Highest Good and atheists

We assume here that we have already established the fact of freedom due to the otherwise inexplicable respect that we hold for the moral law.*

[* See essays Freedom Proof and Moral Proof of Freedom.]

But now it is only natural that we rational humans ask: to what end is this moral law, and thus our freedom also, directed? What is to be accomplished by the fact of such a curious and yet undoubted law affecting our conduct?

The question assumes a purpose, presupposing that all principled action is directed toward some goal, some accomplishment. But this is eminently rational, for otherwise, without a purpose for our practical principles of conduct, we are forced to ask: what's going on? A rule of conduct that has no purpose? Even the game of hopscotch will have a purpose of avoiding boredom. A man who burned up his money to pass the time would be more sane than a man who undertook an act simply because it were derived from the moral law, an absolute code of conduct without any purpose at all, something that we ourselves dream up. One can understand religious people complying with a rule of bowing according to clock and compass, for example, for the sake of a self discipline or because they fear punishment if not. But then imagine people doing that without being religious or wanting exercise. Such senseless principles would be no different from moral principles, absent a purpose.

And so even though the moral law is fully validated in its own right as its own purpose sufficient for action, still it must have a purpose to which it, like any rational, principled action, must aim. The former is a product of reason, the latter a presupposition of reason.

What then is the purpose of the moral law? What is to be accomplished by the fact of this law and the respect that humans hold for it?

We must seek our answer within the context of ourselves as rational creatures who are human, and who are endowed with an irrepressible drive for personal happiness. Our rationality is practical and leads us toward the moral act and also toward the pursuit of happiness. And there is only one way in which these (morality and happiness) can be unified, and practical rationality be brought into accord with itself, and that is by means of the idea of the Highest Good. According to this idea we are to be morally perfect and will have the right to a happiness which is proportionate to that, and so we are to become perfectly happy.*

[* This holds for the individual. For a world, it is likely that there will be different degrees of moral virtue and hence there would be different degrees of happiness.]

And so it is this idea that we must come to put out in front of the moral act (and even of the act in pursuit of happiness to the extent we do not make ourselves unworthy of happiness). And we unify practical rationality within ourselves by means of this conception of the Highest Good as the purpose of the moral law. Essentially we are making the moral act also the most prudent act possible.

Therefore, because our rationality is practical (and hence therefore also unified) the Highest Good is a practical (achievable) goal, and so it is in (implicit) fact the purpose of the moral law and to which the moral act is understood to aim, and what it is to accomplish. Whenever we undertake a moral act we are implicitly and ipso facto implementing the idea of the Highest Good.

Eternal Life. The Highest Good is then a rationally necessary goal for all moral striving. It assumes the attaining of moral perfection, to which each moral act points as evidence. The fact that this moral perfection cannot be attained in any finite span of time means only that the human must have a longer life in order to further that approximation and approach. Otherwise the Highest Good cannot be a practical goal . . . but it is a practical goal! for we are constantly called to act as the morally perfect, and so the Highest Good has to be possible in a practical way (for what we are called to do, we can do), and so utter virtue is practical and thus to be expected as an eventual result of the moral striving.

God. And likewise the Highest Good as a practical goal calls for the intervention of a God as the Omnipotent and All Knowing Moral Judge who dispenses happiness in proportion to one’s virtue. And so where the perfect virtue aimed at by the individual in his pursuit of the Highest Good (through every moral act) is actually realized (for this moral rectification cannot arise by the workings of laws of nature).*

Now we can examine some test cases of atheists who have chosen to reject God (and soul) and the Highest Good. To aid us here in seeking rigor in our evaluation it will be helpful first to consider the atheist's conception of the human.

The atheist's general conception of humanity. In the eyes of the atheist there is no more objective meaning to the human than there is to the cow or the ant or the tree or the toaster oven. Each of these can be considered as a machine and where some of these machines possess thinking and feelings and desires, but where all, when “un-plugged”, reduce to just a mash of indistinguishable atoms and particles. In a crass expression we could speak of the cemetery as the garbage dump reserved for human leftovers. In this atheist vein we will consider Kant's moral law as so much prattle and his vaunted “moral feeling” as just another word for compassion or animal pity which has well served the species in its pointless struggle for domination on the earth. Shakespeare's representation of the inanity of the moral disposition and striving can be rendered by Richard III's oration to his army,

“Conscience is a word that cowards use,
“Devised at first to keep the strong in awe.
“Our strong arms be our conscience, swords our law.
“Conscience avaunt!”

