The Critique of Practical Reason
by Immanuel Kant

Translated by Philip McPherson Rudisill
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Beginning on page xiii of Kant’s 
Religion Within The Bounds Of Sheer Reason
a concise summary of this Critique of Pure Reason is available.

And a more expansive summary may be found in Kant In A Nutshell.

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**Anschauung** I render in English with “perspective” although “intuition” is far more common in translations of Kant’s works. The suggestion of “etwas anschauen” in German is “looking at something” or “viewing something”. According to one person’s Anschauung there is a face of a wolf in the cloud, and according to that of another person there will be no such face, but rather the form of a fish or perhaps nothing but a cloud. I am also partial to “sighting”, e.g., in my sighting I see the face of a cloud. Or: the face is not in the cloud, but only in one’s *looking at* the cloud. “Viewing” can also suggest much of this. And we might speak of someone’s “take” on something, i.e., what that person gleans from that something. I have also often used “envisagement” and like the suggestion of putting a face on something. In general the suggestion of Anschauung is a direct and personal receipt of information without any use of reasoning. For example I see that one object is to the left of another; and I see that directly and immediately. For more on this see Anschauung.

**Erkenntnis.** The root of this word is “kennen” which means to know or to have familiarity with. In all of my translations I have used “recognition” over the more commonly used “knowledge”.

**Erscheinung.** For this I use “appearance” which is very common, although I have also utilized “specter” in some other works on Kant. When St. Paul reports seeing a Jesus-in-the-sky this is given in German as an Erscheinung. There is a suggestion of “shining forth”. The rainbow is considered to be an Erscheinung by the Germans. The appearance of water on the heated road ahead which vanishes as you approach it is an Erscheinung. So the word has an affinity also with “mirage” and “hallucination”. The import for the student of Kant is that this appearance is not a thing which exists on its own as it appears, but which has its existence solely within the perception.

**Idea** is a technical term for Kant and I render it always as “Idea” and not with a lower case i. Generally it denotes a concept for which no object can be given corresponding to it, at least not given to the human who is limited to a sensitive perspective of things. For example there may be a soul, but this is not subject to a perspective through any looking whatsoever. Thus the soul would be an Idea.

**Schein** I translate as “semblance”. Another possibility would be “illusion”. The implication is that of some misleading.

**Triebfeder.** This I render with “incentive”. It refers immediately and, in a technical sense, to the mainspring of a watch. It could also be rendered as motivating force or incentive force. I have also considered “drive”.

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1 This is the literal translation of Anschauung; ich schaue das an = I’m looking at that.
**Vernunfteln** is a disparaging term which is rooted in “Vernunft” (reason) and for which I use “**rational contriving**” though “rationalization” or “rational concocting” could also work.

**Willkür** is rendered as “**discretionary choice**”. Also “arbitrary choice” might work as well.

**Concerning This Translation**

I have chosen to number each of Kant’s sentences and paragraphs in a format such as 4.2, which would indicate the fourth paragraph (of a given section) and then the second sentence of that paragraph. I may break up Kant’s sentences into several, but they will be included all together under that single number. For example, sentence 4.2 of the Preface reads:

4.2 For the Ideas of God and immortality are not conditions of the moral law, but rather only conditions of the necessary object of a will determined through that law, i.e., merely of the practical usage of our pure reason. Therefore we not only cannot recognize nor penetrate the actuality of these Ideas, but indeed not even their possibility.

And so here I have divided the original German sentence into two English sentences, but still under the indicator of sentence 4.2.

My comments are given as footnotes to the text. Kant’s own footnotes I have shown as paragraph notes, following the relevant paragraph, and I have used a smaller font.

The reader is invited to consider [Kant in a Nutshell](#) for a cursory review of Kant’s effort in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR), the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral* (GMM), the *Critique of Practical Reason* (CPrR) and *Religion Within The Bounds Of Sheer Reason* (Religion). This may help in establishing the context of this present work as well as a short summary.

I cordially invite the reader who spies any errors or has any suggestions to contact me at [pmr@kantwesley.com](mailto:pmr@kantwesley.com).

The translation now follows.
The Critique of Practical Reason

by Immanuel Kant

Translated by Philip McPherson Rudisill
Preface

1.1 This critique is entitled only a critique of practical reason in general, and not rather a critique of pure practical reason, even though a comparison with speculative reason would seem to suggest the latter. The reason for this is given an adequate explanation in the treatise itself,

1.2 for here we are to establish merely that there is a pure practical reason and then to critique its entire practical capacity.²

1.3 If we succeed in doing this, there is no need to critique the pure capacity itself in order to determine whether reason might not have presumptuously overstepped its bounds with such a capacity (which indeed is the case with speculative reason);

1.4 for if as pure reason it is truly practical, then it proves its reality and that of its concepts through that fact, and all rational contriving against its possibility is in vain.³

2.1 With this capacity transcendental freedom will also stand firm and indeed in that absolute sense which speculative reason required with the usage of the concept of causality in order to save itself from the antinomy into which it unavoidably stumbles if it contemplates the unconditioned in the series of causal connection.⁴ But it could only set up this concept problematically as not impossible to think, without securing its objective reality, but rather only not to be assailed in its existence nor be toppled into an abyss of skepticism through the vain impossibility of that which it must still allow as at least thinkable.⁵

² This would mean to show that pure reason is able to determine and direct the will without the necessary presupposition of some object of desire, i.e., that this can be done immediately by reason alone. And then we need merely to examine how reason is able to determine the will in general.

³ If pure reason is in fact found to be practical, then we don't have to consider how this is possible. For every reality is ipso facto possible, even if it cannot be understood.

⁴ We know that every condition in the appearance of things is conditioned and we look for its condition and also, via pure reason, we seek to go back to the unconditioned. This unconditioned is something speculative reason requires but then can never arrive upon. This is presented in the Third Antinomy of CPR. The most that could be accomplished was to show that freedom was compatible with natural necessity, but not that freedom itself were possible, and certainly not that it was a reality.

⁵ Imagine a free leaf which does not have to fall when a cold wind blows, but decides to do so anyway. This is entirely compatible with the necessity of science's laws of nature, for we do not assert that the leaf did not fall, but only that it did not have to fall, and so it freely chose to fall, and hence it was just a coincidence that it chose to fall when the cold wind came. There is as yet no point in making such an assertion and it is simply a matter of arbitrary whim to assert it. The point of the Third Antinomy is that this gratis assertion of freedom does not contradict the laws of nature. Freedom is a tenable and (thus far) arbitrary fiction.
3.1 Now the concept of freedom, to the extent its reality is proven through an apodictic law of practical reason, constitutes the keystone of the entire edifice of a system of pure, even speculative, reason. And all other concepts (those of God and immortality), which remain in speculative reason as mere Ideas without support, are now attached to it and obtain stability and objective reality with and through it, i.e., their possibility is proven by the actuality of freedom; for this Idea is revealed through the moral law.  

4.1 But among all Ideas of speculative reason, freedom is also the only one whose possibility we know a priori (even though we can still never understand it), because it is the condition* of the moral law, which we do know. 

4.2 For the Ideas of God and immortality are not conditions of the moral law, but rather only conditions of the necessary object of a will determined through that law, i.e., merely of the practical usage of our pure reason. Therefore we not only cannot recognize nor penetrate the actuality of these Ideas, but indeed not even their possibility. 

4.3 But nonetheless they are the conditions of the application of the morally determined will to its object (the highest good) which is given to it a priori. 

4.4 Consequently their possibility in this practical referral can and must be assumed, but still without recognizing or penetrating them theoretically. 

4.5 Concerning this theoretical referral, it is sufficient in a practical intention that they contain no inner impossibility (contradiction). 

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6 This will complete and unify pure reason, both speculatively and practically, for what had to remain as arbitrary, though plausible, suppositions in speculation (in the CPR) will now be established in a practical sense. First transcendental freedom (based on the moral law) will be established, and then there will follow the postulation of the soul and God (as conditions of the highest good which is the morally necessary object of the moral law). Thus freedom might be considered the central focus of both critiques of reason. 

7 In this CPrR we will discover the moral law as a fact (provided as a pure practical and binding law), and the necessary condition for the consciousness of the (binding of this) law is freedom. And so freedom will be a fact even though we will still not be able to comprehend how any such property could be possible. 

8 We have a will which is determined through the moral law alone, and thus without reference to God or a soul. The necessary object of this will will be shown to be the highest good which in turn presupposes God and immortality as necessary conditions for the achievement of that object. And so we are not able to prove even the possibility of freedom, God or immortality. And while we can prove the actuality of freedom, that of God and immortality will remain merely necessary, practical postulates. 

9 While there was no evidence supporting the existence of God or of an immortal soul, there was no contradiction (no internal impossibility) in the CPR. Accordingly both are available to practical reason if needed. And they will be needed now in a practical sense in order to justify the highest good which is the necessary object of a free will, i.e., a will subject to the moral law.
4.6  Now here is a basis for avowal which, while merely subjective in comparison with speculative reason, is still objectively valid for a reason which is just as pure, though practical. Indeed it is by means of the concept of freedom that objective reality and authority, and even subjective necessity (a need of pure reason) to assume them, is supplied to the Ideas of God and immortality. This is true even though this does not expand reason in a theoretical recognition, but rather only that the possibility, which previously was only a problem, is here an assertion. Accordingly the practical usage of reason is connected with the elements of the theoretical.

4.7  And this need is not per chance a hypothetical one of an optional intention of speculation, i.e., having to admit something if we want to ascend to the completion of the rational usage in speculation, but is rather a prerequisite, without which that, which we are unremittingly supposed to place before us as the intent of our doing and forbearing, cannot happen.

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1  In order not to fancy an encounter here with inconsistencies when I term freedom the condition of the moral law, and then assert later in the treatment that the moral law is the condition under which we first can become aware of freedom, I will only recall that freedom in any case is the ratio essendi of the moral law, but the moral law the ratio cognoscendi of freedom.

1.2  For were the moral law not first distinctly thought in our reason, we would never hold ourselves justified in assuming such a something as freedom (even though this still is not contradictory).

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10 In the speculation of the CPR we could not prove the existence or even the possibility of God and the soul. But since we could also not prove any impossibility we were free to assert it, but only subjectively for the purposes of practical reason and not objectively regarding theoretical reason.

11 By virtue of freedom (as the condition of the moral law, which will be undoubted) we find objective meaning to God and the soul and even a subjective need to assert them (in order to support the highest good which is required by the moral law). So what in pure reason was merely not impossible is asserted in practical reason to be possible, and indeed morally necessary to be asserted as actual.

12 This intention is the highest good which we will find to be a prerequisite as the object of our moral striving. We will find that without this object there would be no point or purpose to our moral striving and it would become a sheer vanity.

13 We could not be aware of our freedom except for our consciousness of the moral law (as binding us). And it is only a free person who could be imposed upon by this law. Thus we must be free people in order to recognize the moral law as binding, and thus it is only by means of the moral law that we will come to recognize our freedom.

14 Since we are able to think that a leaf might be free (see footnote to Par. 2.1 above), but have no rational basis for actually asserting such, the notion of our own freedom would be considered absurd and silly. We would be able to calculate the expected return from two alternatives and opt for the greatest, but never presume to think we could act independently of our inclinations.
5.1 In any case it would be more satisfying for our speculative reason to solve that problem for itself and to preserve it as an insight to practical usage without this digression. But for this our capacity of speculation is not so well endowed.

5.2 Those who boast of such lofty recognitions should not restrain themselves but rather should present them openly for probe and evaluation.

5.3 They want to prove it? Then so be it! Let them prove it, and the critique lays its entire armament to their feet as conquerors.

5.4 *Quid statis? Nolunt. Atqui licet esse beatis.*

5.5 Since therefore they do not in fact want to (which seems very much like they cannot do so) we must instead take them in hand to seek this in the moral usage of reason and upon this to establish the concept of God, freedom and immortality, concerning the possibility of which speculation does not find a sufficient guarantee.

6.1 Here also the riddle of the critique is first explained, i.e., how we can deny objective reality to the usage of the categories beyond the realm of the sensitive, and still concede this reality to them with respect to the objects of pure practical reason. For at first glance this must look thoroughly inconsistent, as long as we are familiar with such a practical usage only with regard to its name.

6.2 But if we now become aware through a complete dissection of practical reason that the cited reality here concerns no theoretical determination of the categories nor any expansion of the recognition beyond the sensitive, but rather means merely that an object befits them in this regard somewhere because they are either a priori contained in the necessary determination of will, or inseparably connected with the object of that will, then that in-

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15 From the German translation of the Latin we can understand: A god would speak . . . “Why do you hesitate? Don’t be anxious. Do it and finally achieve happiness.”

16 We must give up trying to prove these three Ideas via speculative reasoning as we were instructed by the *CPR*, and just accept them at the insistence of our practical reasoning, as will be shown in this present critique.

17 So at first glance it seems that we are contradicting ourselves, declaring first in the *CPR* that the categories of understanding have no role apart from the sensitive world of appearances, and then to assert here in the *CPrR* that they have meaning after all and indeed via practical considerations.

18 Freedom will be determined as the necessary presupposition of the consciousness of the moral law (as binding), and God and immortality are the conditions of the object of a will determined by the moral law. But this has meaning only in the practical, and not in the theoretical and speculative, use of reason.
consistency disappears. In other words our use of these concepts is different from what speculative reason has need of.\(^\text{19}\)

6.3 On the other hand a very satisfactory confirmation of the consistent way of thinking in the speculative critique, hardly to be expected previously, is now revealed. For since that critique called for the objects of experience as such, and among them even our own subject, to hold only for appearances, but also at the same time to lay things on their own to them as a basis, therefore not to hold all that is beyond the sensitive to be fabrications nor as a concept empty of content, practical reason now, of itself and without having conspired with speculative reason, supplies reality to an extra-sensory object of the category of causality, namely freedom (though as a practical concept only for practical usage). Therefore what previously could only be thought, is now certified as a fact.\(^\text{20}\)

6.4 In this way the strange, though incontrovertible, assertion of the speculative critique that even the thinking subject is a mere appearance to himself in the inner perspective\(^\text{21}\) obtains now in the critique of practical reason its complete certification and indeed so decisively that we would have come upon it here even if the first critique had not proven this proposition at all.*\(^\text{22}\)

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 The union of causality as freedom with causality as natural mechanism--of which the first is firmly established through moral law and the second through natural law--and indeed in one and the same subject, namely the human, is impossible without representing this in refer-

\(^{19}\) Where the possibility of freedom and God and immorality could not be established in the CPR, this possibility is granted by virtue of the assertion of the reality of these three per the CPR. But this will be of no benefit to the speculative use of reason.

\(^{20}\) All our science holds for appearance, and yet we were required to conceive of the thing on its own as underlying these appearances, but without possibility of sensitive evidence. See Key to Kant. And so the appearances are treated as subject to laws of nature, while the thing on its own can be conceived of as being free. Then what is necessitated in one regard is free in another regard.

\(^{21}\) Anschauung. See Translator’s notes. This might also be called the “inner looking”. This is most usually translated as “intuition” in kantian inquiry and counts as a direct and immediate insight.

\(^{22}\) I recognize that I am a thinking being only because I am able to express the elements of a thought to myself in the time-determined medium of the inner sense. It is only in this way that I can even be conscious of being able to think a thought if I wish, for the thinking is one with the expression. But these thoughts that I think to myself are not merely thoughts that exists as such by themselves as though their spectral (verbally articulated) appearance were a thing on their own, but rather I must assume a something = X = my soul, which thinks these thoughts, but concerning which I know absolutely nothing at all, except as I appear to myself in, and by means of, these thoughts. In a word, I know myself only to the extent that I appear to myself in the inner sense.
ence to the first as an thing on its own, and to the second as an appearance, the former in a pure, the latter in an empirical, consciousness.\textsuperscript{23}

1.2 Without this dual way of considering things a contradiction of reason with itself is unavoidable.

7.1 With this I also understand why the most considerable challenges which have come to my ear thus far against this critique revolve around these very two points: namely

on the one hand a denial of the objective reality of the categories applied to noumena in the theoretical recognition and the affirmation of that in the practical; and

on the other hand the paradoxical demand to make oneself, as the subject of freedom, into noumenon, but also simultaneously, with regard to nature, into phenomenon in one’s own empirical consciousness.

7.2 For as long as we had no determined concept of morality and freedom, we could not guess that what we would want to lay as the basis to the alleged appearance on the one side as noumenon and, on the other side, whether it also would be possible in any way to make a concept of that if we had already beforehand dedicated all concepts of pure understanding in the theoretical usage exclusively to mere appearances.\textsuperscript{24}

7.3 Only a detailed critique of practical reason can correct all of this misinterpretation and clearly set forth the consistent thinking manner which actually constitutes its greatest merit.

8.1 So much for the justification of why the concepts and foundational propositions of pure speculative reason in this work, which after all have already undergone their particular critique, are again subjected here from time to time to a test which otherwise would hardly be appropriate to the systematic path of a developing science (since matters once decided must properly only be cited and not again bought up for discussion). But here this was allowed and indeed was necessary because with those concepts reason is considered to be in a transition to an entirely different use than was made of them earlier.

\textsuperscript{23} Appearance is my rendering for “Erscheinung” which suggests the looks of something. See Translator’s notes for this and also for the “brainarium”. As suggested in Key to Kant we have the capacity for considering objects of the brainarium world of appearances in this two-fold way: once as a sheer appearance (in the brainarium) and subject to laws of nature, and then also as a thing on its own (independently of any brainarium) where freedom can asserted.

\textsuperscript{24} It would be pointless to conceive of the thing on its own (noumenon) with regard to the sciences of the appearances. For the very notion of noumenon means beyond all context of the brainarium, and it is precisely on the appearances of the brainarium that the sciences are focused. But now, by means of the CPrR, we will be able to see the need for having made such a distinction earlier in the CPR.
8.2 But such a transition makes a comparison of the old usage with the new necessary in order to distinguish more easily the new track from the earlier one and at the same time to note the coherence of the two.

8.3 Therefore considerations of this sort, and among which those which are directed again to the concept of freedom, though now in the practical usage of pure reason, we will consider not as insertions which are supposed to serve only in filling up holes of the critical system of the speculative reason (for this is complete in its intention) nor, as it tends to go with a hasty construction, afterward to start bringing in props and buttresses, but rather as true members which make the coherence of the system notable in order now to allow penetration of the concepts in their real presentation, which could be represented only problematically in the speculative.²⁵

8.4 This reminder goes particularly to the concept of freedom which, we must note with consternation, many people still boast of being able to penetrate quite well and to explain its possibility by considering it merely in a psychological sense. If, however, they had weighed it precisely in reference to the transcendental, they would have had to recognize its indispensability as a problematical concept in the complete use of the speculative reason as well as the complete incomprehensibility of that and, if they afterwards took it to the practical usage, would have had to come of themselves precisely to the nominal determination of that with respect to its foundational proposition, which they otherwise so reluctantly want to understand.

8.5 The concept of freedom is the stumbling block for all empiricists, but also the key to the most sublime practical principles for the critical moralists who in that way understand that they must of necessity proceed rationally.

8.6 For that reason I implore the reader not hastily to overlook that which was said about this concept at the conclusion of the Analytic.

9.1 Whether such a system as is developed here of pure practical reason from its critique has been too laborious or not, especially in order not to miss the correct perspective from which the whole can be properly sketched out, I must leave to those familiar with such a work to evaluate.

9.2 It presupposes indeed the *Groundwork to the Metaphysic of Morals* (*GMM*), but only to the extent that this provides a preliminary familiarity with the principle of duty, and ren-

²⁵ We will be considering the treatment of certain concepts in the *CPR* in order to see how it is that there is a complete accord of those with this *CPrR*. This will not be an introduction of any new material but rather a reminder of what was undertaken and established in the former critique, and also a reconciliation with the latter.
ders and justifies* a determined formula of that duty. Otherwise this critique is complete in itself.

9.3 The division of all practical sciences was not added for completion as was done in the critique of speculative reason. A justification for this will be found in the constitution of the capacity of practical reason.

9.4 For the particular determination of duties as human duties, in order to divide them, is only possible if the subject of this determination (the human) were previously recognized according to his actual constitution, but still only as much as would be necessary with regard to duty in general. But this does not belong to a critique of practical reason in general, which is supposed to render completely only the principles of its possibility, scope and limits without particular reference to human nature.26

9.5 The division, therefore, does belong here to the system of the science, but not to the system of the critique.

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 A reviewer, who wanted to say something in censure of this text, has put it better than he probably meant by saying that in this work no new principle of morality was erected, but rather a new formula.

1.2 But then who would want to introduce a new foundational principle of all morality and to first discover this, as it were, as though prior to him the world had been unknowing or in thorough error regarding what is duty?

1.3 But who is familiar with what a formula means to the mathematician, which precisely determines and allows no deviation from what is to be done in order to comply with a task, will not hold a formula which does this with respect to all duties in general as something meaningless and dispensable.

10.1 In the second part of the analytic I have, hopefully, satisfied a certain truth-loving, acute and, therefore, honorable reviewer of the *Groundwork to the Metaphysic of Morals* concerning his challenge that (being necessary in his opinion) the concept of good was not established* before the moral principle. I have also considered several other challenges which have come to my attention from men who exhibit a will that ascertaining the truth lies in their heart (for those having only their old system in mind and with whom it is already before hand concluded what is supposed to be sanctioned or condemned, still require no explanation which stand in the way of their private intentions). And I will also continue in that vein.

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 Someone could still make an objection as to why I have not also explained in advance the concept of the capacity of desire or the feeling of pleasure. But this reproach would be un-

26 We are considering the human not so much as a human as rather more especially a rational being. And so elements which are unique to the human will not be relevant here.
fair because it is reasonable to expect the presupposition of this explanation as given in psychology.

1.2 But, of course, the definition of this could be so arranged that the feeling of pleasure would be placed as the basis to the determination of the desire capacity (as actually it also customarily happens). But in that way the supreme principle of practical philosophy would necessarily be empirical, which at this stage here is still to be determined and which is entirely refuted in this critique.

1.3 Hence I will provide the explanation as is called for in order to leave this disputed point undecided at the beginning, which is certainly reasonable.

1.4 Life is the capacity of a being to act according to laws of the capacity of desire.

1.5 The desire capacity is the capacity of that living being, by means of its representations, to be the cause of the actuality of the objects of these representations.

1.6 Pleasure is the representation of the agreement of the object, or of the action, with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the capacity of the causality of a representation with respect to the actuality of its object (or of the determination of the power of the subject regarding the action to produce that object).

1.7 I have no need of any more than this in aid of the critique of concepts which are borrowed from psychology. All else is performed by the critique itself.

1.8 It is easy to see that the question as to whether pleasure would always have to be positioned as the basis to the desire capacity, or whether it follows only under certain conditions upon the determination of that capacity, remains undecided by this explanation. For the explanation is assembled from obvious characteristics of pure understanding, i.e., the categories, which contain nothing empirical.

1.9 Such caution is very commendable in all philosophy and still is often neglected, i.e., using ventured definitions for anticipating our judgments before the complete dismemberment of the concept, which is often attained only later.

1.10 It can also be noted through the entire course of the critique (of theoretical as well as practical reason) that multiple occasions arise for supplementing some deficiency in the old, dogmatic way of philosophy and for amending errors which were not noted earlier, as though we made a use of reason from concepts which concerns all of reason.

11.1 Now if the concern is about the determination of a particular capacity of the human soul with respect to its sources, contents and limits, then with respect to the nature of human recognition we indeed cannot begin its exact and complete description (as complete as possible according to the present position of the elements of that which we have already acquired) except from its parts.

11.2 But there is yet a second observation which is more philosophical and architectonic, namely to grasp properly the Idea of the whole and then out of that Idea all of those parts in their reciprocal reference to one another by means of their derivation from the concept of the whole in a pure rational capacity.

11.3 This test and guarantee is possible only through the most intimate familiarity with the system, and those, who were annoyed with respect to the first investigation and who, therefore, have not considered this familiarity worth the trouble of acquisition, do not succeed to the second level, which is that of overview, and which is a synthetic return to that
which was previously given analytically. And it is no wonder if they always find inconsist-

tencies, although the holes which they suppose are not be encountered in the system itself, but rather only in their own incoherent way of thinking.

12.1 With respect to this treatment, I am not concerned about the reproach of having wanted to introduce a new language, because the manner of recognition here approaches popularity of itself.

12.2 And also, with respect to the first critique, no one could approve this reproach who had not just read it through, but rather had thought it through.

12.3 To dream up new words, where the language already has no lack of expressions for given concepts, is a childish endeavor to stand out in the crowd, if not through new and true thoughts, then through a new patch on old clothes.

12.4 Hence if the readers of this essay know popular expressions which are just as suitable to the thought as these seem to me, or if they per chance trust themselves able to lay out the inanity of these thoughts, and thus at the same time the inanity of the expression which describe the thoughts, they would much oblige me through the first, for I want only to be understood. But with respect to the second, they would acquire merit on behalf of phi-

losophy.

12.5 But as long as these thoughts yet stand, I doubt very much that suitable and still passable expressions may be found for them.*

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 Rather (than that incomprehensibility) I am here occasionally more concerned about misin-

terpretation with respect to certain expressions which I have endeavored to seek out in order not to miss the concept which they indicate.

1.2 In the table of  the categories of  practical reason, for example, under the title of  modality, the permitted and the forbidden (the practically objective possible and impossible) are often treated in common discourse the same as the subsequent categories of duty and contrary to duty. But with us here the former are to mean what is merely a possible practical precept in agreement or conflict (somewhat as with the solution of all problems of geometry and me-

chatics), while the latter are to mean what stands in such reference to a law actually lying in reason in general. And while this difference of meaning is not entirely foreign to com-

mon discourse, it is somewhat unusual.

1.3 So, for example, it is not permitted for an orator, as such, to fashion new words or mean-

ings, although the poet may be allowed to do this to a certain extent. But here neither of these is concerned with duty.

1.4 For whoever wants to give up the reputation of an orator cannot be resisted. 27

27 There is no duty of the orator (or the poet) to avoid developing new words. And so he can do as he wishes, and if this destroys his capacity as an orator, that’s his business.
1.5 Here we are dealing only with the distinction of the imperatives in the problematic, the assertive and the apodictic.

1.6 And just so in the note, where I position the moral Ideas of practical perfection in different philosophical schools, I have differentiated the Idea of wisdom from that of holiness, even though regarding their foundation I have declared them objectively identical.

1.7 Except in that note I understand with this arrangement only such wisdom which is proportionate to the human (the Stoic), thus subjectively imputed to the human as a property.

1.8 (Perhaps the expression “virtue”, with which the Stoics drove a great nation, could better describe the characteristic of its school.)

1.9 But the expression of a postulate of pure practical reason could occasion the greatest misunderstanding if with that someone wanted to mix the meaning which the postulates of pure mathematics have and which denote apodictic certitude.

1.10 These latter postulate the possibility of an action, the object of which we have already a priori recognized as possible with complete certitude in the theoretical.

1.11 But the former postulates the possibility of an object (God and immortality of the soul) even from apodictic practical laws, therefore only in aid of a practical reason. For since this certitude of the postulated possibility is not at all theoretical, hence also not apodictic, i.e., not a recognized necessity with respect to the object, but rather is a necessary assumption with respect to the subject for compliance with its objective, though still practical, laws, it follows that it is merely a necessary hypothesis.

1.12 I knew of no better expression for this subjective, but still true and unconditioned, rational necessity.

13.1 In this way furthermore the principles a priori of two capacities of the mind, that of the recognition and of the desire, would be worked out and determined according to the conditions, the scope and the limits of their usage, and accordingly a secure basis would be positioned to a systematic philosophy as science, including the theoretical and the practical.

14.1 But nothing worse could accompany these efforts than if someone made the unexpected discovery that there were no recognition a priori anywhere at all, nor could be.

14.2 But there is no reason for any such concern.

14.3 It would be as though someone wanted to prove through reason that there were no reason.

14.4 For we only say that we recognize something through reason if we are conscious that we also could have known it even if it had not come forth to us in experience. Thus rational recognition is the same as a priori recognition.

14.5 To want to squeeze necessity out of an experiential proposition (*ex pumice aquam*\(^{28}\)), and with this then also to want to procure true universality (without which no rational infer-

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\(^{28}\) Latin for: squeezing water out of a stone.
ence, thus not even the inference from analogy, which is at least a presumed universality and objective necessity, which takes place only in judgments a priori) is to deny to reason the capacity of judging about the object, i.e., to recognize it, and what befits it. For example, we would not be able to say of what followed often and always upon a certain preceding state that we are able to infer from the latter to the former (for that would mean objective necessity and a concept of a connection a priori). Rather all we could expect would be only similar cases (in a manner similar to the animals), i.e., basically reject the concept of cause as false and a sheer deception of thought.

14.6 To want to remedy this lack of an objective and universal validity stemming from that by still seeing no basis for attributing another representational manner to other rational beings, if that were to render a valid inference, our ignorance would be of more service for the expansion of our knowledge than all contemplation.

14.7 For merely because we are not familiar with other rational beings apart from the human, we would have the right to assume them so constituted as we recognize ourselves, i.e., we would actually be familiar with them.

14.8 I do not even mention here that it is not the universality of the avowal that proves the objective validity of a judgment (i.e., the validity of that as recognition), but rather, if that also applies accidentally, this is still not able to render a proof of the correspondence with the object. Far rather the objective validity alone would make up the basis of a necessary, universal agreement.

15.1 Hume would also be comfortable with this system of the universal empiricism in foundational principles. It is known that he demanded nothing more than the replacement of all objective meaning of necessity in the concept of cause with a mere subjective one, namely custom, in order to deny to reason all judgment about God, freedom and immortality. And he surely understood very well with that, if one only admitted to him the principles, to deduce inferences from them with all logical compulsion.

15.2 But not even Hume made empiricism so universal as to include mathematics with it.

15.3 He held their propositions to be analytical, and if that had been correct, they would in fact also be apodictic. But still no inferences could be drawn from that to a capacity of reason also to pronounce apodictic judgments in philosophy, namely such which were synthetic (as the proposition of causality).

15.4 But if we accept the empiricism of principles in a universal sense, then mathematics would also be included with that empiricism.
16.1 Now if this runs into a conflict with a reason, which admits only empirical foundational principles, as is unavoidable in the antinomy (where mathematics proves beyond all dispute the infinite divisibility of space, while empiricism cannot permit it), then the greatest possible evidence of the demonstration is in obvious contradiction with the alleged inferences from principles of experience. And then we would have to ask, like Cheselden’s blind man: what deceives me, looks or feeling?

16.2 (For empiricism is based on a felt necessity, but rationalism on a penetrated necessity).

16.2 And so universal empiricism reveals itself as the genuine skepticism which was incorrectly attributed to Hume in such an unrestricted meaning.* For he did leave at least one such touchstone of experience remaining with mathematics, instead of permitting utterly no touchstone of that (which can always only be encountered a priori in principles), although this still does not consist of mere feelings, but rather also of judgments.

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 Names which indicate an adherence to a sect have always entailed much legalistic perversion: as though someone said, “so and so is an Idealist”.

1.2 For even though he not only thoroughly admits, but rather even insists, that actual objects of external things correspond to our representations of external things, he still maintains that the form of the perspective of those external things does not adhere to them but rather only to the human make up.

17.1 Nevertheless, since that empiricism can hardly be serious in this philosophical and critical time, and since it is supposedly positioned only for the exercise of judgmental power and in order to place the necessity of rational principles a priori in a clearer light through contrast, we can still convey thanks to those who want to trouble themselves with this otherwise not very informative work.

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29 See this article. Similarly to this blind child I once was given a cocaine drug and my reaction was that for several minutes I saw external things as though they were within my eye (which, of course, as impressions they actually were, but which I otherwise and normally picture apart from me in space).

30 I think the boy was confused by being able to see things on his retina but not being able to touch them (they being beyond his reach).
Introduction

The Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason

1.1 The theoretical usage of reason was occupied entirely with objects of the capacity for recognition, and a critique of that with regard to this usage actually concerned only the capacity for pure recognitions. The reason for this was that a suspicion arose (which was later confirmed) that beyond its boundaries it might easily lose its way among unaccessible objects or even among concepts which conflict with each another.\(^{31}\)

1.2 With the practical use of reason the situation is quite different.

1.3 Here reason is occupied differently, namely with determination bases of the will, which is a capacity either for producing objects corresponding to representations, or at least for determining itself to the production of such objects (regardless of whether the physical capacity were adequate or not), i.e., determining its causality.\(^{32}\)

1.4 For here at least reason achieves to the determination of the will, and moreover always has to this extent objective reality, in that we are dealing merely with desire.\(^{33}\)

1.5 Our first question therefore is this: whether pure reason is able to achieve to the determination of the will by itself, or whether reason could be a determination basis only as empirically conditioned?\(^{34}\)

1.6 At this point the concept of freedom comes to the fore. This is a concept of causality which is authorized through a critique of pure reason, even though this concept is not subject to an empirical description. If we can now discover the bases for proving that this

\(^{31}\) In the *CPR* we were only concerned with knowledge and not with actions. We examined the recognitions of mathematical and empirical sciences only in order to discern why it is that pure reason was not able to attain to a like success regarding pure recognitions, i.e., why it was that metaphysics was so dysfunctional. The unattainable objects were God and the soul, while freedom and natural necessity conflicted with each other.

\(^{32}\) The will then is the capacity for producing (or trying to produce) objects which we can imagine and represent to ourselves as possible through our actions. Thus there is no concern about the recognition of objects given from elsewhere, but solely in the pursuit of represented objects via actions.

\(^{33}\) Reason can determine the will to an action, even if the desired object of that action eventually proves to be impossible. And so again the question here is with the determination of the will and not with the recognition of objects.

\(^{34}\) Can pure reason itself, independently of any object, make a determination of the will on its own, or must some empirical object always be presupposed for such a determination? In the latter case we would not be able to act except we have some object which could appeal to some desire.
property does in fact adhere to the human will (and likewise to the will of all rational beings), we will not only have established in that way that pure reason were practical, but also that it alone, and not the empirically conditioned reason, were unconditionally practical.\(^{35}\)

1.7 As a result we have in mind not a critique of pure practical reason, but rather only that of practical reason in general.

1.8 For pure reason, once it is established that there be such, has no need of a critique.\(^{36}\)

1.9 It is that which itself contains the standard of the critique of all of its usage.\(^{37}\)

1.10 In general, therefore, the critique of practical reason has the obligation of restraining the empirically conditioned reason from the presumption of being the exclusive source of the determination bases of the will.\(^{38}\)

1.11 Once it is established that there is such a thing, then the use of pure reason is always immanent. In contrast to this the empirically conditioned reason, which presumes sole dominion, is transcendent and expresses itself in presumptions and commands which go entirely beyond its realm, which is the exact opposite of what could be said of pure reason in its speculative usage.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{35}\) Freedom “now comes to the fore” because of the question of 1.5 concerning whether pure reason itself and alone can determine the will, or whether objects of desire must be presupposed. In the CPR freedom was shown to be thinkable, but not recognizable. Here we will seek the foundations for recognizing such freedom (and not just for humans, but for all rational beings). This will be accomplished by showing not only that the moral law is a function of pure reason alone (and for which no object must be presupposed), but that we are bound by that law, and so where pure reason itself is practical. And at the same time we will also see that the empirically conditioned reason is just that, conditioned.

\(^{36}\) There is no need to show how pure reason can be practical, which is impossible, for that is the same as showing how freedom is possible. It is sufficient to show that it is practical.

\(^{37}\) As Kant shows in the CPR pure reason is directed to itself for the sake of critiquing itself. And it is impossible to critique the capacity of pure reason to make a critique of anything.

\(^{38}\) This will be accomplished by showing that pure reason is practical (via the conception of the moral law and the human response to that law) and so that there is another basis for determining the will besides merely empirical objects of desire.

\(^{39}\) Pure practical reason gives us the moral law. By virtue of effect of the moral law on us we see that we are free. Thus there is no need for a critique of pure practical reason, but only of practical reason in general where we will come to see that empirically conditioned reason is thoroughly proscribed by the object of desire which must be given, e.g., some reward. And so in the CPR we saw that pure reason (in seeking knowledge of objects) was not immanent while here with the CPrR it is just the opposite, i.e., pure reason as practical is immanent, for the reference is now the will and actions which are under the purview of reason while earlier the question had to do with knowledge of objects which were apart from reason.
2.1 But otherwise, since there is always a pure reason, the recognition of which lies here as the basis to the practical usage, it follows that the division of a critique of practical reason, according to the universal template, would have to be organized according to the critique of speculative reason.

2.2 We will, therefore, also have to have a doctrine of elements and one of methodology, in which the first part will be an analytic as rule of truth, and then also a dialectic as description and solution of the semblance (Schein)\(^{40}\) in the judgments of practical reason.

2.3 But the order in the treatment of the analytic will in turn be the reverse of that in the critique of pure, speculative reason.

2.4 For in the present work we will begin with principles and go to concepts, and only then from these, where possible, continue on to the senses With speculative reason, in contrast, we began with the senses and had to end with the principles.

2.5 The reason for this is due to the fact that we now are dealing with the will and must consider reason not in relationship to objects, but rather to this will and its causality, where the principles of the empirically conditioned causality would have to make the beginning, according to which the attempt can be made to firmly establish our concepts of the determination basis of such a will, its application to objects, finally to the subject and only then to its sensitivity.\(^{41}\)

2.6 The law of the causality from freedom, i.e., some sort of a pure, practical principle, makes the beginning unavoidable here and determines the objects, to which it alone can be referred.

\(^{40}\) Schein denotes what seems to be the truth, but may not be so.

\(^{41}\) In the CPR we were concerned with the relationship of the recognition capacity to objects, and had to begin with the senses, where our looking/perspective (Anschauung) first gave us objects, and then to the concepts for the recognition of these objects and finally to the principles for the relationships of these objects. Here, since we are dealing not with objects but rather with the actions of the will, we begin with principles of action and continue over to the objects of the will and finally end with the senses and our emotional response to this production of reason, i.e., the moral law.
First Book
The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason
First Part

The Fundamental Principles of Pure Practical Reason

No. 1

Explanation

1.1 Practical foundational principles are principles which contain a universal determination of
the will, which in turn themselves contain several practical rules.\textsuperscript{42}

1.2 They are subjective, i.e., maxims, if the condition is viewed by the subject as valid only
for its own will. They are objective, i.e., practical laws, if the condition is seen as objec-
tive, i.e., valid for the will of every rational being.\textsuperscript{43}

Remark

2.1 If we assume that pure reason were able to contain a practical basis within itself, i.e., suf-
ficient for the determination of the will, then there would be practical laws. If not, then all
practical principles would be only maxims.\textsuperscript{44}

2.2 In a pathologically affected will of a rational being, a conflict between his maxims and the
practical law recognized by him can be encountered.

2.3 For example, someone might devise a maxim to permit no insult to pass unrequited, and
yet at the same time realize that this were not a practical law, but only his maxim which,

\textsuperscript{42} A principle (universally applicable determination of the will) might be to look out for one’s self before all
else. One of the rules under this might be to do a good job at work in order to maintain, and advance in,
that position. Or it might be to tell the truth in order to establish confidence in others for one’s self which
could be advantageous. In any case, and per 2.6 below, the rule calls for some action as a means to
some goal.

\textsuperscript{43} Here “condition” would refer to justification of the actions, e.g., I may cheat if it is safe and profitable;
and this would be only a maxim and not a law. That maxim could only be valid for my will, but I could not
consider it valid for the will of all (for then it might be used against me).

\textsuperscript{44} With pure reason we are necessarily thinking of the objective, because this use of reason would be the
same among all rational beings, and thus would be independent of personal inclinations, which vary from
person to person. Without this we would have not laws but simply subjectively valid maxims.
in contrast, were not able to coexist with itself as a rule for the will of each and every ra-
tional being as one and the same maxim.\footnote{Indeed such a rule, universally accepted, could easily inhibit an action which were beneficial to me. For example, I might need some help which only A might provide, and yet A might at that moment discover the only opportunity to repay an insult on my part and could decide to refuse to aid me per this his rule.}

2.4 In the recognition of nature the principles of what happens (e.g., the principle of the equality of effect and counter-effect in the communication of movement) are at the same time laws of nature, for there the use of reason is theoretical and determined through the constitution of the object.\footnote{In the theoretical (as opposed to the practical) our concern is in the recognition of objects and of expe-
rience, and so where the object is considered as given and which we then seek to recognize and experi-
ence.}

2.5 Regarding practical knowledge, i.e., that which has to do merely with the determination bases of the will, principles, which we make for ourselves, are not for that reason laws to which we are irresistibly subjected, because in the practical realm reason is concerned solely with the subject, namely the capacity of desire, and where the rule can vary considerably according to the particular constitution of that subject.\footnote{We make principles as laws, but do not have to comply with these principles. And so practical laws are different from theoretical laws. And just because we come up with a personally valid maxim, that does not make that maxim a law. For in order to be a law it must hold for all rational beings, i.e., be objective.}

2.6 The practical rule is always a product of reason because it prescribes an action, as a means to an effect, as an intention.\footnote{A rule: always eat healthy foods. Why do that? In order to stay healthy. This then is a practical rule, for its intention is premised as its basis. So the principle/precept would be to remain healthy, and one rule under that principle would be to eat healthy food just as another might be to exercise. And such rules are always the product of reason for they imply and presuppose a purpose which only reason can come up with.}

2.7 But for a being, with whom reason is not the sole determination basis of the will, this rule is an imperative (i.e., a rule, which is indicated by an “ought” which expresses objective necessity of the action). This means that if reason determined the will alone, the action would unfailingly occur according to this rule.\footnote{Reason would tell me to look out for my own health. And so if reason were the sole determination of my will, I would seek always to be healthy. But I am also torn by inclinations to eat too much or unhealthy foods, and so may not do as reason calls for. Thus what is a law and “will do” for a purely rational person is only an imperative and an “ought to do” for a person who is rational and who can also be affected by inclinations.}
2.8 Therefore the imperatives hold objectively and are entirely different from maxims as subjective principles.\textsuperscript{50}

2.9 The former either determine the condition of the causality of the rational being as an effecting cause merely with regard to the effect and its sufficiency to that, or they determine only the will, regardless of whether it is sufficient for the accomplishment of the effect or not.\textsuperscript{51}

2.10 The former would be hypothetical imperatives and contain mere precepts of skill. The latter would be categorical and it is these alone that would be practical laws.\textsuperscript{52}

2.11 Therefore maxims are indeed foundational principles, but not imperatives.

2.12 But if the imperatives themselves are conditioned, i.e., if they do not determine the will utterly as such, but rather only with respect to a desired effect, i.e., if they are hypothetical imperatives, then they are practical precepts indeed, but not laws.\textsuperscript{53}

2.13 Laws, even before I ask whether I have the requisite capacity for a desired effect, or what I must do in order to produce this effect, must sufficiently determine the will as such, and thus be categorical. Otherwise they are not laws, because they would lack the necessity which, if they are supposed to be practical, must be independent of pathological conditions, thus of conditions contingently adhering to the will.\textsuperscript{54}

2.14 Were someone told, e.g., that he would have to work and save during his youth in order not to famish in old age, this would be a proper and likewise very important precept of the will.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{50} Thus if the rule is valid per reason alone, it would hold for all rational beings and would be an imperative and hence would be objective. Otherwise it would be merely subjectively valid for me and thus a maxim.

\textsuperscript{51} We either determine whether we have the capacity for a certain outcome, and where it is still questionable whether we will go for that outcome, or else we determine the will independently of any outcome. In both cases reason is providing principles of action for determining the will.

\textsuperscript{52} The former indicate whether I am capable of accomplishing some feat, while the latter indicates what I must do whether I want to or not.

\textsuperscript{53} And their violation would only suggest that we were stupid or that the outcome were personally not desired. The violations would not be immoral. They have nothing to do with the moral. See 2.14 below.

\textsuperscript{54} If I thought about murdering someone I would have to reject that and the question as to whether such a murder is feasible or not is not even to be considered. The will is already determined via the law alone.

\textsuperscript{55} In the \textit{Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals} these precepts are referred to as “counsels of prudence”.
2.15 But we notice immediately that here the will is referred to something else, which we pre-
sume that the person desires. And we must leave this desiring to him, the doer himself,
whether he might foresee yet other resources apart from his own productive capacity, or
whether he have no hope at all of becoming old, or whether he might think himself able to
help himself in case of need some day, even if badly.

2.16 Reason, the solitary source of every rule which is to contain necessity, does indeed of
course include necessity in this its precept (for without such it would not be an impera-
tive). But this [precept] is only conditioned subjectively, and we cannot presuppose it in
all subjects in a like degree.

2.17 But to be legislative the rule needs merely to presuppose itself, because it is objective and
universally valid only if it holds without the contingent or subjective conditions differenti-
tiating one rational being from another.

2.18 Now let someone say he were never to promise deceptively. This would be a rule which
concerned merely his will, regardless of whether any intentions he might have were
achievable or not. For it is the sheer wanting that is to be determined entirely a priori
through the rule.

2.19 Now if this rule were found to be genuinely practical, then it would be a law because it is
a categorical imperative.

56 The precept should rationally be adhered to, but that only works on average, for some people may not
consider themselves affected.

57 The necessity is predicated merely upon the individual objective of the person: assuming that this goal
is desired, then the necessity enters, i.e., the person must do thus and thus. Or be counted as stupid.

58 The hypothetical is instructional, how to attain skillfully to some presupposed objective. The categorical
imperative is legislative, i.e., do this independently of any personal objective or even consideration.

59 With the hypothetical imperatives we must first decide if we want the object, and then it is binding. But
with laws the wanting itself is determined a priori by the rule.

60 In other words, if it is something more than a mere dream (which is yet to be established), then it will be
a law.
Therefore practical laws refer solely to the will without regard to what is to be accomplished through the causality of that will, and we can abstract from the latter (as belonging to the sense world) in order for them to be pure.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{61} Thus all we are doing now is getting our nomenclature straight. To be practical means that reason does in fact determine the will, i.e., that we recognize its instructive and its legislative rules. A natural cause deals with an effect merely as an event (in the Theoretical, dealing with knowledge), while a practical cause deals with an effect as an intention of the action.
No. 2

Theorem I

1.1 All practical principles which presuppose an object (a material) for the capacity of desire as a determination basis of the will are all together empirical and can render no practical laws.\(^{62}\)

2.1 With “material of the capacity of desire” I mean an object, the actuality of which is desired.

2.2 Now if the longing for this object precedes the practical rule and is the condition for making the rule someone’s principle, then I say (first) that this principle is always empirical.

