Kant in a Nutshell

The difference between the human and the animals, I think Kant may be saying, is that the human figures out; the animal catches on to patterns, but the human figures them out. The animal catches on to the reduction in size of things as they get further away, and can deal with that as well as a human; but the human figures out that the thing that is getting smaller is not really a thing at all, but only the picture of a thing, which is an affectation of our retina; and the thing remains the same size (which latter, by the way, is a category of thinking and which is applied to the pictures that we see, and which can never in any way be concluded from experience).*

[* For an earlier essay and a greater development of this section and especially Kant's concept of the object, click here.]

The human will then try to figure out the universe and existence and comes up with such ideas as a soul, free will and God, for it is by means of these that our reasoning can be satisfied. But here, since there is no thing which we can conceive of as a thing of experience, we find that we have no certitude here at all, and must conclude that reasoning about things is not really figuring things out, but rather dreaming things up that can apparently be figured out, but not actually. And these are unessential in explaining the pictures of the world we are subjected to. And so here Kant finds no hope in all of theoretics or speculation that can assure us of our immorality, free will or God. The only solace, Kant finds, is that these can also not be refuted by the realm of science and philosophical knowledge, and so they are permissible, but unneeded ideas. In a word: they name ideas, but not things, at least not as far as anyone can tell.

Now when we get with Kant into practical matters we find we have a rational need for all three of these. And since there is no reason in theoretical and speculative reasoning which prevents them as existences, Kant will take advantage of them for his practical purposes.

Kant wants the human to have confidence in the moral law which wells up from within his own rationality and his emotional response to this product. He finds the moral law sufficient on its own without any props. By virtue of his analysis of the effect of the moral law on the human, Kant finds that the human must conceive of himself as a free being. Essentially it goes something like this: for a being who were not free of the necessitation of nature, and thus of innate self interest, would not be able to understand the suggestion of a moral act any more than he could believe that you were serious in asking him if he would like to have his hand roasted alive so that he might eat it, or would he rather have an ice cream cone. If he were told that the rule says that he must give up his life in order to spare an innocent man by telling the truth and can safely avoid that by telling a safe lie, he would look at in the same light. The human at least pauses and considers the matter, no matter how finally chooses, and it is in that pause that Kant spies the recognition of personal freedom, i.e., it is possible that I might tell the truth. That thought is not possible to a being who is rational, but not free.

And so we have freedom as a meaningful idea, but then we have a rational problem which needs fixing. By all right reason it doesn't make the least bit of sense to do something which is simply inane and without purpose. But this would mean that the moral law, which needs no purpose in its command, still needed a purpose in order to satisfy rationality. Even though the moral law is a product of rationality, nevertheless it, as all rational actions, must have a purpose, for otherwise it is to be counted as silly, a silly thing to do. And so, unless we can find a purpose, the moral act stands in a gulf between two precipices, adherence to a law of reason and rational rejection of inanity.

This needed purpose to the moral law and freedom Kant calls the Highest Good. The Highest Good that human rationality can conceive of has an existence of happiness which is proportionate to one's moral worth and where everyone can achieve to that moral worth (which is given via freedom). Now Kant really goes to work. In order that this Highest Good be a practical purpose for the moral law, that means that I have to believe that I can achieve to the required existence, and looking out now into possible eternities of existence, and so for it to be this necessary purpose I must believe that I am going to live longer than this span of life and that that purpose will indeed be attained, and I will achieve to moral perfection. Thus does he introduce eternal life, as necessary for my wanting to strive in pursuit of this moral perfection now, and for seeing it as a practical goal. *

[* Kant doesn't get into this, as far as I know, but it is an interesting thought that in the time span of the earthly part of this continuing existence, I may be establishing something which become fixed part of my being after this earthly part, and thus something which will continue as my eternal character.]

Now God is a bit easier. Since it is incoherent to speak of the apportionment of happiness to moral perfection by laws of nature, the only way that the Highest Good can be conceived of as a practical goal is if there is an Omnipotent Moral Judge.

And so there we have it: Kant has his freedom and his eternal soul and his God, all derived from rationality itself in order to “rationalize” one of its own laws, if you will, the moral law. All this leads us now into religion.

Kant introduces this by raising a question which I think is rather fascinating to contemplate. Let a man, who wishes to honor the moral law and who is guided by practical rationality, be given an opportunity to fashion his own world, and in which he would have to live just like anyone else, what would he do?

Well in the first place, guided as he is by practical rationality, he would not opt for a world where happiness were independent of moral worth, but rather he would choose a world of the Highest Good, where the virtuous can expect happiness by virtue of being the condition for happiness.