Now we will examine the trustworthiness of certain types of atheists regarding a case of private and secret morality by considering Kant's case of a man who is in a position to safely cheat another person and enrich himself and who guides himself solely by personal happiness.*

“If an intimate friend, otherwise endeared to you, thought to justify himself in your eyes regarding a falsely rendered testimony by first pleading the--as he put it--holy duty of personal happiness, then by enumerating the advantages he acquired by doing this, mentioning the prudence he observed in securing himself against any disclosure (including that on your part even, to whom he reveals his secret only because he is able to deny it at any time); but then allowing in dead seriousness to have performed a true human duty; you would either immediately laugh in his face, or cringe with abhorrence; even though, if you had guided your principles solely by personal advantage, you would be unable to say anything at all against your friend's measures.”

[* Critique of Practical Reason, Section 8, Par. 4.]

Now we turn to estimate how the atheist would respond to this situation.

Saganian Atheist. Sagan has established that he is moved by animal pity and by fear of the police. And so it is a personal happiness as the supreme maxim of his actions where animal pity (compassion) and fear of the police are factors in his equation. Accordingly in Kant's case of the perjurer (where animal pity seems not to be important) the Saganian atheist will have no incentive to restrain himself and will instead seize the opportunity for self enrichment.

Uhlian Atheist. The Uhlian atheist expresses a great compassion for the aimless humans with their lack of any meaning to the moral law. He devises a substitute which will serve them well in their striving for happiness. As with Kant's perjurer above the Uhlian is first and foremost in pursuit of personal happiness and all else is secondary. Now given this, Stephen Uhl informs us that if we reflected properly we would realize that the Golden Rule would on average do a better job of producing our own happiness than any other rule. For example, we are happier with others who are happy and so by following the Golden Rule we will work to make others happy, and so then also ourselves. On average then we will not do better than this Golden Rule which, for this reason, Uhl denominates the Golden Rule of Selfish Enlightenment.

Now what will the Uhlian do in the case of Kant's profitable perjury cited above? Let us assume that the victim of the lie is not someone whose suffering would arouse animal pity on the part of the Uhlian (which seems reasonable as Kant has described the situation). Since the supreme principle for Uhl is personal happiness and since the Golden Rule only works only “on average” in procuring personal happiness, it would be impossible (irrational) for the Uhlian atheist to avoid perjuring himself in this situation. There is no incentive for complying with the Golden Rule. In a word: it is certain that the Uhlian atheist cannot be considered as trustworthy in such a matter.

Spinozan Atheist. Now we are dealing with an atheist who is dedicated to the moral law above personal happiness. However, since this atheist does have an incentive to violate the moral law for the sake of happiness (and especially given the pointlessness of the moral act) the trustworthiness of such an atheist will have to be problematic and uncertain.*

[* Kant's advice to Spinoza or the moral atheist is interesting. Since it is very difficult (though still expected) to remain true to the moral law in the absence of any objective meaning or purpose, why not just accept the Highest Good as its purpose and then also accordingly assume the existence of God, even without asserting it. It makes the moral quest much easier.]

Buddhist Atheist. This is an interesting case, for this atheist has no incentive for telling here a lie, but not because it is immoral and wrong, but because it reflects a desire, and the Buddhist is steadfast in his determination to eliminate all desires in general (as the source of all suffering and unhappiness), and so therefore also any desire to gain these funds. Consequently the Buddhist can be trusted to avoid the perjury. For he has no desire for the object of the perjury.*

[* Buddhist thinking is complicated in that one of the desires that the Buddhist desires to be rid of is the desire to be rid of all desires.]

In contrast we will consider the case of the Kantian theist.

Kantian Theist. By means of the Highest Good as the purpose of the moral act and which encompasses also the Kantian's own personal happiness, the Kantian theist has no conflict in goals regarding the moral law and happiness, and thus no incentive to the perjury. Consequently he is trustworthy and can be depended upon.

Recap: And so the only roads here to certainty regarding trustworthiness are via Buddha (atheist) and Kant (theist). In fact they have no more reason to consider lying than Uhl or Sagan have in not lying. Only Spinoza must consider his responses to the opportunity for gain in Kant's case, for only he has both an objective basis for morality as well as subjective incentives for dereliction of his moral duty.