2.3 For then the determination basis of the discretionary choice \([\text{Willkür}]\) is the representation of an object along with the relationship of that representation to the subject, where then the desire capacity is determined regarding the actualization of the object.\(^{63}\)

2.4 But such a relationship to the subject is called pleasure in the actuality of the object.

2.5 Therefore this [relationship of pleasure] would have to be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of the determination of the discretionary choice.

2.6 But from no representation of any sort of object, be what it may, can it be a priori recognized whether it be joined with pleasure or displeasure, or indifference.\(^{64}\)

2.7 In such a case, therefore, the determination basis of the discretionary choice is always empirical, hence then also the practical material principle which presupposed it as condition.\(^{65}\)

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\(^{62}\) This makes immediate sense (given the preceding), for if an object is empirical then the question arises as to whether it is desired or not, and that may depend upon the individual and so will vary. And so we are already with hypothetical imperatives. Only categorical (unconditioned) imperatives can be a law.

\(^{63}\) In ordering from a menu, for example, we would consider the various dishes and would see how they related to the subject in terms of desirability of each dish.

\(^{64}\) For example, I cannot tell from looking at a chocolate ice cream cone for the first time whether I will like its taste or not, and so to know I must find out i.e., I would have to taste it.

\(^{65}\) In general then if an object is the reason for the action, then the desire for the object is a function of that empirical element, and so any such imperative will have to be hypothetical and not categorical and thus cannot be a law.
3.1 Now (secondly) since a principle, which is based only on the subjective condition of the receptivity of a pleasure or displeasure (which can only be recognized empirically and cannot be valid for all rational beings in the same way), can certainly serve easily enough as a maxim for the subject who possesses it, but not at all as a law (because it lacks objective necessity, which must be recognized a priori). Such a principle can never render a practical law.\footnote{So such a principle may serve as our subjectively valid maxim of action, but again, since it presupposes a desire for the action, cannot be a law. A law must hold for all without exception.}
No.3

Theorem II

1.1 All material practical principles, as such, are entirely of one and the same sort and are grouped under the general principle of self love or personal happiness.

2.1 The pleasure from the representation of the existence of something, to the extent it is to be a determination basis of the desire for that something, is based upon the receptivity of the subject, for it depends upon the existence of that object, hence it pertains to the sense (feeling) and not to understanding. Indeed the latter expresses a reference of the representation to an object with respect to a concept but not to the subject with respect to feelings.

2.2 Therefore it is only practical to the extent the sensation of the charm, which the subject expects from the actuality of the object, determines the capacity of desire.

2.3 But now the consciousness by a rational being of the charm of life accompanying its entire existence without interruption, is happiness, and the principle for making this the highest determination basis of its discretionary choice, is the principle of self love.

2.4 All material principles, therefore, which place the determination basis of discretionary choice in the pleasure or displeasure emanating from the actuality of any sort of object, are to this extent entirely of one sort and belong altogether to the principle of self love or personal happiness.67

Conclusion

3.1 All material, practical rules place the determination basis of the will in the lower desire capacity and if there were no purely formal laws at all for these rules, which would sufficiently determine the will, then no higher desire capacity could be admitted.68

67 If it is the expected pleasure in any object that must entice me, and since this then depends upon my personal determination of happiness and either adds to it, in which case I will seek it (if I consider it possible), or detracts from it, in which case I will avoid it, it follows that the principle of trying to attain something will depend upon my estimation as to how it may affect my own, personal happiness.

68 Some have called the sensuous desires, e.g., drinking alcohol, to be lower than the intellectual desires such as attending a symphony or play. But this is not valid, and a higher desire capacity will have nothing to do with happiness per se.
Remark I

4.1 One must wonder how otherwise astute men can believe to find a distinction between lower and higher capacities for desiring which is based on whether the representations, which are connected with the feeling of pleasure, originate in the senses or in the understanding.

4.2 For if we ask about the determination bases of the desiring and place them in some sort of expected charm, then the source of the representation of this enjoyable object hardly matters, but rather only how much amusement it provides.

4.3 If a representation, even if it arises from, and is based on, the understanding, can only determine the discretionary choice by the presupposition of a feeling of pleasure in the subject, then a determination basis of the discretionary choice will depend entirely upon the constitution of the inner sense, namely that it can be affected with charm by this representation.

4.4 Let the representations of the objects be as dissimilar as we wish, let them be understanding, or even rational, representations in contrast to representations of the senses. For the feeling of pleasure by which they actually constitute the determination basis of the will (the charm or amusement which we expect from them, and which incentivizes the action toward the production of the object) is not only of the same sort to the extent that it can be recognized only empirically, but also to the extent that it affects one and the same vitality, which is expressed in the capacity for desire, and in this regard cannot differ from any other determination basis except in degree.

4.5 For if two determination bases were completely different with regard to their manner of representation, how could they be compared in terms of magnitude in order that the one, which most affects the desire capacity, be preferred?

4.6 The very same person can return unread a book, which is highly instructive to him and which comes into his hands only once, in order not to miss the hunt, or he can leave in the middle of a fine speech in order not to be late for dinner, or quit a judicious conversation, which he ordinarily values highly, in order to get to the gambling table, or even deny a poor person, whom he otherwise enjoys helping, because he has just enough money in hand for the theater.

4.7 If the determination of his will depends upon the feeling of agreeableness or disagreeableness expected from any cause whatsoever, then he is indifferent regarding which representational manner affects him.
4.8 The only question for him in making up his mind is how strong, how long, how easily procured and often repeated this agreeableness will be.

4.9 Someone needing gold for some expenditure is entirely indifferent about its source (whether it comes from a mountain mine or is washed from sand) as long as it is accepted everywhere at the same value. Likewise no person who is concerned solely with the pleasure of life will ask whether representations come from the understanding or from the sensitivity, but rather only how much amusement they will provide and for how long.

4.10 Only those wishing to deny to pure reason the power of determining the will without the presupposition of any sort of feeling can be so mistaken in their own explanation that what they themselves have previously brought to one and the same principle, they later declare to be entirely dissimilar.

4.11 Hence we find, e.g., that we can derive pleasure in the sheer exertion of power, in the consciousness of the strength of soul in overcoming obstacles which block our projects, in the cultivation of spiritual talents, etc. And these we quite properly denominate finer joys and delights because they are in our power more than others and are not depleted, and rather strengthen the feeling for yet more gratification of the same sort and, by entertaining, likewise cultivate.

4.12 But since a predisposition in us of a feeling for that as the first condition of this liking must be presupposed for the possibility of that pleasure, the ensuing proclamation of these as a way of determining the will differently than through the senses, is like ignorant people, who want so much to dabble about in metaphysics, thinking up a material so fine, so exceedingly fine, that they even become dazzled and then believe that in this way they have devised a spiritual being which still occupies space.

4.13 If, with regard to the determination the will, we charge Epicurus with basing virtue on the sheer pleasure it promises, it is inappropriate for us subsequently to cast dispersion on him because he held this to be entirely homogeneous with those of the coarsest sense. For we have no basis at all for accusing him of attributing the representations, by means of which this feeling became excited in us, merely to the bodily senses.

4.14 As far as we can surmise, he sought the source of many of these representations in the utilization of the higher capacity for recognitions. But then, according to the principle cited above, that did not, and also could not, hinder him from holding the enjoyment im-
parted by those intellectual representations, and by means of which alone they can be determination basis of the will, as entirely homogeneous.\(^{69}\)

4.15 Consistency is the greatest obligation of a philosopher and nonetheless is rarely encountered.

4.16 The ancient Greek schools give us more examples of consistency than we encounter in our syncretic age, where a certain coalition system of contradictory principles, full of slant and shallowness, is fabricated because it better commends itself to a public which is satisfied in knowing a little of everything, but nothing thoroughly, and in that way to be a jack all trades [and a master of none].

4.17 The principle of personal happiness, regardless of how far understanding and reason may be used with it, would still encompass no other determination bases for the will than what is commensurate with the lower desire capacity. Accordingly there is either no supreme desire capacity, or else pure reason must be practical of itself alone, i.e., able to determine the will through the mere form of the practical rule without presupposing any sort of feeling, thus without any representation of the pleasant or unpleasant as the material of the desire, which is always an empirical condition of principles.

4.18 Reason alone then, but only to the extent it determines the will for itself (not in service to inclinations), is a true supreme desire capacity, to which the pathologically determinable is subjected, and is actually, indeed specifically, distinguished from it so that that even the least mixture of the incentives of the pathological impairs its strength and superiority, even as the least empiricism as a condition in a mathematical demonstration, topples and destroys its dignity and force.\(^{70}\)

4.19 Reason determines the will immediately by means of a practical law, and not by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure and displeasure, not even some pleasure in this law. Only by being practical as pure reason can it possibly be legislative.

**Remark II**

5.1 To be happy is a necessary demand of every rational being who is also finite, and hence an unavoidable determination basis of his desire capacity.

\(^{69}\) Thus to get drunk or to enjoy a theatrical performance must be compared with regard to the expected pleasure in order to make a choice between them on any given occasion. In this regard they are both pleasure, but of a different degree.

\(^{70}\) All desires are of the same sort, i.e., pleasures, and empirically conditioned, unless pure reason can be practical on its own. Only then and by virtue of the latter can there be a higher desire capacity.
5.2 For the satisfaction with our entire existence is not perchance an original possession and a bliss, which a consciousness of our independent self sufficiency would presuppose, but rather is a problem imposed by our very nature as finite beings, and because we are needful. This need concerns the material of our desire capacity, i.e., something which refers to a feeling of pleasure or displeasure lying subjectively as the basis, and by means of which the person who has need of that feeling to be satisfied with his state is determined.

5.3 But precisely because this material determination base can be recognized by the subject only empirically, it is impossible to consider this task as a law, because to be objective in every case and for all rational beings this would have to contain the exact same determination basis of the will.

5.4 For even though the concept of happiness is always the basis of the practical referral of objects to the desire capacity, it is still only the general title of subjective determination bases and does not specifically determine anything. But precisely such determination is our task here, and without that our problem cannot be solved at all.  

5.5 How each person obtains happiness depends upon the particular feeling of pleasure and displeasure of that person, and even with the same person it depends upon the diversity of needs according to the modifications of this feeling. Therefore a subjectively necessary law (as a law of nature) is objectively a very contingent practical principle indeed, one which can and must be very diverse in diverse subjects, thus never can render a law. Concerning then the avidity for happiness the question is not about the form of the legality, but rather solely about the material, namely whether and how much enjoyment I may expect by complying with the law.

5.6 Principles of self love can indeed contain universal rules of skill (for discovering means for the accomplishment of one’s intentions). But in that case they are merely theoretical principles,* e.g., how someone who thoroughly enjoys bread, might dream up a mill.

5.7 But practical injunctions, which are based on them, can never be universal. For the determination basis of the capacity of desiring can never be assumed to be universally directed to the same object.

* Kant’s footnote:
1.1 Propositions, which are called ‘practical’ in mathematics and in science, should really be called ‘technical’.
1.2 For in these settings we are not concerned at all about the determination of the will. These propositions indicate merely the manifold of the possible actions which are sufficient for

71 It does not help to say that all people want to be happy, for in order for the pursuit of happiness to be a law it would have to specify exactly what would be happiness for all people. And this will vary greatly between people and even with the same person over time.
the production of a certain effect and therefore are just as theoretical as all propositions which express the connection of cause and effect.

1.3 Who is taken by the effect, must also be satisfied with the cause.

6.1 Let us assume that finite rational beings also thought exactly the same with regard to what they had to assume as objects of their feelings of pleasure or pain, and even also with respect to the means for attaining the former and avoiding the latter. Still the principle of self love could in no way be proclaimed by them as a practical law, for this unanimity would still only be contingent.  

6.2 The grounds of determination would still always be only subjectively valid and merely empirical, and would not have that necessity which is thought in each and every law, namely the objective necessity from reason a priori. In the latter case [that of objective necessity] we would have to proclaim this necessity as not at all practical, but rather purely as physical, namely that the action would be just as unfailingly necessitated through our inclination as is our yawn when we see others yawning.

6.3 Rather than elevating merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws, it would be easier to assert that there were no practical laws at all, but only counsels in aid of our appetite. For practical laws have objective, and not merely subjective, necessity. And they must be recognized through reason a priori, not through experience (regardless of how empirically universal this might be).

6.4 Even the rules of consistent appearances are only termed natural laws (e.g., the mechanical) if they are actually recognized a priori or at least (e.g., the chemical) assumed to be so recognized from objective foundations if our insight went deeper.

6.5 With merely subjective practical principles, however, there is the expressly imposed condition that subjective, and not objective, conditions of the discretionary choice must be the foundation. Hence, they must always be represented as mere maxims, and never as practical laws.

Theorem II

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72 Even if all people had the same, specific needs regarding objects of happiness, this would still not bring us to laws based on this. For people could always arise who had different needs regarding the specifics of their happiness.

73 Suppose all people without exception preferred vanilla ice cream to all else, then we would have a law of nature rather than a practical law, and people would respond to the opportunity of that ice cream just as we respond to yawning.

74 A reminder: maxims are subjective valid for the respective individual, while laws are considered as objectively valid for all.
6.6 At first glance this latter remark seems to be sheer quibble. But it is the verbal determination of the most important distinction which can ever be considered in practical investigations.
No. 4

Theorem III

1.1 If a rational being had to think his maxims as practical, universal laws, then he could only do so if they were principles which contained the determination basis of the will with regard to their form, and not to their material.

2.1 The material of a practical principle is the object of the will.

2.2 This either is, or is not, the determination basis of the will.

2.3 If it were the determination basis, then the rule would be subjected to an empirical condition (the relationship of the determining representation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure), consequently would not be a practical law at all.\(^{75}\)

2.4 Now if we abstract from all material aspects, i.e., every object of the will (as the determination basis), nothing remains of a law except the sheer form of a universal legislation.

2.5 A rational being, therefore, can either not at all think his subjectively practical principles, i.e., maxims, as being also universal laws at the same time, or else must assume that their mere form alone (by means of which they are suitable for universal legislation) makes them into practical laws.

Remark

3.1 Which form in the maxim be suitable for universal legislation, and which not, the most ordinary mind can distinguish without instruction.

3.2 Let us say that I have formulated a maxim to increase my fortune through all safe means.

3.3 A sum of money is assigned to me in trust, the maker of which has died, and there is no evidence whatsoever of this assignment.

3.4 This is, of course, the precise occasion for my maxim.

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\(^{75}\) This conclusion was drawn in the previous section.
3.5 Now I want only to know whether my maxim might also be valid as a universal, practical law.\textsuperscript{76}

3.6 Therefore I apply my maxim to the present case and ask whether it could arguably assume the form of a law, hence whether I could simultaneously proclaim through my maxim such a law that anyone may deny the existence of a trust fund, the establishment of which no one is able to prove.

3.7 I realize immediately that such a principle, as law, would destroy itself because it would mean that there would be no trust funds at all.\textsuperscript{77}

3.8 A practical law, which I recognize as such, must qualify as a universal legislation. This is an identical proposition and, therefore, self-evident.

3.9 Now if I say my will is subject to a practical law, then I cannot introduce my inclination (e.g., in the present case my avarice) as a determination basis of the will suitable for a universal, practical law. For this inclination, so vastly deficient with regard to any suit-ability as a universal legislation, must far rather, in the form of a universal law, destroy itself.

4.1 Since therefore the avidity to happiness is universal, hence also since the maxim according to which each person places this [avidity] as the determination basis of his will would be universal, it is very curious how it could occur to intelligent people to suggest this avidity to happiness were a universally practical law.

4.2 For since a universal law of nature brings everything into agreement, it follows here that if we wanted to concede the universality of a law to the maxim, then precisely the ex-treme opposite of accord would ensue along with the most annoying conflict and the complete destruction of the maxims themselves and their intentions.

4.3 For the will of everyone does not then have one and the same object, but rather each person has his own (his own well being), which indeed can also coexist contingently with the intentions of others, which they in a like manner center upon themselves, but is by no

\textsuperscript{76} On a popular level we often ask how would it be if everyone acted like we want to act in a given situa-tion, e.g., act dishonestly regarding such a trust as we are considering here. Then we can tell if our maxim were suitable for a universal law such that all people might act accordingly.

\textsuperscript{77} In the absence of the moral law the only restraints against this sort of conduct would be a comprehen-sive police state or “animal pity”, both of which are very contingent. See comparison of Sagan and Kant on this general topic.
means sufficient for laws, because the exceptions, which one is occasionally authorized to make, are endless and cannot at all be determinedly embraced in a single universal rule.\textsuperscript{78}

4.4 In this way a harmony arises which is similar to that described by a certain satirical poem about the spiritual concord of two married people who are thoroughly attuned to each other. “O wonderful harmony! What he wants, she wants, too”, etc., or what is related about the pledge made by King Francis I to Emperor Charles V, “What my brother Charles wants (Milan) I also want.”\textsuperscript{79}

4.5 Empirical determination bases are no more suited to the inner, than they are to the universal external, legislation. For one person places his subject to the inclination as foundation, but someone else another subject, and even in each subject sometimes this and sometimes that inclination is the more influential.

4.6 To discover a law that rules them all together under this condition, namely with all-faceted accord, is utterly impossible.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{78} The only way this could work would be for all people to be happy about, and want, the same thing, as the next sentence indicates.

\textsuperscript{79} This latter could also be a play on words, where Francis would be telling Charles, I don’t want you to have Milan for I want Milan myself. Otherwise it seems as though Francis could not be happy in the thought that Charles were unhappy. It is this latter sense that Kant uses here.

\textsuperscript{80} And so we can forget the notion that all people might have the same object of desire with all others and in that way find a maxim for happiness to be suitable for a law.
1st Task

1.1 Assuming that the sheer legislative form of the maxims were by itself the sufficient determination basis of a will, we are to find the constitution of such a will (that were so determinable).

2.1 Since the sheer form of a law can only be represented by reason, and thus is not an object of the senses, and so does not belong among the appearances, the representation of this form, as the determination basis of the will, is distinguished from all determination bases of the events in nature according to the law of causality, because with them the determining bases themselves must be appearances.⁸¹

2.2 But if no determination basis of the will can serve as its law except merely the universal, legislating form, then such a will must be conceived of as entirely independent from the natural law of appearances, namely from the law of causality, with regard to one another.

2.3 But such independence is call freedom in the most rigorous, i.e., transcendental, sense.

2.4 A will, therefore, to which the sheer legislating form of the maxim alone can serve as a law, is a free will.⁸²

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⁸¹ Since only the form of the maxim is in question here, namely that it be suitable for a universal legislation, it follows that this is independence from all laws of nature, e.g., natural necessity in the relationship of cause and effect. The form is a product of reason and thus has nothing to do with the senses and thus also not with the appearances.

⁸² Any other will, i.e., one determined by an object of the sense as an appearance, e.g., personal inclination and desire, would not be a free will, and no choice would ever arise. For example, if the will were determined by happiness, then in the case above of the opportunity for safely cheating someone the will would be determined and the choice would be a foregone conclusion, i.e., the cheating would have to occur according to laws of nature.
No. 6

2nd Task

1.1 Supposing that a will were free, what would be the law uniquely suited to determine it necessarily?

2.1 Since the material of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim, can never be given otherwise than empirically, and since a free will, independent as it is of empirical conditions (i.e., those pertaining to the world of the senses), must still be determinable, it follows that a free will must encounter a determination basis in the law, though independently of the material of the law.\textsuperscript{83}

2.2 But apart from the material of the law, nothing further is contained in the law than its legislative form.

2.3 Therefore the legislative form, to the extent it is contained in the maxim, is the only thing which can constitute a determination basis of a free will.

Remark

3.1 Freedom and unconditional practical law, therefore, refer to each other in a reciprocal way.\textsuperscript{84}

3.2 Now I am not concerned here about whether they are actually different, or whether the unconditioned law be nothing else than the consciousness of a pure practical reason, and this in turn nothing other than the positive concept of freedom. Rather I seek the source of our recognition of the unconditional practical, whether it be freedom or the practical law.\textsuperscript{85}

3.3 This source cannot be freedom; for we can neither become immediately conscious of freedom, because its first concept is negative, nor can we infer it from experience, for ex-

\textsuperscript{83} “Free” as opposed to “chaotic”, I would think. The three realms would be: chaos, necessity, and freedom.

\textsuperscript{84} Freedom means the capacity of determining the will by practical laws (according to form and without regard to a material object), and the capacity of so determining the will means freedom.

\textsuperscript{85} The “unconditional practical” will mean the capacity for determining the will independently of all appearances and objects of the senses. What then suggests this to us: freedom or the moral law?
Experience provides only the law of appearances to be recognized, thus the mechanism of
nature, which is the diametric opposite of freedom.86

3.4 Therefore it is the moral law, of which we become immediately conscious (upon devising
maxims of the will), which first comes to us and leads us precisely to the concept of free-
dom, for reason presents the moral law as a determination basis to be outweighed by no
sensitive condition, and indeed as entirely independently of such.

3.5 But how is the consciousness of that moral law possible?

3.6 We can be conscious of pure practical laws in exactly the same way that we are conscious
of pure theoretical principles, i.e., we attend to the necessity with which reason prescribes
them, and to the isolation of all empirical conditions, which these indicate.

3.7 The concept of a pure will arises out of the first even as the consciousness of a pure un-
derstanding arises from the latter.87

3.8 That this be the true subordination of our concepts, and that morality first reveal the con-
cept of freedom, thus practical reason first pose the most insolvable problem to specula-
tive reason with this concept in order to place it in the greatest embarrassment through
that; all this becomes clear from the following consideration:

since nothing in the appearances can be explained through the concept of freedom [for
here mechanism of nature must always constitute the guide] and beyond which the anti-
mony of pure reason, if it seeks to ascend in the series of causes to the unconditioned, en-
tangles itself in incomprehensibilities as much with the one as with the other of these con-
cepts [but where the latter at least (i.e., mechanism) still has applicability in explaining
the appearances], the hazardous undertaking of introducing freedom into science would
never have occurred to anyone had not the moral law and with it practical reason arrived
at that and forced this concept upon us.88

86 The first concept of freedom means merely an ability to act independently of the laws of nature, and so
is a negative expression. And the notion freedom cannot possibly have arisen through experience for
here everything is a function of a natural law of necessitation.

87 We conceive of the pure understanding when we look for the conditions of experience and come to re-
alize that the principles of the pure understanding necessary for experience cannot have arisen through
experience. This was established in the CPR. And likewise when we consider the moral law we realize
that this can also not have arisen from experience, but is a product of pure practical reason in the consid-
eration of the form of our maxims.

88 Freedom according to science would mean merely a capacity for choosing among different objects of
happiness, e.g., delaying a gratification in order to obtain a greater gratification later, as is indicated in the
first case in the example which follows, and which ensues from laws of nature for the appearances. And
this is entirely different from the freedom recognized here as independence from a determination by the
laws of nature. Evidently at some time there was an attempt to introduce a study of freedom into the cur-
ricular of the science schools.
3.9 But even experience certifies this order of the concepts within us.

3.10 Suppose that some one were to aver of his most passionate desire that it were irresistible if the alluring object and the opportunity to it were at hand; ask him whether he might not be able to master this desire if a gallows were erected before the house where he is to avail himself of this opportunity, in order that he might be hanged there immediately after his savored passion . . . it won’t take long to guess his answer.\(^89\)

3.11 But inquire of him further: suppose his sovereign, threatening him with the same inexorable death penalty, should require him to bear false witness against an upright man whom the king very much wishes to ruin through trumped up charges, and given how much his love for life might be, ask him whether he would consider it possible that he might overcome this love of life?

3.12 Whether he would do it or not, he may not be able to say; but that it be possible for him to do so, this he will admit without hesitation.\(^90\)

3.13 Therefore he judges that he can do something for the simple reason that he is aware that he ought to do so, and recognizes within himself the freedom which otherwise, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him.\(^91\)

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\(^89\) Here we are speaking of merely practical freedom (as understood by science) and not transcendental freedom. Here there is no actual choice. It is a foregone conclusion that the “irresistible” object of desire will be rejected for the sake of a greater happiness later (life itself).

\(^90\) If humans were not free it would be impossible even to make any sense out of such a question. It would be like asking a person if he wanted a steak for dinner or to have his hand cooked and served to him on a platter? It would be considered either a joke or some kind of trick question.

\(^91\) He is not intuitively and directly aware of his freedom, for this would require an intelligible perspective. Instead he is forced by the consciousness of the moral law (as a law and not as a mere, subjectively valid maxim) to consider this, and in that way to recognize his freedom. We know we are free, and this is only possible by means of the moral law. In the \textit{GMM.III.2} we “assumed” our freedom, but here we recognize it.
No. 7

Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason

1.1 Act in such a way that the maxim of your will can at the same time always hold as a principle of a universal legislation.92

Remark

2.1 Pure geometry has postulates as practical propositions which, however, contain nothing further than the presupposition that one is able to do something if it were required. These are its only propositions, and they concern an existence.93

2.2 They are, therefore, practical rules under a problematical condition of the will.94

2.3 But in the case here the rule says that we are to behave in a certain way--regardless!95

2.4 Here the practical rule is unconditioned, thus is represented as a categorically practical proposition a priori such that the will is utterly and immediately determined objectively (through the practical rule itself, which therefore is here a law).96

2.5 For here pure and intrinsically practical reason is immediately legislating.

2.6 The will is thought of as independent of empirical conditions, thus as a pure will, as determined through the mere form of the law, and this determination basis is considered to be the supreme condition of all maxims.

2.7 The matter is quite curious and without parallel in the entire field of practical recognitions.

92 Maxim is a subjectively valid principle of action (of determining the will), i.e., a matter of personal choice. And so we are here called upon to always make sure that our maxim can serve as a universal determination of the will, i.e., by anyone at all.

93 Such a postulate might be the ability to draw a circle, or a triangle.

94 Now since we are able to draw a circle, the only question arises as to whether we want to draw a circle. And so this drawing is hypothetical, i.e., if desired a circle can be described.

95 This might be like drawing a circle whether one wanted to or not. An absolute imperative to draw a circle.

96 Here there is no consideration given at all to any desire. Instead the will is determined immediately by means of the form as suitable for a universal legislation.
2.8 For the a priori thought of a possible universal legislation, which therefore is merely problematic, is commanded unconditionally as law, and without borrowing anything from experience or from any sort of external will.\(^97\)

2.9 But it is also not a precept by which an action is to occur by which in turn a desired effect is possible (for then the rule would always be conditioned physically). Instead it is a rule which determines a priori merely the will with respect to the form of its maxims. And in this case it is at least not impossible to think a law, which serves merely to assist the subjective form of the fundamental proposition, as the determination basis through the objective form of a law in general.

2.10 We can term the consciousness of this basic law a fact (\textit{Faktum}) of reason, not because we can rationally contrive it from the preceding data of reason, e.g., out of the consciousness of freedom (for this is not given to us before hand), but rather because it impresses itself upon us as a synthetic a priori proposition which is based upon no perspective, neither pure nor empirical. It would of course be analytical if one presupposed freedom of the will. But for this as a positive concept we would need an intellectual perspective/intuition, which here may not at all be assumed.\(^98\)

2.11 Still, in order to avoid any misinterpretation in considering this law as a given, we need to note that it is not an empirical fact, but rather entirely of pure reason, which in this way proclaims itself to be originally legislating (\textit{sic volo, sic jubeo}\(^99\)).\(^100\)

\textbf{Consequence}

3.1 Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (humans) a universal law called the moral law.\(^101\)

\(^{97}\) Here there is no appeal to happiness or animal pity or the will of God or any motive beyond the mere universal form of the law. Accordingly this is quite curious indeed.

\(^{98}\) This consciousness of the law arises a priori and is not derived from freedom. Far rather, as we have seen, it is by virtue of the consciousness of this law binding on us, that we become aware of our freedom, which would not be possible in any other way. The factum is the realization that we are obligated or necessitated to universalize our maxims

\(^{99}\) As I will, so command I.

\(^{100}\) This independence from all empirical aspects will be made clear later in the consideration of the incentives of pure practical reason.

\(^{101}\) Pure reason by itself is able to determine the will by the requirement to universalize the maxims and make them then independent of the particular individual.
4.1 The previously noted fact cannot be denied.\textsuperscript{102}

4.2 We need only dissect the judgment which humans pass on the legality of their actions. It will always be found upon the occasion of an action that no matter what the inclination may say to the contrary, their reason, incorruptibly and compelled through itself, will hold the maxims of the will always to the pure will, i.e., on its own, in that it considers itself as practical a priori.\textsuperscript{103}

4.3 Now precisely because of the universality of its legislation, making it the formal and supreme determination basis of the will and with complete disregard of all subjective differences, reason also declares this principle of morality to be a law for all rational beings, to the extent they in general have a will, i.e., a capacity for determining their causality through the representation of rules, thus to the extent they are capable of actions according to foundational propositions, consequently also according to practical principles a priori (for these alone have that necessity, which reason demands for principles).\textsuperscript{104}

4.4 Therefore it is not limited merely to humans, but rather goes to all finite beings who have reason and wills, indeed includes even the infinite being as the supreme intelligence.

4.5 But in the first case, the law has the form of an imperative because, while we can indeed presuppose a pure will with rational finite beings, still, as affected as we are with needs and sensitive motivational causes, we cannot presuppose a holy will, i.e., one which were incapable of any maxims conflicting with the moral law.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102} See 2.10 above; the consciousness of this basic law, i.e., a requirement of reason to universalize one’s maxims, is a factum or fact or accomplishment of reason.

\textsuperscript{103} No matter how I might try to justify an action to the contrary, the law (= my conscience guided by this law) will not be corrupted nor impressed, and I cannot bend it to my pleasure. Thus I cannot help but consider the acceptability of my maxims as universal principles, thus principles of a pure will which is not affected by personal inclinations and desires.

\textsuperscript{104} The implication of 4.3a is that some rational beings might not have a will, i.e., might not be able to determine their actions via principles and rules of action.

\textsuperscript{105} Being an imperative here means that we know what pure practical reason calls for, but where we may also choose to disregard this and act according to a maxim which accords with inclinations and not with the moral law. A holy will would be one where it were impossible to act except in accordance with the moral law.
4.6 The moral law with such a finite being, therefore, is an imperative which commands categorically because the law is unconditioned. The relationship of such a will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation. This denotes a necessitation to an action, albeit only through reason and its objective law. This necessitation is called duty because a pathologically affected, though not thusly determined and hence still always free, discretionary choice (Willkür) entails a wish, which arises from subjective causes, and so can often be at odds with the pure objective determination basis and therefore has need of a resistance of practical reason as moral necessity, which can be termed an inner, but also intellectual, compulsion.  

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4.7 With the all-sufficient intelligence, its discretionary choice is properly represented as incapable of any maxim which were not simultaneously capable of being an objective law. The concept of holiness befitting such a being for that reason does not rise above all practical laws, although it does so regarding all practically limiting laws, thus above all obligation and duty.  

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4.8 This holiness of the will is likewise a practical Idea which must necessarily serve as a model. Indeed the ever approaching approximation to this model, extending out into eternity, is the only thing incumbent upon all finite beings.  

108 This Idea holds the pure moral law, which for that very reason is itself called holy, continually and properly in mind. And to secure our maxims and their immutability for a continuing advancement, the progress in keeping that moral law in mind (a progress going on for eternity) is the pinnacle achievable by finite practical reason, even though this goal in turn, at least as a naturally developed capacity, can never be completed, because the confidence in such case never becomes apodictic certitude and the persuasion of that being the case is very dangerous.  

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106 Later in Incentives of Pure Practical Reason we learn that the respect held by finite rational beings for the moral law is indeed an emotion, and indeed such a one which can only arise by virtue of the conception (Idea) of this law.

107 With such a holy will it would be impossible for there to be any maxim which were not in accord with the moral law.

108 Later, in the Dialectic, we learn that this ever striving for moral perfection is part and parcel of the highest good which includes then not only this moral perfection, but a commensurate perfection in happiness. Here we see that we are not only obligated to undertake an immediate moral act, but also to consider that undertaking as a progression toward moral perfection.

109 Again we see here an anticipation of the Idea of the highest good.

110 This can reminds us of Tolkien’s Fellowship of the Ring where a human might think he were holy enough to handle the omnipotent ring of power, but where he was always proven wrong and had overestimated his moral strength.
No. 8

Theorem IV

1.1 The autonomy of the will is the solitary principle of all moral laws and of the duties conformable to them.\textsuperscript{111} In contrast to this no obligation whatsoever is established through any heteronomy of discretionary choice. In fact this would be contrary to the principle of such autonomy and to the morality of the will.\textsuperscript{112}

1.2 Indeed the general principle of morality consists in the independence from all materiality of the law (namely from any desired object) and yet at the same time in the determination of discretionary choice through the sheer universal, legislating form, of which a maxim must be capable.

1.3 But now this independence is freedom in a negative sense, while the inherent legislation of pure and, as such, practical reason, is freedom in the positive sense.\textsuperscript{113}

1.4 Therefore the moral law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of pure, practical reason, i.e., freedom, and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, by means of which alone they can agree with the supreme practical law.\textsuperscript{114}

1.5 Hence if the material of the wanting (which can be nothing other than an object of appetite) which is connected with the law, were to enter into the practical law as a condition of its possibility, then heteronomy of discretionary choice would arise from that, namely dependence upon natural law in following some incentive or inclination. In that case the will would not produce the law, but rather only guidelines for rational compliance with pathological laws. But the maxim, which could never in this way contain within itself the universal, legislative form, not only would establish no obligation, but would even be con-

\textsuperscript{111} By autonomy of will we mean then the self (and rational) evaluation of the suitability of maxims for universal legislation.

\textsuperscript{112} If we were obligated to seek some happiness, then this would be equal to the obligation arising from the autonomy of determining the will and would be in conflict with the moral and on an equal footing with it, a conflict which could not be decided.

\textsuperscript{113} The negative freedom means that no object/material determines the will, and this leaves open the question as to whether the will under such conditions could be determined to an action. The positive freedom means that the action is still determined even though there is no object. Ordinarily without an object you would think action were impossible, for there would be nothing to occasion an action; but here we see that the will is determined positively by the law and so the action can occur. And so it is the form of a law in the universality of the maxims that provides the positive notion of freedom.

\textsuperscript{114} Autonomy of the will, therefore, means our capacity of determining the will independently of all objects of desire. This is accomplished through the universalization of the maxims. And it is in this way alone that we can have agreement of the maxims of all people, i.e., that such is possible.
trary to the principle of a pure practical reason, and so also to the moral disposition even if the action arising from that should happen to conform to it legalistically.\textsuperscript{115}

\textbf{Remark I}

2.1 Therefore a practical injunction, which entails a material (thus empirical) condition, must never be counted as a practical law.\textsuperscript{116}

2.2 For the law of the pure will, which is free, places a practical law in an entirely different sphere from the empirical. And the necessity expressed by that practical law, since it is not to be a necessity of nature, can for that very reason consist only in the formal conditions of the possibility of a law in general.\textsuperscript{117}

2.3 Every material content of practical rules always depends upon subjective conditions, and these provide no universality for rational beings except solely the conditioned (if I desire this or that, then what I would have to do to actually acquire it), and they all together revolve around the principle of personal happiness.\textsuperscript{118}

2.4 Now it is certainly undeniable that all wanting would have to have an object, thus a material. But it is not for that reason the determination basis and condition of the maxim. For if it were, then the maxim could not be rendered in a universally legislating form, because the expectation of the existence of the object would then be the determining cause of the discretionary choice and the dependence of the desire capacity upon the existence of some sort of material would have to be the basis of the wanting, which can never be sought

\textbf{Theorem IV}

If we followed counsels of prudence in pursuit of happiness, these could not be laws and could not establish any obligation and would be contrary to the moral sense of duty even if, for example, one found enjoyment in returning lost property to their rightful owner.

These would always be merely counsels of prudence in pursuit of personal happiness and due to diversity of inclinations could never be a practical law and thus never valid for all rational beings. This was established earlier in \textbf{Theorem II}.

There are only two possible necessities, i.e., natural (determination of the will by an object of desire) and practical (determination by universalizing the maxims). If a desired object were the determination basis of the will, we would be in the realm of natural causation and be reacting to our inclinations.

And so a practical rule is either material or formal. In the first case it is conditioned by a desire for an object and tells us how to obtain that object, e.g., acquiring an automobile or a lover, and thus is conditioned upon a desire for that object. In the second case it has no material and thus no object (except, as we will discover later, the object of the good) and is expressed in the form of a universalized maxim.
anywhere except in empirical conditions and thus can never render the basis to a necessary and universal rule.\textsuperscript{119}

2.5 Thus the happiness of others can be the object of the will of a rational being.

2.6 But if it were the determination basis of the maxim, then we would have to presuppose not only a natural delight in the well-being of others, but even a need, as entails the sympathetic sensitive temperament with humans.\textsuperscript{120}

2.7 But I cannot presuppose this need with every rational being (and certainly not with God).

2.8 Therefore the material of the maxim can indeed remain, but it must not be the condition of the maxim, for otherwise it would not be fitted for a law.\textsuperscript{121}

2.9 Therefore the mere form of a law which restricts the material content must at the same time be a basis for adding this material to the will, but not for presupposing it.\textsuperscript{122}

2.10 Suppose the material were my personal happiness.

2.11 This, if I attribute it to everyone (as I may in fact do with every finite being), can become an objective, practical law only if I include the happiness of others along with it.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{119} In other words we cannot want in the abstract, but always only in the concrete, i.e., want a specific something. But the question here is the basis of the determination of the maxim. I may enjoy fishing, but I cannot universalize a maxim to fish at every opportunity for that would require all people to enjoy fishing as much as I do; and that is simply not true.

\textsuperscript{120} This may be an allusion (albeit anticipatory) to Mill's thesis that we take an innate delight in the happiness of others. In that case it would not be a law, but merely a subjectively resident inclination. This also looks ahead to the necessary object of the moral act and finally the highest good. What Kant wants to say here is that while we may indeed have the happiness of others as the object (material) of the will, it cannot be the determination of the will. For it cannot be assumed to be universal that all people desire the happiness of others.

\textsuperscript{121} So the happiness of others, for example, can be an object of the will, but it cannot be the determination basis of the will as a law, for then we would have to assume all people were so inclined, and such an assumption would be unwarranted, given the diversity of the wants of all people. In other words we cannot assume that all people would want the happiness of others.

\textsuperscript{122} In universalizing my maxim I may come to make the happiness of others the object of the will, but this follows the universalization and does not precede and determine it.

\textsuperscript{123} Therefore if I want to say that I can seek my own happiness as a principle, I cannot merely say that everyone may seek their own happiness (which they would do anyway according to natural law), but rather I must seek the happiness of all people, and therefore then also include my own. Thus my own happiness would be derivative from the happiness of all, and not original.
2.12 Therefore the law for the promotion of the happiness of others, does not arise from the presupposition that this were an object for the discretionary choice of everyone, but rather merely in order that the form of the universality, which reason has need of as a condition for giving the objective validity of a law to a maxim of self-love, might become the determination basis of the will. It is for this reason that the object (the happiness of others) was not the determination basis of the pure will. For this basis was entirely and alone the sheer legislative form whereby I restrict my maxim, based on inclination, in order to procure for it the universality of a law. And I do this to make it commensurate with pure practical reason, from which constraint, and not from the addition of an outer motive, the concept of obligation, to expand the maxim of my self-love also to the happiness of others, could only then arise.\textsuperscript{124}

Remark II

3.1 The diametric opposite of the principle of morality would arise upon the establishment of the principle of personal happiness as the determination basis of the will. For according to this latter, as I indicated above, utterly everything, which places the determination basis (which is supposed to serve as law) anywhere except in the legislating form of the maxim, would have to be counted.\textsuperscript{125}

3.2 But this conflict is not merely logical, as is the case among empirically conditioned rules which someone nonetheless might want to elevate to necessary, recognitional principles, but rather practical. Indeed if in referral to the will the voice of reason were not so clear, so insurmountable, so audible even for the most common human, this conflict would undermine morality entirely. But this can only be sustained in the giddy speculations of academics who have the temerity to deafen themselves to that heavenly voice in order to support a theory for which little genius is required.

4.1 If an intimate friend, otherwise endeared to you, thought to justify himself in your eyes regarding a falsely rendered testimony by first pleading the--as he put it--holy duty of personal happiness, then enumerating the advantages he acquired by doing this, mentioning the prudence he observed in securing himself against any disclosure (including that on your part even, to whom he reveals his secret only because he is able to deny it at any time) and finally allowing in all seriousness to have performed a true human duty, you

\textsuperscript{124} As we seek to find the principle which could encompass the particular of my self love, it would be that all people are to be loved, and so then therefore also myself, and so the particular (personal happiness) is contained in the universal (happiness of all).

\textsuperscript{125} So we would have as many determination bases of the will as we have different inclinations among people. Instead of the universalization of maxims we would have a confusion of different rules, with much conflict and contradiction and all of which would be considered as a duty. This confusion and conflict is impossible with the principle of morality as the universalization of maxims.
would either immediately laugh in his face or cringe with abhorrence, even though, if someone had guided his principles solely by personal advantage, you would be unable to say anything at all against his measures.\textsuperscript{126}

4.2 Or suppose a someone wanted to recommend someone to be your steward, a person you could blindly entrust with all your affairs. And in order to evoke your confidence, suppose he extolled him as an intelligent person who precisely understood his own advantage and was untiring in utilizing every opportunity for that purpose; and finally, to insure that not even a concern about any ignoble selfishness stood in the way, applauded his appreciation of fine living, not in hoarding money or vulgar luxury, but rather in the expansion of his knowledge, choosing a proper circle of friends, even seeking his enjoyment in benevolence toward the needy, and incidentally also mentioning that he were not concerned about the means for performing such benevolence (such means acquiring their worth or worthlessness only from the purpose anyway), and for such purposes the money and property of others were for him as good as his own, at least once he knew he could so utilize them without discovery or hindrance. In such a case you would think the advocate either were making fun of you or had lost his mind.\textsuperscript{127}

4.3 So clearly and sharply differentiated are the boundaries of morality and self-love that not even the most common eye can mistake the distinction of whether something belong to the one or to the other.

4.4 The following few remarks will indeed seem superfluous with so evident a truth, but they do serve in procuring greater clarity to the judgment of ordinary, human reason.

5.1 The principle of happiness can indeed render maxims, but never any which were suitable as laws of the will, even if we made universal happiness the object.\textsuperscript{128}

5.2 For since the recognition of happiness is obviously based on experiential data, where every judgment depends very much on the opinion of each person (and even then is quite transient\textsuperscript{129}), it follows indeed that there can be general rules, but never universal ones, i.e., there can be rules which prove correct most of the time and on the average, but none

\textsuperscript{126} This is an example of how one’s own happiness could not be the basis of any duty, for this “duty to personal happiness” comes out to the opposite of morality. The example of the next paragraph presents an occasion to test a duty concerning the happiness of others.

\textsuperscript{127} Here we see also that the principle of the happiness of others could also not serve as a basis of morality (even if we assume the person being taken advantage of is not made unhappy as a result, e.g., remaining unaware, for here, as with the preceding sentence, the opposite of morality would be achieved.

\textsuperscript{128} Accordingly the principle of happiness cannot be obligatory. Only the moral law provides for obligation.

\textsuperscript{129} The criteria for happiness not only varies between individuals, but even for the same individual over a period of time.
which would have to be valid every time and necessarily. In a word, there could be no practical laws.\textsuperscript{130}

5.3 For that very reason, therefore, because here [with happiness] an object of discretionary choice must be the foundation for its rule, and so of course must precede the rule, it cannot be referred to or based on anything other than what is recommended, which calls for experience, and there the diversity of judgment will be endless.

5.4 This principle, therefore, does not prescribe precisely the same practical rules to all rational beings, although they do stand under a common title, that of happiness.

5.5 But because it is to be valid for everyone who can reason and will, the moral law is necessarily thought as objective.\textsuperscript{131}

6.1 The maxim of self-love (prudence) merely counsels; the law of morality commands.

6.2 But there is a great difference between what we are advised to do and what we are obligated to do.

7.1 What is to be done according to the principle of the autonomy of discretionary choice is grasped quite easily and without reflection for the most ordinary understanding. But what is to be done under the presupposition of the heteronomy of discretionary choice is difficult and requires worldly knowledge. In other words, everyone can figure out for himself what duty requires, but then what brings true, durable advantage, if this is conceived as stretching over an entire existence, is always shrouded in impenetrable darkness and requires considerable prudence in order that the rule, determined practically for that, is accommodated through skillful exceptions to the purposes of life in any sort of tolerable way.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} And this holds of Stephen Uhl’s so-called Golden Rule of Enlightened Selfishness, where the supreme principle of the will is personal happiness and which on average happens to work out for the good of others, e.g., seeking a world which is better for others will most often encourage others to treat you also better.

\textsuperscript{131} The rule of happiness will be very diverse with different people (and even with the same people at different times), while the moral law of the universalized maxims is the same for all people, e.g., that it is wrong to lie.

\textsuperscript{132} Accordingly if a system of action is not to be based on the moral law, it will be necessary to specify what the rules for achieving personal happiness, but which is impossible due to the lack of clarity as to what produces this enduring happiness.
7.2 And yet the moral law commands everyone and indeed to the most precise compliance.  

7.3 And it most certainly follows that the estimation as to what is to be done to accord with this law cannot be so difficult that the most ordinary and unpracticed person would not know of himself except by utilization of worldly prudence.

8.1 To perform adequately for the categorical command of morality is always in the power of every person. But this is rarely the case for the empirically conditioned prescription of happiness, and with regard to all people it is not possible with respect to even a single intention.

8.2 The reason why is this: with the moral everything depends only on the maxim which must be genuine and pure. But with happiness there is a dependence on the forces and the physical capacity for making a desired object actual.