And also he would even be obligated to fashion this sort of world because he honors the moral law which requires his greatest good at any instant, and at the instant of his creation this world of the Highest Good would be the greatest good he can do. And it should be noted that he will make this choice even though he will not himself be able to vouch for his own outcome in such a world, for he may very well not live up to the requirements of perfect virtue. He will create this Highest Good world because he knows that it is right and good that the moral law be purposeful and that there be a meaning to one's duties.

Now from this reflection and conclusion Kant wants not only for people to imagine this world, but also to realize that they are morally obligated to fashion this world to the extent of their power through their good deeds now.* And it is from here that we delve into Kant's meditations on religion, on what sort of religion pure reason would recommend for the humans. And this calls for an investigation of the human condition, starting with man's innate and voluntary descent into evil.

[* This certainly seems to be reflected in the criminal law system where we punish people for disobeying the law, although we don't reward people who obey the law, that being a duty and in no need of reward in order to be efficacious (although, as we saw, it is needful in order for the moral act to be termed a rational (purposeful) act.]

Book One - Human Evil. The human, though certainly made for good, automatically and voluntarily chooses the evil principle (self-interest) over the good (common interest). Hence this evil may be ascribed to the humans as a species. It is a natural and voluntary initial choice, made perhaps at birth, to disregard the moral law on occasion, if it is advantageous to do so. We support this tendency by avoiding discussing the principles of each other's actions and look to the effect to see good and evil. We justify the polite lie to ourselves and each other, for example, and demonstrate thereby immediately our evil, while claiming to be good. There is even a natural corruption of meanings through this charades of moral, social talk, such that the term morality is confused and uncertain and we don't even understand ourselves.

Book Two - Possibility of Change. In order to straighten out the language and make things clear we need the idea of a perfectly righteous man, who always disregards self-interest for the sake of righteousness. We can create the idea itself rationally (as a product of human rationality), even though it may have first been introduced in the life of a historical man. And reports of such a moral man are not to be doubted, for reason requires it of each person at this very instant.

What we will need in our religion will be a means for a person to think that he can actually change and become morally a different person, and that experience will give him evidence of this, and finally that his former trespasses are legally forgotten and counted as paid for.

These difficulties must be overcome in a rational way for any man to seriously consider changing his ways for the good. Regarding becoming a different person, this is possible by considering the disposition has having become moral and which is all that is considered in a moral court, the acts themselves in time and experience being a mix of this new disposition and the vestiges and inertia of evil in daily life. Experience can tell that a person is making progress in moral perfection (or is remaining evil), but not that one's has achieved to holiness and need not strive longer for virtue. Regarding any forgiveness, the “new man” shoulders the ills that were due the “old man” and without complaint and without seeking credit for his good acts, and this taking on of these theoretically infinite ills associated with a dedication to the moral principle counts as an atonement for the theoretically infinite evil that the “old man” was capable of doing in his former disposition (and where occasion and opportunity determined his factual evil), and which is the moral way of thinking.

Book Three - Rational Expectations. Next we must deal with the precarious position of a “new man” remaining in the “old world” of evil. He will be tempted mightily and it is not to be expected that he can be successful by himself, no matter how great his dedication. And so we come to the “curious duty” belonging to man not as himself but as a member of a species of like men, each inadequate on his own to the task at hand, i.e., moral perfection. By virtue of this duty we find that we and all men need help and so we must help each other (the call of duty being for us to do our best). If I myself am to achieve to moral perfection, as is my intention as a “new man”, then I will need the help of others, and likewise others who strive to be morally perfect need my help. We have a duty to each other, a duty of the species to help the entire species, a duty of the species to itself (and where success is not guaranteed). As a result these unions are to be formed and should be called churches of God. God is then finally introduced as the lawgiver who guarantees that the union will always be morally founded and directed, i.e., God has commanded the moral law and that cannot therefore be uncommanded.

Book Four - Rational Church. And finally, since we are duty bound to join a church, we must make sure that it is a “real” church and avoids the pitfalls which arise through superstition, where we utilize inane ceremonies to show our devotion and gain divine favor, in lieu of comply with the moral law; and fetishism, where we think to bend God to our way of thinking and acting and to work on Him as though He were a means for our ends; and fanaticism where we think we have divine favor or insight and need not to bother with moral matters. Creeds and ritual are acceptable as long as they are not considered as necessary for salvation, and it is always understood that the only requirement for pleasing God is a good heart and spirit. Creeds and rituals may become symbols of solidarity with all people of a certain spirit (including former generations) and thus be useful for giving people a sense of oneness in their effort to help each other practice being moral on an ongoing basis and of becoming stronger in the struggle with the “prince of the world” (whose name is Self-Interest).