The Transcendental Deduction
of the Pure Concepts of Understanding
from Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason

A PDF version with a better format and more recent editing is available here.

First Version (A)

Translation by Philip McPherson Rudisill

cir January, 1993. Last edited 3/23/2011

General Notes

In this translation I have identified each sentence by paragraph and its order within the paragraph. Regarding references TDA.II.3.5.1, as an example, refers to this (A) version of the Transcendental Deduction, the second part, third division of that part, paragraph 5 and sentence 1.

I have added comments to many of the sentences in the Deduction and these will be found immediately following the relevant sentence. I am currently (cir March, 2011) in process of adding to, and revising, these comments, for some of them go back to 1993. For a gloss on this Deduction and especially Part II, Section 4, the reader is invited to review a revision of the publication of my essay entitled "Circles In The Air" by Kant-Studien in 1996.

Regarding some technical words, I use concept for Begriff, representation for Vorstellung (instead of "depiction" which I often use in my writings), appearance for Erscheinung (where I often use "specter" in many of my other writings on Kant), recognition for Erkenntniß (instead of "cognition" or "knowledge"), and manifold or multiplicity for Mannigfaltigkeit, and envisagement for Anschauung (rather than the more common "intuition"). Accordingly the rainbow would not be an object but merely the appearance of an object, or perhaps the representation or looks of a bow just as the face in the cloud would not be an object but, at most, the representation or looks of a face.

Throughout the translation reference will be made in comments to the example of the "slamming door". This example is presented at the end of the Preliminary Notes by Translator.

The following table of contents may be helpful to the reader.

Table of Contents

Preliminary Notes by Translator

I. Concerning the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in General

Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

II. The A Priori Foundations For The Possibility Of Experience

1. The Synthesis of the Apprehension in the Envisagement

2. The Synthesis Of The Reproduction In The Imagination

3. The Synthesis Of The Recognition In The Concept

4. Preliminary Explanation Of The Possibility Of The Categories As A Priori Recognitions

III. The Relationship of the Understanding to Objects in General, and the Possibility of Recognizing Them A Priori

Preliminary Notes by Translator

Looking and Understanding

What we see and sense in general ends up as a projection within the brainarium. For example light waves from a light source strike an object and then some are reflected and some of thse reflected waves in turn enter the eye and are converted into electrical impulses which travel along the optical nerves to the brain where finally a picture/appearance (Erscheinung) of the object unfolds within the brain to consciousness. Space and time are the form of the outer and inner sense, respectively. They are pure looks at things, the envisagement or Anschauung. If I see something to the left or right of something else, that left or right are not things on their own nor are they properties of things, but merely the way that I look at things. A memory is now, of course, whenever I am conscious of it, but as a memory it is looked at and considered as before or earlier.When I see my cup of coffee I see it perhaps as the second cup this morning, and since that "second" is not any aspect of the cup it is obvious that that is an envisagement or take on the cup, my way of looking at the cup, what I am conscious of seeing when I look. Even how I look at something in space or time is subjective, I make it objective by orienting myself to others within my brainarium, e.g., my left will be your right if you are facing me.

Understanding something means a necessitation of some manifold, and this is accomplished by means of a concept. The understanding itself is a set of certain pure concepts which are called categories.* By means of these categories a manifold (or multiplicity or diversity) of sensitive data** is unified via some rule, which is a connective device (the concept of the object), and in data is necessitated in this way. For example the manifold of legs and the top are unified as parts of a single object, a table, and in this wise the manifold is necessitated, i.e., it is understandable that the legs and top are configured as they are, e.g., that the legs are positioned between the top and the floor,*** because the table is an surfaced elevated for human use in writing, etc.

[* There are four classes of the pure concepts of understanding, i.e., quantity, quality, relationship and mode, with each class made up of three categories, e.g., those of relationship being: substance, causation and reciprocity. All these are connective devices, as it were, whereby two representations are unified into one, much as 1 and 2 are unified in the number 3.]

[** Sensitive data would be either a pure envisagement such as the three sides of a triangle traced out in mid air, or an empirical envisagement such as the legs and top of a table, or even the top as an extended surface.]

[*** It is by means of this empirical necessitation that we are able to recognize a broken table, one where the legs are above the top, for example, in being repaired and in an upside down position.]

Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories

In order to understand the context of the deduction of the categories we need to be aware that these categories are not, and cannot be, derived from experience and are not contained in any envisagement. David Hume establishes this very clearly, especially with regard to the concept or category of causation. No matter how many times A is followed by B, there is no necessity in the envisagement of this sequence. As a result we can understand that the notion of causation is a priori (preceding and independent all experience).*

[* This is called the metaphysical deduction of the categories, namely that the concept cannot have been derived from experience. Actually Hume came to treat causation as nothing more than an abbreviation for saying: every time A has appeared B has followed, and everytime B has appeared, it was following an A.]

And this very independence of the categories from all perception suggests a problem, namely how is it that something that we devise of ourselves, e.g., causation, would have any relevance and application to the appearances/Erscheinungen of the brainarium? We can dream up the notion of a unicorn, but that would not in anyway suggest that there were any appearance possible to which this concept might be applied.

Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

The transcendental (knowledge-enabling) deduction of the categories will show how it is that a concept which is devised before and independently of any experience can have application to the appearances which are in turn given entirely independently of the concept in the brainarium* Essentially the application will be justified by showing that it is only by means of this concept that perception and experience are possible in the first place.

[* So while the metaphysical deduction shows that a concept is arrived at independently and before all exposure to appearances, this transcendental deduction will show how such a concept, even though devised by the mind independently of appearances, finds application to the appearances.]

In order to prepare for this deduction it is helpful to consider what we mean by perception and by experience. We will look first to perception.

Perception denotes a “careful take” (Wahr-nehmung) and so is not momentary and fleeting (as when we sight things while driving a car while preoccupied, the so-called “auto pilot”). It has to do with what Kant in the B Deduction called “paying attention”. I have likened it to the “second look” when you “make sure”, e.g., checking the clock to make sure that you did indeed set it, as you thought you had, but having done so while preoccupied and not paying attention. And so in a sense there is an a priori aspect of the perception, namely various elements are apprehended and kept in mind as a single thing in search of the object, i.e., the concept of which necessitates the unification.

Now as I try to fathom Kant's discussion of perception, I find two and maybe three representations: perhaps sheer perception, and then definitely subjective perception and objective perception. We turn now to a consideration of these sorts of perception.

The subjective perception* is based on a descriptive rule, even if originally very arbitrary, as in the legs are below the top (in the perception of a table). We apprehend a manifold or multiplicity which is seen as a single composite thing in the envisagement/intuition/Anschauung (again like a face in the cloud), and we remember it and then we also associate the manifold with such as not only legs and top (which is no better than some sequence in the alphabet, e.g., H and I), but with the legs below the top, or between the top and the floor. That, I think, would be an association, connecting the manifold according to some kind of rule.** And I am very sure that this is what Kant is calling the subjective perception, his own example in the Prolegomena being: when the sun shines on the stone, the stone grows warmer. That is a rule which describes the careful look at the manifold,*** but, again, has no suggestion of any necessity.

[* The terms "subjective" and "objective" perceptions are taken from Kant's Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics. and are not used in the A version of the Deduction.]

[** When I try to remember numbers I like to make up a rule to describe them, e.g., today it was 321, which is very easy, and it is nice, for me, to find a rule like this, i.e., there are the same number of digits as the first number, and then each subsequent numeral decreases by 1. All this, Kant tells us, is the work of the understanding which is to be understood as a capacity for providing rules, connective rules.]

[*** The apprehension is interesting in that it constitutes an intervention on our part (via our imagination) in the synopsis (a given manifold or multiplicity) given to us in the senses, i.e., the entire spectral world. We start an accumulation in time of a manifold, and this means that we distinguish this time from the time preceding and at the end of the apprehension we ignore what is subsequent, and hold this manifold up, via our reproductive imagination, and consider it as a single thing, just as we can see it in the envisagement/intuition/Anschauung, and look for a rule that will describe it.]

Now the objective perception is also very clear. This is also called a recognition and constitutes recognition/knowledge/Erkenntniss. Here we conceive of an object according to a rule which is universal and binds all objects, i.e., in accordance with the category, and also binds the immediate manifold of the subjective perception. With regard to the stone the recognition is that the sun light warms the stone, and so where it is obviously that and why the subjective perception holds true, i.e., the reason that the stone is warm when the sun is shining on it is because the light of the sun is warm and thus causes the stone to warm up. And the reason the legs are between the top and the floor is because they are a table and a table is a flat surface elevated for human convenience in use.

The concept of an object is a rule which determines and then binds a particular manifold in the appearance in the context of a single object called nature.*

[* I'm not yet (3/4/11) 100% sure about this, for it could be that a manifold could be unified by an object which could not mesh with other perceptions in a single experience, but I think that the unification of the manifold via the object implies that this object is an object of experience and therefore compatible with all objects of experience.** Kant speaks of a single experience, even as there is a single nature, and all so called individual experiences are actual perceptions, all of which together make up this single experience. We need to keep in mind that the subjective perception is a perception which is not yet integrated into this single, all-encompassing experience, but when it becomes an objective perception, then this integration is complete. With a subjective perception, therefore, we are still wondering and trying to figure it out.]

[** Perhaps the Ptolemaic system of the worlds were compatible with the freezing of water into ice, but eventually the two would have become inconsistent in a science of a single nature and one would have to change. Or perhaps it is that the Ptolemaic system was compatible but independent of the freezing of water, and that the Copernican system not only was compatible but was called for by the freezing, through a long chain for reasoning and connection.]

Perception, therefore and now obviously, is a function of the category as the only means for achieving to a unified consciousness (called “of self”) for it is in pursuit of the object of experience that the perception is first undertaken, namely in this apprehension of a manifold, the careful sighting (paying attention) in the envisagement/intuition/Anschauung a composite thing, i.e., a manifold seen as a single thing (face in the cloud, a tree, table, etc.) and then a careful, relatively a priori look at the manifold in order to associate the manifold and discover the object that the manifold represents.*

[* Even the subjective perception arises as a function of the category as the entire point and purpose in apprehending and reproducing given data, for all this is undertaken in anticipation of a unification of a manifold. First we apprehend and retain the manifold, and then we utilize the productive imagination in pursuit of some binding, and which binding is based on the categories, and which binding necessitates the manifold by means of the provision of an object, and that object expresses a unified consciousness, where diverse consciousness, e.g., legs and top, and make into one, e.g., legs of the table and top of the table.]

Now it is possible to have an empirical envisagement of some object, e.g., a table or a tree or a face in the cloud, without achieving to a perception, by simply seeing a something accompanied by a total absence of thought, and then seeing something else and then something else, etc., in a progression like the ABC's where upon B, A is forgotten and we are conscious of B, and which might lead to a C and whereupon then B is forgotten, etc., a disjointed consciousness. And so the perception is based on the premise that the manifold represents something, an object, i.e., can be unified, and it is in pursuit of that object that we first come to apprehend and reproduce and associate the manifold that happens to stand out to us in the empirical envisagement.*

[* I can easily imagine that my dog, Jacky, can look at me hundreds of times every day and not realize that I have two hands, as opposed to five or six. I don't think he has ever apprehended me, although he has sees me all the time. I'm not sure he knows that I am actually not twins or a bunch of clones who resemble each other, but some in motorcycle outfits, some in pajamas, some naked (and I am not even sure he knows that my skin is not just another garment like the pants and shirt). In fact I am not even sure he sees me as opposed to my face and my arm and my leg and my hand and my fingers, etc.,in the same way that I look out and see the trunk and the branch and the leaves and the clouds and the sky and the mountains, etc. The apprehension is a conscious, careful look to determine a manifold, to establish a fact, as we might say.]

So I guess this is how it goes: there is the empirical envisagement of something just like there is a pure envisagement of a triangle or circle traced out in mid air. And there is no consciousness of self involved (other than the unity called “paying attention”), but merely some singularity composed of some diverse appearances, like the face in the cloud and seen as such, but totally without necessity. Then there is the subjective perception which is the careful apprehension and retention (reproduction) of the manifold and then the association via the application of some rule. From this subjective perception we move to the objective perception (or recognition) when we unify the manifold via the concept of an object, and where it is assumed (here we come to the affinity of all the appearances*) that this object is compatible with all objects, or more precisely: this perception is compatible with all perceptions because the appearances make sense, i.e., the appearances are part and parcel of a single object = nature.

[* This is one of the most critical and important aspect of Kant's thinking regarding recognition, namely that we automatically and in advance of all experience make the assumption that all the appearances that invade our eyes and the brainarium in general are connected, either directly or remotely. This is the primary basis of human experience and which works to make all perceptions compatible with each other, each being an element in a general experience of a single all-encompassing nature (which corresponds to the categorical make up of the human mode of understanding).]

And the unified consciousness of self arises by means of the unification of the sensitive manifold via the concept of the object. Before this unification the consciousness is disjointed and held together, if at all, by rote. The consciousness of 1 is different from the consciousness of 2 and only when they are unified in the number 3 have we attained to a unified consciousness of self. Or the consciousness of legs and the consciousness of a top are disjoined and are finally unified in the consciousness of the object, table, so that the legs becomes the legs of the table, etc. And as the three straight lines are necessitated by the rule of common end points and become a single thing made up of a manifold. Preceding all combination of a diverse and disjointed consciousness there is the potential for unification called the pure apperception.

The pure apperception is the capacity for paying attention and it must precede all experience because it is only by means of the apprehension and retention of data (the elements of paying attention [TDA.II.1 & 2]) that we come to the first subjective perception (which represents a determined fact but which is not yet necessitated by being incorporated into a general experience) and which then leads [TDA.II.3 & 4] to the objective perception (necessitating the envisagement and at the same time unifying the consciousness by including this in the single all encompassing experience the focus of which is nature). And so the pure apperception is the potential for self awareness and the capacity for the subjective perception and when the data is unified via the object there arises an actual recognition of self which can then be considered in pure thought as in Descartes' “I think, therefore I am”.*

[* As the second footnote to Section 24 of the B version of the Deduction Kant had this to say about paying attention: "I do not understanding why people find so much difficulty about the inner sense being affected by ourselves. Every time we pay attention to something we have an example of this. For there the understanding always determines the inner sense conformable to the connection which it thinks to the inner envisagement which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How frequently the mind is affected in this way can be easily perceived within each person."]

