incentive to be moral”. This is from the first paragraph. The remaining points are from the second paragraph.
2. Sagan doubts any such incentive, and says what works here is a diligent police force.
3. Sagan thinks that something akin to what Kant calls the moral feeling can have arisen through evolution.
4. Sagan has men arising (evolving) at some point who are able to reason out laws on their own without need for God.

Consideration. When we put 1 and 2 together you have something like this: Kant thinks that people would not be so moral without God, but which is exactly what Sagan is saying in form, using merely policeman as a proxy for God, which is a compelling judgment. And so here Sagan and Kant are together, although Kant has not yet here adequately spelled out his reasoning for Sagan to understand.

Now with regard to No. 3, Kant would have absolutely no problem with this, and he does show hints of thinking of evolutionary development. The point that Kant would make would be something like this. The feeling of respect is indeed a feeling, but it is a feeling which is unique in origin from all other feelings. All other feelings arise by virtue of an exposure to an object. The moral feeling arises independently of an object; it arises upon exposure to, and understanding of, the idea of the moral law. It arises before the object (the action being here the object).* And so it is quite acceptable to submit, if one wishes, that this moral feeling developed in an evolutionary way, but it would have been a hidden feeling, the capacity for a feeling; for the feeling itself, the moral feeling, cannot arises at all except by the intervention of the moral law and human choice.** And so here there is absolutely no quarrel between Sagan and Kant.Kant is simply being more precise in terminology.

[* A further elaboration. This feeling is known a priori by anticipation, i.e., when we learn the moral law and duty, we realize that as categorical our duty cares not at all for our feelings and desires, and so a negative feeling arises of the distress of this to our egos, and this occurs in the mere conception. This is an humiliation, that we have do to do things whether we want to or not.

[But then there is a positive aspect which comes from the satisfaction we can take in the accomplishment of our duties. We see this also in advance, that we shall be satisfied and content that we have done our duty. And this likewise arises entirely from the conception and before any action is undertaken.

[And so the negative negates the ego both with regard to selfishness and arrogance. This is humiliation. And the positive gives the feeling of contentment. Both together they are respect for the moral law and can be called the moral feeling. One humiliates and the other exalts.]

[** This is like saying there is a feeling which is occasioned by certain music, and which could not be experienced without the music. And so as a certain music will evoke a certain feeling, even so the idea of the moral law will evoke a certain feeling. With music the performance (as the object) must precede the feeling, while with the moral feeling the idea of the moral law must proceed, and thus, again, without any reference to an object.]

With regard to No. 4, well this is pure Kant. Kant maintains that every rational creature, upon adequate development (with regard to the human), conceives of the moral law on his own, and this law is the foundation of all legal law. Kant allows no need of God to understand the moral law, for each conceives of it himself.

Interim Conclusion. So far Sagan and Kant are in agreement, but Sagan thinks not. In order to show this agreement we will now take a look at Kant's statement of paragraph 1, where God provides the “incentive” for the moral life. We will now consider this statement in its proper context, as the conclusion of a line of reasoning.

Kant's Reasoning. On the surface there is a conflict between moral reasoning and prudent reasoning, arising because there is no purpose that is premised for the moral imperative. But implicitly there is no conflict, because we realize (through practical rationality) that there is indeed a purpose to the moral act and that purpose is the Highest Good whereby moral perfection and happiness, i.e., moral law and prudence, are reconciled. This is the rationally necessary implication of the moral act. The attainment of this purpose, this Highest Good, is dependent upon us achieving to moral perfection, which is impossible in earthly life, and achieving a commensurate happiness, which is impossible from the laws of nature; and so accordingly we need a longer life, an eternal life, and we need God.

In reverse: without God there is no possibility of the Highest Good, and without the Highest Good there is no purpose to the moral act, and without a purpose any act, moral or otherwise, is inane and pointless, and--to return to Sagan's first paragraph--no rational human will undertake inane and pointless acts. Hence: without God (and eternal life) there would be no incentive for the moral act, and accordingly precious little morality. Hence (from the first paragraph): without God we would not know (we would not have an incentive) to be good.

Conclusion: Now, after all this, if Sagan denies the existence of God, he must either renounce morality (making it perhaps “quaint”) or else he must renounce his own rationality. I cannot believe that he would renounce morality and I know he cannot renounce his own rationality, and so I am sure he would now proclaim at least the moral necessity of God.

In this way Kant has given a purpose to the moral law itself, to express the Highest Good of moral perfection and happiness. For the fulfillment of this purpose God (as well as eternal life) is required.

To contact the author, please e-mail: pmr**kantwesley.com (note: the ** must be replaced by @)

To The Table Of Contents on Kant Studies