8.3 A command that everyone should seek to find happiness would be foolish; for we never command anyone to do what he invariably wants to do anyway and on his own.

8.4 One would have to command or, far rather, merely prescribe to him the steps leading to that, because he can never do all that he wants to do.

8.5 But morality, commanded under the name of duty, is entirely reasonable. In the first place not everyone will gladly obey its proscription if it is in conflict with inclinations. And then the steps necessary for compliance with this law need not be taught here, for what he wills to do in this regard, he can do.

9.1 Who has lost at gambling can certainly be vexed with himself and his imprudence. But if he is also conscious of having cheated (even if he won) he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law.

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133 And so the determination of the moral act is quite different from the determination of the act of personal happiness. The former is simple, the latter complex and always tentative.

134 And in contrast, to determine what leads to the happiness of people is very vague and uncertain and ever changing.

135 It is difficult to ascertain what leads to enduring happiness for any individual, much less for all people.

136 So there is a reason for a command in order to overcome the inclinations (which is not the case with a pursuit of happiness) and then the necessary steps are clear, which is never the case in the pursuit of abiding happiness.
9.2 Therefore this (the moral law) must be something far removed from the principle of personal happiness.

9.3 For having to admit internally to one’s own worthlessness, even though winning, still indicates another standard of judgment than to applaud one’s self and say, “I am a clever man, for I have enriched my till.”

10.1 Finally there is something else in the Idea of our practical reason which accompanies the violation of a moral law, namely the deserving of punishment.

10.2 Now we are unable to join any participation of happiness with the concept of a punishment per se.

10.3 For even though the chastiser may have the good intention of directing this punishment for that purpose [for the violator’s eventual happiness], still the punishment must be justified in advance as punishment, i.e., as sheer ill for itself alone, so that the person punished, if the matter stopped there and he looked out to no good will lurking behind this severity, must admit that it were rightly applied to him and that his lot were perfectly commensurate to his conduct.

10.4 In every punishment as such there must first be justification and this makes up the essential aspect of this concept.

10.5 Grace may be connected with this, of course, but the one deserving punishment with respect to his behavior does not have the least reason to reckon upon this grace.

137 This is quite a contrast between the principle of happiness and that of morality. For if obligation were based on happiness, the cheat would have no basis for any self condemnation, and which then could not even arise in his consciousness.

138 This seems to be tied in with the Idea of the highest good which will be covered later in the Dialectic of Practical Reason.

139 I might punish someone also in the hopes that this would induce a new thinking and attitude which would result in a happier life on the part of that person.

140 Below in 8.5 of the Objects of Pure Practical Reason, we have an example of how a man who deems others is beaten and how that man would have to admit that the beating were well deserved.

141 Grace is an undeserved gift, a liberation from a deserved punishment.
10.6 Punishment, therefore, is a physical ill which, even if it were not connected as a natural consequence with the morally bad, would still have to be connected as consequence according to the principle of a moral legislator.\textsuperscript{142}

10.7 Now if every crime, even without seeing to the physical consequence with respect to the perpetrator, is punishable \textit{per se}, i.e., calls for the forfeiture of happiness (at least in part), it would obviously be absurd to say that the crime consists simply in the incurrence of a punishment, the perpetrator having injured his own happiness (which, according to the principle of self love, would have to be the actual concept of every crime).

10.8 In this way punishment would be the basis for terming something a crime, and justice would consist in discontinuing all punishment and even in hindering any naturally ensuing ill. For in that case there would no longer be anything bad in the action, because the ill, which otherwise followed upon it and for which reason alone the action was called bad, would now be restrained.\textsuperscript{143}

10.9 But finally to consider all punishment and reward simply as the machinations of a higher power which were supposed to serve only to prompt rational beings into activity toward their final purpose (of happiness) is too obviously a mechanism of their will, abolishing all freedom, for us to dwell on it.\textsuperscript{144}

11.1 More refined, though just as erroneous, is the pleading of those who assume a certain morally special sense which determines the moral law in the place of reason, and according to which the consciousness of virtue were connected immediately with satisfaction and delight, and that of depravity with spiritual unrest and pain, and so still display everything on the demand for personal happiness.\textsuperscript{145}

11.2 Without reference to what was stated earlier, I will only note the deception which passes under this guise.

\textsuperscript{142} Emerson, in contrast here to Kant, teaches that there is a natural consequence to violations of the moral law per his \textit{Essay on Compensation}. Perhaps he means that God has arranged this “natural effect”, as an omnipotent moral judge.

\textsuperscript{143} This would be as much as saying that murder were a crime in that a punishment is mandated, and not that it were wrong in a moral sense.

\textsuperscript{144} In section \textit{IX} of the Dialectic Kant will show that if we were as certain of God and of the rewards and punishments prescribed by him as we are of the truths of mathematics, we would have become no more than puppets, and the notion of moral duty and freedom could never arise. We would comply with the moral law solely to avoid the unhappiness to be conveyed as a result, and not because it were our duty.

\textsuperscript{145} This seems to be a reference to the theory of Epicurus, and which will be considered in more detail in the Dialectic. According to this theory people who do things which are immoral would naturally not be able to be happy.
11.3 In order to represent the depraved as plagued with mental unease through the consciousness of his transgressions, these must represent him already in advance with respect to the most noble foundation of his character (at least in some degree) as morally good just as they must represent one, whom the consciousness of dutiful actions delights, as before hand already virtuous.

11.4 Therefore the concept of morality and duty still had to precede before any regard to this [satisfaction or dissatisfaction] and cannot be derived from it at all.

11.5 Now one must still beforehand estimate the importance of that which we term duty, the esteem of the moral law and the immediate value which the compliance of that gives to the person in his own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in the consciousness of his conformity to duty and the bitter rebuke if one can reproach himself for its transgression.

11.6 Therefore one cannot feel this satisfaction or spiritual unrest before the recognition of obligation in order then to make such feeling the basis of the latter.

11.7 One must already be at least half honest in order to be able to make even a representation to himself of those sensations.

11.8 By the way, I do not at all deny that just as the human will, by virtue of freedom, is immediately determinable through the moral law, the frequent practice conformable to this determination basis is finally able to effect subjectively a feeling of satisfaction with one’s self. Indeed it belongs to duty to establish and cultivate that which actually alone deserves to be called the moral feeling. But the concept of duty cannot be derived from that, for otherwise we would have to think up a feeling of a law as such and make what can only be thought through reason into the object of this sensation. And this, if it is not supposed to become an obvious contradiction, would remove entirely every concept of duty and replace it with merely a mechanical play of finer inclinations (with the courser ones frequently conflicting with them).

12.1 Now if we compare our formal supreme foundational proposition of pure practical reason (as autonomy of the will) with all previous material principles of morality, we can present all remaining ones as such in a table, according to which, at the same time, all possible cases apart from a single one are actually exhausted. In this way we can prove through

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146 In a like way then we may discover in the Dialectic that we have a duty to promote the Highest Good as the necessary purpose and object of the will (and which includes the moral law), in order to minimize temptations to transgress that law. Indeed in this way the moral act becomes also the most prudent act.
inspection that it is vain to look about for another principle other than the formal one presented here.\textsuperscript{147}

\subsection*{12.2} All possible determination basis of the will are namely either merely subjective and therefore empirical, or also objective and rational; and both are either internal or external.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (per Montaigne)</td>
<td>Civil State (Per Mandeville)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\subsection*{13.1} Those on the left side (Subjective) are entirely empirical and are obviously not fitted at all for the universal principle of morality.\textsuperscript{148}

\subsection*{13.2} But those on the right side are based on reason (for perfection, as the constitution of things, and the highest perfection represented in substances, i.e., God, are both only to be thought through rational concepts).

\subsection*{13.3} However the first concept, that of perfection, can be taken either in the theoretical meaning, and there it means nothing except the completeness of each and every thing in its kind (transcendental). Or it means a thing merely as a thing in general (metaphysical), and there can be no discussion of that here.

\subsection*{13.4} But the concept of perfection in the practical sense is the suitability or adequacy of a thing to all sorts of purposes.

\subsection*{13.5} Such perfection as a constitution of the human, consequently inward, is nothing other than talent and that which strengthens or supplements this, namely skill.

\textsuperscript{147} So we will present all proffered sources of duty and see how it is that none of them, besides the universalization of the maxims, can meet the requirements of duty.

\textsuperscript{148} The empirical principles must presuppose some material, and this we have seen earlier can never provide a basis for morality.
13.6 The highest perfection in substance, i.e., God, consequently outward perfection (considered in the practical intention), is the adequacy of this being to all purposes in general.

13.7 Now therefore if purposes must be given to us beforehand with regard to which alone the concept of perfection (be it an inner one in us ourselves or an outer perfection in God) can become a determination basis of the will, and if we keep in mind that a purpose as an object, which must precede before the determination of the will through a practical rule and contain the basis of the possibility of such a object, thus the material of the will, taken as determination basis of that, is always empirical, it follows that such a purpose can serve as the Epicurean principle of doctrine of happiness, but never as the pure rational principle of the doctrine of morality and duty. (And the reason for this is that talent and its promotion, because they contribute to the advantage of life, or the will of God, if agreement with it, without beforehand practical principles independent of His Idea, are taken as the object of the will, can be motive causes of that only by means of the happiness which we expect from it).

it then follows first that the principles presented here are material, and second that they encompass all possible material principles.

And finally we can conclude from this and also because material principles are entirely unsuited to the highest moral law (as we have already shown), that the formal practical principle of pure reason (according to which the mere form of a legislation, universally possible through our maxims, must make up the highest and immediate determination basis of the will) is the single principle possible which is suitable to categorical imperatives, i.e., practical laws (which make actions into duties) and in general to the principle of morality as well in the estimation as also in the application to the human will in the determination of that will.
I. Deduction of the Foundational Propositions of Pure Practical Reason

1.1 This analytic establishes that pure reason is practical, i.e., can determine the will of itself and independently of all empirical considerations. This is accomplished by means of a factor through which pure reason proves itself practical in fact, namely the autonomy in the foundational principle of morality, by means of which it determines the will to an action.---

1.2 And at the same time we see that this factor is inseparably connected with the consciousness of the freedom of the will, and indeed is identical with it. As a result of this the will of a rational being, which belongs to the sense world and which recognizes itself (like other effecting causes) as necessarily subjected to the laws of causality, is in another way, as a being on its own, also conscious of its existence as determinable in an intelligible order of things, not of course conformable to a particular perspective of itself, but rather conformable to certain dynamic laws which can determine its causality in the sense world. For freedom, once it is attributed to us, moves us into an intelligible order of things, as has been adequately proven in another place.

2.1 Now if we compare this analytic with the analytical part of the critique of pure speculative reason, we see a notable contrast between the two.

2.2 For in the earlier work it was not foundational propositions, but rather pure sensitive perspective (space and time) that constituted the first datum and which made recognitions a priori possible, but only for objects of the senses.--

2.3 Synthetical foundational propositions from mere concepts without perspective were impossible, for such propositions could only take place with reference to what was sensitive, thus only to objects of possible experience. And this was the case because it is only by means of these concepts of the understanding, connected with this perspective, that make possible that recognition which is called experience.--

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149 Reason is not impotent when divorced from objects which make an appeal to inclinations. In an entirely objective vein it is able to devise rules of action which hold for rational creatures in general and so where no object or material content of the willing is presupposed. This “autonomy” here refers to the “consciousness of the moral law” of earlier, i.e., where we consider ourselves bound by this law of our own conception and proclamation for universalizing our maxims. Every action must, of course, have an object, but it is not this object but solely the universal character of the maxim which determines the will, as we have just established in the preceding section.

150 Freedom is characterized and identified by reference to a subjugation of the will to the moral law. And the moral law is the necessary condition for any expression of a transcendental freedom.
2.4 Out beyond objects of experience with things as noumenon, any positive aspect of a recognition was denied to speculative reason, and quite rightly so.\textsuperscript{151}

2.5 But this much was provided in that critique: the concept of noumena was secured, i.e., the possibility, and indeed the necessity, for thinking such.\textsuperscript{152} And freedom, negatively considered, was rescued against all challenges.\textsuperscript{153} For example freedom could now be thought with complete compatibility with those foundational propositions and limitations of pure reason. However this does not provide any sort of a determined and expansive something to be recognized about such objects. On the contrary it cuts off entirely all consideration to such as that.\textsuperscript{154}

3.1 On the other hand the moral law gives us a factor in hand, even if not visible, which is absolutely inexplicable, both from all data of the sense world and from the entire scope of our theoretical rational usage.\textsuperscript{155} This factor points to a pure understanding world, and even determines it positively and allows us to recognize something about it, namely a law.

4.1 This law serves to apply the form of an understanding world, i.e., of a supersensitive nature, to the sense world as a sensitive nature (concerning rational beings).\textsuperscript{156} But even so it still does not encroach upon the mechanism of that sense world.\textsuperscript{157}

4.2 Now nature, in a more universal meaning, is the existence of things under laws.

\textsuperscript{151} The categories of understanding speak to all things in general, but find a schema for their application only with regard to objects of the senses in a framework of time and space, and so are useless apart from a possible experience.

\textsuperscript{152} It is important to note that we have not shown the possibility and necessity of these noumena, but only the possibility and necessity of conceiving of such.

\textsuperscript{153} The negative expression of freedom is a capacity for acting independently of the inclinations. This freedom was shown in the \textit{Third Antinomy} to be compatible with the laws of nature. This suggests the impossibility of showing the impossibility of freedom in this negative sense.

\textsuperscript{154} The reference here is to the Third Antinomy, where we see the possibility in Speculative Reason of asserting two separate, but compatible, causalities, i.e., one of nature and one of freedom, and where experience and science take no account of any such freedom. And so it is asserted as though a fiction.

\textsuperscript{155} This “factor” will be the consciousness of the moral law and, what is the same thing, the recognition of our own freedom or autonomy in the composition and assertion of our subjugation to this moral law.

\textsuperscript{156} The moral law is to be exemplified in the sense world through the free actions of those subject to that law.

\textsuperscript{157} There is no need to incorporate such a thing as freedom into the equations and thinking of the sciences.
4.3 The sensitive nature of rational beings in general is their existence under empirically con-
ditioned laws. For that reason it is called heteronomy.\textsuperscript{158}

4.4 The supersensitive nature of these very same beings is their existence according to laws
which are independent of every empirical condition, and which therefore belong to the
autonomy of pure reason.

4.5 And since the laws, according to which the existence of things are dependent upon a rec-
ognition, are practical, the supersensitive nature, to the extent we can make a concept of
it, is nothing other than a nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason.\textsuperscript{159}

4.6 The law of this autonomy, however, is the moral law. And this therefore is the basic law of
a supersensitive nature and of a pure understanding world, the counterpart of which is
supposed to exist in the sense world, though without encroaching upon the laws of that
sense world.\textsuperscript{160}

4.7 We might term the former the original (\textit{natura archetypa}), which we recognize merely in
reason, but the latter (the sense world), because it contains the possible effect of the Idea
of the former as a determination basis of the will, the imitated (\textit{natura ectypa}).\textsuperscript{161}

4.8 For in fact the moral law, according to this Idea, transfers us into a nature in which pure
reason, if it were accompanied with the physical capacity commensurate to it, would pro-
duce the highest good. And it determines our will to impart a form to the sense world as to
a whole of rational beings.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{158} Here the spurs to action are the inclinations which practical reason then seeks to satisfy, and so where
the actions are functions of the inclinations and thus subject to laws of nature, e.g., human desires.

\textsuperscript{159} The objects of practical reason don’t even exist except through the recognition. This is in contrast to
theoretical reason where the objects are conceived to exist independently of us and merely await our rec-
ognition. Here now we are speaking of a nature where the moral law is efficacious.

\textsuperscript{160} We conceive of an intelligible (free world) which is manifested in the sense world by free beings, but
without interfering with the laws of the nature of that sense world. In that intelligible world then people
would obey the moral law and that would be an expression of the super-sensitive nature.

\textsuperscript{161} So the moral gives us the form of a supersensitive nature, and the latter is the implementation of this
moral law in the world of sense and experience.

\textsuperscript{162} The moral law determines the will to provide a realm of rational beings who are in a world of sense,
i.e., that a nature in the sense world should arise in conformity to this law. (This is also the first reference
after the preface to the highest good which will first be examined in the Dialectic.)
5.1 The most common attention to one’s self will certify that this Idea actually constitutes the pattern, as it were, for the determination of our will.\textsuperscript{163}

6.1 If the maxim, according to which I reflect about bearing witness, is tested through practical reason, I always see how it would be if it held as a universal natural law.

6.2 It is evident, in this manner, that this would necessitate everyone to truthfulness.

6.3 For it is incompatible with the universality of a natural law to allow testimony to hold as proving something and yet as deliberately untrue.

6.4 In a like manner the maxim which I take with respect to the free disposition of my life becomes determined immediately if I ask myself how things would have to be constituted such that a nature were organized in accordance with that maxim.

6.5 Obviously no one in such a nature would be able to end his life impulsively, for such a constitution could provide no enduring natural order, and so in all other cases.\textsuperscript{164}

6.6 But now in the actual nature, to the extent it is an object of experience, the free will is not determined of itself to such maxims which could establish for themselves a nature according to universal laws, nor is this free will fitted of itself in such a nature which were organized according to such maxims. For these are private inclinations which indeed make up a natural whole according to pathological (physical) laws, but not a nature which were possible only through our wills according to pure practical laws.

6.7 Nonetheless through reason we are conscious of a law, to which all our maxims are subjected, as though a natural order would simultaneously have to arise through our will.\textsuperscript{165}

6.8 Therefore this must be the Idea of a nature which is not given empirically and yet which is possible through freedom. This would be a supersensitive nature, to which we give objec-

\textsuperscript{163} Essentially then and in order to express such a supersensitive nature we come to ask: what sort of world would it be if everyone acted as I do, i.e., acted in accordance with my own maxims? If the answer is a world which either contradicted itself or which I could not will, my maxims would not be morally acceptable.

\textsuperscript{164} And so we conceive of a world which conformed to the moral law, and this is the only world that could provide a nature commensurate to our position as free rational beings, this so-called supersensitive nature.

\textsuperscript{165} This speaks of the moral law of universalizing our maxims (subjective principles of action) and making sure they are commensurate with the willing of all people. And the way we conceive of this law is by thinking that a moral world order and nature could arise by virtue of our willing this universalization.
tive reality, at least in a practical sense, because we consider it as the object of our wills as pure rational beings.\footnote{And so the object of our wills would be this supersensitive nature and it has then objective reality in a practical sense, i.e., can be expressed in free actions.}

7.1 Therefore the distinction between the laws of a nature, to which the will is subject, and the laws of a nature, which is subject to a will (with respect to what has reference to its free actions), is based on this: with the former the objects would have to be the causes of the representations which determine the will, but with the latter the will serves as the cause of the objects, such that its causality would have its determination basis in the pure rational capacity alone. For this reason it can also be termed a pure practical reason.\footnote{The Idea of a pure practical reason consists in the ability of practical reason to determine the will in the absence of any given object. Then the object of the will is the effect to be accomplished by (action of) the will and this is introduced later in the section on incentives of the will and then culminates in the dialectic where we treat of the highest good. In the theoretical examination the object is considered as given and we are concerned in recognizing what that object be. But in the practical examination the object first comes into existence (as an effect of our actions) by means of recognizing our freedom of action.}

8.1 Therefore we are dealing with two, very different tasks. On the one hand we want to ascertain how pure reason is able to recognize objects a priori. And on the other hand we look to see how it can be a determination basis of the will immediately, i.e., concerning the causality of the rational being with respect to the actuality of the objects (merely through the thought of the universal validity of its own maxims as laws).\footnote{It's really surprising that the human should be intrigued into thinking about how his maxims might serve as universal laws. There is no natural or obvious reason that anyone should want to do this. It's really quite strange. It's understandable that I might be interested in how others perceive me and think about me, but that has to do solely with image and appearance.}

9.1 The former task pertains to the critique of pure speculative reason and requires that we first explain how it is that perspectives are a priori possible (and without these no object whatsoever can be given to us, and so therefore also none synthetically recognized). The solution here turns out to be that they are all together only sensitive. And because of that they permit no speculative recognitions which would go further than possible experience. Therefore all foundational propositions of pure speculative reason accomplished nothing more than to make experience possible either of given objects, or
of objects which might be stretched out into infinity but which are never completely given.\textsuperscript{169}

10.1 The second problem pertaining to the critique of practical reason does not require any explanation as to how objects of the capacity of desire might be possible, for that remains a task of the theoretical recognition of nature and is addressed by the critique of speculative reason. The only question here concerns how reason might be able to determine the maxims of the will, i.e., whether that might happen only by means of empirical representations as determination bases, or whether pure reason might also be practical and a law of a possible order of nature which could not be recognized empirically at all.\textsuperscript{170}

10.2 The possibility of such a supersensitive nature, the underlying concept of which could at the same time be the basis of the actuality of such a nature through our free will, has no need of any a priori perspective (of an intelligible world). And since such a perspective would be supersensitive, it would be impossible for humans.\textsuperscript{171}

10.3 Here we are concerned solely with a function of the determination basis of the wanting in the maxims, whether that be empirical or a concept of pure reason (of its lawfulness in general), and how it can be the latter.\textsuperscript{172}

10.4 Whether or not the causality of the will suffice for the actuality of the objects remains to be evaluated by theoretical principles of reason, as an examination of the possibility of objects of the wanting, whose perspective therefore makes up no moment at all in the practical sphere.

10.5 The only thing that is important here is the determination of the will and the determination basis of its maxim--not its success.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{169} See the 2nd (B) version of the Transcendental Deduction, paragraph 26.3 and footnote for an example of 9.1b above. The former are objects recognized in experience, and the other are objects which stretch out into the past in a long line of ever conditioned conditions.

\textsuperscript{170} This is the question posed by David Hume, whether reason is restricted to carrying out the wishes of our empirical nature (as "slave of the passions"), or is free of that. He rejected the latter.

\textsuperscript{171} We cannot look at any person, ourselves included, and recognize such a capacity as freedom, for this is not subject to a sensitive look in space and time, the forms of all our looking, perspective.

\textsuperscript{172} Must I be inactive unless I have some empirical incentive, e.g., some advantage? Or am I able to act independently of all empirical incentives?

\textsuperscript{173} Whether I can obtain some object is dependent upon conditions of nature, e.g., whether I can order a steak in a restaurant, or whether I can levitate. The question for the determination of the will is whether I am allowed to even want such an object.
10.6 For if the will is lawful for pure reason, then its capacity in any execution doesn’t even matter. An actual nature may or may not arise to accord with these maxims of the legality of a possible nature. But this is not a concern of a critique which investigates whether and how pure reason might be practical, i.e., how it can determine the will immediately.\textsuperscript{174}

11.1 In this occupation, therefore, the critique can begin without reproach and must start from pure practical laws and their actuality.

11.2 But instead of a perspective being the foundation to these laws, it appeals to the concept of their existence in the intelligible world, i.e., freedom.\textsuperscript{175}

11.3 For this signifies nothing else. And those laws are possible only in reference to freedom of the will, but, given its presupposition, they are necessary, or turned about: this freedom is necessary because those laws are necessary as practical postulates.\textsuperscript{176}

11.4 Now it is impossible to explain further how this consciousness of the moral law or, which is the same thing, that of freedom were possible. The most we can do is adequately defend its admissibility in the theoretical critique.\textsuperscript{177}

12.1 Now that the exposition of the supreme foundational proposition of practical reason has occurred, we see what it contains, that it exists of itself entirely a priori and independently of empirical principles, and how it is distinguished from all other practical foundational propositions.

12.2 With the deduction or justification of its objective and universal validity, and with the insight of the possibility of such a synthetic proposition a priori, we should not expect the sort of good progress we made with the foundational principles of pure theoretical understanding.

\textsuperscript{174} We are not here in pursuit of any given, empirical object, but are concerned merely with whether pure reason can determine the will, i.e., formulate maxims which are acceptable as universal laws for all rational actors.

\textsuperscript{175} The moral laws are given as facts of pure practical reason, and these facts necessitate the affirmation of our freedom as the necessary foundations to a consciousness of the (binding by the) moral law.

\textsuperscript{176} Because we know that we are bound by the moral law, it is necessary that we be free. And the fact that we are free means that we would be bound by the moral laws as the necessary criteria for freedom. But our being bound by the moral law precedes the recognition of our freedom.

\textsuperscript{177} We cannot imagine how any such freedom could be possible, but we can understand how it could be consistent with theoretical reasoning as was shown in the Third Antinomy of the CPR.
12.3 For the principles of pure theoretical understanding referred to objects of possible experience, namely to appearances, and we were able to prove that it was only by bringing these appearances under the categories according to the standard of those principles (or laws) that it became possible for these appearances to be recognized as objects of experience. Obviously then every possible experience had to conform to these laws.\footnote{It was by virtue of the utilization of the categories per these principles that we were able to grasp that the appearances were merely representations of these objects instead of being things on their own. And so all appearances and hence every experience is subject to these principles of understanding without exception.}

12.4 But I cannot follow such a route with the deduction of the moral law.

12.5 For now we are not concerned with the recognition of the \textit{constitution} of the objects which might be given to reason from elsewhere. Instead our concern is with a recognition, to the extent it can be the basis of the \textit{existence} of the objects\footnote{With practical reason the term object refers to an effect possible through a will determined by reason. And so with recognition (or knowledge) we mean an awareness that an action is possible whereby a certain effect should be attained. In contrast, with the theoretical we were concerned with the recognition of the make up of objects.} themselves and with reason having causality in this way within a rational being.

In a word we are concerned with pure reason, which can be viewed as a capacity for immediately determining the will.

13.1 But now every human insight is at an end as soon as we have achieved to the foundational forces or capacity. Nothing can enable us to comprehend their possibility. But their possibility can also not be feigned and assumed.

13.2 Hence in the theoretical usage of reason only experience can justify us to assume them.

13.3 But this surrogate of conducting empirical proofs instead of a deduction from recognitional sources a priori, is also denied us here with respect to the pure practical rational capacity.

13.4 For whatever must base the proof of its actuality on experience must be dependent upon principles of experience for the basis of its possibility. But due to its very concept it is impossible that pure reason, even as practical, could be so dependent.
13.5 Indeed the moral law is given as a factor, as it were, of pure reason. We are conscious of it a priori and its certainty is apodictic, even though we may be unable to ferret out in experience a single example of perfect compliance with it.\(^{180}\)

13.6 Therefore the objective reality of the moral law can be proven through no deduction, despite all efforts of theoretical, speculative or empirically supported reason. Therefore, if we were willing to renounce apodictic certitude, it would be uncertified and not a posteriori proven through any experience. Hence it stands firm of itself.

14.1 But something different and quite counterintuitive takes the place of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, namely that it itself, turned about, serves as the principle of the deduction of an unfathomable capacity, which no experience can prove, but which speculative reason (in order to find among its cosmological Ideas the unconditioned with respect to its causality, in order not contradict itself) at least had to accept as possible.\(^{181}\) This capacity is that of freedom, concerning which the moral law, which itself has no need of any justifying bases, proves not merely its possibility, but even its actuality in beings who recognize this law as binding for themselves.\(^{182}\)

14.2 In fact the moral law is a law of causality through freedom, and therefore of the possibility of a supersensitive nature, even as the metaphysical law of the events in the sense world was a law of the causality of sensitive nature. And so, therefore, what speculative philosophy had to leave undetermined, namely the law for a causality whose concept was only negative in that law of events, is determined by the moral law and therefore first supplies objective reality to this causality.\(^{183}\)

15.1 These sorts of credentials of the moral law, where it is itself laid as a principle of the deduction of freedom as a causality of pure reason, is completely sufficient a priori, for in

\(^{180}\) As a factor of pure reason we are conscious of the law a priori and with total certitude, and all this without the least reference to any experience.

\(^{181}\) We were unable to prove this possibility, but simply to accept it as compatible with, though still always useless to, theoretical reasoning.

\(^{182}\) So the possibility of the moral law will never be understood, i.e., how a being can be free of the compulsion of the inclinations by subjugation to this law. Our insistence upon considering it is based entirely upon the fact that we admit it to be binding upon us. And this “binding” is the respect which we exhibit for this law and the realization that except for inclinations to the contrary, this law would always be implemented by us. To recognize a law as binding means to be conscious of the moral law, i.e., not merely as it is understood as a rule, but rather that it is in fact binding, though we always remain free to disregard it.

\(^{183}\) The negative concept is an ability to act independently of laws of nature, and without any indication of how such a capacity might function. The positive concept is the ability to determine the will by pure practical reason via the autonomy in the specification of the moral law, i.e., in the requirement to universalize one’s maxims.
lieu of every justification, theoretical reason was necessitated to accept at least the possibility of freedom to supplement a need for that.\textsuperscript{184}

15.2 For the moral law proves its reality enough even for the critique of speculative reason by providing a positive determination to a causality which was thought merely negatively and whose possibility was incomprehensible to speculative reason while still having to assume it. This positive determination is the concept of reason determining the will immediately (through the condition of a universally lawful form of its maxims). And so reason, which always became rapturous when it wanted to proceed speculatively, is given objective, though still only practical, reality for the first time by freedom, and its transcendental usage is transformed into an immanent one (itself to be effecting cause in the field of experience through Ideas).\textsuperscript{185}

16.1 The determination of the causality of the beings in the sense world could never be unconditioned as such, and yet there has to be something unconditioned to every series of the conditions, thus also a causality determining itself entirely of itself.\textsuperscript{186}

16.2 Hence the Idea of freedom, as a capacity of absolute spontaneity, was not a need, but rather, concerning its possibility, an analytical foundational proposition of pure speculative reason.\textsuperscript{187}

16.3 However, it is utterly impossible to find an example commensurate to freedom in any sort of experience, because among the causes of things as appearances no determination of the causality which were utterly unconditioned can be encountered.\textsuperscript{188} Hence we could only defend the thought of a freely acting cause by applying this to a being in the sense world

\textsuperscript{184} This will refer to the Third Antinomy of the CPR where natural necessity and transcendental freedom were found not to contradict each other. The need has to do with the unconditioned for every conditioned in the Third Antinomy. This is no proof of such possibility, but only of the need for such possibility.

\textsuperscript{185} And so in the Third Antinomy we conceived of a person acting independently of the necessitation of nature, which is a merely negative expression. But now we see that pure reason can also come up with a code of conduct on its own without any preceding reference to an object (and this via the universalizing of the maxims). And so pure reason proves that it is practical and proves in this way that the human is free; but still only in a practical context. Negative: he did not have to do that; positive: he should have done this.

\textsuperscript{186} From the Third Antinomy we realize that without an original cause the series of causes would become infinite, and that is impossible (even though for every given cause, be it called original or subsequent, there would have to be some cause according to theoretical reason).

\textsuperscript{187} Later in the Dialectic of CPrR we will discover a rational need for God and immortality.

\textsuperscript{188} And so as was just stated in the preceding footnote, every cause is assumed to be an event and thus to have its own cause in the temporal chain of causes. In theoretical reason an event is considered to be a synonym for effect.
to the extent it is considered from another side also as noumenon. We showed that it was not self-contradictory to consider all its actions as physically conditioned, to the extent they are appearances, and yet at the same time to consider its causality, to the extent the acting being is an understanding being, as physically unconditioned. In this way we turn the concept of freedom into a regulative principle of reason. Now I certainly do not recognize the object to which such causality is attributed as to what it might be. But I do remove the obstacle in that on the one hand in the explanation of the world events (thus also of the actions of rational entities), I satisfy the mechanism of natural necessity in its regressive quest in going from the conditioned to the condition infinitely. And on the other hand I reserve for speculative reason that empty place open for it, namely the intelligible, in order to position there the unconditioned.\footnote{Reason tells us that there has to be an unconditioned and ultimate cause, but experience cannot provide an example of anything like that. And so we stick with the principle of experience (and we count every cause as itself an event and thus look for a preceding cause) and at the same time also think of a dual causality with one and the same effect, where the intelligible is also a causality. For this purpose we have the conception of the thing on its own as a container, as it were, for this causality in freedom that we are necessitated in thinking. But this tells us nothing about the nature of such an intelligible being. But it does satisfy theoretical reason by providing the required and sought for unconditioned.}

16.4 But I could not make this thought real, i.e., I could not transform it into a recognition of a being acting in that way, not even with regard to its possibility.\footnote{We had to conceive of a free being for the sake of solving the Third Antinomy of speculative reasoning, but we were not able to recognize such a being.}

16.5 Now pure practical reason fills this empty place through a determined law of causality in an intelligible world (through freedom), namely the moral law.

16.6 In this way nothing accrues to speculative reason with respect to its insight, although something does accrue to it with respect to the security of its problematic concept of freedom, to which here reality is objectively supplied and indeed beyond doubt, although only practically.\footnote{What (i.e., freedom) was asserted problematically in the critique of speculative reason is now established as a fact, although merely for practical purposes. As far as the sciences are concerned, nothing has been accomplished and freedom is ignored.}

16.7 The application and, therefore also, the signification of the concept of causality actually occurs only with reference to appearances in order to connect them for experience (as the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} proves). And the usage of this concept is not expanded here beyond the boundaries mentioned.

16.8 For if it started from beyond those boundaries, I would have to show how the logical relationship of the ground and consequence were able to be synthetically attained via some
non-sensitive perspective,\textsuperscript{192} i.e., how \textit{causa noumenon}\textsuperscript{193} might be possible. But this is quite beyond our capacity. On the other hand, however, practical reason is not at all concerned with this, for it only places the determination basis of the causality of the human as sensitive being (which is given) in pure reason (which, therefore, is called practical). In aid of theoretical recognitions, therefore, it can now abstract entirely the concept of cause from its application to objects (because this concept is always encountered a priori in the understanding, and thus independently of all perspective), but not in order to recognize objects as rather to determine the causality with respect to them. Thus it uses this for no other intention than the practical, and hence can shift the determination basis of the will into the intelligible order of things by gladly acknowledging not the least understanding as to what sort of determination the concept of the cause may have to the recognition of these things.\textsuperscript{194}

16.9 In any case, with respect to the actions of the will in the sensitive world, reason must recognize this causality in a determined way, for otherwise, practical reason could actually accomplish nothing.\textsuperscript{195}

16.10 But it does not need to determine theoretically the concept which it makes of its own causality as noumena in order to assist in the recognition of its supersensitive existence and in that way to be able to give meaning to it to this extent.

16.11 For it obtains meaning in any case, although only for practical purposes, namely through the moral law.\textsuperscript{196}

16.12 Considered theoretically, it also always remains a pure, a priori given concept of understanding, which can be applied to objects, be they given sensitively or not. But if not given, then it has no determined, theoretical meaning and application, but rather is merely a formal, but still essential, thought of the understanding of an object in general.

\textsuperscript{192} This would mean a way of looking (perspective) which were not conditioned by time or space or by sensations.

\textsuperscript{193} The causation of the thing on its own, thus conceived of independently of the information available through the senses.

\textsuperscript{194} I think Kant means here that Ideas are practical too, and that once possessed of an Idea that Idea results in actions. And so we are not trying now to understand the causality of the actor as rather noting that his Idea has causality through practical reason. This is a subtle distinction.

\textsuperscript{195} This will be the basis of the consciousness by every finite rational being of its freedom. At any moment in time, while we can know theoretically that everything is determined including our presently proposed action, we still know that we are free and not bound by the laws of nature.

\textsuperscript{196} So we can see that our Ideas result in actions and so that we are free, but we cannot even begin to understand how any being, ourselves included, could be free.
16.13 The meaning, which reason supplies to causality through the moral law, is solely practical, since namely the Idea of the law of a causality (of the will) has causality itself, or is its determination basis. 197

197 Assume I think about cheating on my wife. But then I think how badly I will feel in having to keep secrets from her and so decide not to cheat. This would be the explanation according to natural laws, how I have been affected by my upbringing and by my consideration and respect for the moral law and so how it was clear that I would not engage in this act. And at the same time I am conscious not so much of all this background and precedent, but of the command of the moral law (where I myself autonomously universalize my maxims) and so am conscious of having also acted freely and spontaneously and independently of the laws of nature, and by virtue of this moral law concerning my maxims.
II. The Authority of Pure Reason to an Expansion in its Practical Sphere which is not Possible for it as such in the Speculative

1.1 Upon the moral principle we have erected a law of causality which removes its determination basis from all conditions of the sense world. We have not only thought how the will could be determinable, belonging as it does to an intelligible world, we have also considered the subject of this will (the human) not merely as belonging to a pure understanding world, though still as unknown to us with regard to this (as it had to happen according to the critique of pure speculative reason), but have also determined it with respect to its causality by means of a law which cannot at all be counted as a natural law of the sense world. Thus we have expanded our recognition beyond the boundaries of that sense world. But this is precisely a presumption declared by the critique of pure reason to be inane in all speculation.

1.2 Now how is the practical usage of pure reason and its theoretical usage to be reconciled here with respect to the determined limitation of its capacity?

2.1 David Hume who, we can say, actually began all challenges to the rights of pure reason, and who in that way made its thorough examination necessary, reasoned in the following way.

2.2 The concept of cause contains the necessity of a linking of the existence of the disparate. By this we mean that if A is granted, I recognize that something entirely different from that, B, would also necessarily have to exist.

2.3 But necessity can only be attributed to a linkage to the extent it is recognized a priori. For experience would only provide to a recognition that there were a connection, but not that it had to be necessary.

2.4 Now, he continues, it is impossible to recognize a priori and as necessary the connection which exists between one thing and another (or between one determination and another which is entirely different from it) if it is not given in the perception.

2.5 Therefore the concept of a cause is itself untruthful and deceitful. In fact the mildest thing we can say about it is that it is a pardonable deception. For we have a custom (which is a subjective necessity) of taking certain things or their determinations, which are frequently adjacent to, or follow upon, one another with respect to their existence, as being associated on their own. This custom is then unwittingly thought to be an objective necessity such that a connection is placed in the objects themselves. In this way the concept of a

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198 This will be the factum of pure practical reason where we see ourselves (morally) necessitated to universalize our maxims and make them suitable for laws.
cause is a sham and not defensibly acquired, and indeed can never be acquired or certified because it calls for a connection, which per se is inane and chimerical and indefensible by reason, and to which no object at all can ever correspond.199—

2.6 Now regarding every recognition concerning the existence of things (hence excluding mathematics), Hume presented empiricism as the single source of principles. And commensurate with it he introduced the severest skepticism with respect to all natural science (from a philosophical standpoint).200

2.7 For according to such foundational principles as these we could never begin with given determinations of things, concerning their existence, and then infer a sequel (for the concept of cause, which contains the necessity of such a connection, would be required for such inference201). All we could ever do would be to expect similar cases according to a rule of our imagination, but which is never certain, no matter how frequently encountered.

2.8 Indeed with no event could we say, “something would have to have preceded, upon which it had to follow, i.e., it had to have a cause.” Hence no matter how many cases we might be familiar with, where such events not only preceded but also so frequently that a rule could be derived from them, still that would not be reason enough to assume the sequence as always and necessarily occurring in this way. In this wise even blind chance would have its day such that all rational usage would have to cease.202 All of this therefore firmly establishes skepticism concerning inferences ascending from the effects to causes, and makes this skepticism irrefutable.

3.1 Mathematics had remained unscathed in all this because Hume held all its propositions to be analytical, i.e., as advancing from one determination to another by means of identity, thus according to the proposition of contradiction. (But this is false for all these propositions are actually synthetic. It is true that geometry, for example, is not concerned with the existence of things, but only with their determinations a priori in a possible perspective. But this is not a difference because mathematics still passes from one determination, A, to

199 We notice that B follows A many times and our minds jump from A to B very naturally, and we come to think that A and B are connected in the object; but (according to Hume) it is actually only in the mind of the perceiving subject.

200 It is important to qualify all this as philosophical. For no one else pays the least attention to all this and the assumption is that there are objective connections in the world, and people just live their lives according to that assumption and have no need to question it. Only philosophy comes to raise such questions.

201 And Hume has just removed all necessity from the notion of cause, making it nothing but a customary association of disparate things or determinations of things, i.e., something we get used to.

202 Thus no matter how many times I hear a sound when I clap my hands together, there would be no basis for saying that the clapping caused the sound, and I might hear the sound without my clapping or I might someday clap my hands and hear nothing.
an entirely different one, B, as connected necessarily with that A, which is precisely what the causal concept does).\textsuperscript{203}

3.2 But ultimately that science of mathematics also, so highly praised for its apodictic certainty, would have to succumb to empiricism regarding its foundational propositions for the same reason that Hume placed custom in place of objective necessity in the concept of cause. Indeed despite all its pride, mathematics would have to dwindle and moderate its bold claims of a priori determination, and instead would have to expect the acclaim for the universal validity of its propositions from the favor of the observers who, as witnesses, would not refuse to admit that they had also every time so perceived that which the geometer presented as foundational propositions. Hence, even though it were not exactly necessary, there would still be an expectation of similar results in the future.\textsuperscript{204}

3.3 Accordingly then Hume’s empiricism in foundational propositions leads unavoidable to skepticism even with respect to mathematics, and so then in all scientific, theoretical usages of reason (for this has to do either with philosophy or mathematics).\textsuperscript{205}

3.4 Given such a terrible ruin befalling these monarchs of recognitions\textsuperscript{206} one must wonder whether common rational usage will fare any better and not far rather become hopelessly entangled in this same destruction of all knowledge. In a word, would a general skepticism not follow from the same foundational prepositions (but which, of course, would still only concern the scholars\textsuperscript{207})?

4.1 Now my treatment, which was occasioned by Hume’s doctrine, went much further than this in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} and encompassed the entire field of pure theoretical reason in its synthetic usage, including therefore what is termed metaphysics in general. And with regard to the doubt of the Scottish philosopher concerning the concept of causality I proceeded in the following way.

\textsuperscript{203} For example we prove that together the angles of a triangle have a necessary connection with a single straight line. This recognition can be obtained from no analysis (nor also not from experience, no matter how many triangles we might examine). Here we are forced to turn to the a priori synthetic.

\textsuperscript{204} We could inspect many triangles and would find in all of them that every two sides together were greater than the remaining side. But this would be no guarantee regarding future inspections. We might guess and expect such a relationship, but no guarantee could arise in this way.

\textsuperscript{205} Had Hume realized that mathematics was not based on analysis, he would have realized, as Kant did, that there was another basis for both mathematics and the empirical sciences.

\textsuperscript{206} Mathematics and natural sciences

\textsuperscript{207} Common people and scientists don’t read such books as this for fun.
4.2 When Hume declared the concept of cause to be deceitful and a false illusion, he was technically correct, for he took the objects of experience as things on their own (which almost always happens). And certainly no one can grasp from things on their own and their determinations as such how it would come about that because A is granted, something else, B, would also have to be granted. Therefore Hume could not rightly admit to such a recognition a priori concerning things on their own.

4.3 But this perceptive man had even less reason to admit an empirical origin for this concept because this directly contradicts the necessity of the connection which constitutes the essential aspect of the concept of causality. In a word the concept was banished and its place was taken by the customary practice of observing the route of perceptions.

5.1 My own examinations, however, found that the objects, with which we deal in experience, are not things on their own at all, but rather mere appearances. And so there is no predictor at all with things on their own, and it is impossible to penetrate how, if A were granted, it were contradictory not to assume B, which is entirely diverse from it (the necessity of the connection between A, as cause, and B, as effect). Nevertheless it is quite easy to think that as appearances they would have to be connected in an experience in a certain way necessarily (e.g., with respect to time relationships) and cannot be separated without contradicting that connection; and it is by means of this that this experience is possible. It also developed that I could prove the concept of cause not only according to its objective reality with respect to the objects of experience, but rather also derive it as a concept a priori due to the necessity of the connection which it entails, i.e., I could estab-

208 Concisely stated: what we see, for example, are impressions which have their entire existence as impressions only in the looking, and when we close our eyes these impressions go out of existence. Thus they are not things on their own at all, but merely the way things look and appear to us.

209 Musing on the thing on its own and the object of experience. Hume looks at the table and thinks: what I am seeing is a perspective of this real thing which exists on is on independently of me and my looking. The table does not change size, but only my perspective of it changes. But since this table is something entirely independent of me and my looking, it follows that I cannot know this. And as a thing on its own it could conceivable get larger or smaller on its own, without me making the least move. I don’t believe this, but I cannot prove it impossible. In contrast Kant sees the table as merely a thought thing (the object of experience) which he had to conceive of in order to connect the many appearances (of large and small) into these perspectives of this table. And so in the last analysis the table is not a thing on its own at all (as Hume erroneously thought) but merely a mental unification of appearances by means of this concept of the table as the object of experience. And it was only by means of the concept of enduring substance (one of Kant's categories of understanding) and that of causation that we were able to realize that the various appearances were merely different perspectives of this table.
lish its possibility out of the pure understanding without empirical sources.\textsuperscript{210} In fine, after removal of the empiricism with regard to its origin, I was able fundamentally to cancel its unavoidable consequence, namely skepticism, first with respect to the natural science, and then also, due to the consequences following perfectly from the same foundations, with respect to mathematics, hence both of the sciences which are referred a priori to objects of a possible experience, and along with that also to cancel all doubt concerning everything which theoretical reason presumes to penetrate.\textsuperscript{211}

6.1 But regarding the category of causality (and indeed also all the rest, for without them no recognition of existing things can be attained) a question arises concerning its application to things which are not objects of possible experience, but rather lie out beyond its boundaries.

6.2 For I have been able to deduce the objective reality of these concepts only with respect to the objects of a possible experience.

6.3 But it is precisely because I have in this case also rescued them by indicating that because objects may be thought by means of them, although not determined a priori, they are given a place in pure understanding, by means of which they are referred to objects in general (be they sensitive or not sensitive).

6.3 The only thing lacking would be the condition of the application of these categories, and especially that of causality, to objects, i.e., to the perspective, in the absence of which no application for the authentication of a theoretical recognition of objects as noumenon is possible. And so if someone attempted to do that (as it did occur in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}) it would be completely vain, although the objective reality of the concept always remains, and can even be used of noumenon, though without being able to determine this concept theoretically in any way, and hence it would unable to attain to a recognition.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{210} I can see that I could not have gotten the notion of causation from experience, for all that gives me is a this and then a that following, which is always merely contingent and without necessitation. But I do have this notion of causation and so I can easily see that it has been a contribution of my own understanding, by means of which I am then able to recognize that what I am looking at regarding Hume’s table is just an appearance, and not a thing on its own.