Now here is an excerpt from a letter to a friend of mine, a Mr. Jimmy, regarding a smoother presentation of these various concepts and elements of the Deduction:

The pure and transcendental apperception, that consciousness of self, that consciousness which incorporates and includes all consciousness as a single consciousness. The I. This capacity of the human is called into play when we pay attention to something. It all starts with us paying attention. This is what we ourselves bring to the fray with regard to knowledge. This is our a priori capacity for unifying diverse consciousness into a single consciousness of self. We had to pay attention to the split of the finger approaching the nose (in two eyed people) in order to figure it out. So in the very beginning before experience we are beings who have the capacity of uniting many individual consciousness of this and that into a single, unified consciousness. For without this synthesis provided a priori by the single consciousness (apperception), our consciousness would be as disjointed as the ABC's, where we plod along with A and B and C and D, etc., and where is no unity. The unity is made possible by this transcendental (knowledge-enabling) self consciousness, the self being the common element then among each and every consciousness, i.e., this is my consciousness. So we start off with the framework and potentiality for unification of diverse consciousness into a single consciousness which ends up being what we call experience. So that frame of mind which possess you when you pay attention to something is an action of the self or the mind in order to reap some unity. I think it is like the state of mind when listening to a sentence and where at the end it makes sense (unless it is a Zen koan--look up Zen in your new book. It's interesting).

Continuing, we begin with this pure capacity for unifying. And we unify by means of something called the object = X, that something which exists according to rules. And when these rules are universal they are called laws. We have a certain framework in our understanding for connecting two different things together. These are the categories of connection like extension in the space and time, and like the endurance of substance and like cause and effect. These are the way our understanding connects anything at all.

Accordingly we have a capacity for unification and this is in the form of our understanding. The only way there can be a unification of consciousness is by means of these connections/categories. So what we then do, as I am thinking now, is to take on the brainarium world of appearances and seek to unify this entire world in the thought of an object = X = a single nature, a single compliance with laws of natural connection. That's a fundamental assumption we make when taking on the world of appearance to turn it into the world of experience. That assumption is that all appearances are connected, and so can be connected, and so for this reason we are taken by suggestions of connection such as a coincidences.

The way this works subjectively is this: there are three components to paying attention and recognizing. 1. There is the apprehension of a manifold or multiplicity by ignoring all else and paying attention in the apprehension and accumulation of data (a manifold) in the expectation of coming to a unification via an object, which is called a recognition. So we have first this apprehension of the relevant data by ignoring all else. 2. There is the retention of the data and of the order of the data. 3. And finally there is the conception of a rule (which represents the object) which makes this data be as it appears to us. In the case of a triangle traced out in the air we necessitate it via its definition (rule) and say to ourselves: well, of course; it is a triangle. We conceive of a triangle as three straight lines, each end point being an endpoint of two. And that rule necessities the envisagement or look of the object. In this way we recognize the object, the triangle.

Likewise with the table (an empirical object) we will start off with the top and the legs.* And then we may look and see the top and the legs together as a thing, like a face in the cloud. We pay attention and take in the legs and the top, and we keep them both in mind (as we anticipate a unification) and finally we come to conceive of a table as flat surface elevated for human use. This concept gives us a rule which determines the manifold (top and legs) and binds or necessitates the elements together (flat surface elevated for human convenience), and that rule is the concept of the table. And so we recognize a table, namely we understand the necessity of the legs and top for they are parts of the table. And this recognition of an object in the appearances of the top and the legs has such a necessity that we are forced to wonder when we see a table on its side, for this is a violation of the rule; but then we learn it is being repaired or perhaps it part of an art show of inane objects.**  So the table in the first place a unified consciousness, a necessitation of both elements (top and legs) together. It's a way that we not only look at the top and legs, but also think them (as parts) of a single thing, the table.

[* We have to start somewhere. The envisagement gives us singularities. They just pop up. A face of eyes and nose will suddenly just pop up in the cloud. The top will just pop up and be seen as a singularity. As with the legs.]

[** Without that necessitation of the top and the legs and then also with the top above and the legs below, we would not find anything odd about a table being on its side. That would just be a table, namely top and legs. But this would be no necessity and not a recognition, but more a memorization like the ABC's. The only way that it can be odd for a table to be on its size is to know that a table is an elevated top for human use. Only then, via that necessity given via the rule of the elevation for human use, can we find something surprising about a table on its side. Only in that way is there something wrong or amiss.

[Before we come to an objective perception (recognition of the object via the necessity of the unification) we would be in limited to a subjective perception where we hold together by rote the top and the legs, but no better or more securely than we hold together M and N in the recitation of the alphabet, i.e., it is circumstantial and not definitive at all.]

To further expand on this, Kant wants us to know the work of the "productive imagination". Some imagination is merely reproductive, like calling to mind some past memory. But there is a transcendental (knowledge-enabling) capacity of the human imagination in that it is productive. It is productive in seeking ways to bind a manifold being looked at (like the three sides of a triangle or the top and legs of a table, and with the rule of the table making reference to the elevation of the top). And so we contemplate a manifold or situation, and we think of rules by means of which this could be necessitated and thus brought into a single consciousness of an object. So what is this object? The productive imagination works with the relationships of the understanding categories of connection. And once the imagination arrives at a rule that will necessitate the manifold, e.g., the legs and the top (by means of the object table), the object is recognized. 

Trying to recap the great dreamer Kant up to this point: we have an a priori (advance) capacity for unification of consciousness and having a common consciousness (called "paying attention"). The unification is via objects. The objects are rules which bind a manifold (top and legs for human convenience; three straight lines with common end points, etc.) and are derived from the categories of human understanding by the workings of the productive imagination. In this way the appearance as a thing becomes the appearance of an object and represents that object.

Example of Subjective and Objective Perception: The Slamming Door

This example will be referred to several times in the comments to the translation.

I live in a high rise condo. I am leaving my unit and shutting the door and suddenly it seems to shut itself, putting pressure on my hand as I stand outside the unit in the hallway. That was funny, I think to myself, and in an effort to confirm that, I open the door again and, sure enough, the door presses against my hand in an effort to shut itself. This second look constitutes a subjective perception. I was taken by a hint of something "out of whack" and I had undertaken a deliberate test and paid attention to what I was doing and discovered that the door tried to shut itself against my hand. So this is a fact. But why? How could this be? I am assuming the affinity of all the appearances/specters, namely that there is a reason for this. The door had never done anything like this before and so something must have changed (which is a conclusion based on the Second Analogy of Experience, namely causation [and which is not considered here in this consideration of the Transcendental Deduction]). Again I opened the door and noticed that the window was open, which was very rare and occasioned at this point in time by some painting that I done in the unit and in order to rid the air of the fumes. Then it suddenly all came together in a unified consciousness whereby the elements of the subjective perception were necessitated, and thus constituting an objective perception (or recognition) . In the hallway were exhaust ducts which acted by gravity, i.e., warm air would slowly rise to the vents in the roof as air might enter the hallway via the occasional opened unit and elevator doors. The air within the building was much warmer than the external air, but could not easily escape through the ducts because there were no intake ducts for air to enter the hallway (except, again, when a door was opened). When I opened the door to my unit this constituted an opening for the cooler air to enter the building and enabled the warmer interior air to rise rapidly to the roof. When I tried to close the door, this was like a valve in the airflow system set up by the exhaust ducts and the open window, and the pressure of the moving air was strong enough to force the door to close without my assist. Thus I had unified the manifold in my consciousness and had done so in a way that was intergrated with all my perceptions in general (as functions of a single nature). I had explained and necessitated the slamming door by means of the concept of a value in a air flow system.

There follows now the translation of the TDA along with interspersed comments by the translator.

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Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

First Part

Concerning the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in General

And for which reason then quite rightfully we can be suspicious regarding the validity of their usage and meaning. And likewise, as we shall see, with concepts such as permanence and causation, questions can also arise as to their justification in usage.

2.1 But among the many concepts making up the very mixed web of human recognitions there are some which are determined for a pure usage a priori (in complete independence of every experience), and the authority of these concepts always has need of a deduction, because a proof from experience would not suffice for the legitimacy of such usage. And yet we insist upon knowing how these concepts, which do not arise out of any experience, might still refer to objects.

Suppose I knew a total stranger were going to visit me tomorrow and I fancied what he would look like and what sort of character he would have. By what authority could I presume that my fancy would have even the least application to the stranger himself?

2.2.a Such an explanation of the manner as to how concepts might refer a priori to objects I call their transcendental deduction,

In the Aesthetic we find both a metaphysical deduction and a transcendental deduction concerning space and time. The former indicates that the knowledge we have of space and time could not have been derived through experience, while the transcendental deduction shows how these a priori concepts of space and time could nevertheless be applied to objects, including objects of experience. Earlier Kant has given a metaphysical deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding indicating that these concepts could not have been derived from experience (which was pretty much accomplished by David Hume). Now we are concerned with a transcendental deduction to show how these pure concepts of understanding, even though a priori and preceding all experience, can nevertheless be applied to objects of experience. In contrast the empirical deduction would only show the circumstances whereby these concepts are actually applied.

2.2.b. And I differentiate this from an empirical deduction which would show how a concept were acquired through experience and through reflection about that experience. The empirical deduction, therefore, would not concerning the lawfulness of the concept, but rather only the fact of the possession of that concept.

For example the concept of table will be derived through experience.

3.1 We are already in possession of two classes of concepts which are thoroughly different, even though they agree by each class referring entirely a priori to objects; I am speaking of the concepts of space and time, as the forms of sensitivity, and of the categories, as the concepts of the understanding.

3.2 To want to pursue an empirical deduction of these would be a complete waste of time. The very character of their nature lies in their reference to objects without having borrowed anything for their representation from experience.

To derive space, for example, from experience would be curious indeed. For since we sometimes see pictures of objects, which look precisely like the objects, except that they are flat where the objects protrude, we would come to conceive of a flat space in which objects were often found, and then the entire concept of space would be corrupted and meaningless. And how could we empirically derive the meanings of here and there or, relative to time, now and earlier? A given tree is sometimes here and sometimes there, depending on where we are standing. And no matter how much earlier a particular incidence has occurred, the memory of that incidence is always now, and so there is never anything to which "earlier" or "before" might be referred.

3.3 Therefore if a deduction of these concepts is necessary, then it will always have to be transcendental.

By transcendental we mean showing how a priori representations like space and time and the categories or pure concepts of understanding can be applied to the appearances which are given independently of those representations. For example (and hearkening back to TDA.I.2.1 above), suppose a stranger is coming to visit me, and that I go ahead in advance and picture what he will look like. By what authority can I presume to think that this stranger will have to correspond to my a priori and fanciful representation of him?

4.1 But concerning these concepts (as indeed with every recognition) we can of course seek out in experience if not the principle of their possibility, still at least the opportunity for their generation where then the impressions of the senses supply the first occasion for the awakening of the entire recognitional capacity with respect to these concepts and the production of experience, namely a material for the recognition from the senses and also a certain form of ordering them from the internal source of the pure envisagement and thinking which (latter), upon the occasion of the former, is first brought into exercise and produces the concepts.

4.2 Such a hint of the first strivings of our recognitional power in order to ascend from individual perceptions to universal concepts, is doubtlessly of great utility, and we may thank the celebrated Locke for first preparing the way for this.

4.3.2 But a deduction of the pure concepts a priori can never take place in this manner, for such a deduction is not to be found in this way; for due to their future usage, which is to be entirely independent of experience,

This will refer to an intention to utilize these a priori concepts in metaphysics or pure reason and which goes beyond the limits of mere experience. In fact we are now going to determine the scope of these pure concepts of understanding to see whether they can be utilized in metaphysics.

4.3.b these concepts must be able to produce a quite different birth certificate than that of an origin from experience.

4.4 This attempted physiological derivation, therefore, which actually cannot even be called a deduction, concerning as it does a quaestio facti, I will call the explanation of the possession of a pure recognition.

So Locke enables us to see how we came to occasion the use of these pure concepts whereby then we became aware of them. I have a capacity for appreciating music, for example, but which would not have become known to me without some actual music to call this capacity into play.

4.5 It is clear therefore that of these pure concepts there can only be a transcendental deduction and in no way an empirical one, and that the latter, with respect to the pure concepts a priori, are nothing other than vain attempts with which only those who have not comprehended the entirely peculiar nature of these recognitions can ever occupy themselves.

Accordingly then Locke showed us the circumstances which awakened our wondering capacity which then results in the utilization, and finally thereby also the recognition and identification, of the a priori concepts.

5.1 But now even though the only way that a possible deduction of the pure recognitions a priori, namely in a transcendental manner, can be admitted, it still is not clear that it is so unavoidably necessary.

5.2 Above we pursued the concepts of space and time to their sources by means of a transcendental deduction, and explained and determined their objective validity.

See Aesthetic.

5.3 Independently of this [transcendental deduction] geometry proceeds along its secure way through sheer recognitions a priori without needing to petition philosophy for a certification with regard to the pure and lawful derivation of its foundational concept of space.

5.4 But the usage of the concept in this science only touches upon the external sense world, whereof space is the pure form of its envisagement, in which therefore every geometrical recognition, because it is based on an envisagement a priori, has immediate evidence, and the objects are given through the recognition itself, a priori (with regard to the form) in the envisagement).

In geometry we construct our object and so it is a priori and in that way holds for all objects which can ever appear in space. For example we construct a triangle and in that construction we see that any two sides would have to be together longer than the third (for otherwise there could be no triangle) and so we see that this holds for all possible triangles which could ever appear to us in space.

5.5 In contrast to this there begins with the pure concepts of understanding an unavoidable need to seek a transcendental deduction and not only of them but even of space, because since they do not speak of objects through the predicates of envisagement and sensitivity, but rather of pure thinking a priori, they refer to objects without any condition of sensitivity, and these pure concepts, since they are not based on experience, can also not show any object a priori in the envisagement on which they might base their synthesis before every experience, and therefore not only raise suspicions about the objective validity and limits of their own usage, but make even the concept of space equivocal by their inclination to utilize it out beyond the conditions of the sensitive envisagement, for which reason also a transcendental deduction was necessary for it.