\textsuperscript{211} By starting with appearances Kant shows that we ourselves conceive of the object (Hume’s table) such that the appearances are necessitated in this way (via the categories of substance and causation) and in that way rescues not only these categories but also even mathematics.

\textsuperscript{212} By validating the concept of causation, showing that it is a means of the mind for connecting appearances, Kant also gives meaning to the concept independent of any application to appearances. But this is merely a means of thinking this concept and not of actually applying it, for application requires the appearances.
6.4 For that this concept also contain nothing impossible with reference to an object, was proven by its position in pure understanding being secured with all application to objects of the senses. And even though if afterwards it happened to be referred to things on their own (which cannot be objects of experience), it is still incapable of any determination for the representation of a determined object in aid of a theoretical recognition. However and nevertheless it might still be beneficial in some other sort of way (perhaps practical) in a determination for its application, which would not be if, as Hume asserts, this concept of a causality contained something which were absolutely incapable of being thought.  

7.1 Now in order to discern this condition of the application of the concept in question, we only need to look back as to why we are not satisfied with the application to objects of experience, but rather want very much to use it for things on their own.

7.2 For then we see that it is not a theoretical, but rather a practical, design which makes this necessary for us.  

7.3 For speculation, if it could go that far, would still make no authentic acquisition with respect to knowledge of natural things and, in general, with respect to objects which might be given to us in some way. Quite the contrary, it would always take a giant step away from the sensitively conditioned (where we already have quite enough to do in remaining in, and diligently wandering through, the string of the causes) into the supersensitive, and to complete and limit our recognition on the side of the grounds. And all the while an infinite gulf would always remain unfilled between that limit and what we are familiar with, and we would have hearkened more to a vain intellectual mania than to a well grounded desire for knowledge.  

8.1 But apart from the relationship between the understanding and objects (in the realm of theoretical knowledge), the understanding is also related to the capacity of desire and which for that reason is called the will and, to the extent the pure understanding (which

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213 Accordingly even if the concept of causation cannot be applied apart from appearances, it still has a meaning on its own (as we have just shown and as Hume was unable to acknowledge) and so it is a valid concept and it may then also prove to be meaningful in a practical sense, and where it would not be a sheer vanity

214 So, the reason were not satisfied with limiting the concept of cause to experience is because we are going to have need of it later in the practical regard.

215 If we followed the speculation and it could give us real knowledge on its own, we would be able to go ahead of experience and jump to the ultimate cause, but would then have a vacuum in the known and recognized steps of nature in getting to that ultimate.

216 And so here we are connecting the desires with actions for attaining those desires.
in such case is called reason) is practical through the mere representation of a law, also the pure will.\(^{217}\)

8.2 The objective reality of a pure will or, what is the same thing, of a pure practical reason is given a priori through a factum, as it were, in the moral law. This is what we call a determination of will which is unavoidable, even though it does not rest upon empirical principles.\(^{218}\)

8.3 In the concept of a will, however, the concept of the causality is already contained, hence then in the concept of a pure will also the concept of a causality with freedom, i.e., which cannot be determined according to natural laws. And so this causality with freedom is not subject to any empirical perspective as proof of its reality. And yet it still perfectly justifies its objective reality a priori in the pure practical law, though (as is easily seen) not for the benefit of the theoretical, but rather merely for that of the practical, utilization of reason.

8.4 Now the concept of a being possessing free will is that of a \textit{causa noumenon}. And that this concept not be self-contradictory we are assured by the concept of a cause having arisen entirely from the pure understanding, likewise certain of its objective reality with respect to the object in general through the deduction. In this way the concept can be independent from all sensitive conditions with respect to its origin, and is therefore not limited to phenomena (excepting where a theoretically determined usage were to be made of that) and can in any case be applied to things as pure understanding entities\(^{219}\).

8.5 But because no perspective can be supplied to this application, except that which can always only be sensitive, it follows that \textit{causa noumenon}, with respect to the theoretical usage of reason, is still a possible, thinkable, yet always empty, concept.\(^{220}\)

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\(^{217}\) The understanding has put together the moral law of universalized maxims as connecting the maxims of free beings in a single realm. It makes the connection through the form of a law.

\(^{218}\) This factum is the requirement to universalize our maxims in order then to recognize them as objective and moral principles, or serviceable only for us individually and personally.

\(^{219}\) Now normally we would say that the notion of causation is restricted to objects of experience. But here we have a being which is a conception of pure understanding it self. And so we have is the application of the category of causality to a noumenon. With all objects of experience and sense there is required a schema for application, but there the application is direct.

\(^{220}\) In the preceding two sentences Kant repeats yet again a comment which is often split apart, namely that the concept of cause is not limited to appearances, but that it is worthless (even if not meaningless) in such non-appearance cases because there is nothing by which it can demonstrate its validity. Usually the latter part is forgotten and then complaints are raised as to Kant’s “inconsistency”, namely by saying the cause is valid apart from appearances, which then contradict other statements to the contrary.
8.6 But now I do not require theoretical familiarity with the constitution of a being to the extent it has a pure will. For me it is sufficient merely to describe it as such by means of that pure will, thus only to connect the concept of causality with that of freedom (and what is inseparable from it, i.e., the moral law as its determination basis). This authority is rightfully mine in any case by virtue of the pure, non-empirical origin of the concept of cause, in that I do not consider myself authorized to make any other usage of that except in referral to the moral law which determines its reality, thus only a practical usage.

9.1 If I, like Hume, had bestowed objective reality in a practical sense to the concept of causality not only with respect to something on its own (the supersensitive), but rather also with respect to the objects of sense, the concept would be deprived of all meaning and as a theoretically impossible concept it would be entirely useless. And then, since it would permit of no use by anything, the practical usage of a theoretically void concept would be absolutely absurd.

9.2 But now the concept of an empirically unconditioned causality, in a theoretically sense, is of course empty (i.e., without any perspective appropriate to it), even though still it is always possible and refers to an undetermined object. But in the place of that concept, a meaning is still given to it in the moral law, consequently in a practical referral. And so while I have indeed no perspective which determined its objective, theoretical reality, it still has actual application which can be presented in concreto in dispositions or maxims, i.e., practical reality, which can be presumed. And this is sufficient for its justification even with respect to noumena.

10.1 But this objective reality of a pure understanding concept in the field of the supersensitive, now instituted, provides objective reality to all remaining categories, though only to the extent they stand in a necessary connection with the determination foundations of the pure will (the moral law). But this objective reality is none other than merely a reality with practical application. It does not have the least influence upon the theoretical recognitions of these objects as insights of nature for purposes of explaining them.

10.2 We will also discover later that they always have referral only to beings as intelligences, and with respect to them also only to the relationship of reason to the will, thus always only to the practical. Beyond that they presume no recognition of such beings. But the sort of properties which might be connected with them and which pertained to the theoretical representational manner of such supersensitive things do not at all count as knowledge. Instead they only serve for assuming and presupposing them (but not at all to necessity in the practical intention), even where we assume a supersensitive being (like God) according to an analogy, i.e., the pure rational relationships. We avail ourselves of them with respect to what is practical, and so they do not give any assistance whatsoever to
II. The Authority of Pure Reason to an Expansion in its Practical Sphere
which is not possible for it as such in the Speculative

pure theoretical reason for flights of fancy through the application to the supersensitive, but aid only in a practical sense.
1.1 With the concept of an object of practical reason I mean the representation (*Vorstellung*) of an object as an effect possible through freedom.\(^{221}\)

1.2 To be an object of a practical recognition as such, therefore, means only the referral of the will to the action whereby it [the object] or its opposite would be made actual as an effect.\(^{222}\) And the estimation as to whether something were an object of pure practical reason or not is only the distinction between the possibility and impossibility of willing [\textit{wollen}] that action such that, if we had sufficient capacity (concerning which experience must judge), a certain object would become actual.\(^{223}\)

1.3 If the object is assumed to be the determination basis of our desire capacity, then the physical possibility of that object through the free usage of our powers must precede before the estimation as to whether it were an object of practical reason or not.\(^{224}\)

1.4 On the other hand if the law can be considered a priori as the determination basis of the action, thus the action as determined through pure practical reason, then the judgment as to whether something were an object of pure practical reason or not is entirely independent of any consideration of our physical capacity for attaining that. For then the only question has to do with whether we are allowed to will an action directed toward the existence of an object if this were in our power. And so the moral possibility of the action must pre-
cede. Indeed here it is not the object but rather the law of the will that is the determination basis of the action.225

2.1 The sole objects of practical reason are, therefore, those of good and evil.

2.2 For through the first we understand a necessary object of the capacity of desire, and through the second that of abhorrence, but both according to a principle of reason.226

3.1 If the concept of good were not to be derived from a preceding, practical law, but rather were to serve as a basis to this law,227 then it could only be the concept of something whose existence promises pleasure and which in that way determines the causality of the subject for the production of that pleasure, i.e., the capacity of desire.

3.2 And since it is impossible to ascertain a priori which representation will be accompanied with pleasure and which with displeasure, the determination as to what were immediately good or evil would depend entirely on experience.

3.3 The property of the subject in whom, and in reference to whom alone, this experience can be located is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure as a receptivity belonging to the inner sense. Hence the concept of what is immediately good would concern only what is immediately connected with the sensation of the enjoyment, and the utterly evil would have to be referred solely to that which incites immediate pain.228

3.4 But since that is already contrary to common usage, where we distinguish the agreeable from the good and the disagreeable from evil, and which demands that good and evil always be evaluated by reason, thus through concepts which allow of universal communica-

225 Morally (via pure reason) we ask first if we can want a certain object, and only then is it a matter to determine whether we can get it or not, i.e., whether it is an object of practical reason, i.e., attainable through freedom. So an object of practical reason is an object which is attainable through freedom, and an object of pure practical reason is an object which is possible to even want. And so an object of practical knowledge may not be an object of pure practical reason, for while it is attainable through freedom, it is not permissible to want it.

226 We are not speaking here of actions as reflexes, but rather as derived from a rational principle of determining the will to some action. What is good would then be a necessary object per some rational principle. We would always be after the good--however it is to be understood--and to avoid the evil.

227 This would require us to have another source for good and evil in the place of the moral law so that from that source the moral law might be derived (which would make it empirical and call for an expectation and estimation of the likelihood of happiness).

228 Accordingly good would equal pleasure and evil would equal displeasure. See imagined Lecture at an Atheist Youth Camp for a contrast of right and wrong with smart and dumb.
tion and not through mere sensations (which are limited to individual subjects and their susceptibility),

and since nevertheless no pleasure or displeasure can be connected immediately with the representation of an object a priori,

the philosopher, who thought it were necessary to put a feeling of pleasure as the basis of his practical judgment, would utilize good to mean whatever is a means to the agreeable, and evil would be the cause of the disagreeable and pain. For the judgment of the relationships of the means to purposes always belongs to reason.\textsuperscript{229}

3.5 But even though reason alone is empowered to assess the connection of the means with its intentions (such that we might even define the will as the capacity of purposes, in that these are always determination bases of the desire capacity according to principles.\textsuperscript{230}) then the practical maxims, which arose from the above concept of the good merely as means, would never contain anything of themselves, but rather always only some sort of a good as the object of the will, the good would always be merely the useful, and that, for which it is useful, would in every case have to lie outside of the will in the sensation.

3.6 Now if this sensation, as a pleasing sensation, would have to be distinguished from the good only as the means to something else, then there would be no immediate good anywhere, but rather the good would have to be sought only in the means to something else namely to some sort of a convenience.

4.1 There is an old formula of the schools: \textit{nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione boni, nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali};\textsuperscript{231} and it often has a proper usage, but also a very disadvantageous one for philosophy. The reason for this is that the expressions of boni and mali contain an equivocation, for which the limitation of the language is responsible. For this reason they are capable of a double meaning, and hence place the practical laws unavoidably on a turnstile. And even though in the use of these terms philosophy can, of course, be aware of the diversity of the concept with the same word, it can still find no particular expression for it, and is driven to subtle distinctions about which people cannot subsequently agree, since the distinction could not be immediately designated through any commensurate expression.*

\textsuperscript{229} And so in accordance with common usage good would describe the means to the pleasurable and evil would denote the means to the displeasurable.

\textsuperscript{230} So we have the capacity of establishing purposes and that is what the will is all about, i.e., the determination of a purpose.

\textsuperscript{231} This can be translated either as: “we desire nothing except with regard to our weal or woe,” or: “we desire nothing according to directives of reason, except only to the extent we consider it to be good or evil.” See sentence 5.3 below for a consideration and clarification of this expression.
* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 And for that matter the expression *sub ratione boni* is also equivocal.

1.2 For it can mean that we represent something as good if and because we desire (want) it; but also that we desire something because we represent it as good. And this means that either the craving is the determination basis of the concept of the object as a good, or the concept of the good is the determination basis of the desiring (of the will). And so then in the first case the *sub ratione boni* would mean that we want something under the Idea of the good; and in the second that we would want it as a consequence of this Idea which must precede the wanting as its determination basis.

5.1 Our German language has the good fortune of possessing expressions which do not permit this diversity to be missed.

5.2 Where the Latin uses a single word bonum German has two very different concepts, and two equally different expressions. For bonum we have the good [*Gute*] and the weal [*Wohl*], and for malum the evil [*Böse*] and the ill [*Übel*] (or woe [*Weh*]). Hence there are two entirely different evaluations depending on whether we draw good and evil into consideration with an action, or our weal and woe (ill).\(^{232}\)

5.3 We can now already see that the above psychological proposition would at least be very uncertain if it were translated as “we desire nothing except with regard to our weal or woe.” If on the other hand we read “we desire nothing according to directives of reason, except only to the extent we consider it to be good or evil,” it becomes expressed indubitably certain and simultaneously quite clear.

6.1 Weal or woe always indicates only a referral to our state of agreeableness or disagreeableness, of enjoyment or pain. And if it is for that reason that we desire or abhor an object, this only happens to the extent it becomes referred to our sensitivity and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure which it effects.\(^{233}\)

6.2 But good or evil always means a referral to the will, to the extent this is determined through rational law, to make something an object for oneself. Hence the will is never determined immediately through the object and the representation of that object, but instead is a capacity for making a rule of reason into the motivational cause of an action (such that an object can become actual).\(^{234}\)

\(^{232}\) This latter might be rendered as “good and bad” and so where it is not immediately clear whether we are speaking of the moral or of the sensation.

\(^{233}\) And so in this case good and evil would always have to do merely with how we respond to some sensation, and so could be different with different people and even with the same person at different times.

\(^{234}\) And so here we have it: reason never opts for an object as a given, but rather by its very nature imposes general rules by means of which then an object is sought as a result of that rule.
6.3 Good or evil, therefore, is actually referred to actions, not to the state of susceptibility of the person, and is supposed to be something utterly good or evil (and in every intention and without further condition) or be held as such. Accordingly it would not be a material which could become so termed, but only the manner of the action, the maxim of the will and thus the acting person himself as a good or evil human.

7.1 Therefore people have always wanted to deride the Stoic who in the most intense pain of gout cried out, “Pain, torment me as you will, you will never get me to admit that you are something evil (χαράφων malum)!”

7.2 And yet he was right.

7.3 An ill it was, which he felt, and his cry revealed this. But he had no reason to admit that some evil adhered to him because of it, for the pain did not diminish the value of his person in the least, but rather only the value of his state.\(^{235}\)

7.4 An awareness of even a single lie would have toppled his fortitude. But if he was conscious of having incurred the pain through no improper action whereby he would have deserved punishment, it served only as an occasion to elevate him.

8.1 What is to be termed good must be an object of the desire in every rational human’s judgment, while evil must be an object of abhorrence in the eyes of all. And so out beyond the senses it has need of reason for this evaluation.\(^{236}\)

8.2 It is like veracity in contrast to lie, and justice in contrast to might, etc.

8.3 We can term something an ill which at the same time everyone would still have to declare to be good, often mediately, often even immediately.

8.4 Whoever willingly undergoes a surgical operation will unquestionably feel it as an ill; but rationally he and everyone explains it as good.

8.5 And if someone, who likes to provoke and disturb peaceful people, is finally taken on and soundly pummeled, this is an ill in every regard. But nevertheless everyone applauds this

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\(^{235}\) I might be troubled by some physical disability, but only physically and not because it suggested anything regarding my moral state. However, there may be people (South Asia, for example) who might think that this same physical ailment were a karmic response to some earlier wrong action.

\(^{236}\) For if it were dependent upon pleasure, we could not speak universally for it would all depend upon the makeup of a given individual and even then at some particular time.
and declares it to be good on its own, even if nothing further should arise from that. In fact even the one who receives these blows must recognize by his own reasoning that it was rightly done to him because he sees here precisely the proportion between wellbeing and proper conduct brought into practice, which reason inexorably holds up to him.\footnote{This suggests a tie in between wrongful conduct and punishment/pain, which is the basis of the legal systems of all societies.}

9.1 Much indeed depends upon our weal and woe in the estimation of practical reason. And regarding our nature as sensitive beings everything depends upon our happiness if this, as reason especially demands, is not evaluated according to a passing sensation, but rather according to the influence which this contingency has upon our entire existence and our satisfaction with it. And yet not everything in general depends on that.

9.2 The human, belonging as he does to the world of sense, is a needful being, and to this extent his reason always has an undeniable commission from the side of sensitivity to be concerned about his interest in this world and to make practical maxims for the pursuit of happiness for this life and, where possible, also for a future life.

9.3 But this does not mean that he is so much animal as to be indifferent to everything which reason says of itself alone, nor to use these maxims merely as tools for the satisfaction of his needs as a being of sensation.

9.4 For rationality does not elevate his value beyond the mere animal if it only aims at serving him in pursuing what instinct accomplishes with the animals. For in that case it would merely be a particular way taken by nature to equip the human for the same purpose to which animals are determined, and so without determining him to a higher purpose.\footnote{In this way our rationality would have no other role than an instinct; and so where the animals act automatically and even unconsciously, the human would act with consciousness and deliberation.}

9.5 With respect to this natural layout once met with in him, therefore, he certainly and always has need of reason to consider his weal and woe. But beyond that he has reason for a still higher calling, namely: not only to consider what is good or evil on its own, and about which pure reason alone, and no sensitive interest at all, can judge, but even to distinguish this estimation entirely from that of weal and woe and to make it the supreme condition of that latter.\footnote{We use our rationality to aid in pursuit of our weal (and to avoid our woe), but then also to distinguish the good and the evil and finally then to clearly distinguish these two uses of reason to show the greater importance of the good and evil over weal and woe.}
10.1 In this estimation of the intrinsic good and evil in distinction to that which can be termed
good or evil only with reference to weal or woe, the following points are decisive.\textsuperscript{240}

10.2 Either a rational principle is already thought by itself as the determination basis of the
will, without regard to possible objects of the capacity of desire (therefore, merely
through the legal form of the maxim); and where then that principle is practical law a pri-
or, and where pure reason is assumed to be practical of itself,

10.3 and then the law determines the will immediately. Here the action commensurate to the
law is good on its own, and a will whose maxim is always commensurate to this law, is
utterly good, for every intention, and the supreme condition of all good.\textsuperscript{241}

Or else: a determination basis of the desire capacity precedes before the maxims of the
will. And this basis presupposes an object of pleasure and displeasure, thus something
which pleases or pains. In this case the maxim of reason, to promote this or to avoid that,
determines the actions as they are good with reference to our inclination, thus only medi-
ately (with regard to another goal, as means to that goal), and while these maxims can
never be called laws, they are still rational practical precepts.\textsuperscript{242}

10.4 The purpose itself, the enjoyment which we seek in the second case, is not a good, but
rather a well being or pleasing, and not a concept of reason, but rather an empirical con-
cept of an object of sensation. But the utilization of the means to that, i.e., the action (be-
because rational reflection is required for that) is still called good, but not utterly so, but
only with reference to our sensitivity with regard to the feelings of pleasure and displeas-
ure. But the will, whose maxim becomes affected by that, is not a pure will. For the latter
is only concerned with how pure reason can be practical of itself.\textsuperscript{243}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The good and evil is the object of practical reason and this has two references either to the good or
evil with respect to merely personal interests and purposes or else absolutely and categorically. The latter
is a product of pure practical reason alone. The former is practical reason directed to the personal inter-
est. The former is objective and universal while the latter is subjective and person specific.
\item The law is to fashion our maxims for action in such a way that these maxims could be universal. We
can here also see Kant approaching the highest good (to be treated later in the Dialectic) as the maximi-
zation of the object (good) in every respect.
\item Here the good and evil must be established with reference to our inclinations, i.e., as leading to pleas-
ure or pain, respectively, e.g., it is good to seek our own welfare. These will refer to “counsels of pru-
dence” as presented in the GMM. So there the term good refers to a means to satisfying a personal incli-
nation.
\item Thus good and evil have only to do with actions. That action is good which leads to some enduring
happiness. This is subjectively conditioned, although it may be universal in that experience shows that it
is valid for all humans, e.g., it is good to seek health and wealth and wisdom. But still it is only a sugges-
tion and not a law.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
11.1 Here now is the place to explain the paradox of the method in a critique of practical reason, namely that the concept of good and evil is not to be determined before the moral law (and in fact, if we went by the looks of things, this concept would have to be positioned as the foundation to this law\textsuperscript{244}), but rather only afterwards and by means of that law (which is the case here).

11.2 If we did not know that the principle of morality were a pure law which determined the will a priori, and since we would not want to assume foundations gratuitously, we would initially have to leave it undecided as to whether the will might have pure determination bases a priori or merely empirical ones. For it is contrary to all foundational rules of philosophical proceedings to assume as decided in advance what we are supposed to be deciding.

11.3 Assuming we wanted now to begin with the concept of the good in order to derive the laws of the will from that, then this concept of an object (as a good) would simultaneously render this the single determination basis of the will\textsuperscript{245}.

11.4 Now since this concept would have no practical law a priori as a procedural guide, the touchstone of the good or evil could only be found in the agreement of the objects with our feelings of pleasure or displeasure. Accordingly then the use of reason could only consist

1. in determining this pleasure or displeasure relative to all sensations of my existence\textsuperscript{246}, and then also
2. in determining the means for procuring this object\textsuperscript{247}.

11.5 Now since what accords with the feelings of pleasure can be determined only through experience,

and since the practical law, according to the present hypothesis, is supposed to be based on those feelings and conditioned by them,

\textsuperscript{244} Normally we would expect to consider killing and stealing as examples of wrong doing and then try to come up with some expression of this which would serve as the definition of good and evil.

\textsuperscript{245} Thus here is a thought experiment where we will assume that the objects of good and evil are first given to us and by means of which we come to fashion a law.

\textsuperscript{246} Comparing, for example, the pleasure from the excessive use of some narcotic with the pleasure from a healthy existence.

\textsuperscript{247} And so if there were no practical law, all that reason could do would be to estimate the importance and consequences of a given pleasure or pain to all pleasures and pains, and then also to determine the means for acquiring this object in the most expeditious way. And this it will actually also do, but only after a consideration of the intrinsic good and evil (per the universalized maxims).
it follows immediately that the possibility of any practical law would be excluded a priori.\footnote{248}

We see this clearly when we realize that we would have to discover, in advance and necessarily, an object for the will, concerning which the concept, as that of the good, would have to make out the universal, although empirical, determination of the will as a good.\footnote{249}

11.6 But now it was still necessary to examine previously whether there were not also a determination basis of the will a priori (which had never been discovered anywhere other than in a pure practical law, and indeed even to the extent this prescribes the mere legal form to the maxim without regard to an object).

11.7 But since here we have already presupposed an object with respect to the concept of good and evil as the basis to all practical laws,

and since the concept, without a preceding law, could only be thought according to empirical concepts,

it follows that we have already removed the possibility of even thinking a pure practical law.\footnote{250}

On the other hand if we had previously investigated the law analytically, we would have found that the concept of good as an object does not determine and make possible the moral law, but rather, vice verse, the moral law first determines and makes possible the concept of the good, to the extent it deserves this name utterly.\footnote{251}

12.1 This remark, which concerns merely the method of the supreme moral investigations, is quite important.

\footnote{248}{Thus those wanting to find good and evil in the weal and woe would never come upon any law, but merely rational precepts for promoting one’s happiness.}

\footnote{249}{And of course this is impossible as the feelings are subjectively seated and vary from person to person.}

\footnote{250}{And so if we begin by conceiving of good and evil as an existing object, everything would depend upon our pleasure and displeasure related to that object and we would never be able to come to the notion of an absolute law, due to the disparity of feelings among different people.}

\footnote{251}{Good and evil (or better expressed perhaps via good and bad) can have a meaning as to whether the objects of an action provide pleasure or displeasure. So if an object is already desired, then the actions leading to that would be called good (relative to that desire). But we can also beforehand determine that an action is good or evil on its own without reference to any desire, and this is the morally good and evil and is based on the law of universalizing one’s maxims. And this is also the only source for a practical law as opposed to merely practical precepts and recommendations.}
12.2 It explains at once the reason occasioning all mistakes of philosophers with respect to the supreme principles of the moral.

12.3 They looked for an object of the will in order to make it the material and basis of a law (and this law then was not supposed to be the determination basis of the will immediately, but rather by means of that object applied to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure). What they should have done instead was to inquire about a law which determined the will a priori and immediately, and only then subsequently inquire about the object conformable to this law.

12.4 Now this object of pleasure, which was supposed to give us the supreme concept of good, they wanted to establish in happiness, in perfection, in moral feeling, or in the will of God. Thus in every case their foundation was heteronomy. And it was certainly no wonder that they ran into empirical conditions for their moral law. For as an immediate determination basis of the will they could term their object good or evil only with respect to its immediate bearing to feeling which is invariably empirical.

12.5 Only a formal law, i.e., one which prescribes to reason nothing further than the form of its universal legislation as the supreme condition of its maxims, can be an a priori determination basis of practical reason.

12.6 The ancients, however, evidenced this error frankly by basing their moral investigation entirely upon the determination of the concept of the highest good, thus of an object which they afterwards planned to make the determination basis of the will in the moral law. This object, which much later, if the moral law is first preserved for itself and justified as the immediate determination basis of the will, can be represented to the will, determined now a priori with respect to its form, as object. We will embark upon this question in the **dialectic of pure practical reason**.

12.7 The moderns--with whom the question about the highest good seems to have come into disuse, or at least to have become only of peripheral concern--conceal the above error (here as they do in many other cases) behind undetermined words. But we still see it peering out of their systems, for then in every case it evidences heteronomy of practical reason from which a moral law, commanding a priori universally, can never arise.\(^\text{252}\)

13.1 Now since the concepts of good and evil, as consequences of the a priori determination of the will, also presuppose a pure practical principle, thus a causality of pure reason, they do not originally refer to objects, as do the pure understanding concepts or categories of

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\(^{252}\) Based on heteronomy the law would depend upon the effect and how that works with personal inclination. Based on autonomy the law is the need to universalize the maxims, and so where the effect is immaterial, i.e., the action is determined independently of the expected effect.
theoretically utilized reason (perchance as determinations of the synthetic unity of the manifold of given sightings in a consciousness), but rather presuppose these as given. Instead they are all together modi of a single category, i.e., causality, to the extent its determination basis consists in the rational representations of a law of that causality, which, as a law of freedom, reason gives itself and in that way proves itself a priori as practical.\textsuperscript{253}

13.2 Since, nonetheless, the actions on the one hand do indeed belong under a law, which is not a law of nature, but rather of freedom, and so where they belong to the conduct of intelligible entities,

and since also, on the other hand, as events in the sense world, they belong to appearances,

it follows that the determination of a practical reason is able to take place only in reference to the appearances, consequently conformable indeed to the categories of the understanding, but not for the intention of its theoretical usage in bringing the manifold of the (sensitive) perspective under a consciousness a priori, but rather only a priori to subject the manifold of the desires to the unity of the consciousness of a practical reason, commanding in the moral law, or of a pure will.\textsuperscript{254}

14.1 These categories of freedom, which is how we want to denominate them in contrast to those theoretical concepts as categories of nature, have an obvious priority over the latter. The categories of nature are only thought forms, which, by means of universal concepts, indicate only indeterminate objects in general for every perspective \textit{[Anschauung]} possible to us.\textsuperscript{255} The former, on the other hand, go to the determination of a free discretionary choice.\textsuperscript{256} Now it is true that no fully corresponding perspective can be given to this free discretionary choice, but it does have a pure practical law a priori lying as its foundation, which is not the case with any concept of the theoretical usage of our recognitional capacity. This practical law is a practical, elementary concept instead of the form of the perspective (space and time), and which [perspective] does not lie in reason itself, but rather

\textsuperscript{253} With practical reason we are not concerned with the recognition of objects as is the case with theoretical reason. Rather here we are dealing only with the determination of the will by means of the causality of freedom.

\textsuperscript{254} The categories of theoretical reason bring the manifold of a perspective to a unity of consciousness by means of a conceived object which the appearances then represent to us. The categories of freedom, on the other hand, subject the manifold of desires to a unity of consciousness of a pure will, and so make them all fit together as a single will.

\textsuperscript{255} The categories of the understanding of a nature serve as a general framework for the conception of an object which in term serves to unify relevant appearances as representing a single thing (the object), e.g., a table close up and the table further away.

\textsuperscript{256} The categories of understanding with regard to a nature are indeterminate, while the categories of freedom are determinations of a free acting.
must be obtained from elsewhere, namely, in the sensitivity. Therefore these categories of freedom have the form of a pure will lying as foundation within them, thus as a given in the very thinking capacity itself. Now since in all proscriptions of pure practical reason, we are concerned solely with the determination of will, and not with the natural conditions (of the practical capacity) of the execution of a purpose, we see that the practical concepts a priori in referral to the supreme principle of freedom become law recognitions immediately and do not have to wait upon a perspective in order to obtain meaning. And indeed there is a noteworthy reason for this, namely that they themselves produce the actuality of what they refer to (the disposition of the will), which is not the business of theoretical concepts at all.

14.2 However one must note very carefully that these categories concern only practical reason in general, and so advance in their order from the morally undetermined and sensitivity conditioned to that which, sensitively unconditioned, is determined merely through the moral law.

Table of the Categories of Freedom with Respect to the Concept of Good and Evil

1. Quantity
Subjective, according to maxims (opinions of will by the individual)
Objective, according to principles (precepts)
A priori objective as well as subjective principles of freedom (laws)

By means of the categories we conceive of an object which unifies and necessitates the various elements of a perspective. And so the perspective is called for in order to apply these categories. With the categories of freedom there is an immediate determination of the will by means of the moral law, and so where there is no need or call for any perspective.

Perhaps the contrast could be expressed in this way: if the categories of theoretical reason functioned as do the categories of freedom, then by virtue of the theoretical categories an object would actual arise independently of the sensitivity.

So these categories encompass all aspects of practical reason and begin with the morally indifferent and empirically (or feeling) based of the individual and ascend to the morally important and based on the make up of the group (all humans) and finally reach the morally necessary and objective for all rational beings.

For precepts see also GMM.II.42.3, i.e., “In contrast, whatever is deduced from the particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain feelings and propensities, nay, even, if possible, from any particular tendency proper to human reason, and which need not necessarily hold for the will of every rational being, may indeed supply us with a maxim, but not with a law. It may supply us with a subjective principle on which we may have a propensity and inclination to act, but not with an objective principle on which we should be enjoined to act, even though all our propensities, inclinations, and natural dispositions were opposed to it.”
2. Quality
Practical rules of desiring (*praeeptivae*)
Practical rules of avoidance (*prohibitivae*)
Practical rules of exceptions (*exceptivae*)

3. Relation
To the Personality
To the state of the Person
Alternatingly of one person to the state of others

4. Modality
The Permitted and Forbidden
Duty and the Contrary to Duty
Perfect and Imperfect Duty

15.1 We note here very quickly that in this table freedom is considered as a manner of causality, but not one subject to empirical determination foundations. Now indeed with respect to actions as appearances in the sense world which are possible through that causality, freedom refers to the categories according to their natural possibility. But at the same time every category is taken so universally that the determination basis of that causality can also be assumed apart from the sense world in freedom as a property of an intelligible being, all the way to where the categories of modality herald the transition from practical principles in general to those of morality, though only problematically. Only after this can morality be presented dogmatically through the moral law.

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261 Perhaps: go for the good, avoid the bad, and how to make exceptions. Or seek good health, avoid losing limbs, remove limbs which are dead or poisoned and dangerous to health.

262 I wonder if we are speaking here first of coming up with rules which are self serving (and cannot be universalized) and then secondly with rules with respect to all humans including therefore ourselves, and then with rules with respect to all rational beings, i.e., to all. This latter is the moral, although the second one is on the way; it holds for all humans (but still only problematically).

263 The follow is taken from a footnote in the *Preface*,12.5: “In the table of the categories of practical reason, for example, under the title of modality, the permitted and the forbidden (the practically objective possible and impossible) are often treated in common discourse as the same as the subsequent categories of duty and contrary to duty. But with us here the former are to mean what is merely a possible practical precept in agreement or conflict (somewhat as with the solution of all problems of geometry and mechanics), while the latter are to mean what stands in such reference to a law actually lying in reason in general. And while this difference of meaning is not entirely foreign to common discourse, it is somewhat unusual.”

264 For that would make it a natural law.

265 The categories of theoretical reasoning apply to all appearances whatsoever.
16.1 Here I add nothing further to the exposition of the present table, because it is sufficiently understandable by itself.

16.2 Such division, drafted according to principles, is very compatible to all science, for the sake of thoroughness as well as understandability.

16.3 So we know immediately from the above table and the first group, for example, where we would have to begin in practical considerations; from the maxims which each establishes upon his inclinations, from the precepts which hold for a species of rational beings to the extent they agree in certain inclinations, and finally from the law which holds for all regardless of their inclinations, etc.

16.4 In this way, one overviews the entire plan of that which one has to perform, every question of practical philosophy, in fact which is to be answered, and simultaneous the order which is to be followed.
Typic of Pure Practical Judgmental Power

1.1 The concepts of good and evil first determine an object to the will.

1.2 But they themselves stand under a practical rule of reason which, if it is pure reason, determines the will a priori with respect to its objects.

1.3 Now whether an action possible to us in sensitivity be the case which stands under the rule or not, is a matter for practical judgmental power, whereby that, which becomes said universally (in abstracto) in the rule, becomes applied to an action in concreto.266

1.4 But a practical rule of pure reason, as practical, concerns first the existence of an object,267 and secondly, as a practical rule of pure reason, entails necessity with respect to the existence of the action,268 and thus is a practical law. It is certainly not a law of nature through empirical determination bases, but rather a law of freedom, according to which the will is supposed to be determinable independently of all that is empirical (merely through the representation of a law in general and its form269). Hence all forthcoming cases can be pertinent to possible actions, but only empirically, i.e., to experience and nature. Consequently it seems nonsensical to want to encounter in the sense world a case which, since to this extent it always stands only under the natural law, still permits the application of a law of freedom upon itself and on which the supersensitive Idea of the morally good, which is supposed to become presented in that way in concreto, can be applied.270

1.5 Therefore the judgment power of pure practical reason is subject to the very same difficulties as that of pure theoretical reason, although the latter had a means for extricating itself from them. For since in pure theoretical reason the determination as to which pure understanding concepts could be applied depended upon perspectives, such perspectives (though only of objects of sense) can still be given a priori, and thus, concerning the con-

266 I can do a lot of things, e.g., make myself a cup of hot coffee, but whether any of these things are compelled by a practical rule of reason is a matter for practical judgment, e.g., are they good for me.

267 As an object here we are referring to an action for producing an effect, and which is possible through freedom.

268 Here we mean that the action, which is to produce the effect, is necessary.

269 The form being the universalized maxim.

270 If the case is subject to natural law, why would anyone expect a law of freedom to be applicable or even relevant?
nection of the manifold in that perspective, conformable to the pure understanding concept a priori (as schemata).271

1.6 Here, on the other hand, the morally good is something beyond the sensitive with respect to the object, and for which, therefore, nothing corresponding can be found in any sensitive perspective. Thus the judgment according to laws of pure practical reason seems to be subject to particular difficulties, in that a law of freedom is supposed to be applied to actions as events which occur in the sense world and which, therefore, to this extent belong to nature.272

2.1 Here again, however, we still can find an advantageous prospect for the pure practical judgmental capacity.

2.2 When we consider an action which is possible for us in the world of sense, and think of the subsumption of that action under a pure practical law, we are not concerned with the possibility of the action as an event in the sense world. For that pertains to an estimation by a theoretical usage of reason according to the laws of causality, a pure understanding concept, for which it possesses a schema in the sensitive perspective.

2.3 The physical causality of the condition, under which it takes place, belongs among the concepts of nature, the schema of which (concepts) the transcendental power of imagination lays before us.

2.4 But here we are not concerned with the schema of a case with respect to laws, but rather the schema (if you will) of a law itself. For here the determination of the will (not the action with reference to its outcome) binds the concept of causality through law alone (without any other determination basis) to entirely different conditions than those which make up the connection which we call nature.273

3.1 To the laws of nature as laws to which the objects of sensitive perspective as such are subjected, a schema must correspond, i.e., a universal procedure of the power of imagination

271 By means of the categories an object could be conceived to represent the appearances and then could be applied to the appearances for the recognition of that object. This will be different regarding pure practical reason.

272 How can we expect to apply a category of freedom to an empirical situation which is already necessitated by the category and an ensuing object of experience?

273 The law of practical reason, therefore, is applied without regard to the theoretical possibilities to actions.
(to present a priori the pure understanding concept, which the law determines, to the senses).\textsuperscript{274}

3.2 But to the law of freedom (as a causality which is not at all conditioned sensitively), thus also to the concept of the unconditionally good, no perspective, and thus no schema, can be an underpinning in aid of its application in concreto.

3.3 Consequently the moral law has no other recognitional capacity mediating the application of this law to objects of nature than the understanding (i.e., no imagination). Now in support of the judgmental power the understanding cannot buttress an Idea of reason with a schema of sensitivity, but it can do so with a law, but still such a one which can be presented on objects of the sense in \textit{concreto}, thus a law of nature, but only with respect to its form. Hence such a law we can term the model \([\textit{typus}]\) of the moral law.\textsuperscript{275}

4.1 The rule of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is this: “Ask yourself whether the action which you propose, if it were to occur according to a law of nature of which you yourself were also a part, you could consider indeed as possible through your will?”\textsuperscript{276}

4.2 It is indeed by means of this rule in fact that every one estimates actions, as to whether they are morally good or evil.

4.3 Thus people say, “if each person were willing to deceive others if it were thought advantageous, or were willing to shorten his own life if he became thoroughly dissatisfied with it, or viewed the needs of others with complete indifference, and you belonged to such an order of things, how would you be in that with the agreement of your will?”

4.4 Now everyone knows very well that if he secretly allowed himself deception, not everyone would also be deceptive, or if he is unnoticeably unkind, not everyone would also immediately be against him. Hence this comparison of the maxims of his actions with a universal law is also not the determination basis of his will.

4.5 But the latter is still a model of the estimation of the form according to moral principles.

\textsuperscript{274} In order for an object to be supplied to the perspective to unify the appearances there must be a schema of the category for the application and connection of the appearances.

\textsuperscript{275} So we are not actually coming to an expression of a law of freedom as a law of nature, but only as a model of a nature.

\textsuperscript{276} The common expression would be, “how would it be if everyone were to act as you want to do?” And if not acceptable, then you could not will this to be a law of nature.
4.6 If the maxim of the action is not so constituted, that it might stand the test on the form of a nature law in general, then it is morally impossible.

4.7 It is in this way that the most common understanding judges. For the natural law lies as the footing to all his most common judgments, even ones of experience.

4.8 Therefore he always has it at hand. But it is only in cases where the causality is supposed to be estimated out of freedom that he makes that nature law into a model of a law of freedom. And he does this because if he had nothing at hand to be utilized as an example in the case of experience, he would not be able procure the usage in the application to the law of a pure practical reason.277

5.1 It is therefore also permitted to use the nature of the sense world as a model of an intelligible nature, as long as I do not transfer the perspectives, and what is dependent on them, to this intelligible nature, but rather refer merely to the form of the legality in general (whose concept also takes place in the most common rational usage, but can be recognized as a priori determined for no other purpose than merely for the pure practical usage of reason).

5.2 For laws as laws are to this extent identical, regardless of where their determination basis may arise.278

6.1 Incidentally, since of all intelligible utterly nothing but freedom (by means of the moral law), and even this only to the extent it is a presupposition inseparable from that law, and further [since] all intelligible objects, to which reason might per chance yet lead us according to the guide of that law,279 have on the other hand no further reality for us than as an aid of the same law and the usage of pure practical reason, but which is justified and also necessitated to use nature as the model of the judgmental power (with respect to the pure understanding form of that nature), this present remark about that serves to prevent what pertains merely to the typic of the concepts becoming reckoned to the concepts themselves.

6.2 As typic of the judgmental power, therefore, this guards against the empiricism of practical reason, which would put the practical concept of good and evil merely in conse-

277 Without this model (or typus) it would not be possible to conceive of an application of the law of pure practical reason to life, so far is the law of freedom from the law of natural necessity.

278 And so I have the capacity of thinking of a law of freedom just as I can a law of nature, at least for the intention of evaluating my maxims.

279 Here Kant will be speaking of an eternal soul and also God as intelligible objects to which reason may per chance lead us (and which will arise first in the ensuing treatment of the Dialectic).
quences of experience (so-called happiness). Nevertheless this typic and the infinitely useful consequences of a will determined through self love, if this simultaneously made itself into a universal law of nature, can serve in any case as the entire and suitable model for the moral good, but is still not identical with it.  

6.3 Just the same typic also guards against any mysticism of practical reason which makes what served only as symbol into a schema, i.e., underlays actual, but not sensitive, perspectives (of an invisible realm of God) to the application of the moral concepts and wanders out into the extravagant.

6.4 The rationalism of the judgmental power is suitable alone for the use of the moral concepts. It takes nothing further from the nature of sensitivity than what pure reason can think for itself, i.e., legality, and carries nothing into the supersensitive except what vice-versa allows of actual presentation through actions in the sense world according to the formal rules of a nature law in general.

6.5 Meanwhile the defense against the empiricism of practical reason is much more important and advisable, because mysticism is still not compatible with the purity and sublimity of the moral law. And beyond that, it is just not so natural nor suitable to the manner of common thinking to stretch one’s power of imagination up to the supersensitive perspective, thus the danger is not so universal on this side.

6.6 On the other hand, empiricism eradicates the very roots of morality in the disposition (in which, and not merely in actions, the high value consists which humanity can and is supposed to procure to itself through it) and provides an underpinning to it which is entirely different, namely an empirical interest, whereby the inclinations in general, instead of duty, take charge, and beyond which for precisely that reason with all inclinations which (cut as they may be), if they are exalted to the dignity of a supreme practical law, degrade humanity. And since they are nonetheless so advantageous to the manner of sense of all persons, empiricism is much more dangerous for that reason than all ecstasy which can never make up a continuing condition of many men.

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280 By means of this typic or model of the moral judgement we can see how far a law based on love of self and empiricism in general would fail and prove untenable as a law, and so therefore how it could also not serve as a law of freedom.

281 To make the law empirical as opposed to mystical is much more appealing to the vast majority of mankind and for that very reason much more dangerous than mysticism.
1.1 The essential aspect of all moral value of any action rests upon the will being determined immediately by the moral law.\textsuperscript{282}

1.2 If the determination of the will conformed to the moral law, but only by means of a feeling, regardless of what sort, which had to be presupposed in order for this to become an adequate determination basis of the will, hence not simply for the sake of the law, then the action would indeed be legal, but it certainly would not be moral.

1.3 And if with “incentive” (\textit{elater animi}) we mean the subjective determination basis of the will of a being, whose reasoning, by virtue of its very nature, were not already necessarily conformable to the objective law, then first of all it would follow that no incentive at all could be attributed to the divine will. And then secondly the incentive of the human will (and that of every created rational being) could never be anything other than the moral law. Accordingly the objective determination basis alone would always simultaneously have to be the subjectively adequate, determination basis of the action if the action is not just to fulfill the letter of the law without containing the spirit of the law.\textsuperscript{283}

2.1 Since, therefore, in our effort to aid the moral law in procuring its influence upon the will, we cannot seek any incentive such that the moral law might become superfluous (for that would result in sheer simulation without substance), and since it is also in fact conceivable that other incentives (like those of advantage) were co-effective along side the moral law, it follows that nothing remains for us to do except diligently to determine the manner in which the moral law becomes an incentive and then, given that it is,

\textsuperscript{282} Failing this the action, if it comports with the moral law, will be legal, but it can only find moral worth as a consequence of, or derivation from, the moral law.

\textsuperscript{283} There are other driving forces and it is only by virtue of the moral law being the determination basis of the will that we can say that the action is moral, as opposed to merely “seeming to be” moral. And so, since the will of God would be considered as holy, no incentive would be needed.
to determine what precedes with the human desire capacity as the effect of that determination basis upon this capacity.\textsuperscript{284}

2.2 For how a law could be an immediate determinations basis of the will and of itself alone (which is the essential aspect of all morality) is a problem beyond solution on the part of human reason and one identical with how a free will might be possible.

2.3 Therefore we must indicate a priori not the basis of how the moral law renders an incentive within itself, as rather what works (or better said, must work) in the mind to the extent it is such an incentive.\textsuperscript{285}

3.1 The essential core of every determination of the will through the moral law is that the will, as a free will, is determined merely through law, thus not only without collaboration of sensitive incentives, but rather even with the dismissal of all of them along with the disruption of all inclinations to the extent they could be contrary to that law.\textsuperscript{286}

3.2 To this extent then the effect of the moral law is only negative, and as such this incentive can be recognized a priori.\textsuperscript{287}

3.3 For every inclination and every sensitive incentive is based upon feeling, and the negative effect upon feeling (through the disruption to the inclination) is itself a feeling.\textsuperscript{288}

3.4 Consequently we can tell a priori that the moral law, as a determination basis of the will, would have to effect a feeling (by infringing upon all our inclinations) and this can be denominated as pain. And so we have here the first, and perhaps only, case where we could

\textsuperscript{284} We will want to discover the make up of the human mind such that the moral law could be a driver.