Unlike geometry then with the pure concepts of understanding we are not able to give ourselves an object a priori and independently of sensitivity, and this gives the natural impression that these concepts are not restrained by sensitivity and have a greater application than mere experience and then also want to take space along and apply it also beyond the sensitive. And this makes everything suspect as though these concepts were fantastic and were used beyond all bounds. The transcendental deduction of space indicated that the assertions concerning space were valid only via the envisagements in the brainarium and which are always only sensitive and thus without application beyond experience.

5.6 Thus the reader must be convinced of the unavoidable necessity of such a transcendental deduction before taking a single step in the field of pure reason. Otherwise he gropes about blindly and, after making wrong turns everywhere, must still return to the ignorance from whence he started.

This is a reminder of what we are about. We want to discover the causes of the confusion which characterizes metaphysics and pure reason. And to do this we must first discover how it is that the pure concepts needed for experience are limited to experience, and then how it is that we come to miss or ignore this limitation and thus how, by finally exceeding this limitation in metaphysics, we wreak such havoc.

5.7 But he must also be aware in advance of the unavoidable difficulty so that he not complain of the darkness in which the subject itself is deeply encased, nor become annoyed too quickly about the removal of obstacles; for here the alternatives are either to give up completely all claim to insights of pure reason in the most coveted of realms, namely out beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, or else to bring this critical investigation to a completion.

6.1 Earlier, with the concepts of space and time, we were able with little exertion to grasp how these, as recognition a priori, still must necessarily refer to objects, and how they made possible a synthetic recognition of them, independently of every experience.

6.2 For there, since it was only possible by means of such pure forms of sensitive that an object appears to us, i.e., can be an object of an empirical envisagement, it follows that space and time are pure envisagements which contain a priori the conditions of the possibility of objects as appearances, and the synthesis in these has objective validity.

We saw in the Aesthetic that space and time are the forms of the outer and inner sense, respectively, and thus are necessary for any looking or sighting of any sensitive object whatsoever, for nothing can ever appear to us except we look at it, and since the form of all looking is space and time, nothing can appear to us except via space and time.

7.1 The categories of the understanding, on the other hand, do not at all represent the conditions by which objects are given in the envisagement, hence objects may appear to us in any case without having to refer necessarily to the function of the understanding and therefore without these containing the a priori conditions of them.

Objects cannot appear to us except we look at them and the forms of our looking are space and time and so of course all objects must conform to the conditions of our looking in order to be looked at and recognized. But objects can certainly appear to us independently of our thinking, and so it is not clear that objects would have to conform to the conditions of our thinking as they must to the conditions of our looking.

7.2 Hence a difficulty is manifested here which was not encountered in the field of sensitivity, namely how subjective conditions of the thinking should have objective validity, i.e., render conditions of the possibility of every recognition of the objects; for without functions of the understanding appearances can still always be given in the envisagement.

And the solution will turn about in this wise: space and time hold because it is only in space and time that objects can be looked at and can appear as appearances. The categories will hold because, as we will soon discover, it is only by means of them that an object can be thought and thus recognized in general and therefore also in the appearance, i.e., that the appearance can come to represent or depict an object.

7.3 I take, for example, the concept of cause which denotes a particular sort of synthesis, where upon something, A, something entirely different, B, is posited according to a rule.

7.4 It is not clear a priori why appearances should contain something like that [i.e., why they should be subject to a law of cause and effect] (for experience can not be introduced in proof, because the objective validity of this concept must be able to be established a priori), and it is therefore a priori doubtful whether such a concept not be entirely empty and encounter no object anywhere among the appearances.

So it is one thing to dream up a concept, e.g., that of causation, independently of experience (which is the case per the metaphysical deduction) and it is another thing entirely that it might find any application among the objects of the sensitivity, i.e., the appearances.

And this is precisely what David Hume has done, to doubt the validity of the category of causation with regard to the objects appearing in the sensitivity.]

Reminder: a metaphysical deduction shows that a concept cannot have arisen through experience (and this is essentially what Hume has provided in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding), while a transcendental deduction shows that and how such a concept can be utilized in experience (and this is what Kant is now in process of providing).

7.5 For that objects of the sensitive envisagement must conform to the formal conditions of sensitivity lying a priori in the mind, of that there is no doubt because otherwise they could not be objects for us [for they could not be looked at]. But that they also would conform to conditions which the understanding needs for the synthetical insight of thinking, there the consequence is not so obvious.

There is no apparent reason why things appearing in the brainarium, i.e., the sensitivity, would have to conform to the way that we happen to engage in our thinking. Again: objects cannot appear except via time and space because they are the forms of all our possible looking, but objects can certainly appear and do appear independently of our thinking and so of course also independently of our form of thinking. Thus there is a distinction and this we are now investigating.

7.6 For it might well be the case that appearances were so constituted that the understanding would never find them conformable to the conditions of its unity and that everything would lie in such confusion that, for example, in the series of the appearances nothing would offer itself which would render a rule of synthesis and correspond accordingly to the conditions of cause and effect, and with the result that this concept would be entirely empty, void and without meaning.

7.7 But appearances would not cease to offer objects to our envisagement, for the envisagement has utterly no need of the functions of the thinking.

8.1 If some one thought to free himself from the tedium of this examination by saying that experience offers countless examples of such regularity of the appearances, which give a sufficient occasion for the abstraction of the concept of cause, and thereby likewise to insure the objective validity of such a concept, then that person has not noticed that in this way the concept of cause cannot ever arise, but rather that it must be based entirely a priori in the understanding, or else given up entirely as a mere fancy.

8.2 For this concept unwaveringly requires that something, A, is of the sort that a something else, B, follows upon it necessarily and in accordance with an utterly universal rule.

8.3 Now appearances do indeed provide cases from which a rule were possible, according to which something customarily occurs, but never that the succession be necessary. Hence the synthesis of cause and effect possesses a dignity which one can simply not express empirically, namely that the effect not merely comes additively to the cause, but rather is necessitated through that and arises from it.

An empirical rule might be: whenever it gets very cold, the water freezes. The rule of causation would have it: a certain cold causes water to freeze.

8.4 The rigorous universality of the rule is not at all a property of empirical rules which can obtain comparative university, i.e., expanded utility, through induction.

We could say that every time my shadow has appeared there has been a bright body on the opposite side of my body from the shadow, but that does not tell us that this shadow is an effect of that bright body and that the shadow could not fail to appear or that it could not appear when there is no bright body on the opposite side. In the Peter Pan play little children of a certain age do not find it humorous that Peter has lost his shadow but are sadden at his plight. It is one thing to get used to something through many repetitions and another thing entirely to recognize a causal relationship.

Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories
 

And this goes back then to the notion expressed earlier that without a concept an envisagement or look is blind, i.e., I am staring at something without the least clue as to what I am seeing. It is simply a appearance.

1.11 For in this way they refer necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only by means of them in general can any sort of an object of experience be thought.

This preconception of the object of experience is of course necessarily connected with any experience because it is only by means of this concept (this preconception = object in general) that we have the object of perception, and thus also then an experience with that object.

2.1 The transcendental deduction of all concepts a priori therefore has a principle to which the entire investigation must be aimed, namely that they must be recognized as the conditions a priori of the possibility of experiences (be it the envisagement, in which they are encountered, or the thinking).

2.2 Concepts, which render the objective basis of the possibility of experience, are precisely for that reason necessary.

2.3 The development of experience, however, wherein they are encountered, is not their deduction (but rather their illustration), because otherwise they would still be contingent.

All empirical knowledge is always contingent, and so the pure concepts, e.g., cause and effect, would not be pure but also empirical and thus also contingent.

Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

Second Part

The A Priori Foundations For The Possibility Of Experience

I might conceive of an object called a Haha and which consists of two straight lines forming exactly three angles. Since this can be given in no looking or envisagement it would be merely the logical form of a concept but not a concept which would have a matter or content, i.e., an object.

2.1 If, therefore, there are such things as pure concepts a priori, then while they may not, of course, contain anything empirical, they must still be utter conditions a priori of a possible experience, upon which alone their objective reality can be based.

And so we are speaking of a pure concept dreamed up independently of experience and which must be valid for experience and so this means that such a concept must be the condition of experience. For otherwise we are dealing with such as the Haha mentioned above which can only be called an empty concept, i.e., just the logical form of a concept.

3.1 To determine how pure concepts of understanding are possible, we must uncover the conditions on which the possibility of experience depends and which would remain as a basis for it even if we were to abstract from all empirical aspects of the appearances.

3.2 A concept which expressed this formal and objective condition of experience universally and sufficiently, would be called a pure concept of understanding.

3.3.a Once I have pure concepts of understanding, of course, I can think of objects which are perhaps impossible

The Haha cited above would be an impossible object as we can tell in our attempt to construct that object in space.

3.3.b or, if not actually impossible per se, still cannot be given in any experience because something would be left out of the connection of their concepts which belonged necessarily to the condition of a possible experience (concept of a ghost), or perhaps it would entail an extension of a pure concept which is further than experience can encompass (concept of God).

A ghost and God might be possible things and which existed but which could never appear within a brainarium and so therefore could never be looked at and thus never be a component of any experience.

3.4 But even though the elements to all recognitions, even to arbitrary and inane fancies, can certainly not be borrowed from experience (for otherwise they would not be recognitions a priori), they must still always contain the pure conditions a priori of a possible experience and its object. Otherwise not only would nothing be thought through them, but they themselves, without data, could not even have arisen in thought.

This hearkens back to the Introduction to the Critique where we saw that sensations prompt the capacity for thinking and recognizing in the first place.

4.1 Now these concepts, which contain a priori the pure thinking for every experience, are found to be the categories, and it is already a sufficient deduction for them and a justification of their objective validity if we can prove that it is only by means of them that an object can be thought.

We need to remember that an envisagement of (or look at) an appearance which is devoid of thought (no concept) is blind, i.e., it is no more than staring at something which cannot be recognized. It is merely a something.

4.2 But because in such a thought more than the single capacity, i.e., the understanding, is involved and because even this, as a capacity of recognition which is to refer to objects, has need of an explanation concerning the possibility of this referral, we must consider the subjective sources which make up the foundations a priori for the possibility of experience, not with regard to its empirical, but rather to its transcendental constitution.

5.1 If every representation were entirely alien to the other, isolated, as it were, and separate from it, then nothing like a recognition, i.e., a whole of compared and connected representations, would ever arise.

5.2.a If, therefore, I attribute to the sensitivity a synopsis

The synopsis is the (entirely contingent) manifold which arises in sight together, like seeing the face in the cloud, consisting of nose, eyes, mouth, etc., or seeing the drinking from a cup, consisting [temporally] in the placing of the cup to the lips, the tilting of the cup upwards and then the removal from the lips, and where this mutiplicity is not distinguished from further elements, e.g., sneezing, or wiping the hands, except by sheer rote.

5.2.b because it contains a manifold in its envisagement, there will always be a synthesis corresponding to this, and only by means of spontaneity can the receptivity make connected recognitions possible.

So while we may spy a manifold as the drinking from a cup, the various elements must be connected and in that way held together and distinguished from other elements, e.g., the cup sitting on the table before or after the drinking.

5.3 Now this is the basis of a three-fold synthesis which appears necessarily in every recognition: the apprehension of the representations as modifications of the mind in the envisagement, the reproduction of these representations in the imagination, and their recognition [Rekognition] in the concept.

5.4 These provide us with a clue to three subjective recognition sources which actually make possible the understanding and, through this, every experience as an empirical product of the understanding.

Accordingly to recognize anything we must apprehend the manifold or multiplicity via the envisagement, and reproduce it via the imagination, and then finally bind the elements in an appropriate concept which results in the unified consciousness provided by the categories of understanding, and in the recognition. The very comprehension of a sentence requires us to apprehend the elements (subject, verb, etc.), keep them in mind (which is usually instantaneous, but occasionally requires time, e.g., with a pun) and then bind them in a unity by the meaning of the sentence (which gives us the connection for the words). If I suddenly heard, "seventy-four left", without context I would be confused, but if I knew that "seventy four" referred to a ball player and that he might be in the game, then I would make sense of the expression and it would be a sentence, i.e., that player had left the game.

Preceding Reminder

We are going now to consider the components of a recognition and how they come together. We will be dealing with a state of mind which can be described as "paying attention". We will want to accumulate the elements in some object, e.g., a top and legs, and then also keep them in mind and then finally to unify them by providing an object in our thinking which necessitates, e.g., in this case a table such that we see the top of the table and the legs of the table and so are not surprised to find them connected physically and are surprised when they are not and where we are moved to seek an explanation for this discrepency. Also we will consider the basis which authorizes and prompts us to make this original accumulation in the first place. And then in Part III we will seek to put all this together in a coherent and compelling way.

1. The Synthesis of the Apprehension in the Envisagement

All that we will be doing will entail our looking and our thinking, and thus our consciousness which is rendered in the inner sense and thus in terms of time. We will see and think like the recitation of the alphabet, i.e., A and then B and then C. All of this is disjoined, for A is not B, etc., and must be brought into a connected order, and not just memorized as we do the ABC's.

1.2 This is a universal remark which we must thoroughly lay as the foundation to all that follows.

We must not forget that we will be dealing with a manifold, represented here by the ABC's as an example, and where we want to get beyond a mere remembrance and recitation of A, B, C, etc., to a connection, more on the line of A + B + C = some object, much as 1+2+3=6. A recognition will arise not in remembering a multiplicity or manifold but in connecting it so that it is necessary that the manifold be as it is, e.g., that the legs of a table are between the floor and the top.

2.1 Every envisagement contains a manifold within itself which still would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the sequence of the impressions upon one another; for, as contained in one moment, no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity.

In the case of the apprehension of a table we must pay attention to the legs and to the top and ignore the floor or carpet or chairs, or items on the top. This calls for a focused consciousness which is an activity of the mind, i.e., it is not passive but active and intervening.

2.2 Now in order that out of this manifold there arises unity of the envisagement (as perchance in the representation of space) first the perusal of the manifold is necessary and then the seizure of that manifold, which action I term the apprehension because it is directed directly upon the envisagement which offers indeed a manifold, but can never effect this as such and indeed as contained in one representation without a synthesis arising.

We see the top and the legs together but still always as separate and distinct, i.e., a manifold.

3.1 Now this synthesis of the apprehension must also be exercised a priori, i.e., with respect to the representations which are not empirical.