\textsuperscript{285} So we assume the moral law is an driving force and want now to discover what has to happen in the mind in order for the moral law to be this driving force. How do we respond to the moral law such that it is an incentive to action for us?

\textsuperscript{286} This sentence must denote then an analytical judgment, i.e., given a free will, then it would follow upon an analysis (as was ascertained earlier) that that free will would be determined, as to its form, by the moral law alone.

\textsuperscript{287} Since it follows that the moral law must be alone supreme, this means that the inclinations (along with everything else) simply don't matter at all. And we can already tell that it will be painful (in the utter disregard to the ego and pride) as we shall shortly discover.

\textsuperscript{288} Since an inclination is based on feeling, any disruption of that inclination would constitute an effect on that feeling, and thus would itself constitute a feeling.
determine a priori from concepts the relationships of a recognition (here it is of pure practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure.\textsuperscript{289}

3.5  All inclinations together (which can also be readily assembled into an acceptable system, and whose satisfaction then is called personal happiness) make up the focus on the self (\textit{solipsimus}).\textsuperscript{290}

3.6  This is either that of self-love, i.e., a partiality for oneself superseding all else (\textit{Philautia}), or else a delight of one’s own self (\textit{Arrogantia})\textsuperscript{291}

3.7  The former is more often called narcissism, the latter egotism.

3.8  Pure practical reason merely disrupts narcissism by restricting that which stirs naturally within us and preceding the moral law to the condition of conformity with this law. Then it is called rational love of self.\textsuperscript{292}

3.9  But it thoroughly topples egotism, for all pretensions of self esteem which precede agreement with the moral law are inane and without the least authority. Indeed it is precisely the certification of a disposition which agrees with this law that constitutes the first condition of all worth of a person (as we shortly shall make clearer), and all presumption before that is false and inadmissible.\textsuperscript{293}

3.10 Now the bent to self esteem belongs with the inclinations, which the moral law disrupts, to the extent this conceit rests merely upon the sensitivity.

\textsuperscript{289} We know from analysis of the moral law that we will have to disregard all inclinations, and this obviously will be painful and make us unhappy. We can tell this by inspection of the law and without having to be involved in an actual case.

\textsuperscript{290} This may be getting close to the optimizing that rational thinking is supposed to produce in our lives, where we seek to formulate maxims and where we try to formulate what our own personal happiness consists in.

\textsuperscript{291} So we have a preference for one’s own wellbeing, and then also a consideration of one’s self as superior.

\textsuperscript{292} Here I think Kant is leading us to consider the love of self to be quite appropriate as long as it is derived from the moral law. For example, in my effort to love in accordance with the Golden Rule, I must love myself and others equally well as derived from this law of laws, and thus not be tempted to love others to my own detriment where I might become depressed due to the lack of satisfaction of my own needs and therefore unable to satisfy duties to myself and also to others. In other words I come to reason in this wise: all people are important; I am a person; hence I am important. Therefore my self love is derived and is no long original.

\textsuperscript{293} So above, we don’t renounce our inclinations for happiness or our love of self, but merely make them secondary to the moral law. But here with egotism this amounts to a complete rejection, at least to this extent, that we cannot be proud of ourselves in any regard when we have failed our moral duty.
3.11 Therefore the moral law topples personal conceit.

3.12 But since this law is something positive on its own, namely the form of an intellectual causality, i.e., of freedom, and since it, in contrast to the subjective antagonist, i.e., the inclinations within us, not only weakens personal conceit--thus simultaneously making the law an object of respect--but also even casts it aside, i.e., via humiliation, thus making the law an object of the greatest respect, it is also the basis of a positive feeling, which is not of empirical origin and is recognized a priori.294

3.13 Therefore respect for the moral law is a feeling which stands upon an intellectual basis, and this feeling is the only one which we can recognize fully a priori, and whose necessity we can penetrate.295

4.1 In the previous part we saw that everything, which presents itself as an object of the will before the moral law, is excluded from the determination basis of the will by means of this law itself as the supreme condition of practical reason under the name of the unconditional good, and that the mere practical form, which exists in the suitability of the maxims for universal legislation, first determines that which is good utterly and on its own, and provides the foundation of the maxims of a pure will, which alone is good in every intention.296

4.2 But now we find our nature as sensitive beings so constituted that the material of the desire capacity (of objects of inclination, be they hoped for or feared) first interjects itself before anything else. And our pathologically determinable self, even though its maxims are entirely unsuited for universal legislation, nevertheless, just as though it made up our entire self, is dedicated to making its presumptions valid in advance as first and original.

4.3 This bent to turn the subjective determination basis of one’s discretionary choice into the objective determination basis of one’s will in general, can be termed self-love, which, if it

294 The moral law makes us put our preference for ourselves behind the moral law. But then by actuallytoppling all pretension to self importance (arrogance) in a humiliation before the moral law we exhibit the greatest respect for it. This enhances and exalts the moral law as the mark of our own freedom.

295 By consideration of the moral law, before even being challenged to comply, we can tell that it will be painful in the subjugation of the inclinations and especially in the humiliation of the rejection of self pride. So we don’t have to await a challenge to experience this respect for the moral law.

296 The foundations of a pure will is the moral law requiring us to universalize our maxims.
makes itself legislative and turns itself into the unconditioned practical principle, can be called self-conceit. 297

4.4 Now the moral law, which alone is truly objective, i.e., in every regard, entirely excludes any influence of self-love upon the supreme practical principle and inflicts infinite injury to self-conceit which enjoins the subjective conditions of self love as law. 298

4.5 Now that which injures our conceit in our own judgment, humiliates us. 299

4.6 Therefore every human, by comparing the sensitive bent of his nature with the moral law, is unavoidably humiliated. 300

4.7 That, the representation of which (as the determination basis of our will), humiliates us in our self consciousness, awakens, to the extent it is positive and a determination basis, respect of its own. 301

4.8 Therefore the moral law is also subjectively a basis of respect.

4.9 Now since everything which is encountered in self love belongs to inclination, but every inclination rests upon feeling, we see that what disrupts all inclinations whatsoever in our love of self has in that very way precisely a necessary influence on feelings. In this way we comprehend how it is possible to penetrate a priori that the moral law, by excluding the inclinations (and the bent to make them into the supreme practical condition), i.e., self love, from all admittance to the supreme legislation, is able to exercise an effect upon the feeling, which on one side is merely negative. But on the other side, and indeed with respect to the qualifying basis of pure practical reason, it is positive, and for which no par-

297 So we have self love where our subjective basis of discretionary choice is made into the objective determination, and then we have self conceit where our subjective basis is made into the supreme and unconditioned practical principles

298 Thus via the consciousness of the moral law we exclude (but do not eliminate) self love and we exclude and also deny all pretensions to self conceit.

299 We come to this conclusion ourselves, comparing ourselves with the moral law, and thus we find it humiliating that we cannot be proud of ourselves in lieu of moral perfection.

300 Merely in comparing our sensitive nature (self love and self conceit) with the moral law automatically results in an humiliation.

301 So I am humiliated and then I realize that a moral disposition alone is what is worthy of respect, and I have respect for this law in my soul.
ticular type of feeling at all, under the name of a practical or moral one, need be assumed as existing before the moral law and as basis to it.\textsuperscript{302}

5.1 The negative effect on feeling (of disagreeableness), like every such influence and like every feeling in general, is pathological.

5.2 But as an effect of the consciousness of the moral law, thus with reference to an intelligible cause, namely the subject of pure practical reason as the highest legislator, this feeling of a rational subject who is affected by inclinations is called humiliation (intellectual contempt) indeed. And yet at the same time, with reference to the positive basis of this feeling, i.e., the law and likewise respect for the law, for which law no feeling takes place at all, since resistance is eliminated, this removal of an obstacle is considered in the judgment of reason to be equivalent to a positive promotion of the causality.\textsuperscript{303}

5.3 For that reason this feeling can now also be termed a feeling of respect for the moral law, but for both reasons together: a moral feeling.\textsuperscript{304}

6.1 Therefore even as the moral law is the formal determination basis of the action through practical pure reason, and indeed also the material, but merely objective, determination basis of the objects of the action under the name of the good and evil, it is also the subjec-

\textsuperscript{302} So we have here a feeling, but one which first arises upon the conception of the moral law. First there is the negative feeling of pain in demoting self love and especially in the destruction of self conceit. Then there is the positive feeling arises from the supremacy of the moral law. And so there is this two-pronged feeling, but which rises entirely and only by virtue of the conception of the moral law in comparison with our desire for happiness.

\textsuperscript{303} Our inclinations stand in the way of the moral act. But the moral law dismisses the inclinations. Thus by reducing the obstacles to moral action, the moral law can lay claim to the feeling associated with this humiliation and call it respect for the moral law. When we first come to understand the moral law we are humiliated for we know that this law dismisses our desires and feelings as immaterial and inconsequential (or at least as secondary), and this feeling of humiliation, i.e., the pain at the inability to follow our desires in light of this intellectual invention (the moral of universalized maxims), can be considered as a positive feeling in the reduction of impediments to the moral act, and as esteem for the moral law.

\textsuperscript{304} The pain of humiliation where no account is given to the inclinations and personal happiness. It seems we first learn of the moral law merely rationally as that which would automatically ensue if people were simply rational and not buffeted by inclinations. Then we learn about the role of the inclinations and understand that thwarting them is painful, but now we see this is necessary in light of this law that we have just accepted as natural (for a free being, not thinking about inclinations). It's as though we recognize the noble and then see that in order to be noble ourselves we must dismiss the ego, and this we see is painful, and this is the respect we have for the moral law, this pain, this humiliation of our and every ego. And in contrast to this humiliation we have then the exaltation of the moral law as the basis for this painful humiliation.
tive determination basis, i.e., incentive, to this action by influencing the sensitivity of the subject and effects a feeling which promotes the influence of the law upon the will.

6.2 Here no feeling in the subject precedes which were conducive to morality.\(^{305}\)

6.3 For that is impossible, because every feeling is sensitive, and the incentive of the moral disposition must be free of every sensitive condition.\(^{306}\)

6.4 Far rather the sensitive feeling, which lies as basis to all our inclinations, is indeed the condition of the sensation which we term respect, but the cause of the determination of this feeling lies in pure practical reason, and therefore, with respect to its origin, this sensation may not be called pathologically affected, but rather must be called practically affected.\(^{307}\) For the representation of the moral law removes the influence toward self love and the mania for egotism, and thereby reduces the obstacles to pure practical reason, and the representation of the superiority of its objective law is produced before the incentives of sensitivity, thus in the judgment of reason the weight of the first [moral law] increased relatively (with respect to a will affected through the latter [incentives of sensitivity]) through the removal of a counter weight.\(^{308}\)

6.5 And so the respect for the law is not an incentive for the sake of morality, but rather it is the morality itself, considered subjectively as incentive, in that pure practical reason, by deprecating every presumption to self love in opposition to it, procures esteem for the law such that the law now has influence alone.\(^{309}\)

6.6 Now we need to note here that since the respect is an effect upon feelings, thus upon the sensitivity of a rational being, it presupposes this sensitivity, and thus also the finite makeup of such a being on whom the moral law imposes respect. Accordingly respect of

\(^{305}\) All these feelings in discounting our self love and destroying our self conceit cannot arise except by virtue of the moral law, and so a consciousness of this law must precede before these feelings can arise.

\(^{306}\) This is an analytical judgment based on our conception of the moral law.

\(^{307}\) The feeling is pathological, of course, as every feeling, but since it cannot arise except by means of a consciousness of the moral law it can be called a practical feeling.

\(^{308}\) So the effect is this: the moral law is adequate for the determination of the will, and the feelings that arise in comparison with this law, humiliation, reduce the obstacles to implementation of the moral law and thus serve subjectively as a positive incentive.

\(^{309}\) Thus in deprecating self love in comparison with the moral law, the moral law is elevated and is found to have solitary influence.
the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being, or even one which is freed from all sensitivity.\textsuperscript{310}

7.1 This feeling (under the name of a moral feeling) is therefore solely effected through reason.\textsuperscript{311}

7.2 It does not serve for the evaluation of the action or indeed even for the establishment of the objective, moral law itself, but rather merely for the incentive, in order to transform this law within itself into a maxim.\textsuperscript{312}

7.3 But with what name could one more fittingly denominate this unusual feeling, which can be compared with no pathological one?

7.4 It is such a particular sort that it seems to stand solely as a command to reason and indeed to practical reason.\textsuperscript{313}

8.1 Respect goes strictly to persons and never to things.

8.2 The latter can awaken inclinations in us and, if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs, etc.), even love. Things can also awaken fear, as the ocean, a volcano, a predatory beast, but never respect.

8.3 Admiration is something which approaches this feeling, and when raised to the affection of astonishment, can pertain to things, e.g., sky-high mountains, the magnitude, multitude and expanse of the heavenly bodies, the strength and speed of many animals, etc.

\textsuperscript{310} To neither of these, absent sensitivity, can respect for the law arise, for respect is seen here as the humiliation via rejection of self love and self conceit, both of which are feelings. And so with neither of these beings can there be a sensitivity and so not a source of sensitive obstacles, and so, since respect is the diminution of such obstacles, no respect, i.e., respect is not necessary here for compliance with the moral law.

\textsuperscript{311} This is clear now since it is only by reason that the moral can be conceived and it is only by means of the moral law that the humiliation can arise.

\textsuperscript{312} As though to say: “I do this because I cannot respect myself otherwise.” And in this wise the moral law is not merely objectively and formally valid, but also subjectively so and actually as a maxim of the will.

\textsuperscript{313} We might liken it to a feeling which arises upon hearing the performance of a symphony, as something which were within us as a potentiality, but which needed a trigger in order to arise in consciousness. But in this singular case of respect the feeling arises upon the conception of the moral law which is a product of reason alone. This feeling then appears as though it were a command to reason itself, to reason in this way and not otherwise.
8.4 But none of this is respect.

8.5 A person can also be an object of love, fear or admiration, indeed even astonishment, and still not be an object of respect.

8.6 His jovial mood, his courage and strength, the power through his rank which he has among others can inundate me with these sensations, but still an inner respect towards him may be lacking.

8.7 Fontenelle says, “I bow before a noble, but my spirit does not bow.”

8.8 I can add, “Before a lower ranked man of the common citizenry, with whom I perceive an uprightness of character in a certain measure which I am not conscious of in myself, my spirit bows whether I want to or not, and this even though I might hold my head ever so high in order that my rank not be overlooked by him.”

8.9 Why is this?

8.10 His example holds a law up to me which casts down my personal conceit if I compare it with my conduct, and whose compliance, and hence the feasibility of that law, I see proven before me in a fact.

8.11 And this respect remains even if I am conscious of a similar degree of uprightness in myself.

8.12 For since every good is always deficient with humans, the law, made visible through an example, still always casts down my pride, while the man, whom I see before me--since his impurities, which may yet always adhere to him, are not so known to me as those of my own--appears to me in a purer light and provides a standard for conduct,.

8.13 Respect is a tribute which we cannot deny to the praiseworthy, whether we want to or not. And while we may always suppress it outwardly, we cannot prevent feeling it inwardly.

9.1 Respect is so little a feeling of pleasure that one only very reluctantly gives himself over to it with regard to a human.

9.2 One tries to discover something which can lighten the burden of this respect, some sort of blame, to compensate ourselves for the humiliation which befalls us through such an example.

9.3 Even the deceased, especially if their example seems beyond imitation, are not always secure against this criticism.
9.4 Indeed even the moral law itself in its solemn majesty is exposed in this endeavor as we seek to resist respect for it.

9.5 Does one really mean that there could be any other reason why someone might gladly demote the law to our familiar inclination and seek to pry everything out of other causes in order to make it into the arbitrary precepts of our well understood advantage? Is there any other reason for us to do so except to be rid of the terrifying respect which throws up to us so strictly our own unworthiness?

9.6 Yet for all that there is still also in turn so little displeasure in that, that if one has once laid aside personal conceit and permitted practical influence to that respect, one can then not see enough of the splendor of this law, and even believes to exalt his soul to such measure as it sees the holy law as sublime above that soul and its criminal nature.

9.7 Indeed great talents and an activity proportionate to them can also effect respect or a feeling analogous to it, it being also entirely proper to dedicate respect to such talents and there it seems as though admiration be identical with that sensation.

9.8 Upon a closer look, however, you will note that since it always remains uncertain as to what part native talent and what part cultivation through personal industry play on skillfulness, reason represents the latter to us supposedly as fruit of cultivation, thus as merit, which notably moderates our personal conceit and either makes accusations about such talents to us or lays to us the compliance to such an example in the manner appropriate to us. 314

9.9 Therefore, it is not merely admiration, this respect, which we prove of such a person (actually of the law, which charges his example to us), and which is also confirmed by the common heap of admirers giving up all respect towards him, if they believe to have acquired somewhere derogatory information about the character of such a man (as per chance Voltaire). But the truly educated still always feels it, at least in consideration of his talents, because he himself is involved in an occupation and calling, which makes the imitation of such a person a law to him to a certain degree. 315

10.1 Respect for the moral law, therefore, is the single and, at the same time, undoubted moral incentive, even as this feeling is also directed to no object other than solely to that of this foundation.

314 If someone has talent, then this does not affect me. But if someone develops himself to greatness, then this can affect me, for it suggests that I might have done the same thing, but didn’t.

315 Even if Voltaire were considered to be someone of a bad character, still what he accomplished in his field shows his colleagues what they should also do, i.e., develop their talents to the utmost.
10.2 First the moral law determines objectively and immediately the will in the judgment of reason. But freedom, the causality of which is determinable merely through the law, consists precisely in the restriction of all inclinations and thus also the valuation of the person himself to the condition of compliance with its pure law.\footnote{I recognize myself as nothing unless I comply with this law. It removes all hope of self-esteem if I fail to comply. Forget self respect if you fail to comply with the moral law, and how can you be happy without self respect?}

10.3 Now this restriction has an effect upon the feeling and produces the sensation of displeasure, which can become recognized a priori through the moral law.

10.4 But since it is to this extent merely a negative effect, which, having arisen out of the influence of a pure practical reason, disrupts especially the activity of the subject to the extent inclinations are the determination bases of that subject, and thus the opinion of one’s personal value (which without agreement with the moral law becomes degraded to nothing), the effect of this law on feeling is merely humiliation, which we therefore penetrate indeed a priori. But we cannot penetrate a priori the force of the pure practical law in it as incentive. We can only recognize the resistance against the incentives of sensitivity.\footnote{We can’t recognize this force except in action against, and in overcoming, the inclinations.}

10.5 But because the same law is nonetheless objective, i.e., is an immediate determination basis of the will in the representation of pure reason, such that this humiliation takes place only relative to the purity of the law, the denigration of the presumptions of the moral self appraisal, i.e., humiliation on the sensitive side, is an exaltation of the moral, i.e., of the practical esteem of law itself, on the intellectual side. In a word therefore: respect for the law is also one of its intellectual causes with respect to a positive feeling, which is recognized a priori.\footnote{So we must even reject the moral self estimation and since this is due to the majesty of the moral, this means an exaltation of the pure moral. This is an intellectual cause and a positive feeling. From the intellectual we know that this subjugation of the less-than-perfect person is based on the sublimity of the moral. All this together then elevates the moral law as a positive feeling.}

10.6 For every diminution of the obstacles to an activity is a promotion of this activity itself.

10.7 But the acknowledgement of the moral law is the consciousness of an activity of practical reason on objective foundations, which expresses its effect in actions excepting only that subjective (pathological) causes hinder them.

10.8 Therefore the respect for the moral law must also be viewed as a positive, albeit indirect, effect of that law on feelings to the extent the law weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations through the humiliation of personal conceit. Thus this hindering of the influ-
ence is a subjective basis of activity, i.e., as an incentive to the compliance with the law and as a basis to maxims of a way of life conformable to it.\textsuperscript{319}

10.9 From the concept of an incentive arises the one interest which is never attributed to a being except it have reason, and it means an incentive belonging to the will to the extent the incentive is represented through reason.\textsuperscript{320}

10.10 Since the law itself must be the incentive in a morally good will, it follows that the moral interest is a pure, sense-free interest of sheer practical reason.

10.11 Upon the concept of an interest the concept of a maxim is also based.\textsuperscript{321}

10.12 This maxim then is only morally genuine if it rests upon the mere interest which is taken in the compliance with the law.

10.13 Now all three concepts, that of an incentive, of an interest and of a maxim, can only be applied to finite beings.

10.14 For all together they presuppose a limitation of the nature of a being, since the subjective composition of its discretionary choice does not accord of itself with the objective law of a practical reason. It is a need to be driven into activity by something, because an inner obstacle stands opposed to that law.\textsuperscript{322}

10.15 Upon the divine will, therefore, they cannot be applied.\textsuperscript{323}

11.1 Something so particular lies in the limitlessly high estimation of the pure moral law, bared of all advantage, as practical reason represents it to us for compliance, whose voice makes even the boldest offender tremble and hide himself before its visage, that we need not

\textsuperscript{319} This means that we realize intellectually that we can never take pride in ourselves if we have not complied with the moral law. So it is not a search for pride directly which brings us to honor the law, but the realization that nothing could have occasion for pride in the absence of the moral conduct. So we are not so much proud of moral conduct as rather desiring self esteem and realizing that this is impossible at the lack of moral conduct.

\textsuperscript{320} And this is the case here, for as we have seen the moral feeling can only arise by virtue of the moral law which is a product of pure practical reason. Thus, again, the feeling is called practical and not pathological.

\textsuperscript{321} The maxim is directed toward the attainment of the interest.

\textsuperscript{322} That inner restraint is the inclination which is independent of the moral law.

\textsuperscript{323} The divine will is a holy will and so automatically complies with the moral law and there are no inclinations to contest the supremacy of this law.
wonder at finding this influence of a mere intellectual Idea on feelings unfathomable for speculative reason and having to be content with being able to penetrate this much a priori: such a feeling is inseparable connected with the representation of the moral law in every finite, rational being.

11.2 Were this feeling of respect pathological and therefore a feeling of pleasure based upon the inner sense, it would be vain to discover a connection between it and any sort of an Idea a priori.

11.3 But now it is a feeling which concerns the practical only, and indeed the representation of a law solely according to its form, and which does not adhere to some sort of an object of that law. Thus it can be reckoned neither to enjoyment nor to pain, and yet produces an interest in compliance with the law which we term the moral interest. Accordingly then the capacity to take such an interest in the law (or the respect for the moral law itself) is actually the moral feeling.324

12.1 Now the consciousness of a free subjugation of the will to the law, though connected with an unavoidable compulsion, which is imposed on any inclinations, but only through one’s own reason, is respect for the law.

12.2 The law, which requires, and also inspires, this respect, is, as we see, none other than the moral law (for no other excludes all inclinations from the immediacy of its influence upon the will).

12.3 That action, which is objectively practical according to this law, to the exclusion of all determination bases from inclination, is called duty. And this, due to this exclusion, contains in its concept practical necessity, i.e., determination to actions, as unwelcome as they may also be.

12.4 The feeling, which arises out of the consciousness of this necessity, is not pathological, as would be effected by an object of the senses, but rather entirely practical, i.e., possible through a preceding (objective) determination of the will and a causality of reason.

12.5 Therefore, as submission to a law, i.e., as a command (which proclaims compulsion for the sensitively affected subject), it contains no pleasure but rather to this extent more displeasure in the action on its own.

324 The capacity to take interest in the law is the moral feeling. When we hear of this law we are interested in it, and that interest is the moral feeling. It is awakened only in this way. It is a practical feeling.
12.6 But on the other hand, since this compulsion is exercised merely through the legislation of one’s own reason, it also contains exaltation. And the subjective effect to the feeling, to the extent pure practical reason is the solitary cause of that exaltation, can for that reason be called sheer self approval with respect to pure practical reason in that one recognizes himself determined to that without any interest and solely through the law. Moreover he becomes conscious of an entirely different interest, brought forth subjectively by means of that, which is purely practical and free. It is not per chance an inclination advisable to be taken to an action conformable to duty, but rather reason utterly commands and also actually produces that through the practical law, and for that reason carries an entirely particularly name, namely that of respect.

13.1 The concept of duty, therefore, objectively requires of the action agreement with the law, but subjectively of its maxim respect for the law as the sole determination manner of the will through that law.

13.2 And on this is based the distinction between the consciousness of having acted conformable to duty and for the sake of duty, i.e., out of respect for the law, of which the first (the legality) is also possible if inclinations had been merely the determination bases of the will, but the second (the morality), the moral value, must be placed solely in the action occurring from duty, i.e., merely for the sake of the law.*

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 If we precisely weigh the concept of respect for persons as it was presented earlier, we become aware that respect always rests upon the consciousness of duty which provides an example for us, and that accordingly respect can never have any basis other than moral. And it is very good, and even very useful, in psychological intentions concerning human recognition, to use this expression to draw attention to the secret and miraculous deference, which arises so often at that moment, and which the human takes in his assessments upon the moral law.

14.1 It is the greatest importance in all moral estimations to attend to the subjective principle of all maxims with the most extreme precision, so that all morality of actions is placed in the necessity of the action for the sake of duty and respect for the law, and not from love and desire for that which the actions are supposed to produce.

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325 And so the exaltation arises from the realization that I myself devise and proclaim this law.

326 This feeling of respect cannot arise except via the moral law.

327 So duty means objectively conformity to the moral law. And subjectively it means that the reason for the action is the moral law and nothing else.

328 So Voltaire (see 9.9 above) was duty bound to utilize his talents.
14.2 For humans and all created rational beings moral necessity is necessitation, i.e., obligation, and every action based on that is to be represented as duty, and not behavioral as a way already endeared to us of itself or being able to be endeared.

14.3 Just as if we might ever bring it so far that without respect for the law, which is connected with fear of, or at least concern for, transgression, we, like the sublime divinity beyond all dependence, of itself, through an agreement of the will with the pure moral law, become a nature to us, as it were, never to be displaced (which indeed, therefore, since we would never become tempted to be unfaithful to it, finally could even cease to be a command for us), could ever come into the possession of a holiness of the will. 329

15.1 For the will of an all perfect being, the moral law is namely a law of holiness, but for the will of every finite rational being, a law of duty, or moral necessitation and of the determination of the actions of that being through respect for the law and out of reverence for his duty.

15.2 Another subjective principle must not be assumed as the incentive, for otherwise the action, as the law prescribes it, can indeed be engaged, but, since it indeed conforms to duty but happens not from duty, the disposition for the action is not moral, upon which it actually still depends in this legislation. 330

16.1 It is certainly nice, out of love for humans and contributory well-wishing, to do good to them or to be just from a love of order. But that is not yet the genuine moral maxim of our conduct, which is suitable to our standpoint among rational beings as humans, if we presume to want to do that voluntarily, as it were, by positioning ourselves with proud imagination beyond the thoughts of duty and, independently from the law, merely from our own pleasing, for which no law were necessary for us.

16.2 We stand under a discipline of reason and in all our maxims must not forget our submission to that discipline nor remove anything from it or in that way to lessen something from the esteem of the law (even though our own reason gives it) through a self-loving mania, where we set the determination basis of our will, even if conformable to the law, still somewhere else than in the law itself and in the respect for this law.

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329 Thus moral perfection (holiness) would mean a condition such that a person is never even tempted to violate the moral law. This cannot be expected in earthly life.

330 I might know someone who is in need and whom I can help, and whom I do help because I like that person and want to show my affection and within the regard or love of that person; and so whom I help for the wrong reason, i.e., not the moral reason but rather for a selfish reason. Legally it would be correct (conformity to the moral law) but morally it would be incorrect (not arising from respect for the moral law).
16.3 Duty and dereliction are the solitary denominations which we must give to our relationships to the moral law.

16.4 We are indeed legislating members of a reams of morals, which is possible through freedom, and represented through practical reason to us as respect. But at the same time we are still subjects, and not the ruler of that realm. And the misjudgment of our lower station, as creatures, and the refusal on the part of self-conceit before the visage of the holy law is already a rebellion against that law with regard to the spirit, even if the letter of the law were fulfilled.\textsuperscript{331}

17.1 But with this the possibility of such a commandment as, “Love God above all and Thy neighbor as Thyself”\textsuperscript{*} accords quite well.

17.2 For as a commandment it still requires respect for a law which commands a love, and does not leave it as a matter of arbitrary choice whether to make this into a principle.

17.3 But love to God as inclination (pathological love) is impossible, for He is no object of the senses.

17.4 Such a love toward humans is indeed possible, but cannot be commanded. For it does not lie within the capacity of any man to love someone merely upon command.

17.5 Therefore it is merely practical love which is understood in the core of all laws.

17.6 To love God, in this sense, means to perform His commandments gladly. To love one’s neighbor means to carry out all duties toward him gladly.

17.7 But the commandment, which make this a rule, cannot also command the having of this disposition in actions conformable to duty, but rather merely the striving toward it.

17.8 For a commandment that one is supposed to do something gladly is contradictory within itself, because if we already know of ourselves what obligates us to acting, and if beyond that we were also conscious of doing it gladly, a command concerning it would be entirely unnecessary. And if we indeed comply, but not just gladly, but rather only out of respect for this law, a commandment which makes this gladness precisely the incentive of the maxim, would work directly against the commanded disposition.

17.9 That law of all laws, therefore, as all moral precepts of the Gospels, describes the moral disposition in its entire perfection. Nevertheless, as an Ideal of holiness, reachable by no

\textsuperscript{331} Don’t do good for the sake of pride and conceit, but always for the sake of duty.
creature, it is the archetype to which we are supposed to approximate ourselves and to be-
come commensurate in an uninterrupted, but infinite progression.  

17.10 If indeed a rational creature could ever come so far as to perform the moral law com-
pletely gladly, that would mean as much as there would not be in him even the possibility of an appetite which excited him to a deviation from that law. For the suppression of such an appetite always costs the subject sacrifice, therefore, has need of self compulsion, i.e., inner necessitation to that which one does not do gladly.  

17.11 To this level of moral disposition, however, creatures can never achieve.  

17.12 For since it is a creature which is always dependent with respect to what it requires for a complete satisfaction with its state, it can never be entirely freed from appetites and inclina-
tions, which, because they rest upon physical causes, do not of themselves accord with the moral law, which has entirely different sources. Accordingly and with regard to these it is always necessary to base the disposition of its maxims upon moral need, and not upon ready devotion; upon respect, which requires compliance with the law even if it occur reluctantly, and not upon love, which provides no inner refusal of the will against the law. But still it is necessary to transform this latter, namely the mere love towards the law (since it then would cease to be a command, and morality, which translates subjectively into holiness, would cease to be virtue) into the enduring, though unreachable, goals of his endeavor.  

17.13 For that which we estimate highly, but still balk at (due to the consciousness of our weak-
ness), changes with great ease into satisfaction, the awesome balking into affection, and respect into love. At least it would be the completion of a disposition dedicated to the law, if it were ever possible for a creature to reach it.  

* Kant's footnote:  
1.1 The principle of personal happiness, which some want to turn into the supreme principle of morality, makes a rare contrast with this law. The former would read: love yourself above all, but then God and your neighbor for the sake of yourself.  

18.1 This consideration here is not directed so much toward bringing the cited evangelical command to a distinct concept in order to preclude religious rhapsody with respect to the love of God, but rather toward immediately determining exactly even the moral disposition with respect to the duties toward humans and with avoiding (steuren) or, where possible, precluding a merely moral rhapsody, which infects many minds.  

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332 And this suggests the postulation of the soul to be covered below in the Dialectic.  

333 In Kant's Religion Within The Bounds Of Sheer Reason this holiness denotes the “Ideal” of the moral religion and is the goal which the human is obligated to approximate.
18.2 The moral rank, upon which the human (also every rational creature, according to our best insight) stands, is respect for the moral law.

18.3 The disposition, which obligates him to comply with this, calls for compliance for the sake of duty, and not per some voluntary inclination or in any case as an endeavor which were not commanded but rather were gladly undertaken of itself. And his moral state, in which he then can always find himself, is virtue, i.e., moral disposition in the struggle, and not holiness in the alleged possession of a complete purity of the disposition of the will.

18.4 It is sheer moral rhapsody and promotion of self-conceit, when through encouragement one determines temperaments to actions as noble, sublime and courageous, and anchors them in the delusion as though it were not duty, i.e., respect for the law, the yoke of which (which, nonetheless, is easy because reason itself lays it upon us), they would have to bear, even if reluctantly, and which makes up the determination basis of their actions, and which is always humiliating in that they comply with it (must obey it). And so instead of this yoke it would be as though those actions were expected from them, and so not out of duty, but rather for sheer merit.334

18.5 Through imitation of such deeds, i.e., from such principle, they have not only failed to do justice to the spirit of the law, which consists in the disposition subjugating itself to the law and not in the legality of the actions (the principle being what it will), and not only have they set the incentives pathologically (in sympathy or even philauty) rather than morally (in the law), but in this way they also produce a windy, soaring and fantastic manner of thinking in order to flatter themselves with a freely willed goodness of their minds, which has need neither of incentives nor reins, and for which no command is even needful. In this way they forget their obligation, which they were supposed to keep in mind rather than merit.335

18.6 Actions of others, which have occurred with great sacrifice and indeed merely for the sake of the law, are well praised under the name of noble and sublime deeds, but still also only to the extent traces are there, which allow them being supposed to have happened entirely from respect for their duty, not from ebullient hearts.

18.7 But if someone wants to represent them as examples for imitation, then the respect for duty (as the single, genuine moral feeling) must thoroughly be used as the incentive. It is

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334 As though we were so perfect that we had no need for respect for the law in order to do these noble things. And especially as though we did these noble actions in order to show off and shine, and not because we were obligated via duty.

335 These would seem to be people who have no need or interest in the moral law and rather act out of noble inclinations and even out of the pride that they are above the moral law.
that wondrous, holy precept, which does not permit our proud self-love to trifle with the pathological incentives (to the extent they are analogous to morality) and to pride ourselves on merit.\textsuperscript{336}

18.8 If we will only search well, we will find with a law of duty all praiseworthy actions, a law which commands and does not tolerate any dependence upon our liking, i.e., what might be pleasing to our inclination.\textsuperscript{337}

18.9 That is the single presentation manner which patterns the soul morally. For it alone is capable of fixed and precisely determined foundational propositions.

19.1 If fawning (\textit{Schwärmerei}) in the most comprehensive meaning is an overstepping of the limits of human reason undertaken according to foundational propositions, then moral fawning is this overstepping of the limits which practical pure reason imposes upon humanity, i.e., where it forbids the positioning of the subjective determination bases of duty-conformable actions, i.e., the moral incentives of those actions, anywhere else than in the respect for this law. In this way it commands the making of the thoughts of duty the supreme animating principle of all morality in humans, while likewise casting down all arrogance as well as vain self-love.

20.1 If that, therefore, is the case, then not only novelists or sensorial educators (even though they passionately disclaim against sentimentality), but occasionally even philosophers, indeed the most strict of all, the Stoics, have introduced moral fawning instead of sober, but wise discipline of morals, even if the fanaticism of the latter was of more heroic composition, while the former was insipid and soft. And in all truth and without exaggeration, one can say of the moral teaching of the Gospels: by means of the purity of the moral principles, but at the same time also through the commensurability of them with the limits of finite beings, it has subjected all beneficial conduct of the humans to the cultivation of a duty which is plain before their eyes, and which does not allow them to fantasize with morally dreamed perfections, and has placed limits of humility (i.e., of self recognition) on self-conceit as well as on self-love, both of which gladly mistake their boundaries.

21.1 Duty! Thou sublimely great name, that encompasses nothing endearing which entails flattery, but rather demands subjugation, but still also threatens nothing which arouses and terrorizes natural abhorrence in the mind in order to move the will, but rather erects

\textsuperscript{336} Thus a Christian, for example, would have to consider his good deeds as required by moral duty, even if that Christian is coming to love doing these deeds.

\textsuperscript{337} So we cannot do an action because it is noble and makes us think of ourselves as noble as the knights of old. We must recognize our obligation to the law and where there is no option but compliance.
merely a law, which finds entrance into the mind of itself and still acquires reverence even against the will (though not always compliance); and before which all inclinations are dumb, even if they secretly work against it! What is Thy worthy origin and where does one find the roots of Thy noble descent, which proudly cast out all kinship with inclinations? And from what root is the unavoidable condition of the value of that to be derived, which humans alone can give themselves?  

22.1 It can be nothing less than what exalts the human beyond himself (as a part of the sense world), and what ties him to an order of things, which only the understanding can think and which simultaneously subjugates under itself the entire world of sense, and with it the empirically determinable existence of the human in time and the whole of all purposes (which alone is commensurate to such unconditional practical laws as the moral).

22.2 It is nothing else than the personality, i.e., freedom and independence from the mechanism of all of nature, and yet at the same time considered as a capacity of a being, which is subjected to peculiar, pure practical laws, which are peculiar in that they are obtained from his own reason. It is therefore the person, as belonging to the sense world, subjected to his own personality, to the extent it belongs simultaneous to the intelligible world. For then it is no surprise if the human, as belonging to both worlds, must consider his own being in reference to his second and highest determination not otherwise than with veneration and the law of that with the highest respect.

23.1 Now on this source are based many expressions, which indicate the value of the objects according to moral Ideas.

23.2 The moral law is holy (inviolable).

23.3 The human is indeed unholy enough, but the humanity in his person must be holy to him.

23.4 In all of creation everything, which one wants and by means of which one empowers something, can also be used merely as means. The human alone, and with him every rational creature, is a purpose on his own.

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338 It is only by means of the standard of nobility arising from the moral law that we are able to find anything about the human to be proud of and worth looking up to. So the conception of the nobel arises from the moral law.

339 According to Kant then personality is freedom from the laws of nature and subjugation to laws of freedom which, interestingly enough, are not obtained externally, but which are conceived of and issued autonomously by the individual.
23.5 Namely by means of the autonomy of his freedom, the human is the subject of the moral law, which is holy.

23.6 Precisely for this reason, every will, even the will of each person directed toward himself, is restricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of the rational being, namely to subject the rational being to no intention, which is not possible according to a law, which could arise out of the will of the passive subject himself. Therefore he is not to use this being merely as means, but rather simultaneously itself as purpose.\textsuperscript{340}

23.7 This condition we properly attribute even to the divine will with respect to rational beings in the world as his creatures, in that this condition rests upon their personality, through which alone they are purposes on their own.\textsuperscript{341}

24.1 This respect-awaking Idea of personality, which the sublimity of our nature (with respect to its determination) places before our eyes by enabling us to simultaneously take note of the deficiency of the commensurability of our conduct with respect to that, and in that way casts down egotism,\textsuperscript{342} is itself natural and easily notable to the most common human understanding.

24.2 Has not every one occasionally found a reasonably honest man who refrained from an otherwise harmless lie, by which he could either remove himself from a vexing situation, or even in fact to procure advantage to an endeared and well-deserved friend; and who acts so merely to avoid secretly despising himself in his own eyes?

24.3 Consider a righteous man in the greatest misfortune of life which he could avoid if he were only able to get beyond troubling himself about duty. Is he not still held upright by the consciousness that he still preserved and revered the humanity of his person in its dignity, and that he not have cause to be ashamed to himself or to shun the inner look of the self examination?

24.4 This comfort is neither happiness nor the least part of it.

24.5 No one will wish the occasion for such comfort, perhaps not even wish a life in such circumstances.

\textsuperscript{340} This harkens back to the requirement to universalize one’s maxims and to make them into laws which would be all rational beings would also be able, and even required, to do.

\textsuperscript{341} Thus God can only relate to humans (and all rational beings) as ends in themselves and never simply as means.

\textsuperscript{342} A person of great achievement who is conscious of having violated the moral law is not able to be proud of himself.
But he lives and cannot endure being unworthy of life in his own eyes.

This inner contentment is therefore merely negative with respect to all that may make life agreeable. It is namely the restraint of the danger of sinking in personal worth, after his state is already entirely given up.

It is the effect of a respect for something entirely different from life, in comparison with, and contra-distinction to, which a life with all its comforts has no worth at all.

He only lives out of duty, and not because he find the least relish in life.

In this way then the genuine incentive of pure practical reason is composed. It is none other than the pure moral law itself, to the extent it allows us to trace the sublimity of our own super-sensitive existence. And in humans, who are conscious simultaneously of their sensitive existence and the dependence connected to that from their so far very pathologically affected nature, this law subjectively effects respect for their higher determination.

Now so much excitement and agreeableness of life can be connected with this incentive that even for no other reason the most prudent Epicurean, rationally considering the greatest weal of life, would opt for the morally good conduct. And it can even be advisable to connect this outlook toward a joyful delight of life with that supreme and, already for itself alone, sufficiently determining motive cause. But this is to be done only to hold counterweight to the allurements, which are not lacking in enhancing the vice for the other side, and not as though in this way to supplement the actual moving force, not in the least, if the discussion is of duty.

For that would essentially be wanting to contaminate the moral disposition at its source.

The reverence of duty has nothing to do in procuring delights for life. It has its peculiar law, also its peculiar court, and even if someone wanted to thoroughly shake them together in order to provide them homogenized, as it were, like a medicine for the sick soul, they would still separate from each other. And if they did not, then duty would not work at all. But even if the physical life were to win some force in this way, the moral would vanish beyond any rescue.

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Respect is sufficient for the determination of the will, and the joy which Epicurus associates with that moral living does not enhance the power and moving force.

And precisely this contamination is what I think Stephen Uhl has done in his *Golden Rule of Enlightened Selfishness*. Here the moral law (expressed as the Golden Rule) is made a function of personal well being.
Critical Illumination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason

1.1 With the critical illumination of a science (or of a section of that science which constitutes a system of itself) I mean the examination and justification as to why it would have to have just this, and no other, systematic form when we compare it to another system which has a similar recognition capacity as its basis.

1.2 Now practical reason has the identical recognition capacity as its basis as does speculative reason, to the extent that both are pure reason.

1.3 Therefore the distinction in the systematic form of the one will have to be determined through a comparison of both, and the reason for that distinction given.

2.1 The analytic of pure theoretical reason has to do with the recognition of objects which may be given to the understanding, and so for that reason had to start with the perspective, and thus (because this is always sensitive) with the sensitivity, and only then to advance to concepts (of the objects of this perspective) and was allowed to end only after premising foundational principles for both.\textsuperscript{345}

2.2 On the other hand since practical reason is not concerned with objects in order to recognize them, but rather with its own capacity for making those objects actual (conformable to their recognition), i.e., with a will [which is a causality, to the extent reason contains the determination basis of that causality],

and since, therefore, it has no need to render an object of perspective, but rather, as practical reason, only a law of reason (because the concept of causality always contains a referral to a law, which determines the existence of the manifold in relation one to the another),

it follows that a critique of the analytic of practical reason, to the extent it is to be practical reason (which is the actual task), must start a priori from the possibility of practical foundational principles.

2.3 Only from there could it advance to concepts of the objects of practical reason, namely those of the utterly good and evil, in order first to render these in conformity with those principles (for through no recognitional capacity whatsoever could good and evil be given before these principles). And only then could the last section, namely that of the relation-

\textsuperscript{345} This may mean that we begin with sightings which prompt our understanding to make connections, etc. Then we go back and look at the principles underlying that understanding such that the understanding comes to the concepts and with the objects of sightings to the recognitions that it does.
ship of pure practical reason to the sensitivity and of its influence on the sensitivity (which must necessarily be recognized a priori), i.e., moral feelings, conclude that part.346

2.4 So then the analytic of practical pure reason, quite analogously with the theoretical, divided the entire scope of all conditions of its use, but in reverse order.347

2.5 The analytic of the theoretical pure reason was divided into transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic, while that of the practical, in a diametric contrast, was divided into a logic and an aesthetic of pure practical reason (“aesthetic” actually being an ill suited term which I use merely for the sake of analogy). Then the logic of the former was divided into the analytic of concepts and that of principles, but that of the latter into those of principles and concepts.348

2.6 Moreover while in the former the aesthetic comprised two parts, due to the two-fold way of sensitive perspective [time and space], here the sensitive was not considered as a perspective capacity at all, but rather merely as feeling (which can be a subjective basis of desiring), and with respect to which, provides no further division for pure practical reason.349

3.1 It will also be easy to see why a division into two parts with their subdivision was not made here (as one at first would likely have been erroneously led to attempt due to the example of the former).

3.2 For since it is pure reason which is considered here in its practical usage, proceeding therefore from principles a priori and not from empirical determination principles, the di-

346 This then gives us the outline of the first half of this book, namely first we have the principles of actions which are expressed in terms of laws; and then we are able to go to the objects of good and evil, and from this we come to the application of practical reason to sensitivity and finally to that of the influence of the practical on the sensitivity, i.e., the moral feelings.

347 In pure, theoretical reason, the perspective prompted the understanding into play and specifically in order to find the necessity for the perspective and to apply the principles of understanding. But here in practical reason, since the objects are really only intellectual, i.e., good and evil, and have to do only with the understanding, reason precedes and then descends to the sensitive in a subsequent effort to make the objects of good and evil actual.

348 In the theoretical study we begin with sightings/perspectives and then conceive of objects for the appearances of the perspective to represent and finally utilize the principles of understanding to recognize the objects. In the practical we begin with principles for laws and then come to deal with objects (which are effects that are possible via freedom) and finally end with the sensitivity and how we relate to these objects via the moral feeling of respect.

349 And this feeling of respect arises in the human only in response to the concept of the moral law, and thus was called not pathological but rather entirely practical. It is a feeling, but it can only arise by the prompt of the conception of the moral law.
vision of the analytic of pure practical reason will have to divide in a similar way to that
of a syllogism, namely advancing from universals in the major premise (the moral princi-
ple) through a subsumption of possible actions taken in the minor premise (as good and
evil) under it and on to the conclusion, namely: the subjective determination of the will
(an interest in the practically possible good and in the maxims based on that).