In the tracing out of a circle pantomically in mid air we must ignore finger as it moves to the Noon position (to use the dial clock as an analog for all this) and then pay attention to the path as it moves to 1 and 2, etc., and back around to 12 again, at which point we would ignore the finger.

3.2 For without it, we would not be able to have either the representations of space nor of time since these can only be generated through the synthesis of the manifold which the sensitivity offers in its original receptivity.

Here Kant will be speaking of the recognition of time and space as objects, and here we must apprehend the manifold of each in order to come to recognize them objects. The view of space east of me is different from that of space west of me, etc. And so we have a manifold which calls for a synthesis. And the same holds of time, of an ordered past which culminates in the recognition of time as an object.

Reminder: recognizing time and space as objects is different from considering them as the forms of our looking, e.g., where we notice that something is here or there and now or earlier.

2. The Synthesis Of The Reproduction In The Imagination

Here we are referring to David Hume’s Law of Association (and not Kant’s empirical rule of association which is discussed later). This law was suggested to David Hume by the “street smarts” of older hunt dogs who, while slower than the younger ones, were still more effective. Through exposure the human mind reacts in a similar fashion, he reasoned, namely we retain elements in series and patterns such that one element in the series will bring the other elements to mind and in that same order, e.g., A suggests B and B suggests C, etc., because we have heard or recited the ABC’s so many times. Hence through exposure we become “smarter” just like the dogs do.

1.2.a But this law of reproduction presupposes that the appearances themselves are actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of their representations a coincidence or succession actually takes place in conformity with certain rules;

Here Hume simply and essentially assumes the object of experience. His idea was that the behavior of things in the world is reflected in the eyes of spectators (dogs, humans, etc.) and these spectators can recall previous situations when prompted by something similar; and so therefore 1. dogs get smarter the more hunts they have, and 2. humans put together series of representations in the same way, e.g., upon knife we think fork, upon 1 we jump to 2, etc. And so the fundamental premise is that there is an actual object which is seen in such and such a way whereupon it follows that the dogs and humans exposed to that object will reveal trains of representations which are also such and such, e.g., first water and then cold and then ice, or first ice and then warmth and then water. Therefore the mental gyrations of dogs and humans are reflective of exposure, and Hume has presumed to explain all (sequential) knowledge, human and animal, by means of a single principle, the Law of Association.Again: Hume assumes what Kant is setting out to establish, namely a law-regulated world of objects from which through exposure we make associations and come to make expectations based on our exposure to these objects.

See Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section XII, Part 118, Third Paragraph, where Hume admits the existence of real objects. For these are the very basis for the empirical law, along with the observed tendency of our minds to mimic the exposures to these objects. For, again, the data is empirical and observational, first of the objects themselves and then of the tendency of the mind to mimic them based on associations arising through exposure to them.

1.2.b for otherwise our empirical imagination would never have anything to do commensurate to its capacity, and therefore would remain concealed in the interior of the mind as a dead faculty, not known even to us.

All that Hume is really doing is finding a cause for our pretended knowledge, namely that we have in fact observed some real patterns and this awakens our imagination to recall these patterns, much like a sing-song of children, to the extent that if one element in a pattern or series is given, our minds supply the others, i.e., we have associated these elements (and when one is always followed by another we finally come to call the one the cause and the other the effect).

1.3 If cinnabar were sometimes red, and sometimes black, sometimes light and sometimes heavy, if a person appeared sometimes in one animal shape and sometimes in another, if on the longest day the land were sometimes covered with fruit and sometimes with ice and snow, then my empirical imagination would never be able to find the least opportunity for recalling the heavy cinnabar upon the representation of red; or if a certain word sometimes meant one thing and sometimes another, or if the same thing were called one thing at one time and something else at another without there being a certain rule to which the appearances were already subject of themselves, then no empirical synthesis of the reproduction could take place.

So Hume has to have, and thus to presuppose, his real world, i.e., that independent and uniformly existing world of objects such that there is a flow of regular sequences/appearances whereby then we come to remember and to reproduce these sequences via his Law of Association. and thus also to recognize them. What he is trying to do is to account for the mental series which fill the heads of dogs and humans alike, and he does this by positing an object which acts in such a way, in such a regular way, that the mental (and even physical) actions are reactions to this original. He is trying to make sense out of the ability of dogs and humans to remember and respond to or "regurgitate" sequences of prior exposure upon the prompt of one element of that prior exposure, and thus obviously requires the regularity of the sequences of the prior exposures in order to have them ingrained in the human brain. What must happen here is that one representation will suggest another and then a similarity or divergence can be noted and mused upon with the intention of making a synthesis. But if there were no similarity at all such that nothing in particular came to mind when in view of an object, there would indeed be nothing for the empirical imagination to do.

There must be that independent and uniformly existing object in order to provide the routine such that this reproduction would first arise. This is Hume thinking here: there is a real object which is independent and uniformly existent, and I see this object and how it acts and I get used to it acting in a certain way, and so come mentally to produce the rest of a given series related to that object, e.g., freezing of water with cold weather, upon the prompt of any one element of that series. But Kant’s question is this: where does Hume's independent and uniformly existing object come from, apart from the appearances of the brainarium? We must take mere appearances, which are disjointed on their own (for A is no closer in resemblance to B than 7 is to 8 or than water is to ice), and we unify them into an object in order then subsequently to be able to use that object as the basis of the empirical gyrations of our own imaginations, i.e., turn them, via the Law of Association, into reproductions of something actually experienced. We must find that the longest day does not have ice and snow, and that words have a reference and that we often speak names of things, etc., and then by means of this independent and uniformly existing world we can explain our reproductive imaginations, namely that we and the dogs reflect this world, and what we spy together we reproduce and reflect together.

This is a difficult passage. The empirical law of mental reproduction (what Hume calls “association”) presupposes real objects which the mind mimics. [For if the real objects, to which the representations might correspond, did not exist, the imagination would never have anything to do] But we are never given these “real objects’ but only appearances; and so there must be something to correspond to these “real objects” which makes this reproduction of the appearance possible. This something, we are about to discover, is the a priori capacity of the mind and the TO=X.

2.2 We recognize this very quickly once we recall that appearances are not things on their own but rather the sheer play of our representations which finally resolve into determinations of the inner sense.

I read: We recognize this (need for an a priori basis) very quickly once we recall that appearances are not things on their own but rather the sheer play of our representations which finally resolve into determinations of the inner sense (for we are faced with the situation of realizing that appearances are not objects themselves on their own, but merely representations, and yet at the same time nothing else is given us to be these objects except these very appearances). And yet as Hume requires for his explanation of human thinking (his Law of Association), there must be real objects existing independently of us so that we can be exposed to these objects so that we can come to reflect them in our associations and reproductions.

2.3 If we can now establish that even our purest envisagements a priori procure no recognition except to the extent they contain such a connection of the manifold that a thorough synthesis of the reproduction is made possible, then this synthesis of the imagination is also based a priori upon principles preceding all experience and we must assume a pure, transcendental synthesis of that imagination as the basis for even the possibility of experience (which necessarily presupposes the reproductability of the appearances).

Hume's Law of Association assumes that things come and go in a regular way according to a rule and that the human mind associates this coming and going and so upon “knife”, for example, “fork” comes to mind, or “pepper” upon the prompt of “salt”. And so obviously we have the capacity for associating and reproducing according to our exposure to routines. But what we need (for the sake of recognitions of objects) is a capacity for making this reproduction and association without having to await for some sequence to actually arise (such that our minds would reflect and repeat it, as Hume's Laws shows).

What is needed here, in Kant's attempt to uncover the capacity for paying attention, is not only the apprehension (presented in the preceding section) but an ability of the imagination to remember or reproduce and to associate a series of impressions.

2.4 Now it is clear that if I draw a line in thought, or think the time from one midday to the other, or if I merely want to represent a certain count, I would necessarily first have to grasp each of these manifold representations in thought, one after the other.

Imagine the tracing out of a pantomimic circle. I first have to ignore the movement of the hand to the Noon (beginning) position, and then follow it around in its tracing to 1 and 2, etc. while keeping in mind the path, and then upon the return to the Noon position (the ending point) I ignore any further movement of the pointing finger. If I did not remember the earlier part of the tracing then I would have apprehended the circle but without having a picture of it in mind. Or suppose I focused exclusively on the two in a count from one, and thus lost track of the one, then while I could say two well enough, it would no more relate to one than to “buckle my shoe".

2.5 And if I were always to forget the preceding (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of the time, or the units represented successively) and not reproduce them as I proceeded to the subsequent one, then an entire representation would never be able to arise, nor any of the thoughts just mentioned; indeed not even the purest and first fundamental representations of space and time.

It would seem clear then that while both the human and the dog can reproduce sequences of impulses, the human can remember them, i.e., upon the first impulse and not have to wait for it to be repeated enough to take hold in the brain.

And so we have the capacity a priori to undertake associations and reproductions in advance of any recognition of an object, and without this capacity it would be fruitless to apprehend any manifold for we would have forgotten what we apprehended.

Accordingly we must apprehend a manifold (diversity) and then also retain and reproduce it, and so both are elements in that consciousness known as “paying attention” and which is necessary for, and leads to, the recognition of objects.

In a word: Hume's Law of Association assumes that things come and go in a regular way according to a rule and that the human mind associates this coming and going and so upon “knife”, for example, “fork” comes to mind, or “pepper” upon the prompt of “salt”. And so obviously we have the capacity for associating and reproducing according to our exposure to routines. But what we need (for the sake of recognitions of objects) is a capacity for making this reproduction and association without having to wait for some sequence to actually arise (such that our minds would come to reflect and repeat it, as Hume's Laws has it). Like the differentiation of time in the apprehension of a manifold, we must also be able retain that manifold without having to wait for it to be repeated many times in order to make an impression on the brain. Without this we could not pay attention, and without that we could not come to the recognition of an object as we shall discover in the next section.

3. The Synthesis Of The Recognition [Rekognition] In The Concept

We are speaking here generally of "paying attention" to what we are doing. We have spoken in the previous two sections of the need for apprehending a manifold (and in what way essentially disregarding all else going on around us) and of retaining that manifold through a reproduction, and now we are speaking of keeping all of this in mind along with what we are seeking to accomplish, namely a unified consciousness. The elements of the accumulation and retention are thus far related to diverse consciousness and the point is the unification of all this into a single consciousness which, as we shall shortly see, arises via the concept of the object.Very often, while doing push-ups, I will suddenly “catch” myself saying “. . . 24 . . . 25 . . . " and realize that due to a preoccupation (like dirving on "auto pilot") I was enumerating the pushups without paying any attention. And so I would be able to come to a number without realizing that the sound of twenty was a count and a total instead of merely a name of a particular push up. Consequently In a word: we need presence of mind, which is a capacity for paying attention in anticipation of a culmination. We need to keep in mind not only the assemblage, but also the point of the assemblage.

1.2 For there would be a new representation in the present state which would not belong at all to the act by means of which it was to have been gradually generated, and its manifold would never make up a whole, because the unity which only the consciousness can provide would be lacking.

In the recitation of a list of unrelated items of a manifold or multiplicity, like the ABC's, there is no unity and so each would stand on its own and not be related in any way to what preceded. If I say: thimble, moon, cloud, A, 76, Philip, there is a discord in the consciousness and no unity at all.

1.3 If I forget, while counting, that the units which I presently have in mind have been gradually added by me, then I would recognize neither the generation of the quantity through this successive addition of ones, nor also therefore the count; for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis.

I could conceivably think of a number in a count in the same way that I think of a name, as though I were reciting the ABC’s, and not that the number represents the culmination and encompassment of what preceded. I could arrive at D just as I do at 4, and as there is no suggestion in D that I have accumulated a total, even so there does not need to be such a consciousness with regard to 4 unless I remain mindful of what I am doing, i.e., accumulating a total and that the 4 includes the 1 and 2 and 3. This also reminds me of Hobbes' village idiot who could count "one one one" as the town clock struck three. Except in my case here I could cound "one two three" but the three would have no more meaning than the one or the two. It would be like saying "Hickory, dickory, dock, the mouse ran up the clock". What is lacking might be called presence of mind.

2.1 The word concept itself might aid us here.

The German word is Begriff, the root of which is greifen (= to grasp or to seize).

2.2 For this is a consciousness which unites into a single representation the manifold which was gradually looked at and then reproduced.

The concept "table" unifies the distinctive "top" and "legs" and make them parts of a single thing. Without that we would have to speak of legs and the top as disjointed, much as we have to speak of a table and a roof or mountain as distinct, disjointed things. And this unification is not merely a consciousness of a manifold as in keeping in mind A and B and C, but a consciousness in which these elements are seen as parts of an object, as, e.g., 1 and 2 are united in 3.

2.3 This consciousness can frequently be very weak; so much so in fact that we connect it with the generation of the representation only in the effect and not in the act itself. But regardless of that difference, a consciousness must always be encountered, even if the distinctive clarity is not, and without this [consciousness] concepts are not possible at all nor, in their absence, any recognition of objects.

Very often, as in the recognition of a circle being traced out in the air, we pay attention to the description and keep it in mind and then conceive of a circle and thus recognize what the mime has done in his tracing, but are not aware of our mental activity in doing all this, e.g., paying attention and conception. We pay attention and recognize the circle and a "light goes on" (unification of the elements and a recognition of the object accomplishing the unification) but we are not conscious of the steps we have had to undertake to get to this recognition.

Or also I as a child might have a vague concept of a table as a something big and wide and brown next to Daddy. Only later will I develop it into a top and legs such that the top is at a height suitable for human usage and which could be any color.

Or perhaps my early concept of Mamma or Daddy will consist in the elements of the face that I see as a singularity (made up of a manifold) like a face in the cloud. And only later will that develop into the person who gave me birth, i.e., the eyes for seeing, the nose for breathing, etc. ??

This may find an echo in TDA.II.3.6 below where Kant talks about the concept of body.

Note: this completes the "Subjective Deduction of the Categories", and prepares us to begin now the "Objective Deduction". Thus far we have looked at what is subjectively necessary for recognitions to arise, i.e., first an apprehension of the manifold of the envisagement, then the association and retention of that manifold via the reproductive imagination and finally a culmination in the unification of the manifold by means of the concept such that it is all seized together as elements or parts of a single thought.

3.1 First we need to make clear what is meant by the expression "an object of representations".

3.2 Earlier we indicated that appearances were really nothing other than representations which must not be viewed in just this way as objects on their own (independently of the representational capacity).