3.3 To those who have been able to convince themselves of the principle arising in the ana-
lytic, such comparisons will be delightful. For they rightly occasion the expectation of
being able perhaps finally to bring it all to the insight of a unity of the entire, pure, ra-
tional capacity (of the theoretical and well as practical) and to derive everything from a
single principle. And this is the unavoidable need of human reason, which finds full satis-
faction only in a complete, systematic unity of its recognitions.

4.1 But if we now consider also the content of the recognition which we can have from pure
practical reason and through that, as its analytic establishes, then along with a remarkable
analogy between it and the theoretical we find distinctions which are no less remarkable.

4.2 With respect to the theoretical the capacity of a recognition of pure reason could be quite
easily and plainly proven a priori through examples from sciences (with which, since they
methodically test their principles in so many diverse ways, there is not as much concern
for unsuspected admixture of empirical determination bases as in more ordinary modes of
knowledge).

4.3 But that pure reason also of itself alone be practical, without admixture of any sort of an
empirical determination basis, called for an establishment from the more common practi-
cal rational usage, in that one certified the supreme practical principle as such which
every natural human rationality recognized entirely a priori (dependent upon no sensitive
data) as the supreme law of his will.  

4.4 With respect to the purity of its origin, we first had to defend and justify it even in the
judgment of this common reason before science were able to take it in hand in order to
make use of it as a fact, as it were, which precedes all rational contriving about its possi-
bility and all consequences which might be derivable from it.

4.5 But this brief mention above does permit of a ready explanation of this circumstance,
namely: because practical, pure reason must necessarily begin from principles which
therefore would have to be laid as the basis to every science as the first data and cannot
first arise from it.

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350 This should pertain to the law for the universalizing of one’s maxims which should be identical with all
people.

351 By showing that pure reason is practical in fact, there was no need to delve into its possibility.
4.6 This justification of the moral principles as foundational propositions of a pure reason could, however, also for that reason be conducted quite well and with sufficient security through the mere appeal to the judgment of common human understanding, because everything empirical, which might enter clandestinely as a determination basis of the will in our maxims, makes itself immediately discernible through the feeling of the pleasure or pain which, to the extent it excites appetite, necessarily adheres to it, but which [feeling] this pure practical reason opposes directly and resists taking it up into its principle as a condition.

4.7 Through this reluctance of a practically legislating reason against every admixing inclination and by means of a peculiar manner of sensation, but which does not precede before the legislation of practical reason, but far rather becomes effected through that alone and instead as a compulsion, namely through the feeling of a respect, which no human has as inclinations, be what sort they will, but very much as law, the dissimilarity of the determination bases (of the empirical and rational) becomes made so familiar and so elevated and prominent, that everyone, even the most common human understanding, was to be aware in an instant from an example laid out to him that through empirical basis of the wanting he could become advised indeed to follow its allurements, but never to be imposed upon to obey another command except solely the pure practical rational law.\textsuperscript{352}

5.1 Now in the analytic of pure practical reason the distinction of the doctrine of happiness from that moral doctrine--where in the first empirical principles make up the entire foundation, but in the second not even the least element of that--is the first and most important of its obligatory occupations. Indeed here it must proceed just as punctually, indeed it could even be said, as painfully, as the geometer does in his occupation.

5.2 But it still proves useful to the philosopher who here (as always regarding rational recognition through mere concepts, and without constructing them) has to struggle with great difficulty, because he can lay no perspective (to a pure noumena) as basis, that he, almost as the chemist, can employ at all times an experiment with every human's practical reason in order to distinguish the morally (pure) determination basis from the empirical. To this end, namely to the empirically affected will (e.g., someone who gladly lies because he can acquire something in that way) he adds the moral law (as determination basis).

5.3 It is as though the chemist adds alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric acid. The acid immediately separates from the lime, unites with the alkali, and plunges to the bottom.

\textsuperscript{352} Everyone can easily discern the difference between the recommendations of the empirically conditioned inclinations and the rigid demands of the moral law. The former advises while the latter commands.
5.4 Just so, hold up the moral law to an upright man (or someone who sets himself in the place of an upright man in a thought experiment) by means of which he recognizes the worthlessness of a liar. Immediate his practical reason (in the judgment about what was suppose to happen by him) abandons the advantage of the lie, unites itself with what preserves to him the respect for his own person (of truthfulness) and the advantage now becomes weighed by everyone, after he has separated and cleansed reason (which is entirely on the side of duty) from all attachment in order to be well connected with reason in other cases, only not where it could be counter to the moral law, which reason never abandons, but rather intimately unites itself with that law.

6.1 But this distinction between the principle of happiness and that of morality is not for that reason the direct opposition of the two. For pure practical reason does not require any one to give up the claim to happiness, but rather only, as soon as the discussion is about duty, to have utterly no regard for that happiness.

6.2 In fact, in one regard, it can even be a duty to be concerned about one’s happiness, partly because happiness (and here belong also skillfulness, health, riches) contains means for the fulfillment of one’s duty, and partly because the lack of that (e.g., poverty) prompts temptations to transgress one’s duty.

6.3 Now to promote one's happiness can never be an immediate duty, much less a principle of every duty.

6.4 Now since all determination foundations of the will, apart from the single, pure practical rational law (the moral one), are altogether empirical and therefore belong to the principle of happiness, they must be totally isolated from the supreme moral foundational principle and never wedded to it as a condition. Indeed this would void all moral value just as much as empirical admixture to geometric principles would undermine all mathematical evidence, the most splendid which (according to Plato’s judgment) mathematics has on its own and which precedes even all its utility.

7.1 But instead of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure practical reason, i.e., the explanation of the possibility of such a recognition a priori, nothing further could be introduced except this: if we penetrated the possibility of the freedom of an effective cause, we

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353 These talents can be useful in our duties to ourselves and others, making us better able to help others.

354 This is like a policing of ourselves, to make sure that we are not so sorrowful that we are tempted to violate our duty. This also suggests a duty to postulate the highest good, to be discussed subsequently.

355 Ultimately there is a sharp difference between happiness and duty, and duty is supreme over every inclination whatsoever.
could penetrate not only just the possibility, but rather even the necessity, of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom one attributes freedom to the causality of their will. The reason for this is that both concepts are so inseparably connected, that one could also define practical freedom as independence of the will from any law except the moral law alone.\footnote{356}

7.2 However the freedom of an effecting cause, especially in the sense world, can in no way be penetrated with respect to its possibility. Fortunately, if we were merely sufficiently assured that there were no proof of its impossibility, then it would be necessitated through the moral law which postulates freedom, and for precisely that reason also be justified in assuming it.\footnote{357}

7.3 Meanwhile there are many who still believe they can explain this freedom according to empirical principles just like every other natural capacity, and consider it as a psychological property (whose explanation depends solely upon a more exact investigation of the nature of the soul and of the incentives of the will), and not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a being, which belongs to the sense world (on which it still actually depends alone). Accordingly they presume to cancel the splendid preview, which befalls us through pure practical reason by means of the moral law, namely the preview to an intelligible world through the recognition of the otherwise transcendental concept of freedom and with this also the moral law itself, which in no way assumes the least empirical determination basis. For this reason it will be needful yet here to introduce something to shield us against this illusion and to present empiricism in its thorough superficiality.

8.1 The concept of causality as natural necessity in contrast to that of freedom touches only the existence of the things to the extent that existence is determinable in time, consequently as appearances in contrast to their causality as things on their own.

8.2 Now if we take the determinations of the existence of things in time for determinations of things on their own (which is the most common way of representing things), then the necessity in a causal relationship cannot in any way be united with freedom. On the contrary, they are placed in contradictory opposition to one another.\footnote{358}

\footnote{356}{It is by means of the moral law, considered as binding on the individual, that we can express practical freedom, i.e., independence from the laws of nature.}

\footnote{357}{And this is precisely the situation with reason. For in the Third Antinomy of the CPR we found that while freedom could not be proven, it could still be asserted as compatible with natural necessity, by simply considering the individual in two different respects, i.e., an as object of experience (with natural necessity) and then as a thing on his own (with freedom).}

\footnote{358}{This dichotomy was presented formally and exposed in the treatment of the Third Antinomy.}

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8.3 For it follows from the former that each and every event, and consequently also every action, which takes place in a point of time, is necessarily subject to the condition of that which was in the preceding time.

8.4 Now since the past time is no longer in my control, so every action, which I undertake, must be necessary by virtue of determination foundations which are not under my control, i.e., at the moment when I act I am never free.

8.5 In fact, even if I assume my entire existence to be independent from any sort of a foreign cause (perchance of God) such that the determination foundations of my causality, indeed my entire existence, were not at all apart from me, even this would not in any way transform that necessity of nature into freedom.

8.6 For in that moment I will always be subject to the necessity of being determined with regard to my actions by what is not under my control, and the \textit{a parte priori} infinite series of events, which I would always advance only according to an already previously determined order, would never begin of itself if it were a constant chain of nature, and if my causality, therefore, were never freedom.

9.1 Therefore, if we wish to attribute freedom to any being whose existence is determined in time, we cannot exempt it, at least to this extent, from the law of natural necessity of all events in his existence, thus also of his actions. For that would be the same as turning it over to blind chance.

9.2 But since this law concerns unavoidably all causality of things, to the extent their existence is determinable in time, and so if this were the manner with which one had to represent to himself also the existence of these things on their own, freedom would have to be rejected as an inane and impossible concept.

9.3 Consequently, if we still wish to rescue freedom, then there is no way other than attributing the existence of a thing, to the extent it is determinable in time, consequently also the causality with respect to the laws of nature necessity, merely to the appearance, but freedom to that very same being as a thing on its own.

9.4 So in any case this is unavoidable, if we wish to maintain both opposing concepts simultaneously. However in the application, if we unite them in one and the same action, and therefore will even explain this unity, still we will encounter great difficulties which seem to make such a unity unfeasible.

10.1 If I say of a person who committed a theft: “this deed is a necessary succession according to the natural law of causality out of the determination bases of the preceding time,” then
it would be impossible for it to have been avoided. How then can the estimation according to the moral law in this case make and presuppose a change, that still it could have been avoided because the law says that it should have been avoided? In other words, how can that person be called entirely free in the same time point with intention to the same action, in which and in the same intention that he still stands under an unavoidable nature necessity?

10.2 Some see a refuge by adopting merely the manner of the determination basis of his causality with respect to the natural law to a comparative concept of freedom (according to which that is occasionally called free effect, where the determining nature basis lies within the effecting being, e.g., that which a thrown body performs if it is in free flight, since one needs the word ‘freedom’ because it, during the actual flight, is not driven externally, or, as to term the motion of a clock also a free motion because it drives its indicator itself, which therefore does not need to become pushed externally, just so do we term the actions of humans yet free--even though they are necessary through their determination bases, which precede in time--because still they are inner representations, produced through our own powers, by means of which desires are generated, according to occasioning circumstances, and thus actions are affected according to our own endearments). But it is a pitiful aid to which some yet also hold themselves and in this way mean to have solved that difficult problem with a little verbalization, on whose solution millennium have been expended in vain, which therefore could hardly have become found so entirely on the surface.

10.3 With the question concerning that freedom which must be laid as basis to all moral laws and the accountability conformable to them, it does not matter whether the causality, determined according to a law of nature, be necessary through determination bases which lie within the subject or apart from him, nor in the first case whether it be necessary through instinct or the cited determination bases with reason. If these determining representations, according to the admission of these very men themselves, still have the basis of their existence in time and indeed in the preceding state, but this in turn in a preceding one, etc., such that these determinations may very well be inward and have psychological and not mechanical causality, i.e., produce action through representations and not through corporeal movement, still they are always determination bases of the causality of a being to the extent his existence is determinable in time, thus under necessitating conditions of the preceding time, which, therefore, if the subject is supposed to act, are no longer under his control, which, therefore, indeed denotes psychological freedom (if one will truly use this word of a merely inwardly connection of the representations of the soul), but still natural necessity. Accordingly no transcendental freedom remains, which as such must be thought as independence from all empiricism and, therefore, also independence from nature in general. So it does not matter whether this being be considered as an object of the inner sense merely in time, or even of the outer sense in space and time simultaneously, for without this freedom (in the latter, actual meaning), which alone is practically a priori, no moral law and no accountability according to that is possible.
Precisely for that reason, we can also term all necessity of the events in time with respect to the natural law of causality the mechanism of nature, even though we do not understand with that that things, which are subjected to it, would actually have to be material machines.

Here we look only to the necessity of the connection of the events in a time series, so as it develops itself according to the natural law, whether we now term the subject in which this course happens automaton materiale, since it becomes driven through matter, or with Leibniz, spirituale, since it is driven through representations. And if the freedom of our will were nothing other than the latter (per chance psychological and comparative, not simultaneously transcendental, i.e., absolute), then it would basically be nothing better than the freedom of a roasting spit, which also, if it once becomes wound up, performs its motion of itself.

In order now to remove the apparent contradiction between the mechanism of nature and freedom in one and the same action in the case before us, we must remember what was said in the critique of pure reason or which follows from it: that the necessity of nature, which cannot exist together with the freedom of the subject, adheres merely to the determinations of whatever stands under temporal determinations, consequently only to those [determinations] of the acting subject as appearances, and therefore to the extent the determination bases of each and every action of that acting subject lie in that which belongs to the past time and is no longer under his control (to which also his already committed deeds and the character determinable to him through them must become counted in his own eyes as a phenomenon).  

But just as the same subject, which on the other side is also consciousness of himself as a thing on his own, also considers his existence this far as not standing under time determinations, and considers himself as only determinable through laws which he gives himself through reason alone, and in this his existence nothing is precedent before his will determination, but rather every action and in general every alternating determination of his existence, conformable to the inner sense, even the entire sequence of his existence as sense being, is in the consciousness of his intelligible existence nothing except consequence, but never to be viewed as determination basis of his causality as noumen.

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This character is a product of science in determining how the person will react to circumstances, and it is called the empirical character.

By utilizing laws for his conduct, the person as a thing on his own would indeed engage in certain actions when the opportunity should arise in time, but the action would still be determined by the law and not by the conditions of time.
11.3 Now in this consideration, the rational being can properly say of each and every illegal action, which it commits, even though it is sufficiently determined and to this extent unavoidably necessary as appearance in the past, that “he could have avoided it”. For with every past, which it determines, it belongs to a single phenomenon of his character which he supplies to himself and according to which he, as a cause and independent of all sensitivity, reckons to himself the causality of that appearance itself.\textsuperscript{361}

12.1 With this the judiciary pronouncements of that wonderful capacity within us, which we call conscience, also agrees perfectly.

12.2 A person may contrive as much as he wishes in order to camouflage to himself an illegal deportment which he remembers as an unintentional mistake or as mere carelessness, which can never be entirely avoided (consequently as something where he were carried away by the stream of the necessity of nature) and to explain himself as guiltless regarding that wrong. Nevertheless he finds that the advocate which speaks to his advantage is in no way able to silence the plaintiff within him if he is consciousness of having being in his right mind, i.e., in the use of his freedom, at the time he committed the wrong. And even though he explains his transgression to himself as based on certain ill habits, developed through gradual negligence of attention, to the degree that he can consider it as a natural consequence of that, still this does not secure himself against the self blame and the reprimand which he makes to himself.\textsuperscript{362}

12.3 On this is the regret about a deed of long ago based with every remembrance of it. It is a painful sensation, effected through a moral disposition which practically speaking is entirely idle, for it cannot serve in making what happened unhappen and would even be absurd (as even Priestly, as a genuine, consistently remaining fatalist explains this regret, and in respect of whose candor he deserves more acclaim than those who, asserting the mechanism of the will in fact, and freedom only with words, yet always want to be held as encompassing that in their syncretistic system, but still not making the possibility of such an assignment comprehensible). But as a pain this regret is still entirely justified because reason, if it depends upon the law of our intelligible existence (the moral), acknowledges no time distinction and only inquires as to whether the event does in fact be-

\textsuperscript{361} This empirical character of its illegal inclinations and actions is seen then as the appearance of the thing on its own, i.e., as an example of his free choice.

\textsuperscript{362} And so even as he can see his past as a consequence, he is still able to recognize that he made free choices throughout, and did not have to choose as he did.
long to me, and morally always connects the same sensation with that whether it occur now or have occurred long ago.  

12.4 For with respect to the intelligible consciousness of one’s existence (of freedom), the life of sense has absolute unity of a phenomenon which, to the extent it contains merely appearances of the disposition which concerns the moral law (of the character), must not be judged according to the necessity of nature, which befits an appearance, but rather according to the absolute spontaneity of freedom.  

12.5 Therefore we can admit that if it were possible for us to have such a deep insight into the thinking manner of a human as is indicated through inner as well as outer actions and such that every incentive of that person, even the least, were known to us, as well as all outward occasions affecting these, one could calculate the conduct of a human in the future with the same accuracy of even a lunar or solar eclipse, and still assert with all that that the human be free.  

12.6 If namely we were capable of another way of looking (but with which, of course, we are not endowed at all, and rather in the place of which we have only the rational concept), i.e., if we possessed an intellectual perspective of this same subject, we would still be aware that this entire chain of appearances, with respect to what can only touch the moral law, depends upon the spontaneity of the subject as a thing on its own, of whose determination no physical explanation can be given at all.  

12.7 At the lack of such a perspective, the moral law assures us of this distinction between the referral of our actions as appearances upon the sense being of our subject on the one hand, and that, according to which this sense being itself becomes referred to the intelligible substratum within us, on the other.--

363 This pain can arise only the recognition of my own freedom at the time of some action. It can't make what has happened to be unhappened, but it is a deserved pain as a punishment, as it means that I count myself as a free being in all of my existence. And it is just as painful upon remembrance regardless of how long ago the action.  

364 We can see the empirical character, considered to be the “thing on its own” by science, is actually to be considered as an appearance of the intelligible character, the actual thing on its own, the free thing on is own, the person conscious to himself of his freedom in making choices.  

365 This essentially equates the knowledge of God, as is usually understood, with the prefect knowledge of science, for in both cases the individual would be totally understood, and predictions could be made without any risk of error.  

366 If we could look at the subject intellectually instead of sensitively, we would see that all appearances (events) which are related to the moral law would be acts of freedom by the subject.
12.8 Regarding this, which is natural though inexplicable to our reason, judgments are justified which, while pleasing in complete conscientiousness, still seem at face value to be entirely unreasonable.

12.9 There are cases where humans from childhood on, even with an upbringing similar to that which was beneficial to others, will show malice so early and which continues into adulthood that one holds them to have been born villainous and, regarding their manner of thinking, as thoroughly incorrigible. But nevertheless one still judges them regarding their commissions and omissions, and reproves them as guilty for their crimes. Indeed they (as children) even find this reproof so entirely warranted as though they, regardless of the natural composition of their minds which is hopelessly imputed to them, remained just as responsible as any other human.

12.10 This could not occur if we did not presuppose that everything arising from such a person’s choice (as every deliberate action certainly does) has a free causality as its foundation, which manifests its character in its appearances (the actions) from early youth on and which, due to the uniformity of conduct, makes a coherent nature discernible. But this does not necessitate the roguish constitution of the will, but far rather is the consequence of the freely accepted evil and immutable foundational principles which only make it all the more worthy of blame and punishment.367

13.1 But freedom still confronts a difficulty to the extent it is supposed to be united with mechanisms of nature in a being which belongs to the sense world.

13.2 This is a difficulty which, even after assent is given to all of the preceding, still threatens freedom with complete ruin.

13.3 But with this danger there is a circumstance, and likewise a hope, for a fortunate way out which agrees with the assertion of freedom, namely that the same difficulty presses even stronger (indeed actually alone, as we will soon see) against the system in which the existence, which is determinable in time and space, is held for the existence of things on their own. Accordingly this difficulty does not necessitate us to give up our most distinguished presupposition of the Ideality of time as a mere form of sensitive perspective, thus as merely a representational manner which attaches inherently to the subject as belonging to the sense world, and therefore only requires it [the Ideality of time] to be united with this Idea.

367 The empirical character which is revealed through actions is then seen as a consequence of the intelligible character and so where the judgment holds as valid.
14.1 Someone may admit to us that the intelligible subject can still be free with respect to a given action, although as a subject also belonging to the sense world it is mechanically conditioned with respect to that same action. But still, as soon as we assume God as the universal, original being to be cause also of the existence of substance (a proposition, which may never be given up without at the same time giving up the concept of God as Being of All Being and with that his All-sufficiency, to which everything in theology depends), it seems that we would also have to admit that the actions of a human have in that [substance] also their determining foundation which is entirely apart from their control, namely in the causality of a being distinguished from that human, upon which foundation the existence of the human and the entire determination of his causality depends entirely.368

14.2 Indeed if the actions of the human, just as they belong to his determination in time, were not merely determinations of him as appearance, but rather as a thing on its own, freedom could not be salvaged.

14.3 The human would be a marionette or a vaucanson automaton, housed and wound up by the supreme master of all art works. And the consciousness of self would indeed make it into a thinking automaton, but in which the consciousness of its spontaneity, if it were held for freedom, would be a mere delusion, for it could only deserve such a denomination in a comparative sense. And this would be the case because the nearest determining causes of his motion and a long series of those causes would indeed be internal up to their determining cause, while still the last and highest cause would be found entirely in a foreign hand.369

14.4 Hence I do not foresee how those, who still always insist upon perspective time and space as determinations pertaining to the existence of things on their own, want to avoid here the fatality of the actions. Or, if they straightforwardly admit (as did the otherwise acute Mendelssohn) that both space and time are only conditions belonging necessarily to the existence of finite and derived beings, but not to that of the infinite source being, how can they want to justify themselves as the source of this authority to make such a distinction.370 In fact how do they even want to evade the contradiction which they make if they consider the existence in time as a determination attaching necessarily to the finite things on their own, since God is the cause of this existence, but he still cannot himself be the cause of time (or of space) (because this must be presupposed as a necessary condition a priori to the existence of things)? Consequently God’s causality must be conditioned

368 Here we will be examining the concept of a thing on its own which were conditioned by the dimension of time, and in which case such a being could never be counted as free.

369 Such a automaton could mistake his spontaneity for freedom, but which would be an illusion, for every thing would be determined by his original makeup conveyed by God.

370 If time and space are the conditions for any finite and derived beings, how can any one think to exclude also the original being from this same condition of existence?
with respect to the existence of these things even according to time, and now accordingly all the contradictions against the concept of his infinitude and independence must unavoidably enter.\textsuperscript{371}

14.5 On the other hand, it is quite easy for us to distinguish the determination of the divine existence, as independent from all conditions of time, from the determination of a being of the sense world, just as we can distinguish the existence of a being on its own from that of a thing in the appearance.

14.6 Hence if one does not assume the Ideality of time and space, Spinozism alone remains, according to which space and time are essential determinations of the source being itself, but where the things dependent on him (therefore even ourselves) are not substances, but rather merely accidents inhering in him. And the reason for this is because if these things exist merely as his effects in time, which were the condition of their existence on their own, the actions of this being would also have to be merely actions of the source being, which he executes somewhere and sometime.\textsuperscript{372}

14.7 Hence Spinozism, despite the absurdity of its fundamental Idea, still concludes far more easily than can happen according to the creation theory if the entities, assumed as substances and existing on their own in time, are viewed as effects of a supreme cause but are still not simultaneously belonging to him and his actions, but rather as substances for themselves.

15.1 The solution of the difficulty cited above happens quickly and revealingly in the following way: if existence in time is merely a sensitive representational manner belonging to thinking beings in the world, and does not concern them as things on their own, then the creation of these beings is a creation of things on their own, because the concept of a creation does not belong to the sensitive representational manner of existence and to causality, but rather can be referred only to noumenon.

15.2 Consequently, if I say of beings in the sense world that they are created, then to this extent I consider them as noumenon.

15.3 Therefore, just as it would be a contradiction to say that God were a creator of appearances, it is also a contradiction to say that God, as creator, is the cause of the actions in

\textsuperscript{371} According to this thinking God’s omnipotence would be limited and curtailed by the independent existence of time (as also space) as a condition of any existence whatsoever.

\textsuperscript{372} According to Spinoza then time and space are the forms of God’s existence and we are not substances but only ways in which this God acts.
the sense world, thus as appearances, even if he is cause of the existence of the acting entities (as noumenon).373

15.4 Now if we assume the existence in time only as something which holds merely of appearances and not for things on their own, is it possible to assert freedom without prejudice to the mechanism of nature of the actions as appearances? If so then that the acting beings are creatures cannot make the least difference here, because the creation concerns their intelligible, but not their sensible, existence and therefore cannot be viewed as a determination basis of the appearances. This, however, would come out entirely different if the beings of the world existed in time as things on their own. For then the creator of the substance would simultaneously be the originator of the entire machine composition to this substance.

16.1 Of such great importance is the disassociation of time (as well as space) from the existence of things on their own, and which was established in the critique of pure speculative reason.374

17.1 But the solution of the difficulty presented here, one will say, still has such difficulty within itself and is hardly receptive to a clear description.

17.2 But then is any other, which one has attempted or may attempt, easier or more embraceable?

17.3 One might sooner say the dogmatic teachers of metaphysics had proven more their wiles than propriety by bringing this ponderous point as far as possible out of view in the hope that if they did not talk about it at all, then surely no one would happen to think of it.

17.4 If a science is supposed to be helped, then all difficulties must be discovered. And this even includes the seeking out of those difficulties which lie very secretly in its way. For each of these will call for an assistance which cannot be provided except by supplying the science with growth, be it in scope or in a determination. Accordingly, therefore, even the obstacles become promotional means for the thoroughness of the science.

17.5 On the other hand, if the difficulties become intentionally concealed or removed merely through palliative means, then they break out sooner or later in an incurable sickness, which leads the science to destruction and total skepticism.

373 God then would be the creator of me as a thing on my own, but God would not be the creator of my appearances, including therefore my actions as appearances.

374 Time and space are merely the forms of all our looking within the brainarium, and have no existence apart from our looking and hence apart from the brainarium.
18.1 Since it is actually the concept of freedom which alone among all Ideas of pure speculative reason procures such a great expansion in the field of the supersensitive, even if only with respect to practical recognition, I must ask, “whence has then arisen such a great fruitfulness exclusively to its lot, while the other Ideas can indicate indeed the empty position for pure possible understanding beings, but can in no way determine their concept?”

18.2 I soon comprehend that since I can think nothing without the category, these would have to first be sought also in the Idea of reason concerning freedom, with which I occupy myself, which is here the category of causality. Furthermore, even if no corresponding perspective can be underlaid to the rational concept of freedom as an extravagant concept, still a sensitive perspective would have to be given to the understanding concept (of causality), for which synthesis this requires the unconditioned, by means of which the objective reality first becomes secured to it.

18.3 Now all categories are partitioned into two classes: the mathematical, which go merely to the unity of the synthesis in the representation of the objects, and the dynamical, going to that unity in the representation of the existence of the objects.

18.4 The first ones (that of magnitude and quality) always contain a synthesis of the homogeneous, in which the unconditioned to the condition, given in the sensitive perspective, in space and time, since it in turn itself would have to belong to space and time and therefore conditioned in turn, cannot be found at all. Hence in the dialectic of pure theoretical reason, the types set counter to one another in seeking the unconditioned and the totality of the conditions for it, were both false.

18.5 The categories of the second class (that of causality and the necessity of a thing) did not at all required this homogeneity (of the conditioned and the condition to the synthesis), because here the perspective was not supposed to be represented with regard to how it is assembled from a manifold within it, but rather only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding to it could come additively to the existence of the condition (in the understanding as connected with it). And here we were permitted to place the thorough conditioned within the sense world (with respect to the causality as well as of the contingent existence of the things themselves), but the unconditioned--albeit, by the way, undetermined--within the intelligible world and to make the synthesis transcendent. Hence then also in the dialectic of pure speculative reason it was found that both manners--apparently opposed to one another--for finding the unconditioned to the

375 In other words, how is it that pure speculative reason is able to conceive of and include freedom, but only as a possibility, while in pure practical reason we are able to assert the reality of our freedom? And how is that we are unable to do this regarding the soul and God?
conditioned--e.g., in the synthesis of the causes and effects of the sense world--the causality which is no longer sensitively conditioned, i.e., is mechanically necessary, still simultaneously also can have as basis to the causality of the acting being, to the extent it pertains to the intelligible world, a sensitively unconditioned causality, thus be able to be thought as free.

18.6 Now it depended merely upon this: that this “can” would change into a “be”, i.e., that one be able to prove in an actual case through a fact, as it were, that certain actions presuppose such a causality (the intellectual, sensitively unconditioned one), be they now actual or also only commanded, i.e., objectively necessary in a practical way.

18.7 In actions actually given in experience, as events of the sense world, we could not hope to encounter this connection, because the causality through freedom must always be sought apart from the sense world in the intelligible.

18.8 But other things apart from the sense world are not given to us for perception and observation.

18.9 Therefore, nothing remains except that perchance a non-contradictory and indeed objective foundational proposition of causality were found, which excludes every sensitive condition from its determination, i.e., a foundational proposition, and where it, therefore, is itself practical as pure reason.

18.10 But this foundational proposition has need of no searching and no invention; it has long been in all human reason and has been embodied in its being and is the foundational proposition of ethics.

18.11 That unconditioned causality, therefore, and the capacity for such is freedom, but with this a being (I myself), which belongs to the sense world, still thought simultaneously as belonging to the intelligible world, and not merely as undetermined and problematical (which speculative reason could already work out as feasible), but rather even with respect to the law of its causality, recognized determinedly and asserted, such that the actuality of the intelligible world, and indeed in a practical regard, is given as determined to us. And this determination, which would be transcendent (excessive) in a theoretical intention, is immanent in a practical intention.

18.12 But such a step with respect to the second dynamical Ideal, namely that of a necessary being, we could not take.

18.13 Without the transmittal of the first dynamical Idea, we could not arrive at it from the sense world.
18.14 For, if we wanted to attempt it, then we would have had to dare the jump and to abandon all that is given to us and to jump over to that concerning which nothing is given to us through which we could transmit the connection of such an intelligible being with the sense world (because the necessary being was supposed to be recognized as given apart from us). However on the other hand, with respect to our own subject, to the extent it determines itself through the moral law on one side as intelligible being (by means of freedom), and on the other side recognizes itself as active according to this determination in the sense world, as now the appearance presents, this jump is entirely possible.

18.15 The single concept of freedom does not enable us to go out apart from ourselves in order to find the unconditioned and intelligible to the conditioned and sensitive.

18.16 For it is our reason itself, which recognizes itself through the highest and unconditioned practical law and the being, which is conscious to itself of this law (our own person), as belonging to the pure understanding world and indeed even with determination of the manner as to how it is able to be active as such a being.

18.17 So now we can comprehend why it is that in the entire rational capacity only the practical is to able to help us out beyond the sense world and procure recognition of a super sensitive order and connection, but which just for that reason, of course, can be expanded only as far as it is directly necessary for the pure practical intention.

19.1 At this opportunity, allow me to draw attention only to one thing, namely that every step which one takes with pure reason, even in the practical field, where one takes no regard at all for subtle speculation, still attaches itself so precisely and indeed of itself to all moments of the critique of theoretical reason, as though that had been thought out with considered caution, merely in order to procure this certification.

19.2 Such a precise attainment of the most importance propositions of practical reason, not sought in any way, but rather (as one can convince himself, if one will only advance the moral inquires up to their principles) revealing itself of itself, with which often excessively subtle and apparently unnecessary remarks of the critique of the speculative surprises and amazes, and strengthens the maxim already realized and praised by others, to advance his way undisturbed in every scientific examination with all possible precision and with open mind, without concern that it might per chance stumble outside of its field, but rather to accomplish, as much as one can, for itself alone true and complete.

19.3 Frequent observation has convinced me that if one has brought this occupation to a termination then that, which seemed often very doubtful early on because of other teachings apart from me, if I just ignore this doubt long enough and remain focused until it be com-
 complète, finally in an unexpected way totally accords with that which had found itself without the least regard to those teachings, without partisanship and prejudice for that.

19.4 Writers would save themselves many errors, and much lost effort (because it was based on illusion) if they could only resolve themselves to go to work with somewhat more openness.
A Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason in General

1.1 Pure reason always has its dialectic, be it in its speculative usage or its practical. For it demands the absolute totality of the conditions to a given conditioned, and this totality can be encountered utterly only in things on their own.

1.2 But since all concepts of things must be referred to perspectives which, with humans, can never be otherwise than sensitive and thus can permit no recognition of objects as things on their own, but merely as appearances, the unconditioned can never be encountered in the series of the conditioned and the conditions. There arises an unavoidable illusion from the application of this rational Idea of the totality of the conditions (thus of the unconditioned) to appearances, as though they were things on their own (for they are always considered as such in the absence of a warning critique). And this illusion would never be noted as deceptive if it did not betray itself through a conflict of reason with itself in the application of its foundational proposition, i.e., to presuppose the unconditioned to every conditioned, to appearances themselves.

1.3 Hence reason is necessitated to track down this semblance wherever it arises and discover how it can be removed. This can only occur through a complete critique of the entire, pure, rational capacity. Interestingly the antinomy of pure reason, which is revealed in its dialectic, is the most beneficial aberration into which human reason could ever have fallen. For it finally incentivizes us to seek the key for extracting ourselves from this labyrinth which, if found, uncovers what we did not seek but what we still need, i.e., an insight into a higher, unalterable order of things, in which we are now already situated, and in which to advance our existence conformable to the highest rational determination, we can be instructed from now on through determined prescriptions.\(^\text{376}\)

2.1 How that natural dialectic be subject to solution and how the error from an otherwise quite natural illusion be prevented in the speculative usage of pure reason, we can find in detail in the critique of that capacity.

2.2 But reason manages no better in its practical use.

\(^{376}\) Evidently Kant would never have considered things as appearances in contrast to things on their own if it were not for the antinomy (of the CPR). But Kant also stated that it was in a recollection of Hume’s work that awakened him from his “dogmatic slumber” and to this problem and its solution in the CPR.
2.3 As pure practical reason, it continues to seek the unconditioned to the practically conditioned (which rests upon inclinations and natural needs), though certainly not as the determination basis of the will, but rather, even if this determination were given (in the moral law), then still as the unconditioned totality of the objects of pure practical reason, under the name of the highest good.\(^{377}\)

3.1 The practical determination of this Idea, i.e., sufficiently for the maxims of our rational conduct, is the doctrine of wisdom. This then as science is philosophy in the sense that the ancients took the word, for whom it was an indication to

the concept where the highest good is to be placed, and to

the conduct, through which that highest good is acquired.\(^{378}\)

3.2 It would be good if we left this word with its ancient meaning, as a doctrine of the highest good, to the extent reason endeavors to bring it to a science.

3.3 For on the one hand the attached, restricting condition would be commensurate to the Greek expression (which means love of wisdom), and yet at the same time it would be sufficient to embrace with that also the love of science, thus of every speculative recognition of reason to the extent the recognition is serviceable to that concept as also to the practical determination basis under the name of philosophy, and still not neglect the primary purpose, for the sake of which it alone can be called the doctrine of wisdom.

3.4 But on the other hand it would not be wrong to quell the self conceit of anyone who dared to presume the title of a philosopher, if through its definition we already hold up to him the measure of self-estimation which will greatly moderate his claims. To be a teacher of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar, who will not yet have come far enough to lead himself, much less others, with the sure expectation of such a high purpose. Indeed it would mean a master in the knowledge of wisdom, which will say more than a modest man will presume even to himself, and accordingly philosophy, as well as wisdom itself, would remain always an Ideal which is represented with complete objectivity in reason alone; but, subjectively for that individual, it would still be only the goal of his unceasing endeavor. No one can claim to be in possession of this wisdom under the presumed name of a philosopher unless that person is justified in asserting the incorpora-

\(^{377}\) We see that the conditioned that we are talking about is happiness, and so we are going to be looking for the condition of that happiness, or rather the totality of the conditions to happiness. And one of the conditions will be virtue, i.e., worthiness for happiness. The objects of practical reason were found above in the Analytic to be good and evil, and so here we seek the maximum good which includes both the morally good and the good (or smart) regarding enduring happiness. And it is certainly rational to seek the maximum for any endeavor.

\(^{378}\) First we want to know in what the highest good is to consist, and then we want to know how to achieve to that highest good.
tion of the infallible effect of that (in the mastering of himself and the undoubted interest which is especially taken in the universal good) in his own person, as examples, which the ancients also required in order to deserve that honored name.

4.1 Here we have only a reminder to give in advance with respect to the dialectic of pure practical reason concerning the determination of the concept of the highest good (which dialectic, if its solution is successful, suggests—as much as the solution of the theoretical dialectic—an expectation of the most beneficial effect through the properly employed and fully exposed contradictions of pure practical reason with itself which necessitate a complete critique of its own capacity).

5.1 The moral law is the sole determination basis of the pure will.

5.2 But since this is merely formal (requiring only the form of the maxims to be universally legislating), it, as the determination basis, abstracts from all materiality, thus from every object of any wanting.

5.3 Thus the highest good may always be the entire object of pure practical reason, i.e., of a pure will, and yet it is not for that reason to serve as its determination basis. The moral law alone must be viewed as that basis, to make that highest good and its effectuation or promotion to be the object.

5.4 This reminder is of importance in a case as delicate as the determination of moral principles, where even the smallest, misinterpretation falsifies the disposition.

5.5 For we will have seen from the analytic that if we assume any sort of object under the name of a good as a determination basis of the will in advance of the moral law, and then if we derive the supreme practical principle from that, this would always end up being heteronomy and supplant the moral principle.\(^{379}\)

6.1 However it goes without saying that if the moral law is already encompassed in the concept of the highest good as the supreme condition, then the highest good is not merely an object, but rather through its concept and the representation of its existence as possible

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\(^{379}\) Accordingly we cannot first position the highest good as the object of pure practical reason and then expect to derive from that the authority and supremacy of the moral law (for then the moral law and happiness would be of equal importance with regard to the determination of the will). Instead it must first be the moral law on its own and as entirely sufficient for the determination of the will, and then it can be unified with happiness via the concept of the highest good, such that then the highest good can become the purpose of pure practical reason. So first the moral law is the determination basis of the will, and then the highest good can be counted as the purpose and object of pure practical reason.
through our practical reason the pure will would also be determined. And indeed because in that case the moral law, already included and thought in this concept, does in fact determine the will according to the principle of autonomy independently of all other objects.\textsuperscript{380}

6.2 This ordering of the concept of the will determination must not be forgotten. Otherwise we misunderstand the matter and think we are contradicting ourselves, when actually all things accord together in the greatest harmony.

\textsuperscript{380} If we make it clear that the moral law is the supreme condition of the highest good, then when we pursue the highest good we are pursuing first and foremost moral perfection and then derivatively personal happiness.
Second Part

The Dialectic of Pure Reason in the Determination of the Concept of the Highest Good

1.1 The concept of the highest already contains an equivocation which, if we do not attend to it, can occasion unnecessary disputation.

1.2 The highest can mean the supreme or also the consummate.

1.3 The first is that condition which itself is unconditioned, i.e., subordinate to no other. The second is a whole which is not a part of a yet greater whole of the same type (perfectissimum\textsuperscript{381}).

1.4 That virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) be the supreme condition of all that may ever seem desirable to us, thus even of all our solicitation for happiness, thus the supreme good, has been established in the analytic.

1.5 But it is not yet for that reason the entire and consummate good as an object of the desire capacity of finite, rational beings. For in addition to virtue happiness is also required for that consummate good, and indeed not just in the biased eyes of the person who makes himself into a purpose, but even in the judgment of an impartial reason which considers each person in the world generally as a purpose on his own.

1.6 For to be needful of happiness, also worthy of it, but still not to participate in it, cannot coexist with the perfect wanting of a rational being who simultaneously had all power, even if we only think of such a being as a thought experiment.\textsuperscript{382}

1.7 Now to the extent virtue and happiness together make up the possession of the highest good in an individual, but at the same time also happiness distributed in precise proportion to morality (as the value of that individual and of his worthiness to be happy) makes up the highest good of a possible world, it follows that the highest good refers to the entire or consummate good. Accordingly virtue alone is always the supreme good as a condition, because it has no other condition beyond itself, while happiness always remains

\textsuperscript{381} Most perfect.

\textsuperscript{382} We tend to say: it is not right for the good to falter and for the evil to advance and prosper. This concept of an all-controlling rational being is the role to be played in the Preface to Religion Within The Bounds Of Sheer Reason where we imagine ourselves as fashioning a world with respect to the relationship of virtue and happiness, and in which we would also have to live along with all others.
something which is agreeable enough to whoever possest it, but is not utterly good of itself and in every regard, but rather always presupposes moral, right conduct as a condition.\textsuperscript{383}

2.1 Two determinations, connected necessarily in one concept, must be joined as ground and sequence, and indeed either so that this unity is considered as analytical (a logical connection) or as synthetical (a real connection), the first according to the law of identity, the latter to that of causality.

2.2 The connection of virtue with happiness, therefore, can either be so understood that the striving to be virtuous and the rational solicitation for happiness were not two diverse, but rather entirely identical, actions, since then to the first no other maxim needs to be laid as basis than to the latter. Or this connection is exposed by virtue producing happiness as something distinct from the consciousness of the former, as the cause does an effect.\textsuperscript{384}

3.1 In the determination of the concept of the highest good among the Greek schools there were actually only two which held to identical methods in that they did not allow virtue and happiness to serve as two diverse elements of the highest good, and rather sought the unity of the principle according to the rule of identity. But then they parted company by choosing their foundational concepts differently.\textsuperscript{385}

3.2 The Epicurean said, “to be conscious of maxims which lead to happiness is virtue”; while the Stoic asserted, “to be consciousness of one’s own virtue is happiness”.

3.3 For the former prudence was as much as morality. The second, who chose a higher denomination for virtue, considered morality alone as true wisdom.

4.1 We must admire these men for seeking out in such early times all imaginable ways of philosophical conquest. And yet we can only lament the misfortune of their acuteness in ferreting out identity between such dissimilar concepts as happiness and virtue.

\textsuperscript{383} For the individual we speak of virtue (moral perfection and worthiness to happiness) and happiness as making up the highest good. For a world we can speak of degrees of moral perfection and so where happiness is always commensurate to the perfection, e.g., if not very moral, then not very happy.

\textsuperscript{384} We could understand the matter analytically by treating happiness and the worthiness for happiness as to be two sides of a single coin. Or else we could treat it synthetically where either morality results in happiness or happiness results in morality.

\textsuperscript{385} Here then we are dealing with the “two-sided coin” and where we either bet (and seek) morality and end up also happy, or we bet happiness and end up being moral.
4.2 However, it suited the dialectical spirit of their times, which occasionally even now misleads subtle heads, to eliminate essential and irreconcilable distinctions in principles by attempting to transform them into verbal disputes and thus, based on the looks of things, to dream up a unity of concept merely under diverse denominations. This usually touches such cases where the unification of dissimilar foundations lies so deeply or so lofty or would require such an immense alteration of the doctrine already accepted in the philosophical system, that delving deeply into the real distinction is so dreaded that it is treated merely as a difference in the formulations.\textsuperscript{386}

5.1 Even though both schools sought to ferret out identity for the practical principles of virtue and happiness, they were not for that reason unanimous about how this identity might be obtained. Indeed they were infinitely divided, the one placing its principles on the aesthetic side, the other on the logical, the former in the consciousness of sensitive needs, the other in the independence of practical reason from all sensitive determination foundations.

5.2 The concept of virtue, according to the Epicurean, was already included in the maxim to promote one’s own happiness; while the feeling of happiness, according to the Stoic, was already contained in the consciousness of one’s virtue.

5.3 But whatever is contained in another concept is indeed identical with a part of that concept, but not with the whole. And moreover two wholes can be specifically distinguished from one another even though they consist of precisely the same material, i.e., if the parts in both are connected into a whole in quite different ways.\textsuperscript{387}

5.4 The Stoic asserted that virtue were the entire, highest good, and happiness only the consciousness of the possession of this good as belonging to the state of the subject.

5.5 The Epicurean asserted that happiness were the entire, highest good, and virtue only the form of the maxim for soliciting it, namely in the rational use of the means to happiness.\textsuperscript{388}

\textsuperscript{386} We conceive of a system of reality and then find that it is difficult to incorporate both virtue and happiness at the same time, and to solve the problem decide to treat them as the two sides of one coin.

\textsuperscript{387} In the first case we can think of table being included in the concept of furniture, but not identical with it. And the second case surely harkens to Kant’s notion of “incongruent counterparts” where two perfectly identical things, e.g., identical hands, are still different, e.g., cannot wear the same glove.

\textsuperscript{388} The Stoic says virtue is the highest good and happiness is being aware of one’s virtue, while the Epicurean puts happiness as the highest good and where virtue leads to that. So again, there is a single coin of the highest good and the difference is on which side of the coin one focuses.
6.1 But now it is clear from the analytic that the maxims of virtue and those of personal happiness are entirely dissimilar with respect to their supreme practical principle and are totally lacking of unanimity. And so even though they belong to the highest good in order to make it possible, they very much restrict and interrupt each other in the same subject. \[389\]

6.2 The question of how the highest good is practically possible, therefore, still remains an unsolved problem despite all the attempts at coalition thus far. \[390\]

6.3 But what makes its solution so difficult is revealed in the analytic, namely happiness and morality are two specifically quite diverse elements of this highest good, and for that reason their connection cannot be recognized analytically (such that someone seeking his happiness will find himself virtuous in conduct through a mere inspection of his concepts, or by pursuing virtue he will already *ipsa facto* find himself happy). Instead we are dealing with a synthesis of these two concepts. \[391\]

6.4 But because this connection is to be recognized as a priori, thus as necessary in a practical sense, and so not as derived from experience, and, therefore, since the possibility of the highest good rests on no empirical principle, the deduction of this concept will have to be transcendental. \[392\]

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389 This has to do with the trade off between virtue and happiness in moral questions. Much of the time the incentive for happiness and the incentive for moral perfection are in conflict on an individual, personal basis, a so-called zero-sum game. Morality wins? then happiness loses (at least quite often).

390 Logically we have conceived of moral perfection and perfect happiness together in the concept of the highest good. But it is another question on the individual level how this can be practically possible. How can it be possible to maximize both morality and happiness? And at this stage in our investigation we have not yet determined that the highest good is even possible, much less actual.