The tree that we see as an appearance gets smaller as we get further away, but we don't consider that tree as existing like that on its own. We know that what we see is merely the representation of a tree and not a tree. We are now undertaking to discover how we come to such a realization.

3.3 But then what do we mean when speaking of an object corresponding to, and hence then also differing from, a recognition?

If the object cannot be the appearances (as we just stated in TDA.II.3.3.2 immediately above, then what is it that we recognize when we recognize an object? If we have knowledge, what does this knowledge cover?

3.4 Obviously this object must be thought of only as a something in general = X, because apart from our recognition we have nothing to place in opposition to it in order then to correspond to it.

The tree that we actually see is within the brainarium, i.e., is a representation and not a real tree, and there is nothing at all in the brainarium which could suggest anything other than this representational tree which, among other things, changes size with distance. And also there is nothing apart from the brainarium where we could find any such object as the real tree, for we are limited in our looking to the brainarium. And so we are having to dream up a something in general, this general and unknown X, in order that we may have or think of something, a real tree, in order to contrast it with the representational tree in the brainarium in order to realize that the representation is just that, namely the appearance of the tree and not a real tree existing on its own as it appears within the brainarium. We will come to realize that the tree is the object and the appearances that we actually see are merely a perspective of this tree, and not the tree itself.

4.1 And yet we find that our thought of the reference of all recognitions to their object entails some sort of necessity, for a recognition is not haphazard or arbitrary but rather a priori determined in a certain way. Indeed it is by reference to the object that recognitions also necessarily agree among themselves with regard to it, i.e., they must have that unity which makes up the concept of the object.

So in TDA.II.3.3.4 immediately above we see the object is something rather vague. But now we realize that it still has to entail some necessity in order that the recognition be definite and that all recognitions concerning a given object must agree with each other.

5.1.a. But since we are dealing only with the manifold of our representations,

b. and since that X (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing apart from us,

c. and yet since it is supposed to be something distinct from all our representations,

d. it is clear that the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the envisagement.

So then ultimately and finally we have only our own representations to deal with. And the object, the X, is something we conceive of (dream up), and since it is supposed to be something different from the representations, it follows that it can be only the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the envisagement. So the legs and the top are appearances and the table then is a consciousness which provides a necessity to the legs and top as parts of a single thing. There is no thing added to the legs and the top, and so the table is merely a way of thinking of the top and legs which provides a unified consciousenss and we are able to recognize the top and the legs as parts of this single thing, this table. The table is the object, and by this concept of the object, the table, we are able to unify the top and the legs, which are otherwise as disparate as A and B or C in the ABC's, and achieved to a unified consciousess. The unity of consciousness in this case can be expressed, via the object, as the top of the table and the legs of the table.

5.2 For we say we recognize an object when we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of the envisagement.

We recognize the loop traced out in the air by means of the concept of a single line which encloses a space, and that concept unifies the elements of the envisagement (in the apprehension and retention). And we recognize the table by means of the concept of an elevated surface for writing, etc., by means of which we unify the top and the legs, i.e., we see the necessity of the conncetion of the legs and top, e.g., that the legs are not only with the top and connected with the top, but also that they are between the top and the floor.

5.3.a. But this is impossible unless the envisagement were capable of production according to a rule through such a function of synthesis that makes

b. the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori, and

c. a concept uniting this [manifold] possible.

The elements or manifold of the envisagement must be necessitated. Accordingly the rule must be such that all of the manifold must arise (and which is the b part of 5.3); and at the same time this rule must accord with a category in order that it be part and parcel of a single consciousness which is expressed by the concept of the object (which is the function of the category, i.e., connecting consciousness). For example if we were told to find a table, the rule would call a priori for a top and some elevating device (legs) for this is the concept of a table, namely a surface elevated to a height from the floor convenient and useful for humans.

5.4 We think of a triangle, for example, by being cognizant of the assemblage of three straight lines according to a rule whereby such an envisagement could be presented at any time.

Such a rule might be this: a triangle is three straight line segments, each end point of each being an end point common to two. By means of this rule a triangle can be constructed and all of the elements reproduced necessarily.

5.5.a. Now this unity of the rule determines all the manifold and

b. limits it to conditions which make the unity of apperception possible and

c. the concept of this unity is the representation of the object = X which I think through the cited predicates of a triangle.

The rule (see comment to 5.4 above) 5.5.a. calls for a specific manifold (three straight lines), and 5.5.b. results in a completion or total (an object) by means of the connection of all three (via the commonality of the end points) and which totaling makes the unity of apperception possible (via the necessity of the assembly by means of the common end points), and 5.5.c. the concept of this unity is the object, the triangle, i.e., a three sided figure enclosing a space (which [object] is added in thought to the three straight lines which are given in the envisagement, much as table is added to top and legs in order to have “top of the table” and “legs of the table.” or where 5 and 7 are unified in 12.) A rule is an expression of a manifold as a unity, i.e., by means of the rule (a singularity) a manifold is rendered, as when, for example, I describe a face in a single sentence, e.g., a face consists of two eyes above a nose and a mouth below it. The unity of apperception comes about by observing the identity of the rule with the envisagement; so the rule must refer to an envisagement. See TDA III 1.3.c. The rule reproduces the manifold and this is then seen to accord with the envisagement. That is the recognition proper: a concept /rule is seen to produce the envisagement. The concept then represents and expresses this unity of apperception.

Without the rule we would have no way of expressing all that is contained in the notion. For example, we would see the top of the table and the legs of the table and the color of the table, perhaps, and yet would not be able to know that the top and legs are all that a table is (and where the color is merely a predicate)

6.1 Every recognition requires a concept, regardless of how imperfect or vague, and it is always something general with respect to its form, and which serves as a rule.

This may echo TDA.II.3.2 above where we spoke of the need of a consciousness of unification of a manifold even if it is weak and indistinct. We must have the concept for it is only in that way that an object (a unified manifold) can be given in order to be recognized, e.g., the table instead of the diverse top and legs, which are only contingently together like the legs and the rug or the floor, or the lamp or the chair.

6.2 The concept of a body, for example, serves as a rule for our recognition of external appearances with respect to the manifold which is thought in that concept.

6.3 But it can be a rule of envisagements only in this way: with given appearances it represents the necessary reproduction of their manifold, and hence the synthetic unity of the consciousness we have of them.

6.4 Upon the perception of something apart from us, therefore, the concept of body makes the representation of extension necessary, and along with it that of impenetrability, shape, etc.

Very early in childhood we will begin to notice appearances and will touch some accidently and be taken by the resistance and will touch them again to make sure of that resistance (which is discussed in TDA.II.1 & 2 above). We will seek to touch other items and find we cannot touch them (they are too far away) and will come to think of the items that we can touch as bodies. The first word might be "ball" but then as we try to use "ball" for "table" we are corrected and come to realize that a ball is a ball and a table is a table and both are bodies, i.e., the common denominator is the resistance to touch. At that point we will have developed the, albeit still vague, concept of body (which is TDA.II.3.1-2). We later come to realize that the appearances that have no touch are still bodies, only too far away to be touched, e.g., the moon.

It is here, I think, that we have the basis for the differentiation of appearance (empirically speaking, and which can only be seen in space, e.g., the rainbow) and an object (body) which occupies space and can be seen and located in space (e.g., the rain).

It is by means of this conception (of body) that we come to recognize a body to which the visual appearance then connects as its view in our eyes. We see that it is this object which has force and resistance and which we can see as occupying space by the ensuing touch. Other appearances are either out of reach, and so are still bodies, or else they are solely in our eyes, like the rainbow.

Due to the necessity of the rule, if I hear someone speaking of a table as a piece of furniture I know they are speaking of a top and legs (elevators). Analysis of the concept of table now reveals this to me. Originally I put together top and legs by means of the concept of table, and now I can analyze the table to derive the top and legs.

7.1 There is always a transcendental condition as the basis to every necessity.

Obviously! For there is never the least necessity in the appearance, as we established earlier in this TDA.

7.2.a. Therefore a transcendental basis of the unity of the consciousness must be encountered in the synthesis of the manifold of all our envisagements,

b. hence also in the concept of objects in general,

c. consequently then of all objects of experience,

d. for without this it would be impossible to think any sort of object to our envisagements;

e. for this object is nothing more than that something concerning which the concept expresses such a necessity of the synthesis.

The concept of a triangle as the three straight line segments where the end points are points of two of the three, and it is by means of this concept that we recognize an object, i.e., the triangle, in the envisagement, for it is this concept which provides the necessity of the three lines so arrayed. Likewise the concept of a table as a surfaced elevated from the floor by legs for human use in eating or writing or working, etc., necessities the elements in an envisagement of the top and legs and indeed as top above and legs below.

8.1 Now this original and transcendental condition is none other than the transcendental apperception.

Preceding any recognition of an object or even any apprehension of a manifold is that consciousness of the self which is called "paying attention", which therefore is transcendental, i.e., preceding experience and making experience first possible. As we shall discover this apperception is an internal reflection of expression of the categories as the connections available to the mind. And so these categories will represent a connected framework which then is given actual content and expression via the objects of envisagements like triangles and bodies and tables.

8.2 The consciousness of one's self, according to the determinations of our state, is merely empirical with regard to the inner perception, always changeable, renders no enduring or abiding self in the flood of the inner appearances, and is commonly referred to as the inner sense or empirical apperception.

The ABC's provide a suggestion for this sort of consciousness. When I think B then A is out of mind, and when I am thinking C, both A and B are gone. This is very close to driving along the road while preoccupied and where once you pass some object there is no memory of that object. I can read a paragraph and at the end not have a clue as to what I read (which happens often in reading Kant). This touches back to the transcendental apprehension and retention of data in TDA.II.1 and 2.

8.3 That which is to be represented as numerically identical cannot be so thought by means of empirical data.

Empirical data is totally diverse and disjointed. A and B are different, as are red and green and heavy.

8.4 There must be a condition which proceeds all experience and even makes this possible, which is to make such a transcendental presupposition valid.

There must be a something definite and fixed which can serve as the basis and framework for a synthesis. For without this we are stuck with empirical data, i.e., no unity disjointed diversity. And so clearly we mean some transcendental capacity.

9.1a Now no recognitions can take place within us, nor any connection and unity among them,

The means, as we will shortly discover, that the way diverse recognitions are connected and unified are the same as the means whereby the elements of any single recognition are connected and unified. We will be concerned not only with the connection of elements in an objective perception, but then also these objective perceptions in a single, all-encompassing experience.

9.1g without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of the envisagement and solely in reference to which every representation of object is possible.

Since the object represents merely the unity of the consciousness, e.g., unifying the top and the legs by means of the concept of table, it certainly does not exist on its own at all to be perceived as such, and so obviously this is a priori (providing the concept "table" for the legs and top) and therefore calls for an a priori capacity for providing that unity and connection.

9.2 This pure, original, unchangeable consciousness I will call the transcendental apperception.

And this can be observed in us in those cases where we exhibit presence of mind with regard to some activity, e.g., when we are careful to make sure that we are locking a door or cutting off an oven or setting a clock. I.e., we can at least be aware of this presence of mind which is not derived from experience but which is an action of the self. It is general called "paying attention" or "minding what we are doing". It begins in the apprehension of TDA.II.1.

9.3 That such a name is warranted is clear from the fact that even the purest, objective unity, namely that of the concepts a priori (space and time), is only possible through the referral of the envisagements to it [i.e., this apperception].

The form of an envisagement in space and time has to do with here and there and now and then. But space and time are also objects (requiring concepts). To recognize them as objects they must be subjected to a synthesis, which calls for a perusal (apprehension) and retention. But of course there is no content to be perused (unlike empirical objects) for time and space are infinite nothings, and any part is simply a limitation of the whole. And the completion does not denote a total (which would be a category of the understanding) but rather as a singularity such that every space and every time is merely a limitation of that infinite singularity See comments on space and time as objects.

9.4 The numerical unity of this apperception, therefore, lies a priori as a foundation to all concepts just as much as the manifold of space and time is the foundation to the envisagements of the sensitivity.

Thus in the same way that space and time contain, as it were, all objects which can ever be sensed by humans, and thus which underlie all these as their form, the apperception is a unity to which all concept (even space and time as objects) must be subject in order to be become recognized as objects in our looking/envisagement.]

The different between space and time and all other objects, is that space and time do not call for any connective measures of the categories, and so their unity is given in their envisagement itself as objects.

10.1 But it is just this transcendental unity of the apperception which takes all possible appearances which could ever be together in an experience, and makes a cohesion of all these representations in accordance with laws.

So then, the transcendental unity of apperception can be viewed as a consistent story, but only in outline or format, i.e., an inherent consistency which could serve as the framework for any story. It never incorporates anything into its story except by means of principles (= universally valid laws = the categories) from which then any appearance representing an element or episode of the story can be derived. That is its peculiarity. It is like the forms of Plato, only without any content; hence it is the basis for the creation of the forms within, as it were.

The slamming door (see note to TDA.II.2.3) would not be a recognition merely by virtue of a rule whereby the observed data was reproduced and enunciated, as it were, for that would be the description of a slamming-door as a thing on its own, and the mental imagery would represent the appearance itself. Rather it is only because the door can be seen as a hinged valve in an air flow system that a recognition can arise; for only then does the appearance represent an object (as opposed to being one). In the same way that the apperception provides an a priori unity for the apprehension and reproduction and (finally, via the concept of the object the) recognition for an object, it also serves in the same way for providing a cohesion of all recognitions in a single universal experience (and which will be emphasized in the subsequent section.
In a word: the recognition of an object and the recognition of an experience with the object and the recognition of all objects and experiences are all based on a single form of human understanding.

10.2 For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind, in the recognition of the multiplicity, were not aware of the identity of its function in combining this (manifold) synthetically in a recognition.

We must have in advance the capacity of approaching a manifold/multiplicity with the intention of combining it. The combination cannot arise empricially, but rather must be provided via the original apperception as a capacity and framework for unification in general.

10.3.a. The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of one's self, therefore,

Before we can ever come to a unified empirical consciouness, we will first have to posit the pure and transcendendal apperception as a framework for the connection of diverse, empirical consciousness into an expression of the original apperception which is called the "I" of the "I think".And so obviously it is needful that this original and transcendental apperception precede experience in order to make possibile the unificaiton of the empirical consciousness (via the concept/rule of the object) whereby then finally the self is itself recognized by itself.

b. is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, i.e.,

c. according to rules which not only make them reproducible necessarily, but also determine in that way an object to their envisagement, i.e.,

d. the concept of a something in which they necessarily cohere;

e. for the mind could not possibly think the identity of its own self in the manifold of its representations, and certainly (not) a priori, if it were not cognizant of the identity of its action in subjecting every synthesis of the apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity by means of which its cohesion (that of the apprehension) according to rules a priori is first made possible.

And so there we have it. The same a priori unity which makes possible the concepts of space and time (which are entirely ideal and are therefore most obviously recognized a priori) is the same means whereby diverse representations come together in a unity of an experience. For this unity of consciousness with regard to empirical objects and experience, since it is a priori in order to make these objects (e.g., space, and then most certainly the empirical objects), and therefore since it cannot arise without a synthesis, is such that it cannot be recognized itself unless it indeed conducts and completes a synthesis, and then only through the consciousness of its own activity in doing so.

In short: the mind cannot arise to view even to itself as such through unsynthesized empirical data. But it does have the capacity of preceding the empirical objects (as also in the case of space and time). And so it has the capacity also of constructing these empirical objects from the data given (for the appearance is not the object, but rather merely the data for an object). And it is by conducting these a priori constructions that the mind does present something discernible to itself and thereby can itself be recognized (though only as a combining capacity of the mind).

The transcendental capacity of apperception precedes all synthesis and thus all connection and unity and thus all recognition. By virtue of recognitions there is an empirical consciousness which is unified and which can give us empirical evidence of the self.

10.4 And now we are also in a better position to determine our concept of an object in general.

10.5 All representations, as such, have their object and can in turn be objects of other representations.

This has been difficult for me to grasp. At this writing my take is this: I see before me a chair. These certain appearances before me then represent a chair. But it could also represent wood. Or it could represent furniture of a certain period or a certain manufacture or certain style, or perhaps I am attending to its black or red or brown color. And so it would seem that anything could represent almost anything. Likewise my extended left index finger could represent one, a finger, a dirty finger, a broken finger nail, a bruise, a color, a pointing device, etc. As we see in 10.6 below what is represented is a function of how we look at it.

10.6 Appearances are the only objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which refers immediately to the object is called envisagement.

I can see the top and the legs as a singularity (called table) just as I can see the nose and mouth and eyes, etc., as a singularity called a face. Or, per the above, the chair or the finger can represent a host of objects, and all depending on how I look at things. The appearance represents and depicts an object, but that object is a function of the envisagement and how we look at it. And so the object that the appearance represents depends on our envisagement.

10.7 But now these appearances are not things on their own, but rather only representations, which in turn have their own object which therefore cannot be observed by us and which therefore may be termed the non-empirical, i.e., transcendental, object = X.

And so what I see is not a thing on its own for me somehow to correctly perceive by putting it in the right light and at a proper viewing distance from me, but rather it is merely a representation of a something, and this something cannot be further observed. Hence this is not a case of selective perception, but rather of having the appearance itself representsomething, a something which is simply not subject to observation. We do not see things as they are on their own, but only the appearance of things. What is “really there” independently of my envisagement can only be described as the transcendental object = X.

When I cut my finger, the reddish stuff which appears I call blood and I see it as the transportation means for delivering nourishment to the cells of the body and of removing waste material. The Mayan during the middle of the first millennium considered blood to be the habitation of gods, and when certain blood was put on paper and burned, these gods could often be discerned in the smoke. The Hebrews thought of blood as life itself, such that if consumed, it would convey that life. This is the same appearance, but a different representation; and what the appearance represents in each case is merely a something = X; which something must be determined.

Additionally, the specific appearance itself represents a something in general in the sense that it is merely one view and one condition of a host of possible views and conditions, and all of these are to be reconciled in the concept of the transcendental object = X (as they arise to view). And so the Hebrews and the Mayan and moderns look at the red stuff differently, given that each then also realizes that the red stuff is merely one view and condition of that X (which can appear dark and bright, which can be thick and fluid or even dry, etc.)

11.1 The pure concept of this transcendental object (which, with all our recognitions, is actually always the same = X) is what can procure objective referral to an object, i.e., objective reality, in all our empirical concepts in general.

In every regard and in every situation, therefore, we look upon the appearance as a representation of some object (= X). We do not look upon the appearance as a thing on its own (in which case there could be no order to our recognitions), but as representing this object = X.

11.2 Now this concept can contain no determined envisagement at all, and therefore will pertain to nothing except that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of the recognition to the extent it refers to an object.

Indeed it is merely the awareness that what we are perceiving is not a thing on its own, but rather is the appearance of a thing and is only one of many possible appearances of that thing. In other words, what we are looking at is a function of our envisagement. But whatever that might be, even then it is merely one of many views and conditions of that thing. And so when we see this object again, but from another perspective or in another condition, we are not slaves to the perception such that we see the object (in this subsequent look) as another, though resembling, object, but as the identical object under other conditions. In so many words, the concept of the object is open ended and we are frequently adding information and maintaining a consistent “story” per the unified apperception.

11.3 But this referral is nothing other than the necessary unity of the consciousness, hence also of the synthesis of the manifold by a common function of the mind in combining it [the manifold] into a single representation.

And so we see how and that the apperception provides this unity and indeed via the concept of the transcendental object = X, that something whereto all these representations refer and in which find unity. Many of the views (some of the manifold) is in space (diverse parts of the object, and diverse perspectives of the object) and some are in time (diverse ages and diverse conditions of the object)

And why is this? because otherwise the appearance itself is the object and as a thing on its own, and therefore a table now and the same table earlier would be viewed as two distinct objects which are entirely unrelated, i.e., there would be no object at all, but only incoherent diversity.

In other words we would be left with sheer appearances as things, and never with objects that these appearances represent. This is the whole point of the doctrine of the object of representations.

With regard to the relationship in the empirical envisagement, since the object does not really exist except as a concept (for where is the table once the legs and the top have been identified?), it is only by means of this a priori rule of synthesis that a relationship between the legs and top exist, i.e., the “of the table” of the legs of the table and of the top of the table, exists only as a representation . The concept, here a table, is a rule regarding appearances (of the legs and of the top) from which an object is to arise. In TDA.II.4.6 we come to the law that all appearances are connected.

But how is this unity to be maintained, this unity which is promised via the transcendental object = X? Every time that TABLE is seen, a recall is made to the recognition of table and additions can be provided. But how about the compatibility of table with chair and with elephant and with the host of other objects that the world is full of. These are not recalled upon the prompt of TABLE.

So far we have discussed the psychological character of human recognition and have come to realize that certain capacities are necessary in order for objects to arise, objects which incorporate a host of appearances as aspects, views and conditions. We are now ready to examine the logical character of human recognition and uncover the means of insuring a completely harmonious picture of all appearances whatsoever, i.e., a nature.

4. Preliminary Explanation Of The Possibility Of
The Categories As A Priori Recognitions

A subjective perception is an awareness of a reality, a fact, which is only of subjective validity; while experience denotes an objective perception called recognition. I may notice that the door slams when the window is open, but without being able to say why; that is a subjective perception (even if more than one person notices it). Once I am able to explain why, I have incorporated that perception into a general body of knowledge which makes it valid for every person; and then I call it experience or an objective pertception. So here Kant is referring to experience as a general, all-encompassing, empirical(ly developed edifice called) unity of consciousness which incorporates and coordinates all recognitions (or objective perceptions).

1.2 If someone speaks of diverse experiences, these are only so many perceptions to the extent they belong to one and the same general experience.

This suggests that the various perceptions constitute a unified manifold and where the object might be called nature, just as the perception of the top and the legs are a manifold which is unified via the rule (for table) which provides for the unified apperception. This then suggests in turn that the process of unifying appearances into objects which are recognized (objective perception) is the same process as unifying the recognitions into a single composite called experience with these objects. Accordingly then we recognize in advance a single object called nature (and which is presented more thoroughly below in this section) and all our recognitions of individual objects add up to a single experience with this single object of nature.

1.3 Actually it is precisely the thorough and synthetic unity of the perceptions which makes up the form of experience, and this is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the appearances by means of concepts.

I suspect Kant here is unifying his language so that the term “perception” can be universal in application both to the makeup of individual objects, e.g., mouth + nose, etc. = a face, and then also to the relationships of that perceived object to other appearances (both to itself at different times [happy and sad, by means of cause and effect] and to other objects [the simultaneous faces of other people via reciprocal influence.])

2.1 Unity of synthesis by means of empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, and if these were not based on a transcendental foundation of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill our souls without experience ever being able to arise from them.

Hence we can imagine empirical concepts which would not have a transcendental basis of unity, in which case they would be no more than descriptions of particular envisagements, e.g., A and B and C, but without any necessity (except perhaps a definition) and no unity. Causation, in this case, would be no more than the perception that one thing had always followed another. And so if we had an envisagement and were able to describe it via a rule of association, but without a transcendental basis, then there would be no object, even though we could produce the rule and then enunciate the manifold (relatively) a priori, i.e., per prior observations; again like saying that a gobblygook = A and B and C..Essentially these would be subjective perceptions which would never fit together into a whole, but remain always disjointed and individual.

2.2 But in that case, every reference of the recognition to the object would vanish because of the lack of connection according to universal and necessary laws. And so while there would certainly be an envisagement devoid of all thought, it would never be a recognition, and hence nothing at all for us.

I could notice the top and the legs and see them together as a thing, just as I might see the lamp on the table and the top as a thing. But this would be entirely contingent and there would be no thougth related to it to necessitate it and thus no recognition at all. I might look out and see a telephone wire cross (in front of) a tree (given my perspective or position of looking) and see a triangle appear. That could be an envisagement but nothing further, and even it would vanish when I move.

3.1 The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are simultaneously conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.

3.2 Now I assert that the categories introduced earlier are nothing other than the conditions of the thinking in a possible experience, just as space and time contain the conditions for the envisagement in that [possible experience].

3.3 Hence these categories are also fundamental concepts for thinking objects in general to the appearances, and have therefore a priori, objective validity, which is what we actually wanted to know.

"Envisagements without thoughts are blind" and are never a recognition. The categories are the means whereby any manifold can be necessitated and so it is clear that only by means of the categories can the (unidentified) object of an envisagement (for example: of a table) be necessitated (for example, with the table, of the legs supporting the top so that the height is useful to humans).

4.1 But the possibility and indeed even the necessity of these categories depend upon the relationship which the entire sensitivity, and hence also all possible appearances, have to the original apperception where everything is necessarily conformable to the conditions of the thorough unity of self-consciousness, i.e., must stand under universal functions of synthesis, namely the synthesis by means of concepts wherein alone the apperception can prove a priori its thorough and necessary identity.

The phrases “entire sensitivity” and “hence also all possible appearances” indicate in the first instance all envisagements and then, by emphasis, all empirical envisagements. This means that all sensitive envisagements of objects (though perhaps not of space and time themselves as envisagements) are subject to the categories as the only means for the unification of a diverse consciousness, as was explained in the previous section (TDA.II.3).

By rejecting unintegrated perceptions from the general consciousness, the apperception proves that it is a unity and that the proffered perception is not compatible with its edifice. For it is only when a perception can be integrated into that general consciousness (by means of a unifying rule which is compatible with all rules consistent with the categories of pure thinking) that we have a recognition.

4.2 The concept of a cause, for example, is nothing other than a synthesis (of what follows in the temporal series with other appearances) according to concepts, and without such unity, which has its rule a priori and subjugates the appearances to itself, no thorough, universal and necessary unity of consciousness would be encountered in the manifold of the perceptions.

Hence we “force” the perception into a mold, namely that of full connection with neither overlap or gap.

4.3 But then these perceptions would also belong to no experience and hence would be devoid of any object and no more than a blind play of representations, i.e., less than a dream.

Our dreams reflect the objects we deal with, and hence, without the objects, would be subject merely to associated appearances and thus would be wild and disorderly. Presently, for example, we dream of the lecturer at an august assembly speaking naked, while we, in the audience, wonder why he is speaking while seated (but without any regard to his nakedness); this is surrealism, but it is already ordered and it utilizes objects, e.g., a lecturer, an assembly, naked, seated, etc. These objects and hence the representations of these objects would be entirely absent in the absence of the categories and would be replaced by sheer appearances, e.g., a man was speaking, the ship sank, the role turned into a turtle, etc.

I think that what we would have would be a world of subjective perceptions and no recognitions and thus no objects. I might notice that the flat surface is above the columns (legs of a table) but this would entail no more necessity than noticing that pages (a book) is lying on the flat surface (the top).

5.1 Every attempt, therefore, to derive these pure understanding concepts from experience and to ascribe to them a merely empirical birth, is doomed to failure.

5.2 I do not even need to mention, e.g., that the concept of cause entails a feature of necessity which no experience whatsoever can provide, teaching, as it [experience] does, that an appearance customarily follows upon something, but not that it must do so necessarily nor that we could infer the appearance from that something a priori and entirely universally as a condition.

This is a concise statement of the metaphysical deduction, namely that the categories cannot have been derived from any experience, for we could never come to the notion of casualty through empirical data. So it is a priori. But suppose we accept it anyway; how does its validity for experience arise? We consider this question now.

5.3 But what about the empirical rule of association which we must unquestionably accept once we assert that everything in the series of succession of events is subject to rules such that nothing happens unless something else precedes, upon which it always follows? What is the basis of this as a law of nature, I ask, and how is even this association possible?

We dream up this law of causality, but then what prompts us to think that the appearances would be subject to this? How do we make this causality a law of nature such that we are empower to associate the appearances (in time via the law of causality)? [Cf. TDB 24 3.4 for a different meaning of “association”]

[Kant distinguishes the empirical rule of association from the law of association. The latter has to do with the way the mind reproduces its impressions; the former is a conscious endeavor to produce an a priori synthesis (even though the data may be empirical).]

More to the point: causality is necessary for a unified consciousness (TDA.II.4.4 above), and it is not obtained from experience (TDA.II.4.5.1 & 2), but what gives it authority over the perceptions?

5.4 The basis of the possibility of the association of the manifold, to the extent it lies in the object, is called the affinity of the manifold.

We must remember that the object is itself a mere representations, the TO=X; and so we are still speaking of the category.