391 The solution of the unification cannot be analytical, but can only be found in a synthetic connection. And at this stage this unification is still a problem.

392 We know of the connection of happiness and virtue a priori, and since this connection is not a matter of identity and thus not subject to analysis, we will have to find the a priori connection in a synthesis (and which as a priori cannot be empirical) and so the connection of the two will have to be transcendental. And so far we are still talking about an Idea (highest good) that we have dreamed up in order to reconcile virtue and happiness.
6.5 It is a priori (morally) necessary to produce the highest good through freedom of will. Hence the condition of its possibility must rest solely upon recognitional foundations a priori.

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393 It may be morally necessary to promote the highest good in order to eliminate the common and expected conflict between the moral command and the striving for happiness.

394 We now want to examine how this highest good might be conceived. Practical reason requires the moral and it promotes the prudent (dealing with happiness) and so it is necessary that this highest good, which unites these two disparate exertions of practical reason, be assumed and acknowledged in order to prove the internal coherence of this practical usage of reason.
I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason

1.1 In the highest good practical for us, i.e., to be made actual through our wills, virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily connected, such that the one cannot be assumed through pure practical reason without the other also belonging to it.

1.2 Now this connection (as every connection in general) is either analytic or synthetic.

1.3 But since this connection cannot be given analytically, as was just indicated above, it must be thought synthetically and indeed as connection of cause with its effect. For it concerns a practical good, i.e., one possible through action.

1.4 Therefore either the appetite for happiness must be the motive for maxims of virtue, or the maxims of virtue must be the efficacious cause of happiness.

1.5 The former is utterly impossible because (as was proven in the Analytic) maxims which place the determination basis of the will in the demand for one’s happiness are not moral at all and can establish no virtue.

1.6 But the second is also not possible because no practical connection of the causes and the effects in the world consequent to the determination of the will is governed by the moral disposition of the will, but rather according to familiarity with laws of nature and to the physical capacity for utilizing them for one’s intentions. And so in the world no connection of happiness with virtue can be expected necessarily and sufficiently for the highest good through the most punctual adherence to the moral laws.\(^{395}\)

1.7 Now since the promotion of the highest good, which contains this connection within its concept, is an a priori necessary object of our wills and adheres inseparably to the moral law, the impossibility of the first must also prove the falsity of the second.\(^{396}\)

\(^{395}\) There is nothing in the knowledge of nature that would suggest that virtue would result in a happy state of being. It is only by means of the laws of nature, and not those of virtue, that we can expect to come up with any happiness.

\(^{396}\) In the Analytic we saw that the necessary objects of practical reason are the good and evil, and how it was that this was understood in a two-fold fashion, concerning virtue and happiness. It would then follow that a rational being would also seek to maximize its objects and so not simply go for some good as an object, but indeed the highest good possible.
1.8 If the highest good is not possible by means of practical rules, then the moral law which commands its promotion, must also be fantastic and directed toward empty, imagined purposes, and as such, therefore, must be false.  

397 This seems to be a powerful statement. If the highest good is not a practical goal and purpose, then the moral law which commands the attainment of that highest good (and which means the practical elimination of the conflict between the moral and happiness, and thus which is a promotion of the moral and a unification of practical rationality itself) is also meaningless and vain. Accordingly it seems to be a moral duty to promote the highest good in order to rationalize the moral law, for surely it is a duty to promote morality and moral perfection both personally and socially. This may then be the basis for a deduction of this concept (highest good), namely that without it the moral law would be a sheer vanity.
II. Critical Neutralization of the Antinomy of Practical Reason

1.1 In the antinomy of pure speculative reason a similar conflict is found between natural necessity and freedom in the causality of the events in the world.398

1.2 That antinomy was removed by proving that it is not a true conflict if (as is proper) we consider the events and even the world in which they occur only as appearances. For then one and the same acting being as an appearance (even to his own inner sense) has a causality in the sense world which is always conformable to the mechanism of nature. But with respect to that same event, to the extent the actor considers himself at the same time as noumenon (as pure intelligence in his existence and not determinable according to time), he is able to contain a determination basis of that causality of natural law, which actually is free of all such laws of nature.

2.1 Now we have precisely the same relationship with respect to the present antinomy of pure practical reason.

2.2 The first of the two propositions, that the striving toward happiness would produce a basis for a virtuous disposition, is utterly false.399 But the second proposition, that a virtuous disposition would produce happiness, is not utterly false, but rather only to the extent it is considered as the form of the causality in the world of sense. Accordingly it is false only if I take existence in the world as the only way for a rational being to exist. Therefore it is only conditionally false.

2.3 But since I am not only authorized to think my existence in an understanding world as noumenon, but rather even have in the moral law a purely intellectual determination basis of my causality (in the sense world), it is not impossible that the morality of the disposition have, if not a direct cohesion, then an indirect one (by means of an intelligible, originator of nature) and indeed a necessary one in the sense world as cause with happiness as its effect. Such a connection can never take place in a nature which is merely an object of the senses except contingently and cannot achieve to the highest good.400

398 This refers to the Third Antinomy pitting natural causation against freedom.

399 It is unreasonable to think that a finite being which focuses on achieving personal happiness would also happen to end up being a virtuous person, i.e., always complying with the moral law for the very sake of that law.

400 There can be a connection between virtue (worthiness to happiness) and happiness in the sense world, but which could only be provided via a creator and never by nature itself.
3.1 Despite this apparent conflict of a practical reason with itself, therefore, the highest good is the necessary, highest purpose of a morally determined will, i.e., a true object of that practical reason. For this highest good is possible in a practical sense. And the maxims of that will, which refer to that object with respect to their material, have objective reality. This reality was first encountered through that antinomy in the connection of morality with happiness according to a universal law, but then only due to a mere misunderstanding, because one held the relationship only between appearances to be a relationship between these appearances and things on their own.

4.1 The highest good is the goal of all moral wishes by rational beings, and is engraved by reason upon them. This being so, if we then find ourselves necessitated to seek the possibility of this highest good to the extent we have done, namely in a connection with an intelligible world, it must seem strange that any philosophers, ancient or modern, would think to find happiness in an appropriate proportion with virtue in this life (in the sense world) or to persuade themselves of being conscious of it.

4.2 For Epicurus, as well as the Stoics, extolled the happiness that arises out of the consciousness of virtue in life as supreme. Indeed the former was not so plebeianly inclined in his practical precepts as one might conclude from the principles of his theory (which he needed for explanation, but not for action), or as many, mistaking the expression ‘contentment’ for ‘pleasure,’ interpreted them. Epicurus counted the most unselfish practice of good among the ways of relishing the most intimate joy, and the moderation and subjugation of the inclinations constituted an integral part in his plan of pleasure (he understood with that the steadily joyous heart) as much as the strictest moral philosopher might require. In all this he deviated from the Stoics primarily in placing our motivation in this pleasure, which the latter refused to do, and indeed rightly not.

4.3 For in the first place the virtuous Epicurus, like many morally minded people of today who do not reflect deeply enough about their principles, fell into the error of already presupposing the virtuous disposition in the persons for whom he first wanted to provide the incentives to virtue. (And it is a fact that no upright person can be happy with himself if he is not conscious of that uprightness before hand. And indeed this follows for the reason that with such a virtuous disposition the moral self-condemnation and the reprimands, which he would be necessitated through his own thinking manner to make to himself upon a transgression, would rob him of all enjoyment of the agreeableness which his state might otherwise contain).

401 A matter or material is given as the object of the pure will, and that is the highest good, i.e., moral perfection coupled with commensurate happiness.

402 It seems then that virtue is the negative condition of happiness, namely I cannot be happy with myself, regardless of my state, if I am conscious of base conduct; and if I am otherwise miserable, but am conscious of having complied with my duty, I can be content, although not happy.
4.4 But the question then would be: how does such a disposition and such thinking for estimating the value of one’s existence first become possible, since before the disposition no feeling for a moral value in general would be encountered in the subject at all?

4.5 Of course it follows that regardless of how favorable fortune is to him physically, if the human is virtuous, he will not be happy in life without being conscious of his uprightness in every action. But in order first to make him virtuous, thus before he estimates the moral value of his existence, can we praise the peace of mind which will arise out of the consciousness of an uprightness of which he as yet has no inkling?  

5.1 But on the other hand, there lies here the basis to an error of subreption (vitium subreptionis) and to an optical illusion, as it were, in the self consciousness of what one does in contrast to what one feels, an illusion which even those most experienced in temptations cannot fully avoid.

5.2 The moral disposition is necessarily connected with a consciousness of the determination of the will immediately through law.

5.3 But now the consciousness of a determination of the desire capacity is always the basis of a pleasing in the action which is produced by that. But this pleasure, this pleasing as such, is not the determination basis of the action, for the determination of the will immediately through reason alone is the basis of the feeling of pleasure, and the former remains a pure practical, and not an aesthetic, determination of the desire capacity.

5.4 Now since this determination has just the same effect in impulsing an activity internally as would a feeling of charm expected from the desired action, we easily consider what we do ourselves as what we merely passively feel, and take the moral incentives as sensitive

403 If a man has a sense of the moral, then he cannot be happy with himself if he is conscious of any dereliction of duty. But if a man has no sense of the moral, how can we entice him to moral conduct by extolling the peace of mind that will arise from a consciousness which is totally alien to him.

404 Fraudulent defect.

405 When we make up our minds to some action, i.e., determined the will, there is an expected pleasure in the action as a result. So the pleasure is not in the action as such but rather as doing what one has determined to be done.
incentives, which always tends to happen in these so-called deception of the senses (here the inner).\textsuperscript{406}

5.5 There is something very sublime in human nature to be immediately determined to actions through a pure rational law, and even in the deception of holding the subjective aspect of this capacity for determining the will intellectually as something aesthetic and the effect of a particular sensitive feeling (for an intellectual feeling would be an oxymoron).

5.6 It is also of great importance to call attention to this property of our personality and to cultivate the effect of reason on this feeling in the best possible way.

5.7 But we must also be vigilant against diminishing and distorting the actual, authentic incentives, i.e., the law itself, through a false veneer, as it were, by inauthentic exaltation of this moral determination basis as incentive, by undergirding it with feelings of particular joys as foundations (which are actually only consequences).\textsuperscript{407}

5.8 Respect, therefore, and not enjoyment or relish of happiness, is something for which no feeling before hand laid to reason as basis is possible (because this would always be aesthetic and pathologic). As consciousness of the immediate necessitation of the will through law, this respect is hardly an analogy for the feeling of pleasure even though it effects the same thing in relationship to the capacity of desire, but from other sources. But it is through this representational manner alone that we can reach what we seek, i.e., that actions not merely conform to duty (thus due to agreeable feelings), but rather submit to duty. This must be the true purpose of all moral education.\textsuperscript{408}

6.1 But don’t we have a word which, though it would not indicate a gratification like that of happiness, would still evince a liking of one’s existence, an analogy to happiness, which would have accompanied the consciousness of virtue necessarily?

\textsuperscript{406} When I make up my mind in general, that gives me a good feeling, perhaps a relief in having completed a determination for action. And so it is the same with regard to moral determinations. The mistake then is in taking that good feeling regarding having made up my mind as the basis of the action when in fact it follows only upon the preceding rational and moral determination. In other words I don’t undertake the action due to the pleasure expected from that, but rather there is a pleasure in doing as one has purposed to do in the determination of the will.

\textsuperscript{407} The pleasure follows from the determination of the will, and it is not the pleasure of the action which determines the will. The pleasure arises from doing what one has made up his mind to do.

\textsuperscript{408} Thus it is not the pleasure which determines the action, but rather this pleasure is an effect of the determination of the will. Accordingly it is a practical feeling and not pathological. This was considered above in the section on the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason. And moral education is treated later in the Method of Doctrine.
6.2 Indeed we do, and this word is ‘contentment’ which, when rightly understood, always suggests a negative liking of one’s existence in which one is conscious of needing nothing.\textsuperscript{409}

6.3 Freedom and the consciousness of that as a capacity for complying with the moral law by means of a prevailing disposition, is independence from the appetites, at least as the determining (even if not as the affecting) motives of our desire. And to the extent that I am conscious of that in the compliance of my moral maxims, it is the exclusive source of an unchangeable satisfaction which is necessarily connected with that and which rests on no particular feeling, and hence can be called intellectual.\textsuperscript{410}

6.4 Aesthetic satisfaction (a mere figurative expression), which rests upon the satisfaction of the inclinations, as finely refined as one will, can never be adequate to what one thinks about this [consciousness of moral strength].

6.5 For the inclinations alternate, grow with the encouragement which we permit to befall them, and still always leave a greater emptiness than we had hoped to fill.

6.6 Hence they are always burdensome to a rational being, and even if he is not empowered to lay them aside, they still elicit from us the wish to be rid of them.\textsuperscript{411}

6.7 Even an inclination toward dutiful conduct (e.g., to benevolence) can indeed greatly facilitate the efficacy of moral maxims, but can produce none.\textsuperscript{412}

6.8 For here, since the action is to contain not merely legality but rather also morality, everything must be appended to the representation of the law as the determination basis.

6.9 Inclination is blind and menial, be it of a good sort or not, and reason must not merely play its keeper when the concern is morality, but rather in the role of pure practical reason must see to its own interest alone, and ignore the inclination entirely.

6.10 The feeling of sympathy and of tender hearted empathy, if it precedes the reflection of what duty calls for and becomes the determination basis, is even burdensome to well

\textsuperscript{409} Happiness requires that we have all our wishes fulfilled, and so here contentment means that we have no unsatisfied needs, although we may still have many unfilled wishes.

\textsuperscript{410} There is a contentment or satisfaction, even if not happiness, when I am aware that my maxims are reflective of the moral law.

\textsuperscript{411} A chronic smoker or drinker may not be able to easily give up the habit, but still will find the satisfaction ensuing from the indulgence to be declining and will come to wish to be rid of the desire.

\textsuperscript{412} The desire to do good deeds can facilitate the implementation of the moral law, but cannot serve as the basis for the moral act. For that must always be duty.
meaning persons. It brings their deliberated maxims into confusion and effects the wish to be free of all that, and to be subject to legislating reason alone.\textsuperscript{413}

7.1 In this wise we can understand how the consciousness of this capacity of a pure practical reason through deed (virtue) is able to produce a consciousness of our dominance over inclinations, and hence of our independence from them, consequently also the dissatisfaction which always accompanies them and, therefore, a negative pleasing with our state, i.e., contentment, which in its source is satisfaction with our person.

7.2 In such way freedom itself becomes capable (i.e., indirectly) of a gratification which cannot be called happiness because it does not depend upon a positive contribution of a feeling and, precisely speaking, also not blessedness, because the gratification spoken of here does not include complete independence from inclinations and needs. But still this gratification is similar to blessedness to the extent that the determination of the will can be kept free of influence of the inclinations, and therefore, at least with respect to its origin, is analogous to self sufficiency, which we can only attribute to the supreme being.\textsuperscript{414}

8.1 It follows from this solution of the antinomy of practical reason that in practical foundational propositions a natural and necessary connection between the consciousness of morality and the expectation of a happiness proportion to it as consequence of that can be thought at least as possible (but not yet for that reason, of course, recognized and penetrated\textsuperscript{415}). And on the other hand, the foundational propositions of the solicitation for happiness cannot possibly produce morality. And so, therefore, morality (as the first condition of the highest good) constitutes the supreme good, while happiness, on the other hand, indeed makes up its second element, but still always so that this latter is the morally conditioned, but still necessary, consequence of the former.\textsuperscript{416}

\textsuperscript{413} Here we would want to exclude our feelings for helping some person in order to be able to think clearly about what our duty is, and not to be swayed by sympathy alone.

\textsuperscript{414} There arises, therefore, a satisfaction or contentment at having made a rational decision independently of the inclinations and feeling.

\textsuperscript{415} The highest good is thus possible in thought, but not yet for that reason understood and recognized.

\textsuperscript{416} The contentment at a determination of the will to the moral law is not what is meant by the happiness which belongs, morally, to a being who is worthy of happiness, but must be something far more.
8.2 In this subordination alone the highest good is the entire object of pure practical reason, which must represent it to itself as possible, because it is its own command, namely to contribute everything to its production.\textsuperscript{417}

8.3 But because the possibility of such a connection of the conditioned with its condition belongs entirely to the supersensitive relationship of things and cannot be given at all according to the laws of the sense world--although the practical consequence of this Idea, namely the actions, which aim to make the highest good actual, belong to the sense world--it follows that we will seek to establish the basis of that possibility first with respect to what is immediately in our control, and then secondly in what reason offers to us as supplementation of our incapacity to the possibility of the highest good (necessary according to practical principles) and is not in our control.

\textsuperscript{417} The reason was stated above, namely without this purpose the moral law itself in inane and a vanity. And so the achievement of the highest good is a command of practical reason itself. This is also given in the imaginary example of the Preface to Kant’s \textit{Religion} of a morally inclined person faced with the task of composing the relationship of virtue and happiness and who utilizes the concept of the highest good in making his decision.
III. The Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its Connection with the Speculative

1.1 With the primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I understand the preference of the one to be the first determination basis of the connection with all others.

1.2 In the more narrow practical meaning, it means the preference of the interest of the one, to the extent the interest of the other is subordinate to it (which can be placed behind no other).

1.3 To each and every capacity of the mind, one can attribute an interest, i.e., a principle, which contains the condition under which alone the exercise of the capacity is promoted.

1.4 Reason, as the capacity of principle, determines the interest of all mental powers, its own interest, however, of itself.

1.5 The interest of its speculative usage consists in the recognition of the objects up to the highest principles a priori, while that of the practical usage goes to the determination of the will with respect to the final and complete purpose.

1.6 That which is requisite to the possibility of a rational usage in general, namely that the principles and assertions of that usage must not contradict one another, makes up no part of its interest, but rather is the condition for even having reason at all. Only the expansion, not the mere agreement with itself, is counted to the interest of reason.

2.1 If practical reason may assume and think as given nothing further except what speculative reason could offer to it of itself out of its insight, then the latter would be supreme.

2.2 But if it had original principles a priori for itself, with which certain theoretical positions were inseparably connected, but which nonetheless forsook all possible insight of speculative reason (even though it also would have to avoid any contradiction with that), then the question of which interest were supreme (and not which would have to yield, for one does not necessarily conflict with the other) is whether speculative reason, which knows nothing of what practical reason offers to it to be assumed, would have to take up these propositions and, even though for it they are excessive, would have to seek to unite them with its concepts as a foreign possession conveyed to them. Or instead whether speculative reason would be justified in stubbornly following its own isolated interest and, according to the canon of Epicurus, discarding as empty rational contriving (Vernünftelei) everything which his objective reality cannot attest to through obvious examples presentable in experience, no matter how tightly it interweaves it with the interest of the practical
(pure) usage and even if on its own it were not contradictory to the theoretical; and taking this tack merely because practical reason actually interrupts the interest of the speculative reasoning to the extent that it eliminates the boundaries which this sets to itself and abandons it to all nonsense or mania of the imagination.

3.1 Indeed to the extent practical reason were pathologically conditioned, i.e., merely controlling the interest of inclinations under the sensitive principle of happiness, and were then to become the foundation, this imposition upon speculative reason would be meaningless.\textsuperscript{418}

3.2 Mohammed’s paradise or the theosoph’s and mystic’s fusing union with the divinity, just as it seems to each one, would force their monsters upon reason and it would be better to have no reason at all, than to surrender oneself in such way to every fantasy.

3.3 But if, as the consciousness of the moral law indicates, pure reason can be practical for itself and actually is so, then it is still always only one and the same rationality which, be it in a theoretical or a practical intention, judges according to principles a priori. And then it is clear that if its capacity does not exactly reach in the first to affirm and stipulate certain propositions, while also not contradicting them, then as soon as these propositions belong inseparably to the practical interest of pure reason it would indeed assume them as a foreign contribution, which has not arisen in its territory, but still is sufficiently certified, and would have to seek to compare and to connect it with all which it has in its power as speculative reason; but ever modestly, that while these are not at all its insights, they are still expansions of its usage into some other intention, namely the practical, which is not contrary at all to its interest in constraining speculative frivolity.\textsuperscript{419}

4.1 Therefore in connecting pure speculative reason with pure practical reason for a recognition, the latter carries the primacy, assuming namely: this connection is not based per chance contingently and arbitrarily, but rather a priori upon reason itself, i.e., necessarily.

4.2 For without this subordination, a conflict of reason with itself would arise, because, if they (the purely speculative and practical) were merely conditioned with one another, the first would block up its boundaries for itself and take up into its territory nothing from the latter, but this latter would still go out beyond its boundaries to everything and, when it claims a need, would seek to encompass the former within that of its own.

\textsuperscript{418} If practical reason looked solely to personal happiness, then there could be no conflict at all with the speculative reason.

\textsuperscript{419} In a word: Hume need not fear for this expansion of speculative reason with foreign Ideas, for this is a product of pure reason itself, only in a practical endeavor, i.e., not in knowing an object, but in pursuing one which is given by practical reason.
4.3 But we cannot at all impose upon pure practical reason and require it to be subordinated to the speculative reason and, therefore, to reverse the order, because every interest finally is practical and even that of the speculative reason is itself only conditioned and is completed in the practical usage alone.
IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason

1.1 The effectuation of the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable through the moral law.\(^{420}\)

1.2 But in this the full commensurability of the disposition to the moral law is the supreme condition of the highest good.\(^{421}\)

1.3 This [full commensurability] must, therefore, be just as possible as its object, because in that object the command to promote this is contained.\(^{422}\)

1.4 The full commensurability of the will to the moral law, however, is holiness, a perfection, of which no rational being of the sense world is capable in any time point of his existence.

1.5 But since it is nonetheless required as necessarily practical, it can be encountered only in a progression going infinitely to that full commensurability. And it is necessary, according to principles of pure practical reason, to assume such a practical advancement as the real object of our will.\(^{423}\)

2.1 But this infinite progression is possible only under the presupposition of an existence and personality of the same rational being, continuing into infinitely (which one terms the ‘immortality of the soul’).

2.2 Therefore the highest good is only possible practically under the presupposition of the immortality of the soul. Therefore this, as inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (which I understand to mean a theoretical, but as such

\(^{420}\) For the moral law to be without a purpose/object means that this law is irrational and to be ignored, especially when in conflict with the pursuit of happiness. Since this would remove the basis of universal dignity and thus also for ourselves, we have to acknowledge a purpose. The only possible purpose for humans (finite rational beings) is the highest good (personal moral perfection and commensurate happiness). Accordingly a will which can be determined by the moral law will necessarily aim toward the attainment of the highest good in the world as the object of that will.

\(^{421}\) Moral perfection is the standard, and happiness is expected according to the degree of that perfection.

\(^{422}\) The concept of the highest good as object calls for the individual to achieve to moral perfection.

\(^{423}\) I am in pursuit of the highest good (for I am morally driven), but this highest good means that I must be virtuous in order to enjoy happiness, and since I cannot become so virtuous in this life, I must assume that I am now in a progression which continues past death. In other words, while we want to say that we are in pursuit of happiness, we as rational creatures actually should say that we are in pursuit of the highest good which calls for happiness, but only commensurate with the degree of moral perfections.
IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason

not provable, proposition to the extent it appends inseparably to an a priori, unconditionally valid practical law).\textsuperscript{424}

3.1 The proposition of the moral determination of our nature, only to be able to achieve to full commensurability with the moral law in an infinite advance, is of the greatest utility, not merely with regard to the present supplementation of the incapacity of speculative reason, but rather also with respect to religion.

3.2 At the lack of this two things happen. Either the moral law is degraded from its holiness entirely by being molded into something indulgent and suitable to our comfort. Or else we stretch our calling, and likewise our expectation, to an unreachable determination, i.e., to a hope for full acquisition of holiness of the will, and lose ourselves in excessive theosophical dreams which thoroughly contradicts knowledge we have of ourselves. By means of these then both the unceasing striving to punctuality and the thorough compliance of a strict, non-indulgent, albeit not Idealistical, but rather true, rational command, are only hindered.\textsuperscript{425}

3.3 To a rational, albeit finite, being only the progress into infinity is possible, from lower to higher rungs of moral perfection.

3.4 The infinite being, to which the time determination is nothing, sees in this, for us, endless series the whole of the commensurability with the moral law And the holiness which that law incessantly demands in order to be conformable to his justification in that portion which he determines to each at the highest good, this holiness is to be encountered solely in a single, intellectual perspective of the existence of rational beings.\textsuperscript{426}

3.5 What alone can befit a creature with respect to the hope of this portion were the consciousness of his vetted disposition. By means of this and from his thus far advance from worse to morally better and from his unchanging resolution, having become familiar to him in that advancement, he can hope for a further uninterrupted advancement, even as far as his existence may ever reach, even out beyond this life.* And so while he indeed can never hope to be fully adequate to this perfection here or in any sort of a foreseeable future time point of his existence, he can so hope in the (God alone ascertainable) infinity

\textsuperscript{424} The highest good is required as a goal for practical reason, and so moral perfection is also required, and since this cannot be expected except in a progression extending beyond life, the postulate for immortality is also required.

\textsuperscript{425} And so either we will make the moral command fit our own assumed capability, or else we will come to think of ourselves has having already attained the moral perfection called for.

\textsuperscript{426} Kant alludes to this in \textit{Religion Within The Bounds Of Sheer Reason} in the first of the “three difficulties” of Book 2. Essentially an infinite being, not constrained by sensitive looking via time, would look at the end result of the striving for moral perfection as accomplished.
of his continuation to be adequate to that will (without indulgence or remission, neither of which accords with justice). 427

* Kant’s footnote:
1.1 The conviction of the inalterability of his disposition in the advance to the good seems nonetheless also to be impossible for a creature of itself.

1.2 For that reason the Christian religious doctrine also allows it only by derivation from the same spirit which effects holiness, i.e., this firm resolution, and with it the consciousness of the endurance in the moral progress.

1.3 But also naturally he who is conscious during a long portion of his life to its end of having made progress toward improvement for the better and indeed having done so from moral incentives of action, may entertain the comforting hope, even if not the certitude, that he will persist in his loyalty to these principles in an existence which extends out beyond this life. And even though here he will not be justified in his own eyes, nevertheless, with the hoped for future growth of his natural perfection, but with this also his duties, he may always hope that this continued existence which concerns a goal stretched out into eternity, still holding for God as a fait accompli, can warrant a prospect to a blessed future. For this is the expression, serviceable to reason, for indicating an exhaustive well-being independent of all contingent causes of the world, which, as holiness, is an Idea which can be contained only in an unending progression, and its totality is never completely attained by any creature.

427 Seen from this perspective then the morally inclined person is not simply engaging in a moral act, but even more is expressing his ongoing development toward moral perfection.
V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason

1.1 In the preceding dissection, the moral law led to the practical task, prescribed merely through pure reason without the assistance of any sensitive incentive, namely the necessary completion of the first and principal part of the highest good, i.e., morality. And since this can be completely resolved only in an eternity, we are led to the postulate of immortality.

1.2 But this very law must also lead to the second element of the highest good, i.e., a happiness commensurate to that morality, and just as independently of any self interest as above, i.e., out of impartial reason alone. This second element is the presupposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect [of commensurate happiness], i.e., to postulate the existence of God as belonging necessarily to the possibility of the highest good (which object of our will is necessarily connected with the moral legislation of pure reason).

1.3 We now want to present this cohesion convincingly.

2.1 Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world, to whom everything in all of his existence goes according to wish and will. Hence this depends upon the agreement of nature with his entire purpose [which includes happiness], likewise to the essential determination basis of his will.\(^{428}\)

2.2 Now the moral law commands as a law of freedom through determination bases which are supposed to be entirely independent of nature and of its conformity to our desire capacity (as incentives). But at the same time the acting, rational being in the world is still not itself the cause of the world and of nature.\(^{429}\)

2.3 In the moral law, therefore, there is not the least basis for a necessary cohesion between morality and a happiness proportionate to it for a being belonging to the world as a part and, hence, dependent upon it. And for that very reason such a being cannot be the cause of this nature through his will, and with regard to his happiness he cannot produce

\(^{428}\) If any wish did not come true, then there is a lack in happiness. Likewise this desire for happiness belongs to one’s very makeup.

\(^{429}\) I am compelled by the moral law to be good, but my wishes are not sufficient to change nature and give me the happiness required by the degree of my moral perfection.
through his own power a thorough accord between that nature and his practical, foundational propositions.\textsuperscript{430}

2.4 Nonetheless, in the practical task of pure reason, i.e., of the necessary process toward the highest good, such a cohesion is postulated as necessary. For we are supposed to seek to promote the highest good (which, therefore, must always be possible).\textsuperscript{431}

2.5 The existence, therefore, of a cause of all of nature is also postulated, a cause which is distinct from nature and which would contain the basis of this cohesion, i.e., the precise agreement of happiness with morality.

2.6 This supreme cause, however, is supposed to contain the basis for the agreement of nature not merely with a law of the will of rational beings, but rather with the representation of this law, to the extent these rational beings admit it as the supreme determination basis of their will, therefore, not merely with the practices according to form, but rather even with morality as their motivation, i.e., contained with their moral disposition.\textsuperscript{432}

2.7 The highest good, therefore, is only possible in the world to the extent that a supreme cause of nature is assumed which has causality conformable to the moral disposition.\textsuperscript{433}

2.8 Now a being which is competent to actions according to the representations of laws, is an intelligence (rational being), and the causality of such a being according to this representation of laws is its will.\textsuperscript{434}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{430} Since we neither create nor control the world, we cannot make it conform to our requirements for happiness. Also with “practical foundational propositions” Kant is alluding to the disposition of this being, and not his actions.

\textsuperscript{431} The highest good is not only a disposition dedicated to the moral law, but a system of justice so that such (moral) people are happy. This is not contained in the concept of the moral law, which only requires righteous actions, but solely in the concept of the highest good which, since it is commanded through practical reason, must be possible.

\textsuperscript{432} The emphasis here is not on actions but rather on the disposition from which the actions ensue, and so this happiness would also belong to beings who have no opportunity for moral actions, but still possess that disposition.

\textsuperscript{433} We must constantly keep in mind that the highest good has two components, the moral disposition as the sole determination of the worthiness to happiness, and the happiness commensurate to that.

\textsuperscript{434} Here is another definition of will.
\end{flushleft}
2.9 The supreme cause of nature, therefore, to the extent this cause must be presupposed for
the sake of the highest good, is a being who is the cause (consequently the originator) of
nature through understanding and will, i.e., God.\textsuperscript{435}

2.10 Consequently the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (of the Ideal
world) is simultaneously the postulate of the actuality of a highest, original good, namely
the existence of God.

2.11 Now it was a duty for us to promote the highest good, thus not only the authority to pre-
suppose the possibility of this highest good, but rather also a necessity connected with
duty as a need to do so, which, since this highest good can only occur under the condition
of the existence of God, inextricably binds the presupposition of this existence with duty,
i.e., it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.

3.1 Now we need to note that this moral necessity is subjective, i.e., a need, and not objective,
i.e., a duty; for there can be no duty at all to assume the existence of a thing (for existence
concerns merely the theoretical usage of reason).

3.2 And we also do not mean that the assumption of the existence of God is necessary as a
foundation for all obligation in general (for this, as was sufficiently proven, rests entirely
upon the autonomy of reason itself).

3.3 It is our duty only to work for the production and promotion of the highest good in the
world. The possibility of this, therefore, can be postulated but which our reason does not
find thinkable except under the presupposition of a highest intelligence. The assumption
of the existence of this highest intelligence, therefore, is connected with the consciousness
of our duty, although the assumption itself belongs to theorizing reason, with respect to
which alone it considers hypotheses as explanatory means. But in referral to the compre-
hensibility of an object which still is propounded to us though the moral law (that of the
highest good), hence in referral to a need for a practical intention, this assumption can be
called belief and indeed a pure rational belief, because sheer reason (with respect to its
theoretical as well as practical usage) is the source from which it arises.\textsuperscript{436}

\textsuperscript{435} This is a moral necessity and not a requirement of pure, theoretical reason. Hence it is valid only to the
extent that matters are considered practically. It is a practical postulate.

\textsuperscript{436} It is our duty to comply with the moral law and accordingly to seek the highest good, i.e., a happiness
commensurate to the degree of moral perfection, for all who have the moral disposition. It is a necessary
postulate for anyone so engaged, that the highest good be possible, and this in turn is only possible un-
der the further assumption of the existence of God. But this touches only the individual practical need for
such a postulate and cannot affect the thinking in theoretical reason.
4.1 From this deduction we can now see how it is that the Greek schools could never achieve to the solution of their problem concerning the practical possibility of the highest good. For they always made the rule of the use, which the will of the human makes of his freedom, the single and all-sufficient basis of the highest good without, in their thinking, needing the existence of God for that.

4.2 They did indeed act properly in establishing the principle of morality independently from this postulate, i.e., by virtue alone of the relationship of reason to the will. And in that way they made it the supreme practical condition of the possibility of the highest good. But it was not for that reason the entire condition of the possibility of this highest good.

4.3 Now the Epicureans indeed had assumed an entirely false principle of morality as the supreme one, namely that of happiness, and substituted a maxim of arbitrary choice, each according to his inclination, for a law. But once having done that, they then proceeded consistently enough by degrading their highest good accordingly, namely in proportion to the lowliness of their fundamental principle and they expected no greater happiness than what might be acquired through human prudence (which also includes contentment and moderation of the inclinations), which, also we know, must turn out feeble enough and very diverse with respect to circumstances. And here we are not even counting the exceptions which their maxims constantly had to admit and which made them unfit for laws.

4.4 The Stoics, on the other hand, had quite properly chosen their supreme practical principle, namely virtue, as the condition of the highest good. But then, by representing the degree of virtue requisite for its pure laws as fully attainable in this life, they not only assumed the moral capacity of the human, under the name of a “wise one”, exceeding all limits of his nature—which contradicts all human knowledge—but most especially did not want the second component of the highest good, i.e., happiness, to be at all valid as a particular object of the human desire capacity. Instead they made their wise one like a divinity in the consciousness of the excellence of his person and as being entirely independent of nature (with regard to his contentment) by exposing, but not subjugating, him to the travails of life (likewise by picturing him as free from evil). In this way they actually omitted the second element of the highest good, personal happiness, by placing it merely in the actions and the satisfaction with the personal worth of their wise one and, therefore, encasing it in the consciousness of the moral way of thinking. In all of this, however, they could have become adequately refuted by the voice of their own nature.

5.1 The teaching of Christianity,* even if we do not consider it as a religious doctrine, provides here a concept of the highest good (the Kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the most rigorous requirement of practical reason.

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437 Stephen Uhl, it seems, has committed this very same error in his conception of “enlightened selfishness”. 
5.2 The moral law is holy (non-indulgent) and requires holiness of deportment, although all moral perfection, to which the human can achieve, is always only virtue, i.e., lawful disposition out of respect for the law, consequently with the consciousness of a continuing bent toward transgression, or at least of ignobleness, i.e., admixture of many non-genuine (non moral) motives for compliance with the law, which in turn renders a humbling estimation of self and, therefore, with regard to holiness required by the Christian law, leaves nothing to the creature except an advance into infinity, but for that very reason also justifies a hope in his own continuation extending out into infinity.

5.3 The value of a disposition, fully commensurate to the moral law, is infinite. And indeed because all possible happiness in the judgment of a wise and all empowered dispenser of happiness has no other restriction than a lack of commensurability of rational beings with their duty.

5.4 But still, of itself, the moral law does not promise happiness. For according to the concept of an order of nature in general, happiness is not necessarily connected with compliance with the law.

5.5 Now the Christian doctrine of deportment supplements this deficiency (of the second, indispensable component of the highest good) through the description of a world--where rational beings dedicate themselves to the moral law with their entire soul--as a Kingdom of God in which nature and deportment come into a harmony, each alien to the other, through a holy originator which makes the derived highest good possible.

5.6 The holiness of morals is already admonished to them for direction in life, but the weal proportioned to it, i.e., blessedness, is represented as attainable only in an eternity. The reason for this is that the former must always be the pattern of their conduct in every state, and the advancement to it is already possible and necessary in this world, but the latter, under the name of happiness, cannot be reached at all in this world (so much depending on our capacity) and hence is made entirely an object of hope.

5.7 Disregarding this, the Christian principle of morality itself is still not theological (thus heteronomy), but rather autonomy of pure practical reason for itself, because it does not

438 Here we have a definition of virtue, i.e., lawful disposition out of respect for the law

439 With regard to sanctification (moral perfection) then the human cannot expect to find inclinations such that sin is never a temptation, but only a state of moral determination such that obstacles must be constantly overcome, but also an increasing ability to do so, extending into the infinite future and justifying his own hope in his personal continuation into this same, infinite future.

440 This is treated extensively in Kant’s *Religion Within The Bounds Of Sheer Reason*. With a moral disposition, the only reason infinite righteousness is not attained is due to the lack of opportunity, and hence is immaterial in the estimation of an impartial judge.
make the recognition of God and His Will the basis of this law, but rather only of the
achievement to the highest good under the condition of the compliance with it. It even
places the actual motives for compliance with the law not in the wished for consequence
of doing so, but rather solely in the representation of duty, in whose true observance alone
the worthiness of the achievement of the those consequences consists. 441

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 People usually consider the Christian precepts of morality, with respect to their purity, to be
no better than the moral concepts of the Stoics. However, the distinction of the two is still
every evident.

1.2 The Stoic system made the consciousness of the soul’s strength the pivotal point, around
which all moral dispositions were to revolve. And though the adherents of this system
spoke indeed of duties, even entirely determined them, still they set the incentive and actual
determination basis of the will in an exaltation of the thinking manner above the motives of
the sense, which were lower and empowered only through the soul’s weakness.

1.3 With them, therefore, virtue was a certain heroism of the wise man, elevating himself above
the animal nature of the human, i.e., someone who is sufficient unto himself, and while he
does indeed expounds duties, he himself is above them and subject to no temptation to
transgress the moral law.

1.4 But all this they could not do, had they depicted this law to themselves in the purity and
rigor, as does the precepts of the Gospels.

1.5 If with an Idea I understand a perfection, to which nothing adequate can be given in experi-
ence, then the moral Ideas are not for that reason excessive, i.e., such, concerning which we
could not even determine the concept sufficiently for which it is uncertain whether any-
where an object might correspond to it, such as are the Ideas of speculative reason. These
Ideas rather serve, as prototypes of practical perfection, for the indispensable guideline of
moral conduct and, simultaneously, for the standard of comparison.

1.6 Now if I consider the Christian moral from its philosophical side, then, when compared
with the Ideas of the Greek schools, it would appear in this way: the Ideas of the Cynic, the
Epicurean, the Stoic and the Christian are, respectively: natural naiveté, prudence, wisdom
and holiness.

1.7 With respect to the way to achieve to their Ideas, the Greek philosophers so distinguished
themselves from one another that the Cynic found the common understanding sufficient to
that, the other two only the way of science, all therefore still the mere usage of the natural
powers.

1.8 The Christian moral, because it furnishes its precepts (as it also must be ) so purely and
non-indulgently, removes all confidence of the human in being fully adequate, at least in
this life, but still also in turn comforts him, that, if we act as good as is in our power, we can
hope that what is not in our capacity comes to us from elsewhere, whether we know in what
manner or not.

1.9 Aristotle and Plato differed only with respect to the origin of their moral concepts.

6.1 In such way then, through the concept of the highest good which is the object and final
purpose of pure practical reason, the moral law leads to religion, i.e., to the recognition of
all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, i.e., arbitrary regulations of a foreign

441 We don’t come to the knowledge of the moral law through a preceding knowledge of God and His Will,
but rather first through the moral law and then to the recognition of God as a necessary condition for the
provision of the happiness commensurate to the degree of our moral perfection.
will, which are otherwise contingent, but rather as essential laws of each and every free will for itself, but which must be viewed as commandments of the highest being because only from a morally perfect (holy and good) and likewise all powerful Will are we able to hope for the highest good, the institution of which as the object of our striving is made into a duty for us by the moral law, and therefore [then also] the achievement of that highest good through agreement [of my will] with this Will.

6.2 Hence also everything here remains free of selfishness and is based merely upon duty; without fear or hope having to be the basis as incentives, which, if they became principles, would destroy the entire moral value of the actions.442

6.3 The moral law commands the production of the highest possible good in a world as the final object of all of my conduct.

6.4 But this production I cannot hope to effect except solely through the agreement of my will with that of a holy and good world creator. And although my own happiness is included in the concept of the highest good as that of a whole in which the greatest happiness is represented as connected with the greatest measure of moral perfection (possible in creatures) and in the most exacting proportion, even so it is not the happiness, but rather the moral law (which rigorously restricts my boundless demand for happiness to certain conditions) which is the determination basis of the will, which is directed to the promotion of the highest good.

7.1 Hence then also morality is not actually the doctrine of how we make ourselves happy, but rather of how we make ourselves worthy of happiness.

7.2 Only then, upon the advent of religion, does the hope arise of someday participating in happiness in that measure as we were considered to be not unworthy of it.443

8.1 Worthy is everyone of the possession of a thing or of a state, if his being in this possession accords with the highest good.444

8.2 Now we can easily see that all worthiness depends upon moral conduct, because it, in the concept of the highest good, constitutes the condition for the remainder (which belongs to the individual’s state), namely the portion of happiness.

442 Here we can compare the “extortion” of Islam (according to Kant’s characterization in his Religion-General Remarks to Part IV, Par. 7) with the freedom of Christianity.

443 There is no hope of enduring happiness except through the advent of religion.

444 And so we sometimes say of someone that he deserved happiness.
8.3 Now it follows from this that one must never treat morality on its own as a doctrine of happiness, i.e., as guides for participating in happiness. Morality is solely concerned with the rational condition (conditio sine qua non\textsuperscript{445}) of the happiness and not with its acquisition.

8.4 But if morality (which merely imposes duties without issuing measures for self-serving wishes) is presented in its entirety, then after a moral wish has arisen, i.e., one based on law, to promote the highest good (the production of the Kingdom of God for us)--to which no self-serving soul could ascend before hand--and after the step to religion in support of that has occurred, then and only then can this moral teaching also be termed a doctrine of happiness, because only with religion does the hope for happiness first arise.\textsuperscript{446}

9.1 We can see from this, therefore, that if we inquire about the final purpose of God in the creation of the world, we would have to mention not the happiness of rational beings in it, but rather the highest good, which imposes upon every wish of these beings a condition, namely that of being worthy of happiness, i.e., the morality of these very same rational beings. This alone contains the standard, according to which they are able to hope to participate in happiness through the hand of a Wise Creator.

9.2 For since wisdom, theoretically speaking, means the recognition of the highest good, and practically speaking, the commensurability of the will to the highest good, one cannot attribute to a supreme, autonomous wisdom a purpose which were based merely on goodness.\textsuperscript{447}

9.3 For to this [wisdom] we can think its effect (with respect to the happiness of rational beings) only under the restricting conditions of the agreement with the Holiness\textsuperscript{a} of His Will as commensurate to the highest original good.

9.4 Hence those who take the purpose of creation to be the honor of God (provided that we not think this anthropomorphically as an inclination to be praised) have indeed found the best expression.

\textsuperscript{445} In the absence of which there is nothing.

\textsuperscript{446} We know that happiness will not follow morality in accordance with laws of nature. And so there can be no basis for hoping for a happiness commensurate to a worthiness to be happy apart from religion.

\textsuperscript{447} Kant is saying that the moral conduct could not be possible if there were not a differentiation in the reward with compliance with the moral law, and so if we had a world where the goal was the total happiness of every being, regardless of conduct, then we would have a world where there could be no moral law, for it would make the law inane. Kant touches upon this in the first Preface to his \textit{Religion}, par. 2.
9.5 For nothing honors God more than that which is the most precious thing in the world, respect for his commandment, the observance of that holy duty which His law imposes upon us, if in addition His splendid institution is added in order to crown such a beautiful order with commensurate happiness.

9.6 If the latter (to speak in human tones) makes Him worthy of love, then by means of the former He becomes an object of adoration.

9.7 Indeed even humans can obtain love through benevolence, but never respect in that way alone, so that the greatest beneficence honors them only when it is practiced with dignity.

* Kant’s footnote:
1. Herewith and in order to make the peculiarity of this concept accessible, I will only note that since one attributes diverse properties to God, whose quality one also finds commensurate to the creatures, only that with God they are elevated to the highest degree, e.g., power, knowledge, presence, goodness, etc., under the denomination of omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, omnibenevolence, etc., there are still three properties which are attributed to God exclusively and still without any admixture of quantity, and which all together are moral, namely: He alone is the Holy, alone the Blessed, alone the Wise. The reason for this is because these concepts already entail the lack of qualification.
2. According to the order of these, therefore, He is then also the Holy Legislator (and Creator), the Good Governor (and Sustainer) and the Just Judge. These three properties contain everything within themselves whereby God becomes the object of religion, and commensurate to which the metaphysical perfections are naturally appended by reason.

10.1 That in the order of ends the human (and with him every rational being) is an end on his own, i.e., may never be used by anyone (not even by God) as a means without at the same time being an end, that therefore humanity in our own person would have to be holy even to ourselves, this follows as self evident because the human is the subject of the moral law, thus of that which is holy on its own and for which reason alone, and in agreement with which even in general, anything can be termed holy.  

10.2 For this moral law is based on the autonomy of his will as a free will, which, with respect to his universal laws must be able to agree necessarily with that, to which he is supposed to subject himself.

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448 Here Kant seems to distance himself from the thinking of John Calvin. For God, according here to Kant, can never use any person solely as a means.
VI. Postulates of Pure Practical Reason in General

1.1 These all arise from the foundational proposition of morality, which is not a postulate but rather a law through which reason immediately determines the will, which will, as pure will, for the very reason that it is so determined, requires these necessary conditions of compliance with its precepts.  

1.2 These postulates are not theoretical dogmata, but rather presuppositions in a necessary, practical regard. And while they do not expand the speculative recognition, they do give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their referral to the practical), and justify them for concepts, whose possibility they also could not otherwise even presume to assert.