We look for associations because of the affinity, and so this affinity, since the object is merely an X, is our own preconception of an object in general. The affinity suggests the connectedness of the manifold/multiplicity.

5.5 I ask, therefore, how do you make the thorough affinity of the appearances understandable (that they do and must stand under enduring laws)?

How do we fathom that all appearances are, and must b, connected, be it closely or remotely?

6.1 According to my principles this is quite easy.

6.2 All possible appearances, as representations, belong to the entire, possible self-consciousness.

All appearances, to the extent they are to represent objects, are subject to the conditions of the unified and numerically identical apperception. It is only by means of the categories that an appearance can be recognized as the representation of an object.

6.3 But from this consideration, as a transcendental representation, the numerical identity is inseparable and a priori certain because nothing can enter into a recognition except by means of this original apperception.

6.4 Now since this identity is necessary in the synthesis of all manifold of the appearances to the extent this manifold is to become empirical knowledge, it follows that the appearances are subject to a priori conditions to which their synthesis (of the apprehension) must be thoroughly conformable.

Thus we do not sit idly with a given perception, but rather work to find the correct elements and to sort them properly to discover the objective apprehension.

6.5 But now the representation of a universal condition by which a certain manifold (regardless of what it might be) can be posited is called a rule, and if it must be so granted, a law.

Referring back to TDA II.3.11.4 where a local manifold had to abide by the rule in order for an object to arise, and now all appearances (a law) are subject to this same connection.

6.6 Therefore all appearances stand in a thorough connection according to necessary laws, and hence in a transcendental affinity, regarding which the empirical affinity is merely a consequence.

There is a connection of all appearances according to laws because these appearances are to represent objects (as opposed to being things on their own). Accordingly we are not surprised to actually find such connections among the appearances for we expect them based on the transcendental affinity.

We assume a single object called nature, i.e., that all things are connected, and we assume the appearances are representations of this object and accordingly go about paying attention upon the suspicion of a connection, i.e., apprehending and reproducing/associating in anticipation of a unity of consciousness via the concept of the object.

Also: in the same way that we put together the parts of an object, e.g., the mouth, nose, eyes, etc., of a face, we put together the parts of nature which are the divese perceptions which make up the single experience of that nature.

The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

Third Part

The Relationship of the Understanding to Objects in General, and the Possibility of Recognizing Them A Priori

The door slams and surprises me. I reopen it to make sure and see it happen again (perception). I muse about it and conceive of a chimney air-flow system (imagination). I realize that such a system would make the door slam, and so I recognize the object, i.e., the imagined object now represented by the physical object (the appearances), and my head (usually) nods to acknowledge this insight (the apperception).

2.1 But there is an a priori basis for each of these three. For the perception we have the pure envisagement (with respect to it as a representation, the form of the inner envisagement, time).

For the association there is the pure synthesis of the imagination.

And for the empirical consciousness [there is] the pure apperception, i.e., the thorough identity of one's self with all possible representations.

I distinguish the time with regard to the slamming of the door; I seek connection via the association, and I remain conscious (exemplify presence of mind) as I take all this in.

The reproduction is no more than that with pure objects where it all stands before us; but with appearances, where the object is “hidden”, association is added by the productive imagination in an effort to facilitate synthesis.

3.1 Now if we want to pursue the internal foundation of this linkage of the representations to the point where they all merge in order first to obtain unity of recognition for a possible experience, we must begin with the pure apperception.

3.2 No envisagement is anything to us nor does it concern us in any way if it cannot be incorporated into consciousness, be that directly or indirectly, and in this way alone is recognition possible.

A unified consciousness is a set or grouping of representations which fit together into a connected whole. Hence to be incorporated directly means to be included among that unified set as an identified object; otherwise, indirectly means that it is included as a problem., e.g., a subjective perception is not yet included. One of the compartments in our consciousness might be called “not yet assigned”. And so if an envisagement cannot be placed directly into consciousness, and not indirectly, then it is certainly of no interest to us. The former, directly, denotes a recognition; while the latter, indirectly, is a mere perception, i.e., an a priori apprehension for the purpose of making a recognition.

I wonder if indirectly might refer to recognitions which violate the rule. For example a table is a top elevated by legs to a height which is suitable for human use. But then a table is found lying upside down. This does not fit with the concept of a table. Then this is brought into the consciousness as a broken table or a table being stored, and thus explaining the apparent contradiction.

And another example would be the door which slams on its own.

3.3 We are a priori conscious of the thorough identity of ourselves with respect to all representations which can ever belong to our recognition, and this as a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations (since in any case these only represent something within me by belonging to one consciousness with all others, hence by being at least subject to connection into a single one).

This a priori consciousness may be a capacity unique to humans. It is often called presence of mind and paying attention for the purpose of learning or discerning something. And certainly, since representations refer to objects and are not contained in objects, it follows that all representations would have to be conscious representations. And so, while we will often subconsciously discern represented objects subsequently as when we drive “automatically”, for example, i.e., when we are preoccupied, it is nonetheless certain that we will have previously been conscious of these representations.

It is worth noting that being a priori conscious of something is not the same as incorporating that into our consciousness. The former indicates an awareness of a representation, while the latter denotes a unified composite of representations which is called an empirical consciousness.

I wonder if the concept of word is not a good example of what Kant is referring to here? Indeed the concept of word refers not only to itself but to table, for example, while table, as a word, will refer to this specific object, and none of this can take place without a conscious awareness.

3.4 This principle stands firmly a priori and can be called the transcendental principle of the unity of every manifold of our representations (hence also in the envisagement).

The unity of the envisagement is different from the singularity which characterizes the envisagement. When I see something, e.g., an A next to something else, a B, then that is a singularity which encompasses a manifold (the A and the B). But this is merely a contingent, happenstance sort of thing, a subjective perception. It is only when I can bring the A and B together as parts of some whole, of some object, that I can speak of unity and unification, and which would denote an objective perception or recognition.

3.5 Now the unity of the manifold in a subject is synthetic; therefore the pure apperception gives us a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in every possible envisagement.*

The pure apperception is to be viewed as a interlocking framework which wants merely a content to become an empirical consciousness. It begins as a unity and remains a unity as the material of the body of knowledge is added.

[* Kant’s footnote:

[1. This statement, which is of great importance, is to be given considerable attention.

[2. All representations are necessarily subject to a possible, empirical consciousness, for if they were not and if it were entirely impossible to be conscious of them, that would mean they did not even exist.

[3. But every empirical consciousness is necessarily subject to a transcendental consciousness (preceding every particular experience), namely that of myself as the original apperception.

This transcendental consciousness (preceding ever particular experience) is the pure apperception which comes into play everything we seek to pay attention to something and engage in an apprehension, retention and unification of some manifold. The understanding of a sentence requires this same state of mind which finds its unification when the sentence is complete and makes sense.

[4. It is therefore utterly necessary that in my recognition every consciousness belong to one consciousness (of myself).

We see here evidence of the singularity of experience itself, that experience consists of individual perceptions which fit together into a single whole. And so the fitting together of individual elements of the manifold of a single perception is one with the unification of all perceptions in one grand experience of the single object called: nature.

[5. Now here is a synthetic proposition which is recognized a priori, and which renders in this way the basis for synthetic propositions a priori which concern the pure thinking in the same way that space and time concern those having to do with the mere envisagement.

[6. The synthetic proposition that every diverse, empirical consciousness would have to be connected in one single self-consciousness, is the utterly first principle of our thinking in general, and it is synthetic.

[7. But we need to remember that the mere representation “I” in reference to all others (whose collective unity it makes possible) is the transcendental consciousness.

[8. Now this representation may be clear (empirical consciousness) or unclear; this does not matter, indeed not even its reality is important. But what is important is that the possibility of the logical form of every recognition rests necessarily upon the relationship to this apperception as a capacity.]

I think that Kant means here that this is so fundamental and original that in the first instance we have merely the transcendental and original and pure apperception and so where the "I" does not (yet) exist in any expressible sense. So first there is the transcendental apperception, which is more like a potential "I" than a distinct expression, and then upon the first synthesis of an object we arrive at an actual expression of the "I". I sometimes think of it as the potential for being moved by music, but which is not given any expression or reality until there arises some music.

4.1 But this synthetic unity presupposes a synthesis, or encompasses it, and if this synthetic unity is a priori necessary, then the synthesis itself must also be a priori.

This should be clear. The apperception begins as a unity and receives a content only under the condition of maintaining that unity; hence a synthesis must be undertaken for any admission into consciousness.

4.2 Therefore the transcendental unity of the apperception refers to the pure synthesis of the imagination as an a priori condition of the possibility of every assemblage of the manifold in a recognition.

For it is only by means of the imagination that any synthesis can be undertaken.

4.3 But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; for the reproductive depends on conditions of experience.

And, since we have already established that the objects of experience do not exist as such on their own, but rather are a product of a synthesis, this synthesis must be a priori (because, again, the objects do not exist in this way on their own).

4.4 Therefore the principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination in light of the apperception is the basis of the possibility of every recognition, and especially of experience.

Precisely! Again: it is only by means of this productive imagination that objects of experience can “come into being” (as objects of experience, e.g., the top and legs becoming [representing] a table) and a synthesis is required in order to maintain the pure, a priori unity of the original apperception. The empirical consciousness is not pure and a priori, but that original unity is maintain as the elements of human knowledge are increased.

5.1 Now we term the synthesis of the manifold in the imagination transcendental if, without regard to any distinction in the envisagement, it aims merely at the connection of the manifold a priori. And the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental if, with reference to the original unity of the apperception, it is represented as a priori necessary.

Now with any synthesis there is, of course, a content, a given manifold. But the action of the imagination in making a connection not only with any given manifold, but merely in general, this action is called transcendental, for it makes possible a recognition. The role of the apperception is critical, for it is to the unity of this apperception that the synthesis of the imagination must be directed in order to produce something which will be compatible with the apperception and its body of knowledge.

5.2 And since this latter lies as the basis of the possibility of every recognition, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of every possible recognition, through which, therefore, all objects of a possible experience must be represented a priori.

Indeed, for it is to an inclusion of a content into the apperception that every synthesis must be directed as its goal and point, and hence this would necessarily have to be the form of any and all recognitions.

6.1 The unity of the apperception with regard to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and this same unity with regard to the transcendental synthesis, the pure understanding.

This is merely another name for what we introduced immediately above, i.e., the unity of the apperception.

6.2 In the understanding, therefore, are pure recognitions a priori which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination with reference to all possible appearances.

6.3 But these are the categories, i.e., pure concepts of the understanding. Hence the empirical, recognitional capacity of the human necessarily contains an understanding which pertains to all objects of the senses (even if only by means of the envisagement) and to their synthesis through the imagination as data for a possible experience.

Right! And because it is only by means of them (as the expression of the modes of apperceptual unity) that a synthesis can be conducted which is also acceptable to the apperception, i.e., to the body (potential or actual) of integrated perceptions (= experience).

6.4 Now since this referral of the appearances to a possible experience is just as necessary (for without it we would not achieve to any recognition at all through them, and they would not concern us in the least), it follows that the pure understanding, by means of the category, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experience, and that the appearances have a necessary referral to the understanding.

There will be no recognition whatsoever except by means of the categories, for it is via them that a synthesis can be attained which is compatible with the apperception (with its unified body of recognitions), which attains to a unity.

But this does not mean that every perception conforms to the categories, for we might have perceptions which never achieve to recognitions.

This problem we take up now. But first: what do we mean by perception? A perception is a clear awareness of empirical data which may (or may not) lead to a recognition. Since it is a clear awareness, it entails an a priori presence of mind in the reception of data. With regard to the slamming door episode, the perception was the awareness that the door does indeed slam when the window was open. We might call it a pre-recognition.

7.1 Now we will present the necessary cohesion of the understanding with the appearances by means of the categories by beginning from below, i.e., from the empirical.

7.2 The first that is given to us is appearance which, if we combine it with consciousness, is called perception. (Without the relationship to an at least possible consciousness, appearance would never be able to be an object of experience, and therefore nothing at all for us and because it has no objective reality on its own and only exists in the recognition, [it] would be nothing whatsoever).

To combine with consciousness means to incorporate into a single, unified consciousness. Since this calls for a recognition, we are speaking here of an indirect combination whereby the data is apprehended for the purpose of such an incorporation. Cf. TDA III 3.2.

In other words, the careful perusal of data for the purposes of recognition (but which must necessarily precede the recognition [for the human advances from the parts to the whole]) is already a combination with consciousness, but only in the class or group of “not yet assimilated” or “yet to be recognized”, i.e., as a problem calling for solution and incorporation. This is a subjective perception and when unified with the single consciusness, by means of a categorical connection, becomes an objective perception, a/k/a a recognition..

7.3 But because every appearance contains a manifold, hence diverse perceptions being encountered dispersed and individual as such in the mind, a connection of these, which they cannot have in the senses themselves, is necessary.

The appearance of the slamming door included not only the door and its motions, but the open window, the hallway location of the door, etc.

7.4 Therefore there is in us an active capacity for the synthesis of this manifold which [capacity] we call imagination, and its action, executed immediately on the perceptions, I call apprehension.*

7.5 This means that the imagination is to bring the manifold of the envisagement into a picture; hence it must previously take the impressions into its capacity, i.e., apprehend them.

So apprehension is a deliberate input project to give the imagination material to play with. It is a perception for the purpose of finding a connection (and differs from the same term, perception, used to indicate the empirical elements of the apprehension, the data itself).

To make this clear: I perceive the elements of the slamming door episode by apprehending them. The elements or individual perceptions include the door, the window, etc., but there is also a perception of all of these together, i.e., the order in which they occur which is not one of the elements but rather is the envisagement of all of them in space and time. So perception sometimes refers to the individual elements and sometimes to the apprehension itself, but in both cases to what is seen carefully and intentionally for the purpose of making a synthesis.

[* Kant’s footnote:

[1. No psychologist seems to have thought about the imagination being a necessary ingredient of the perception itself.

[2. That is because we typically thought of this capacity partly as limited to reproduction and partly, because we thought that the senses not only supplied us with impressions but also even assembled these and brought forth pictures of objects. But it is beyond doubt that something more than the receptivity of the impressions were required, namely a function for their synthesis.]

8.1 But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold alone would produce no picture and no cohesion of the impressions if a subjective basis were not at hand to call one perception, from which the mind transits to another, over to the following ones, and thereby to describe entire series of these, i.e., a reproductive capacity of the imagination, which then also is only empirical.

This refers to the retention of the data as a manifold, i.e., all together. This is obviously necessary if a manifold is to be united into a singularity.

9.1 But if representations were to be reproduced without distinction, just as they were gathered together, no determined cohesion would develop from them, but rather only disordered heaps, and hence no recognition at all. Therefore their reproduction must have a rule according to which a representation must be combined in the imagination with one of these rather than with another.

Here we are speaking of finding a pattern, e.g., (with regard to the slamming door) first the window is open and the weather is cool outside and warm inside. The door is the hallway door and not an interior door, etc.

As an example I hear a honk and then see a car, and I don't try to figure this out by thinking honk and then car, but rather car and then honk. So I don't mechanically keep things in the same order as apprehended, but try to put them in an order that "works".

9.2 This subjective and empirical basis of the reproduction according to rules we call association of the representations.

This activity is prevalent in all our lives, but we see it most clearly in the work of detectives and sleuths and scientists.

10.1 But if this unity of association did not also have an objective basis such that it were impossible for the appearances to be apprehended by the imagination except under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension, then it would be entirely accidental for appearances to fit into a cohesion of human recognition.

This possible synthetic unity may refer to TDA II 3 5.5.a

Now to the crux of the argument. The thesis is that the ability to carefully and clearly apprehend the data is due to a consciously intended synthesis; and this would mean that such a synthesis is considered possible and, of particular importance in this section, that the data apprehended is connected and therefore is subject to a synthesis, i.e., can be associated. To establish this, Kant assumes here the contrary as a hypothesis, i.e., that we do not presuppose that the data is associable, and he does so to show that it leads to a contradiction in fact.

10.2.a For even though we had the capacity for associating perceptions,

b. it would still remain entirely undetermined and contingent whether they were actually associable as such;

There would be no guarantee that the rule of empirical association were warranted.

c. and in case they were not, then a flood of perceptions and indeed an entire sensitivity would be possible in which considerable empirical consciousness would be encountered in my mind,

d. but disjointed and without belonging to a consciousness of myself.

For there would be no basis for insisting in a connection such that a continued search were warranted.

e. But that is impossible,

10.3 for it is only by counting all my perceptions to one consciousness (the original apperception) that I can say with all perceptions that I am conscious of them.

This is a difficult part. From experience I know that when I have a puzzle that I cannot solve, I may put it off, but it always remains a puzzle and will return to mind upon some prompt, e.g., an unsolved mystery for the novel’s detective. But this is because of the pervasive presumption of connection of all appearances (immediately or more remotely). Now without this presumption of connection, I would occasionally be apprehending data for a connection, but without a connection arising. But (under this hypothesis) this would not be a puzzle at all, but would be as valid a perception as one which resulted in a recognition (unified consciousness). But it would not be united and yet, at the same time, it would also not be a puzzle; it would be an independent consciousness but of equal rank and validity as the unified consciousness. And so I would have entirely disparate consciousness; and that is impossible, for the original apprehension represents this single consciousness, this single presence of mind, which takes in the data as part of a this single apperception and keeps unintegrated elements so denominated as puzzles. A good example for an entire sensitivity which is without unity might be wood, some of which floats and some of which (water-logged) sinks.

10.4 Therefore there must be an objective basis, i.e., preceding all empirical laws of the imagination, whereupon would rest the possibility, indeed the necessity, of a law reaching through all the appearances, namely to consider them altogether to be such data of the senses that are associable as such and subject to universal rules of a thorough connection in the reproduction.

Therefore all our knowledge and indeed even the apprehension of data for a possible recognition, is dependent upon the presupposition that all appearances are connected, whereby then alone association is warranted and enabled, and in search of which we are empowered to make perceptions.

Without this presupposition we could expect to unify some appearances and not others and make any distinction between them. It is only via this affinity that we can insist that all objects and all perceptions are unified. And so I could not have a world in which some doors had to be slammed while some doors slammed themselves. This would be a totally disparate and disjointed consciousness.

10.5 This objective basis of all association of the appearances I call the affinity of the appearances.

Speaking now of the rule of association (directed toward connection) and not the law of association, a description of the mechanics of the mind that Hume made much use of.

10.6 But this we can encounter nowhere else than in the fundamental proposition concerning the unity of the apperception with respect to all recognitions which can ever belong to me.

10.7 According to this all appearances whatsoever must so enter the mind or be apprehended that they accord with the unity of the apperception, which would be impossible without a synthetic unity in their connection, which therefore is also objectively necessary.

This seems to suggest that we from the beginning take in appearances only as they seem related and can accord with the unity of apperception. So in the case of the slamming door I would reject any inclusion of something I would deem extraneous (per my transcendental, unifying apperception), e.g., that I had eaten a candy bar and which is something that I would never have done before at that time of day. And so we pick and choose as to what we will allow to enter our equations in solving problems and coming to objective perceptions or recognitions. And the basis for this pick and choose is the unity of apperception which must always be maintained.

11.1 The objective unity of every (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (the original apperception) is therefore the necessary condition even of every possible perception, and the (close or remote) affinity of all appearances is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in the imagination which is a priori based on rules.

Every perception is a clear (empirical) consciousness and is dependent upon an apprehension which is directed toward a unified consciousness. This incorporation is a result of the productive imagination directed toward that same unity. And this synthesis, which is focused on apperceptual unity, is the basis we have for thinking of the affinity of all appearances, i.e., they are considered connected because of the requirements of the productive imagination in its synthesizing endeavors.

12.1 The imagination, therefore, is also a capacity of a priori synthesis, which is why we call it the productive imagination. And to the extent it aims at nothing further than the necessary unity in the synthesis of all manifold of the appearance, it can be termed the transcendental function of the imagination.

12.2 It is indeed curious, but nonetheless quite illuminating from the preceding, that it is only by means of this transcendental function of the imagination that the affinity of the appearances first becomes possible, and with this the association and through this finally the reproduction according to laws, and consequently experience itself.

It is because the productive imagination does in fact seek to combine appearances that we can speak of an affinity, for this affinity is the (implicit) presupposition of this imaginative activity whereby it insists upon finding connection. What follows then is the association as an expression of this imagination and finally a rule whereby the data is rendered a priori and which (rule) is itself an empirical expression of some law, i.e., the rule is not merely arbitrary recitation of data like the alphabet, but is universal.

For purposes of comparison: association is skipped with pure pantomimics because there is nothing hidden, i.e., the object itself stands before us on its own (for all it is is an envisagement devoid of all empirical components).

If it were not for the affinity of all appearances we would be satisifed in attaining to subjective perceptions (no unification in a common, all-encompassing apperception) and not coming to objective perceptions (recognitions).

13.1 For the steady and abiding I (the pure apperception) constitutes the correlatum of all our representations to the extent it is merely possible to become conscious of them, and every consciousness belongs to an all-encompassing, pure apperception just as much as every sensitive envisagement as a representation does to a pure, internal envisagement, namely time.

13.2 Now this apperception is what must be added to the pure imagination to make its function intellectual.

The synthesis must not only combine the data according to a rule, but the rule must be a particular expression of some law, e.g., that of causation. Hence not merely the door slams when the window is open, which is a rule, but rather, the open window allows the air in and up the hallway vent and thereby makes the door into a damper.

13.3 For on its on, the synthesis of the imagination, even though executed a priori, is still always sensible because it only binds the manifold as it appears in the envisagement, e.g., the shape of the triangle.

The elements of the slamming door are put into an order, a schematic, by the imagination, but the consciousness of this picture is that of causation which holds it together and makes it into a unified picture.

13.4 But by means of the relationship of the manifold to the unity of the apperception, concepts (which belong to the understanding) can emerge, but only by means of the imagination in reference to the sensitive envisagement.

The concepts are unifying rules, rules which render a manifold a priori. They are the expressions of the unity of the apperception, but they can only arise as a product of the productive imagination in focus on the data of a given, sensitive envisagement.

14.1 We have, therefore, a pure imaginatory capacity as a fundamental capacity of the human soul, one which lies a priori as the basis to every recognition.

14.2 By means of it we bring the manifold of the envisagement on one hand into connection with the conditions of the necessary unity of the pure apperception on the other.

14.3 Both extremes, sensitivity and understanding, must cohere necessarily by means of this transcendental function of the imagination; because otherwise the former would indeed render appearances, but no objects of an empirical recognition, hence no experience.

14.4 The actual experience, which arises from the apprehension, association (and reproduction), and finally the recognition [rekognition] of the appearances, finds concepts in the latter [the understanding], the highest (of the merely empirical elements of experience), and these concepts make the formal unity of experience possible, and with it, every objective validity (truth) of the empirical recognition.

This is a summary of the entire recognitional process: we differentiate time in the apprehension of data; we retain and bemuse the data; we find a rule to describe it; and we finally conceive of an object whereby the rule is necessitated (which comes about through the rule serving as an application (or specific case) of a general law which is the form of the apperception.

14.5 Now these foundations of the recognition [rekognition] of the manifold, to the extent they concern merely the form of an experience, are the categories.

The categories are the modes or ways of apperceptual unity.

14.6 Upon them, therefore, every formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination is based, and by means of this also every empirical usage of that (in the reproduction, association, apprehension) down to the appearances, because only by means of these elements can they belong to the recognition and in general to our consciousness, hence to us.

Since the recognition depends upon the categories, everything related or directed to a recognition is dependent upon these categories (hence, as we saw in paragraphs 10 & 11, even the perception).

15.1 Therefore we ourselves introduce the order and regularity of the appearances which we call nature, and also would not find such there if we or the nature of our minds had not done so originally.

And so here we have the great thesis of Kant: nature is as much a product of the human mind as it is the external world. And when we think we have thoroughly understood nature, we have merely probed the organization and nature of the human mind and the human way of reception of data (sensitivity).

15.2 For this unity of nature is to be a necessary, i.e., an a priori certain, unity of the connection of the appearances.

15.3 But how could we bring about a priori a synthetic unity, were not subjective foundations of such unity contained a priori in the original recognition sources of our mind, and were these subjective conditions not simultaneously objectively valid by being the foundations of the possibility of recognizing in general an object in experience?

The secret is the original, unified apperception and the only means available for increase in the stock of this unity, namely via the apprehension, association, etc., and including therefore also the categories as the form of concepts.

16.1 We have already explained the understanding in various ways: as spontaneity of the recognition (in contrast to the receptivity of the sensitivity), as a capacity for thinking, or even a capacity for concepts, or yet of judgments, which explanations, when properly considered, blend into one.

16.2 Now we can characterize it as the capacity for rules.

16.3 This characterization is fruitful and comes close to the essential nature of the matter.

16.4 Sensitivity gives us the forms (of the envisagement), but understanding the rules.

16.5 The understanding is ever occupied with perusing the appearances with an eye toward discovering some sort of rule for them.

16.6 Rules, to the extent they are objective (hence adhering necessarily to the recognition of the object), are called laws.

16.7 Even though we learn many laws through experience, these are nonetheless only particular determinations of yet higher laws, among which the highest (under which all others stand) are taken a priori from the understanding itself, and are not borrowed from experience, but rather provide the appearances with their law-likeness, and precisely in that way make experience possible.

The law of reproduction (or, as Hume would have it, of association) is empirical and requires exposure to appearances in order to be conceived and formulated. But it is still merely an application of a even more general law, namely the law of cause and effect, namely that the cause, the exposure to the data by the mind, precedes the effect, the reproduction of this data by the mind upon some prompt (and hence its connection all together such that some bit of the data serves as a prompt), and is necessarily followed by that effect.

16.8 The understanding, therefore, is not merely a capacity by which the appearances are compared in order to make rules. It is itself the legislator preceding nature, i.e., without the understanding there would not even be a nature, i.e., there would not be any synthetic unity of of the manifold of the appearances according to rules. For appearances, as such, cannot take place apart from us, but rather exist only within our sensitivity.

To merely compare and pattern data would be no more than Hume had suggested. It would be no more than the mathematicians does in finding a rule which describes some variable. Experience differs from exposure and in that the data is necessitated by a rule (which not only describes it but also) which is a particular application of a general law whereby objects are admitted into the apperception.

16.9 But this, as an object of recognition in an experience, with everything which it (the experience) may contain, is only possible in the unity of the apperception.

16.10 But this unity of the apperception is the transcendental basis of the necessary law-likeness of all appearances in an experience.

16.11 Precisely this unity of the apperception with respect to a manifold of representations (i.e., to determine it from a single representation) is the rule, and the capacity of these rules is the understanding.

It is the rule whereby a manifold is rendered into a singularity. For example: 2, 4, 8 can be rendered by the rule y = 2ⁿ, where n = 1, 2, 3, respectively. Or: when the window is open and the weather is of a certain qualityy, the door slams shut; this is a rule which contains a manifold as a singularity. So then, Kant is saying, all rules are products of the understanding.

16.12 All appearances, therefore, as possible experience, lie just as a priori in the understanding and obtain their formal possibility from it, as they lie, as mere envisagements, in the sensitivity and are only possible, with regard to their form, through this.

And so then we see, since the understanding is the source of all rules, and since rules are the way we combine disparate data into singularities, it follows that the only way that any unification can ever arise is via the particular ways in which the understanding can formulate rules (which, as we will learn later, is in connection of appearances through time).

17.1 As exaggerated and nonsensical as it may seem, nonetheless, to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and hence of the formal unity of nature, is entirely proper and commensurate to the object, namely experience.

17.2 Empirical laws as such, of course, can certainly not derive their origin from the pure understanding any more than the immeasurable manifold of the appearances can be sufficiently grasped from the pure form of the sensitive envisagement.

The categories and the understanding provide merely the form of experience. The actual experience is dependent upon the material given through the sensitivity. It is conceivable that the material would be such that it would be impossible to ever understand it; but it is also unequivocally clear that no matter how orderly the data might be, unless it is ordered in accordance with the form of apperceptual unity (= the categories), no understanding will ever arise and no experience, but merely disjointed appearances and mental behavior based on hunch alone.

17.3 But all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, under which and according to the form of which those [empirical laws] are first possible, and by which the appearances receive a form of regularity, even as also all appearances, regardless of the diversity of this empirical form, still must always be conformable to the conditions of the pure form of the sensitivity.

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