2.1 These postulates are those of immortality, freedom (considered positively, i.e., as the causality of a being to the extent it belongs to the intelligible world) and the existence of God.

2.2 The first arises from the practically necessary condition of the commensurability of the duration for the completion of the fulfillment of the moral law. The second arises from the necessary presupposition of independence from the sense world and of the capacity for the determination of its will according to the law of an intelligible world, i.e., of freedom. And the third comes from the necessity of the condition to such an intelligible world, in order to be the highest good, through the presupposition of the highest independent good, i.e., the existence of God.

3.1 The intention to the highest good, therefore, an intention necessitated through the respect for the moral law and the presupposition of the objective reality of the highest good flowing from that, leads through postulates of practical reason to concepts which speculative reason could indeed present as tasks, but not solve.

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449 Since the moral law commands imperiously, and since commands without a purpose are vain, the highest good becomes the purpose which entails both a perfection of virtue and a commensurate matching of happiness, and this is only possible via eternal life and God. These two must be presupposed in order to rationalize a moral act.

450 Since we are required by the highest good to achieve to moral perfection and since this cannot be expected during an earthly life, immortality is required.

451 The moral law is objectively meaningful for us and this means that we must be free which we can only understand with respect to an intelligible world.

452 God is a necessary presupposition in order to justify the conception of an intelligible world as called for by the highest good.
3.2 1. This intention, therefore, leads to that, in whose solution speculative reason could meet with nothing except paralogism (namely of immortality), due to the lack of the identification mark of endurance. The result here is to complete the psychological concept of a final subject by means of a real representation of subject—which was attributed necessarily to the soul in the self consciousness. This mark practical reason furnishes through the postulate of a continuing existence, an existence adequate to the moral law in the highest good, as the entire purpose of practical reason.

3.3 2. It leads to something, concerning which speculative reason contained nothing except an antinomy, whose solution it could base only upon a problematical concept, which was indeed thinkable but, according to its objective reality, not provable and determinable. This something was the cosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of our existence in that world by means of the postulate of freedom (whose reality it establishes through the moral law and with it simultaneously the law of an intelligible world, on which speculative reason could only point to, but not determine, its concept).

3.4 3. Finally to something that speculative reason indeed had to think, but was forced to leave undetermined as a mere transcendental idea, namely: the theological concept of the original being, provides meaning (in a practical intention, i.e., as of a condition of the possibility of the object of a will determined through that law) as the supreme principle of the highest good in an intelligible world through an autocratic moral legislation in that.

4.1 But now, does our recognition actually become expanded in such manner through pure practical reason, and is that, which was transcendent for the speculative, immanent in the practical?

4.2 Certainly, but only in practical intention.

4.3 For indeed we recognize in that way that neither the nature of our soul nor the intelligible world nor the highest being with respect to what they are on their own, but rather have only united the concept of them in the practical concept of the highest good as the object of our will. And we have done this fully a priori through pure reasoning, but only by means of the moral law and also merely in reference to that law with respect to the object, which it commands.

4.4 But how freedom even be possible, and how we have to represent this manner of causality theoretically and positively to ourselves, is not penetrated in this way, but rather only that such as this be postulated through the moral law and in support of that law.
4.5 It is also similar with the remaining Ideas, which, according to their possibility, no human understanding will ever fathom, but also, that they not be true concepts, no sophistry will ever tear away from the conviction of even the most common man.
VII. How an Expansion of Pure Reason in a Practical Intention be Possible to think, without at the same time in that way expanding its Recognition as Speculative

1.1 In order not to become too abstract, we want to answer this question in application to the present case.--

1.2 In order to expand a pure recognition practically, an intention must be given a priori, i.e., a purpose as object (of the will), which is represented independently from all theoretical foundational propositions through an imperative, which determines the will immediately (categorically). Accordingly this purpose must be represented as necessary practically. Here that is the highest good.

1.3 But this is not possible without presupposing three theoretical concepts (for which, because they are merely pure reasoning concepts, no corresponding perspective, thus on the theoretical way no objective reality, permits of discovery), namely: freedom, immortality and God.

1.4 Through the practical law, therefore, which commands the existence of the highest good possible in a world, the possibility of those objects of pure speculative reason, the objective reality of which this speculative reason could not secure to them, becomes postulated. And in this way the theoretical recognition of pure reason obtains an increase in each of the three cases, but which consists merely in these otherwise entirely problematical (merely thinkable) concepts now being asserted to be such which objects actual befit.453 And the justification for this assertion is that practical reason has unavoidable need of the existence of these for the possibility of its utterly and practically necessary object of the highest good. And in that way does the theoretical become justified, in presupposing them.454

1.5 But this expansion of the theoretical reason is not an expansion of the speculative, i.e., in order to now make a possible use of that in the theoretical intention.

453 We could think these concepts in the Dialectic of the CPR, but could assert nothing about them, but could only think them. No recognition was possible because no perspective was possible. Now we know for a fact that these concepts have objects, per practical reason, but we are in the same situation as before with respect to any theoretical recognition, i.e., no possibility. We can do no more than think them as we did in the theoretical, without any recognition of relevance.

454 So theoretical reasonings has these three objects of God, immortality and freedom, which have to be accepted for the sake of practical reason, which needs these objects. But nothing can be concluded from these in the theoretical sciences. There are postulated, but not discussed in the sciences.
1.6 For since nothing further was performed through practical reason in this way except that those concepts are real and actually have their (possible) objects, but concerning which nothing of a perspective of them is given to us (which also cannot be required), it follows that no synthetic proposition is possible through this admitted reality of these concepts.\textsuperscript{455}

1.7 Regarding the speculative intention, therefore, this opening does not help us in the least, though indeed it does help with respect to the practical usage of pure reason for the expansion of this our recognition.

1.8 The above three Ideas of speculative reasoning are on their own yet no recognitions. But still they are (transcendent) thoughts, in which there is nothing which is impossible.

1.9 Now through an apodictic, practical law they, as the necessary conditions of the possibility of what this law commands to make as its object, obtain objective reality. In other words through that law we become instructed that they have objects, but without being able to indicate how their concept refers to an object. And this is still also not a recognition of these objects; for we cannot at all judge synthetically about them in that way nor can we in any way determine theoretically their application, thus we can make of them no theoretical usage of reason except in the way that all speculative recognitions of such objects actually consists.

1.10 But still the theoretical recognition was expanded in that way, not indeed of these objects, but of reason in general to the extent that through the practical postulates objects were given to those Ideas, i.e., in this way a merely problematical thought first obtained objective reality.

1.11 Therefore it was no expansion of the recognition of given, supersensitive objects, but still an expansion of theoretical reason and the recognition of that expansion with respect to the supersensitive in general, to the extent it became necessary to admit that there be such objects, though still without being able to determine them closer, thus even to expand this recognition of the objects (which are given to it moreover out of practical bases and also only for a practical usage). For this increase, therefore, pure theoretical reason, for which all those Ideas are transcendent and without object, has solely to thank its pure practical capacity.

1.12 Here they become immanent and constitutive in that they are the basis of the possibility for making the necessary object of pure practical reason (the highest good) an actuality, since they, without this are transcendent and merely regulative principles of speculative reasoning.

\textsuperscript{455} In the speculative use of reason we were able to treat these concepts as thinkable, but nothing regarding their possibility. Now we are able to grasp this reality of the concepts, though still not the reality of the objects, although we do grasp now the possibility of the objects related to them.
reason, which does not force reason to assume a new object out beyond experience, but rather only to draw its usage in experience closer to completeness.

1.13 But if reason is once in possession of this increase, then as speculative reason (actually only for the procurement of its practical usage) it will deal with those Ideals negatively, i.e. not as expanding, but rather as explicative, in order to check on one side the anthropomorphism as the source of superstition of the apparent expansion of those concepts through alleged experience, and on the other side to check the fanaticism which promises it through supersensitive perspective or supersensitive feelings. These are all hindrances of the practical usage of pure reason, the defense against which belonging, therefore, in any case to the expansion of our recognition in the practical intention without simultaneously contradicting this by insisting that reason in the speculative intention have won in that way nothing at all.

2.1 To every usage of reason with respect to an object, pure understanding concepts (categories) are required, without which no object can be thought.

2.2 These categories can only be applied to the theoretical use of reason, i.e, to that recognition to which simultaneously perspective (which always is sensitive) is underlaid, and, therefore, merely in order to represent an object of possible experience through those categories.®

2.3 But here Ideas of reason, which can be given in no experience at all, are what I would have to think through these categories in order to recognize anything.

2.4 But also here we are not concerned with the theoretical recognition of the objects of these Ideas, but rather that they in general have objects.

2.5 This reality pure practical reason supplies and, accordingly the theoretical reason, has nothing further to do except merely to think those objects through categories, which as we otherwise clearly indicated, proceeds very well without having need of any perspective (neither sensitive nor supersensitive). And the reason is that the categories have their seat and origin independently in the pure understanding and before all perspective, solely as the capacity to think. And they always indicate only an object in general, regardless of the manner as to how it may be given to us.

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® The reason for this, as we learn from the CPR, is that a schema is required in theoretical reasoning, and this is only possible for us with regard to objects of the senses where a perspective is possible.

®® And so we cannot recognize any object, but we can know that there is an object, an object which cannot be recognized by us.
2.6 Now to the categories to the extent they are supposed to be applied to those Ideas, no object indeed can possibly be given in the perspective. But for them nevertheless, namely that such an object be actual, thus that the category as a mere thought form not be empty here, but rather have meaning through an object which practical reason unquestionably offers in the concept of the highest good, the reality of the concepts, which belong in aid of the possibility of that highest good, is sufficiently secured. And yet at the same time this does not effect the least expansion of the recognition according to theoretical foundational propositions.

*     *     *

3.1 Furthermore if these Ideas of God, or an intelligible world (of the Kingdom of God) and of immortality are determined through predicates which are taken from our own nature, we may consider this determination neither as a sensitization of those pure rational Ideas (anthropomorphism), nor as an extravagant recognition of supersensitive objects. For these predicates are none other than understanding and will, and indeed so considered in relation to one another as they must be thought in the moral law, therefore only to the extent a pure practical usage is made of them.

3.2 For we abstract from all else which adheres to these concepts psychologically, i.e., to the extent we observe our capacities empirically as we implement them (e.g., that the understanding of the human is discursive, his representations therefore being thoughts and not sightings, that these follow upon one another in time, that his will is always burdened with a dependence of satisfaction in the existence of his object, etc., which cannot be such in the highest being). And after this abstraction concerning the concept through which we think a pure understanding being to ourselves, nothing remains then than what is directly required to the possibility of thinking a moral law to ourselves. Thus there is indeed a recognition of God, but only in a practical referral. And on the other hand, if we make an attempt to expand this practical recognition to a theoretical one, we obtain an understanding of a something, which does not think but rather sights, and a will, which is directed to objects, on whose existence His satisfaction does not at all depend. (And here I will not even mention the transcendental predicates, e.g., a magnitude of the existence, i.e., endurance, but which does not take place in time, as the single means possible to us, for representing existence as a quantity), for these are sheer properties, concerning which we can fashion no concept at all that were suitable for the recognition of the object. In this way we are instructed that these predicates can never be used for a theory of supersensitive entities. And on such predicates, therefore, we are not at all empowered to base a speculative recognition, but rather are to limit their use solely for the application of the moral law.
VII. How an Expansion of Pure Reason in a Practical Intention be Possible to think without at the same time in that way expanding its Recognition as Speculative.

4.1 This latter is quite evident and can be clearly proven through the fact. Indeed proven so clearly that we can confidently summon all alleged natural “divine scholars” (a wondrous title)* to offer even one property which determines this its object (out beyond the mere ontological predicates), perchance the understanding or the will,

and on which we could not establish without contradiction that if we strip away everything anthropomorphic from it, only the mere word would remain to us, and without us being able to connect with that the least concept accordingly to which an expansion of the theoretical recognition might be hoped for.

4.2 But with respect to the practical, there remains to us from the properties of an understanding and a will yet still the concept of a relationship, to which the practical law (which determines a priori precisely this relationship of understanding to the will) supplies objective reality.

4.3 Now if this has once occurred, then the concept of the object of a morally determined will (to that of the highest good) and with it to the conditions of its possibility, the Ideas of God, freedom and immortality, are also given reality, but always only in referral to the implementation of the moral law (and not for any speculative assistance).

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 Scholarship is actually only the embodiment of historical science.

1.2 Accordingly only the teacher of the revealed theology can be called a divine scholar.

1.3 But if we wanted also to use “scholar” for someone who is in possession of rational knowledge (mathematics and philosophy), even though this would already conflict with the meaning of the word (as what always counts as scholarship, i.e., what someone must certainly be taught and which no one cannot invent of himself via reason, then the philosopher with his knowledge of God as a positive science would make a very bad show in wanting to be called a scholar.

5.1 Now after these reminders, the answer to the important question is also easily found, namely whether the concept of God belong to physics (thus also to metaphysics, as that which alone contains the pure principle a priori of physics in its universal meaning), or to morals?

5.2 To explain arrangements of nature or their alterations, if we take here refuge with God as the originator of all things, is at least no physical explanation and indeed a complete admission of having achieved to the end of philosophy. And this because we are necessitated to assume something of which we otherwise have no concept, in order to be able to make a concept of the possibility of that which we see before our eyes.
5.3 To achieve through metaphysics, however, from the information of this world to the concept of God and to the proofs of His existence by sure conclusions, is impossible. In order to be able to do this we would have to recognize this world as the most perfect possible whole. Hence, for this purpose, we would have to recognize all possible worlds (in order to be able to compare them with this one), and thus be all knowing in order to say that this world was possible only through a God (as we must think this concept to ourselves).

5.4 But to completely recognize the existence of this being out of sheer concepts, is utterly impossible. Why? Because every existential proposition, i.e. which says of a being of which I make a concept, that it exists, is a synthetic statement, i.e. one where I go out beyond the concept and say more of it than was thought in its concept--namely: to this concept in the understanding also an object apart from the understanding is correspondingly to be assumed--which is obviously impossible to produce through any sort of a conclusion.

5.5 Therefore one single technique remains for reason to achieve to this recognition, since it, namely as pure reason, determines its object by proceeding from the supreme principle of its pure practical usage (by this being directed merely to the existence of something which is a consequence of reason).

5.6 And here in its unavoidable task, i.e., the necessity for directing the will to the highest good, is revealed not only the necessity for assuming such an original being in reference to the possibility of this good in the world, but moreover, and what is most noteworthy, the necessity of assuming something which was entirely lacking to the advance of reason in the natural way, namely a precisely determined concept of this original being.

5.7 Since we are only acquainted with this world to a small degree, and are even less able to compare it with all possible worlds, we can indeed conclude from its order, purposefulness and magnitude to an originator which is wise, benevolent, powerful, etc., but not to one which is all knowing, all benevolent, all powerful, etc.

5.8 We can also easily admit indeed that we are well authorized to supplement this unavoidable defect through an entirely reasonable hypothesis: namely that if we find wisdom, goodness, etc., shining forth in so many aspects, as our developing familiarity reveals to us, we can also admit it will be just the same in all others, and therefore it is reasonable to attribute to the world originator all possible perfection. But these are not conclusions, by means of which we add something to our insight, but rather only self indulgent authorizations, and where we still have need of a recommendation from somewhere else in order to make use of them.

5.9 On the empirical way (of physics), therefore, the concept of God always remains an imprecisely determined concept of the perfection of the first being, in order to hold that be-
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ing commensurate to the concept of a divinity (but with metaphysics, in its transcendental portion, nothing at all is to be justified).

6.1 Now I attempt to hold this concept to the object of practical reason and here I find that the moral foundational proposition only permits this object as possible under the presupposition of a world originator of the highest perfection.

6.2 He must be all knowing, in order to recognize my conduct down to my most intimate disposition in all possible cases and throughout the future; all powerful in order to convey to it the commensurate consequence; precisely so then all present, eternal, etc.

6.3 In this way, by means of the concept of the highest good as the object of pure practical reason, the moral law determines the concept of the original being as the concept of the highest being, which the physical (and even higher, the metaphysical) and thus the entire speculative course of reason could not effect.

6.4 The concept of God, therefore, is a concept originally belonging not to physics, i.e., not to the speculative reason, but rather to morals, and we can say precisely the same thing also of the remaining rational concepts which we have dealt with earlier as postulates of those concepts in their practical usage.

7.1 If in the history of Greek philosophy out beyond Anaxagoras, we encounter no distinct trace of a purely rational theology, the reason is not due to a lack in understanding and insight on the part of the ancient philosophers to rise to that by means of speculation, at least to the extent of an entirely reasonable hypothesis. What could be easier or more natural than the thought, which arises to everyone, for assuming a single, rational world cause, which has all perfection, instead of undetermined degree of perfection of diverse world causes?

7.2 But the ills in the world seemed to them to be a much too important challenge for them to hold such an hypothesis as justified.

7.3 Hence precisely in this did they show understanding and insight by not accepting such an hypothesis, and instead by seeking about in the natural causes, to see if they might not encounter among them the constitution and capacity requisite to original beings.

7.4 But after this acute people had engaged so far in investigations to treat even moral objects philosophically, concerning which other peoples have never more than chattered about, they found first of all a new need, namely a practical one, which did not fail to give them

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the concept of the original being in a determined way. At this point speculative reason had
the alertness, indeed even more the merit, to decorate a concept which had not arisen un-
der its tillage. And via a cortège of certification of natural considerations, which now first
emerged, speculative reason promoted not its authority (which was already established),
but rather much more only the pageantry of alleged theoretical rational insight.

8.1 With this reminder, the reader of the critique of pure speculative reason, will perfectly
convince himself how highly necessary and how fruitful for theology and morals that te-
dious deduction of the categories was.\textsuperscript{459}

8.2 For in that way alone are we prevented from holding them as did Plato, i.e., placing them
in pure understanding, as innate at birth and on that to base extravagant presumptions via
theories of the supersensitive, concerning which no end is foreseen, and in that way to
make theology the magic wand of phantoms of the brain. And on the other hand if we
hold them as devised, à la Epicurus, we are then also prevented from limiting each and
every usage of them, and even in the practical intention, merely to objects and determina-
tion foundations of the senses.

8.3 But now, after the critique proved first in their deduction that they are not of empirical
origin, but rather have their seat and source a priori in pure understanding, and second
also that since they are referred to objects in general, independent of their perspective,
they indeed produce theoretical realization only in application to empirical objects, but
still also, applied to an object given through pure practical reason, these categories serve
to the determined thinking of the supersensitive, but only to the extent this is determined
merely through such predicates which belong necessarily to the pure, a priori, given prac-
tical intention and its possibility.

8.4 Speculative restrictions of pure reason and practical expansion of that first bring these
into that relation of equality, where reason in general can be used purposefully. And this
example proves better than anything else, that the way to wisdom, if it is supposed to be
secure and not impassable or error-prone, would for us humans have to go unavoidably
through science, but concerning which we can be convinced that this leads to that goal
only after its completion.

\textsuperscript{459} The \textit{Transcendental Deduction} of the Categories from the \textit{CPR}.
VIII. The Avowal out of a Need of Pure Reason

1.1 A need of pure reason in its speculative usage leads only to hypotheses, but a need of pure practical reason leads to postulates. In the first case I ascend from the derived as high in the series of the bases as I will, and I have need of an original base, not in order to give objective reality to the derived in the series (e.g., of the causal connection of things and changes in the world), but rather only in order to completely satisfy my investigative reason with respect to that series.\(^{460}\)

1.2 For example I see order and purposefulness in the nature before me and have no need of turning to speculation in order to be assured of their reality. But I do have need of speculation in order to explain them by presupposing a divinity as their cause. For since the conclusion from an effect to a determined cause--especially to such a precisely and such a completely determined cause as we have to think of God--is always unsure and awkward, such a presupposition cannot be used further than to the degree of the most reasonable opinion for us humans.\(^{461}\)

1.3 On the other hand a need of pure practical reason is based on a duty to make something (the highest good) the object of my will in order to promote it according to all my powers. But in this regard I must presuppose the possibility of this object, thus also the conditions necessary for it, namely: God, freedom and immortality. And the reason [for this presupposition] is that I cannot prove these three via my speculative reason, but I also cannot refute them.

1.4 This duty is based on a law, which is, of course, independent from this latter presupposition entirely, and which is apodictic and certain of itself, namely the moral law. And this duty has no need of any further support through a theoretical opinion about the inner constitution of things, or about any secret aims of the world order or about any governor standing over that world, in order to bind us to unconditioned lawful actions in the most perfect way.\(^{462}\)

1.5 But the subjective effect of this law, namely the disposition commensurate to it and also necessary through that for promoting the highest good that is practically possible, still at

\(^{460}\) In speculation we are in pursuit of the conditioned, and with regard to a series that would be its completion. So, for example, A is caused by B and B is caused by C, etc., and so I want to go back to the original cause of this entire series. The reality of A being the effect of B is not of concern, but here only that original foundation.

\(^{461}\) And so the most we can do in rational speculation is achieve to a reasonable opinion, but neither to belief nor knowledge.

\(^{462}\) The authority of the moral law is not based on the possibility of the highest good or God, but stands rather as a feat of pure reason on the human consciousness, independently of all other considerations.
least presupposes that this highest good be possible. For otherwise it would be impossible, from a practical standpoint, to strive toward the object of a concept which were essentially empty and without object.\footnote{463}

1.6 Now the above postulates touch only the physical or metaphysical conditions or, concisely stated, those conditions which lie in the nature of things concerning the possibility of the highest good. But these postulates are not in aid of an arbitrary, speculative intention, but rather serve for the sake of a practically necessary purpose of the pure rational will, which here does not choose, but rather obeys, an unremitting rational command, which has its basis objectively in the constitution of the things to the extent they must be universally estimated through pure reason. This [command] is not based per chance on an inclination, which we are not in any way justified in assuming, in aid to that which we wish out of merely subjective bases, as soon as the means to that are possible or the object is considered as actual.

1.7 This, therefore, is a need in an utterly necessary intention and justifies its presupposition not merely as a permitted hypothesis, but rather as a postulate in a practical intention. And given that the pure moral law unremittingly binds everyone as command (not as a rule of prudence), the upright may indeed say, “I will that there be a God, and that my existence in this world be yet an existence in a pure understanding world apart from the connection with nature,”\footnote{464} and finally also that my duration be endless. And I insist upon these and do not allow this belief to be take from me. For this is the only thing where my interest—because I am unable to abandon any of this—determines my judgment, without paying attention to any rational contriving, as little as I might also be in a position to answer them or to oppose them with more apparent ones.”\footnote{**}

\* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 But even here we would be unable to make a pretext of a need of reason, if a problematic, but still unavoidable, concept of reason did not arise before our eyes, namely that of the absolutely necessary being.

1.2 This concept will now be determined and, as soon as the incentive for expansion is appended, that concept is the objective basis of a need of speculative reason, namely the concept of a necessary being which is to serve as the basis for more closely determining other concepts, and also to make this being identifiable.\footnote{465}

1.3 Without such necessary problems preceding, there are no needs, at least not for pure reason. All other needs are needs of inclination.

\footnote{463} The highest good calls for moral perfection. But who would strive to achieve to such perfection if that were considered as impossible to attain?

\footnote{464} Namely that I am free.

\footnote{465} In the Dialectic of CPR we were natural driven to the conception of a necessary being, but were unable in any way to identify what that might be. We had also the concept of the most perfect being, but were unable to make a secure connection to the necessary being. Now in the CPrR we are able finally to identity this being.
** Kant’s footnote:

1.1 In February of 1778, a treatise was presented in the German Museum by a very fine and clear thinker, the same Wizenmann, whose early death is regrettable. In this treatise he contested the authority of concluding from a need to the objective reality of the object of that need, and illustrated his point with the example of an amorous fellow who, by becoming infatuated with an Idea of beauty, which is merely a figment of imagination, wanted to conclude that such an object actually existed somewhere.

1.2 In so thinking I acknowledge him as perfectly correct in every case where the need is founded upon inclination, which cannot necessarily postulate the existence of its object even for him who is tempted by that, much less contain a requirement valid for everyone. Hence it is a merely subjective basis of wishes.

1.3 But here we have a rational need out of an objective determination basis of the will, namely originating in the moral law, which necessarily connects every rational being, therefore justifies a priori: to the presupposition of a condition in nature, commensurate to him, and makes the latter inseparable from the complete practical usage of reason.

1.4 It is duty to make the highest good actual, according to our greatest capacity. Hence it must also be possible, thus it is also unavoidable for every rational being in the world to presuppose that which is necessary for its objective possibility.

1.5 The presupposition is as necessary as the moral law, in referral to which it also is only valid.

* * *

2.1 In order to avoid any misinterpretation with the use of such an unusual concept as that of a pure, practical, rational belief, permit me to add yet a remark.--

2.2 It would almost seem as though this rational belief were announced here as a command, namely to assume the highest good as possible.

2.3 But a belief, which becomes commanded, is an absurdity.

2.4 But we should remind ourselves of the above controversy concerning what is demanded in the concept of the highest good, and we will then remember that we cannot at all be commanded to assume this possibility and that no practical disposition would demand it, and instead we will remember that speculative reason would have to admit this without any request. For no one may claim to assert that it would be impossible per se for there to be a state of worthiness (suitable to the moral law) of rational beings in the world to be happy, which worthiness were connected with a possession of a commensurate degree of happiness.

2.5 Now with respect to the first element of the highest good, i.e., what concerns morality, the moral law simply gives us a command. And to doubt the possibility of that constituent element were just the same as bringing the moral law itself into doubt.

2.6 But if indeed we admit the possibility in general of the second element of that object, namely the happiness thoroughly commensurate to that worthiness, we have no need of a
command at all, for theoretical reason itself has nothing against it. Only the manner as to how we are supposed to think such a harmony of the laws of nature with those of freedom concerns something, regarding which a choice arises to us, because theoretical reason decides nothing about this with apodictic certitude. With respect to this provision of commensurate happiness, however, there can be a moral interest which tips the balance.

3.1 Earlier I had indicated that according to the mere natural course in the world, the happiness precisely commensurate to the moral worthiness is not to be expected and is to be held as impossible. Accordingly, therefore, the possibility of the highest good from this side can only be admitted under the presupposition of a moral world originator.

3.2 I deliberately held back concerning the limiting of this judgment to the subjective conditions of our reason. And I did so in order only then to make use of it first and foremost if the manner of its avowal should become more nearly subjective, i.e., if our reason were to find it impossible to make comprehensible such a precisely commensurate and thoroughly purposeful cohesion between two world events, occurring as they would according to such diverse laws with respect to a natural course. Nevertheless as with everything which is otherwise purposeful in nature, it can still also not prove, i.e., adequately establish from objective bases, the impossibility of that according to universal laws of nature.

4.1 However now a decision basis of another manner comes into play in order to tip the balance in the wavering of speculative reason.

4.2 The command to promote the highest good is objectively enabled (in practical reason), and its possibility in general likewise objectively enabled (in theoretical reason, which has nothing against it).

4.3 However, reason cannot objectively decide the manner of representing this possibility to ourselves, i.e., whether according to universal laws of nature without a wise originator overseeing nature, or only under his presupposition.

4.4 Here now a subjective condition of reason enters into play, namely the manner, uniquely possible to it theoretically and at the same time compatible alone with morality (which stands under an objective law of reason) for thinking the exact agreement of the Kingdom of Nature with the Kingdom of Morals as a condition of the possibility of the highest good.

4.5 Now since the promotion of that highest good and, therefore, the presupposition of its possibility is objectively necessary (but only as a consequence of practical reason), but at the same time the manner, in which we claim to think it as possible, is our choice, but in which a free interest of the pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a wise
world originator, it follows that the principle which determines our judgment in this, both subjectively as need, but also simultaneously as promotional means of what is itself objectively (practically) necessary, is the basis of a maxim of the avowal in the moral intention, i.e., a faith of pure practical reason.

4.6 This avowal, therefore, is not commanded. Instead, as a voluntary judgment, conducive to the moral (commanded) intention and agreeing with the theoretical need of reason for assuming that existence and laying it as the basis to the use of reason, it arises from the moral disposition itself. Accordingly the avowal, even with well-disposed people, occasionally turns into wavering, but never into disbelief.
IX. Concerning the Proportion wisely commensurate to the Practical Determination of the Human Recognitional Capacity

1.1 If human nature is determined to strive to the highest good, the measure of its recognition capacities, especially their relation among one another, must also be assumed as fitting to this purpose.

1.2 But now the critique of pure speculative reason proves the great insufficiency of reason for solving the most important task suitable to the purpose which is proposed to it. And even though this critique does not misjudge the natural and not-to-be-overlooked hint of that very same reason, nor also the great steps which it can undertake to approach this great goal, which is marked out to it, still reason never attains this goal of itself even with the aid of the greatest recognition of nature.

1.3 Here, therefore, nature seems to have supplied us quite miserly with regard to the capacity needful to our purpose.

2.1 Now assume nature had been accommodating to our wish in this quest, and had bestowed on us that insightful capacity or illumination, which we would gladly like to have, or in whose possession some actually even fancy to find themselves; what would be the consequence of that with respect to all considerations?

2.2 Provided that our entire nature were not simultaneously changed, the inclinations, which still always have the first word, would demand their satisfaction before all else and, connected with rational reflection, their greatest possible and continuing satisfaction under the name of happiness. The moral law would then also speak, in order to hold the inclinations in their suitable limits and even to subject them all together to a higher purpose, without regard to any inclination.

2.3 But instead of the conflict, which the moral disposition presently has to engage in with the inclinations, in which after some setbacks the soul still gradually acquires moral strength, we would find that God and eternity, with their awesome majesty, would lie incessantly before our eyes (for what we can perfectly prove holds with respect to certitude as much as what we can assure ourselves through visual inspection).

2.4 The transgression of the law, of course, would be avoided, and the commandment complied with. But because the disposition, from which actions are supposed to occur, can be infused by no law, and the arousal to action here would be ever present and external, reason may not first work its way up to gather strength for resistance against inclinations through a lively representation of the worth of the law. Accordingly most legitimate actions would occur from fear, a few would arise from hope, but none at all from duty. And
a moral value of actions, on which alone depends the value for the person and even of the world in the eyes of the highest wisdom, would not exist at all.

2.5 The conduct of the humans, therefore, as long as their nature remains as it is now, would be changed into a mere mechanism, where, as in the puppet shows, the figures would gesticulate very well, but no life could be encountered within them.

2.6 Now since it is constituted entirely differently with us, for with every effort of our reason we have only a very obscure and equivocal consideration into the future, for the world governor allows us only to suppose, not to spy or clearly prove, his existence and his splendor,

and since on the other hand the moral law within us, without promising or threatening anything with certitude, demands unselfish respect from us,

but since, by the way, if this respect is active and prevailing, only then and in that way are we allowed an insight into the Kingdom of the Supersensitive, but even then only with weak glances,

it follows that a genuine moral disposition, dedicated immediately to the law, can indeed have place, and the rational creature becomes worthy of that portion of the highest good, which is commensurate to the moral worth of his person and not merely of his actions.

2.7 Therefore here too it might very well be true, something that the study of nature and of the human otherwise teaches quite adequately, namely that the unfathomable wisdom, through which we exist, is no less worthy of esteem for what it denies, than in what for partly grants.
1.1 With the method teaching of pure practical reason, we cannot mean the manner (in reflection as well as in presentation) that we utilize to proceed with pure practical foundational propositions with the intention toward their scientific recognition, which actually only elsewhere, in the theoretical, we term method (for popular recognition has need of a manner, but science a method, i.e., a procedure according to principles of reason, by means of which alone the manifold of a recognition can become a system).

1.2 Far rather, with this method teaching we mean a manner of how we are able to procure entrance of the laws of pure practical reason into the human mind for influencing the maxims of that mind, i.e., to make objectively practical reason also subjectively practical.

2.1 Now it is indeed clear that those determination bases of the will, which alone make the maxims actually moral and give them a moral value, i.e., the immediate representation of the law and the objectively necessary compliance of it as duty, must be represented as the actual incentives of actions. For otherwise legality of actions would be effected indeed, but not morality of the disposition.

2.3 However it must seem less than clear to everyone, and indeed at first glance even entirely improbable, that also subjectively the description of pure virtue could be able to have more power on the human mind and render a much stronger incentive--even to effectuate that legality of the actions and to produce more powerful resolutions to prefer the law from a pure respect for that law over other concerns--than all allurements which can ever effect the pretenses of enjoyments and, in general, for the sake of all which we may count as happiness, or even all threats of pain and ill.

2.4 Nonetheless it is actually so related and were it not so constituted with human nature, then no manner of representing that law through verbosity and commendation would ever produce morality of the disposition.

466 The objectively practical reason is the ability to universalize one’s maxims. Now we want to consider what is necessary in order to make this also subjectively practical, i.e., actually incorporate this principle and to proceed with this universalization.

467 Human nature is able to prefer the moral over the happiness, and without that it would be impossible to finagle the human to such a consideration from any presentation of the law.
2.5 Everything would be a sheer track, the law would be hated or indeed even despised, while still being complied with for personal advantage.\textsuperscript{468}

2.6 The letter of the law (legality) would be encountered in our actions, but not at all the spirit of that law (morality) in our dispositions. And since with all our exertion we are still not able entirely to rid ourselves of reason in our judgments, we would unavoidably have to appear unworthy and vile humans in our own eyes, even if we tried to hold ourselves harmless for this affront before our inner judgment seat by delighting ourselves with the enjoyments which a law, assumed by us as natural or divine, had connected, according to our illusion, with the machine makeup of its police which functions merely according to what one does, and without the least concern about the motivations as to why one does it.\textsuperscript{469}

3.1 Indeed one cannot deny that in order to first bring an as yet uneducated or even unruly mind onto the track of the moral good, there is a need for some preparatory introduction to entice him through his own advantage or to scare him through his loss. However, as soon as this machine work or bridled course has had only some effect, the pure moral motivational basis must be thoroughly presented to the soul, which by being not only the single way which establishes a character (practical consistent thinking manner according to unchanging maxims), but also by teaching the human to feel his own worth, gives to the mind a power, unexpected by him, for tearing himself away from all sensitive dependency, to the extent it aims to become ruling, and in the independence of his intelligible nature and nobility of soul, to find sufficient recompense for the sacrifice which he makes.

3.2 Through observation, therefore, which every person can engage in himself, we want to prove this property of our mind, this receptivity of a pure moral interest, and thus the motivating power of the pure representation of virtue, if it is properly brought to the human heart as the most powerful and, if it concerns the duration and punctuality in compliance of moral maxims, the only incentive to good which each can employ. But still simultaneously with that it must be remembered that if these observations only prove the actually of such a feeling, but not the moral improvement brought forth by that, this does not injure the single method of making the objectively practical law of pure reason subjectively practical through the sheer pure representation of duty, as though it were an empty fantasy.

3.3 For since these methods had never yet been employed, experience can also indicate nothing of their success. Instead one can only require evidence of the susceptibility of such

\textsuperscript{468} Which is precisely my thinking with regard to the Essentials of Baptist Thinking, and which describes Stephen Uhl’s position in Golden Rule of Enlightened Selfishness.

\textsuperscript{469} This was covered earlier in IX. Para. 2.
incentives, which I will now shortly present and then I will easily project the method of the foundation and cultivation of genuine moral dispositions.

4.1 If we attend to the course of conversation in mixed company, which does not consist merely of the learned and sophisticates, but also of people from business or of women, we note that apart from the narrations and bantering also a conversation, namely reasoning, takes place. The reason for this is that the first, if it is supposed to entail novelty and with it also interest, soon becomes depleted, but the second, banter, easily insipid.

4.2 With all reasoning, however, there is nothing which more excites the participation of people, who otherwise are soon bored with all sophistication, and which introduces a certain quickness into the company than what concerns the moral value of this or that action, and by means of which the character of some person is to be ascertained.

4.3 Those, to whom otherwise everything subtle and penetrating in theoretical questions is dry and tiresome, soon take part if the topic deals with ascertaining the moral content of a narrated good or bad action. Then they become more precise and penetrating and subtle in devising anything which could reduce or even cast suspicion on the purity of the intention and thus on the degree of the virtue in the actor; certainly more so than we otherwise expect from them regarding any object of speculation.

4.4 In these estimations, we can often see shimmering before us the character itself of the person judging about others, among whom some, by practicing their role as judge particularly over the deceased, seem especially inclined to defend the good which is related about this or that deed against all suspicions of ignobleness. And finally they even defend the entire moral value of the person against the offending accusation of dissimulation and secret evilness. In contrast, others think more to issue indictments and impeachments in order to challenge this value.

4.5 Still we cannot always attribute to the latter the intention of wanting to juggle virtue entirely away from all examples of humans in order in that way to make it an empty word. Rather this is often just a well intended rigor in the determination of the genuine moral conduct according to a non-indulgent law compared with which, and not with examples, self conceit sinks very much in matters moral, and where then humility is not merely taught incidentally, but rather is felt by everyone through an acute self evaluation.

4.6 Accordingly we can often see in the defenders of the purity of intention in given examples that where it has the suspicion of uprightness for itself, they would also gladly want to wipe away the least tarnish from the motivational basis so that if the truthfulness of all examples were challenged and integrity denied to all human virtue, still at the end virtue would not at all be held for a mere make believe nor in this way to disparage all striving for virtue as ornamentation and deceptive self conceit.
5.1 I do not know why the educators of the youth did not along time ago make use of this propensity of reason, even in fabricated questions, to purse the most subtle test with pleasure. And after having established a merely moral catechism as a foundation, why did they not search through the biographies of ancient and modern times with the intention of having documentation at hand for the submitted duties on which, especially through the comparison of similar actions under diverse circumstance, they set the evaluation of their wards into motion to note their lesser or greater moral conduct. In this way they, even the early youth, who are otherwise yet unripe for all speculation, soon become very acute and with that, by feeling the advance of their judgmental power, will find it no less interesting, and especially can hope with certainty that the frequent practice in discerning, and acclaiming, good conduct in its entire purity, and on the other hand to note with regret or contempt even the least deviation from that good conduct. And even though at that point it only is conducted as a play for the power of judgement, in which children can rival one another, will still leave behind an enduring impression of the higher evaluation on the one side, or abhorrence on the other, which through the mere custom of often perspective such actions as acclaim or blameworthy, would make up a good basic foundation for the justification in the future course of their life.

5.2 Only I wish them to shun examples of so called noble (highly praiseworthy) actions which our sensitive authors toss about so much, and instead to display everything simply on duty and the value which a human can and must give himself in his own eyes through the consciousness of not having transgressed his duty. They should do this because what ends up with empty wishes and longings for unscalable perfection, produces sheer fictional heroes, who, by indulging their feelings for the extravagant magnitude too much, proclaim them free from the observation of the common and ordinary obligation, which then seems to them as merely insignificant.*

*Kant’s footnote:

1.1 It is certainly advisable to praise actions which illuminate great, unselfish, contributory dispositions and humanity.

1.2 But here we are to attend not so much to the elation of the soul, which is very fleeting and temporary, as far rather to the subjugation of the heart to duty, by which a more enduring impression can be expected, because duty entails principles (but the former only spirit).

1.3 It requires only a little reflection always to find a blame which has been imbedded somehow with respect to the human race (even if it is only that advantage which one enjoys through the inequality of the humans in the civil state, in order to find others all the more dispensable), in order not to dislodge the thought of duty through the self centered imaginings of the praiseworthy.

6.1 But if it is asked as to what is then actually the pure moral on which as touchstone we would have to test the moral stance of every action, then I must insist that only philosophers are able to make the resolution of this question doubtful. In common human reason-
ing this was decided long ago, indeed not through deduced universal formulae, but rather through common usage, much like the differentiation of the right and left hand.

6.2 First, therefore, we want to indicate the assessment of pure virtue with an example, and imagine that it were presented per chance to a ten year old lad for evaluation, and then to see whether he, without being instructed by the teacher, would necessarily also have to so judge on his own.470

6.3 Relate to him the history of an upright man whom someone wants to force into taking part in the slander of an innocent person who is also incapacitated (as per chance Anna of Bolyne at the accusation of Henry VIII).

6.4 Profits are offered, i.e., great gifts or high rank--they are refused.

6.5 This, because it is profit, will effect mere approval and applause in the soul of the listener.

6.6 Now begin with the threats of losses.

6.7 Among these slanderers are his best friends, who will now renounce their friendship, and also close kin, who threaten to disinherit him (who is without power), and then powerful people who are able to track him down and abuse and injure him anywhere, and finally we have a prince of the realm who threatens him with loss of his freedom, even his life.

6.8 But in order to have him also feel the pain which only the morally good heart can properly feel inwardly in order that the measure of the suffering be full, we may represent his family, threatened with extreme need and poverty, beseeching him to submit, and the man himself, even though upright, not just of strong and insensitive organs of the feeling for sympathy as well as for his own need in a moment in which he wishes never to have seen the day which presents such an unspeakable pain, yet the man remaining true to his resolution of doing what is right, without swaying or even doubting. In this way my young listener is gradually raised from mere approval to amazement, from there to astonishment, and finally up to the great veneration and a lively wish to be able to be such a person himself (though, of course, not in these dire circumstances). And nevertheless virtue here has only so much value for the simple reason that it costs so much, and not because it yields some advantage.

6.9 The entire amazement and even the striving for similarity with this character rest here entirely upon the purity of the moral foundational proposition, which (purity) can only be represented quite strikingly by removing from the incentives to action here everything which might count only as happiness to humans.,

470 What follows explores again the example as the common realization of freedom in the 2nd Task, Par. 3:10-13.
6.10 Therefore, the purer it is presented, the more power the moral must have on the human heart.

6.11 It follows then from this that if the law of morals and the image of holiness and virtue is supposed to exercise anywhere an influence on the soul, it can do so only to the extent it is laid as an incentive to the heart purely and unmixed with intentions to one’s own well being, and indeed because it reveals itself most splendidly in suffering.

6.12 But that, the elimination of which strengthens the effect of a driving force, must have been an obstacle.

6.13 Consequently, all admixture of incentives, which are taken from personal happiness, is an obstacle to the procurement of influence for the moral law on the human heart.--

6.14 I assert further, that even in that amazing action, if the motivational basis, from which it occurred, was the high esteem for his duty, then it is this very respect for the law, and not per chance a claim upon the inner opinion of heroism and a noble, praiseworthy thinking manner, that has directly the greatest force on the the mind of that spectator. Consequently duty, not merit, would have to have not only the most determined, but rather, if it is represented in the proper light of its sanctity, also the most urgent influence upon the mind.  

7.1 In our times, where, with softening, tender-hearted feelings or high soaring and inflated presumptions which make the heart more limp than strong, one hopes to accomplish more over the mind than through the dry and serious representation of duty, which is commensurate to the human imperfection and the advance into the good, the utilization of this method is more needful than ever.

7.2 To advance actions to children as noble, heroic and praiseworthy as a model, in the expectation of them absorbing these through an infusion of an enthusiasm for such, is completely contrary to purpose.

7.3 For since they are still so far removed in the observation of the most common duty and even in the proper estimation of that duty, it is though they are being prepared for fantasies.

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471 I wonder if there then are two ways of considering the example: we could feel sorry that the man had not deserved his fate or marvel at his heroism (which would be then praiseworthy and deserving of acclaim and amazement); and we could also be elated by the determination of the man to do what is right.
7.4 But also with the more educated and experienced portion of mankind this alleged incentive, even if not disadvantageous, still has no genuine moral effect on the heart; but that is precisely what we wanted to do.

8.1 All feelings, especially those which are to instigate such unusual exertion, must accomplish their effect in that moment when they are most vehement and before they fade; and otherwise they do nothing. For quite naturally the heart returns to its natural, temperate course of life and accordingly slips back into its earlier languor. Indeed some excitement was brought to that heart, but no strength.

8.2 Foundational propositions must be erected upon concepts. On all other foundations only moods arise, which can procure no moral value to the person, indeed not even an assurance to himself. And without this assurance the consciousness of one’s moral disposition and moral character, which is the highest good in the human, cannot take place at all.

8.3 Now these concepts, since they are supposed to be subjectively practical, must not stop with the objective laws of morality in order to wonder at them and to esteem them in reference to humanity. Rather their representation must be brought into relationship with the human and to his individuality. For then that law appears in a form, which is indeed worthy of the highest respect, but which is not so pleasing as though it would belong to the element to which he were naturally accustomed, but rather as it necessitates him often to abandon this element, not without self-renunciation, and to partake of a higher one, in which, and only with exertion, he can maintain himself by ceaseless concern against relapse.

8.4 In a word, the moral law demands compliance for the sake of duty, and not for the sake of a liking, which we cannot and are not suppose to presuppose at all.

9.1 Let us now look into the example as to whether more subjective motivating power would lie to an incentive in the representation of an action as noble and heroic than if this is represented merely as duty in relationship to the serious moral law.

9.2 Consider an action where, with great danger to his life, someone seeks to rescue people from a shipwreck and finally forfeits his own life in doing so. Such an action is indeed counted as praiseworthy, but our esteem for the person is weakened very much in fact through the concept of duty toward himself, which seems to suffer injury here.

9.3 More decisive is the heroic sacrifice of his life for the protection of his country, and, even it be also such perfect duty to devote himself to this intention voluntarily and without orders, still some scruple remains and the action does not have within itself the entire force of a pattern and incentive for imitation.
9.4 But if it is rigorous duty, whose transgression violates the moral law on its own, and without regard to human welfare and tramples down (such duties we endeavor to term duty towards God, because we think in Him the Ideal of holiness in substance to ourselves), then we dedicate the most complete esteem to the compliance of that duty with the sacrifice of all which may ever have a value for the most intimate of all our inclinations whatsoever. In this way we find our soul strengthened and elevated through such an example if we are able to convince ourselves through that the human nature is capable of such a great exaltation beyond everything whatsoever that nature may produce as incentives to the contrary.

9.5 Juvenal represents in an intense way such an example which lets the reader feel acutely the force of incentives which sticks as duty in that pure law of duty:

9.6 Be a good soldier, a good guardian, even an impartial referee. Shouldest Thou be summoned as witness in a doubtful and uncertain matter, and even if Phalaris should command that thou givest false testimony, and orders thy perjury through threats of roasting in the iron bull; consider it still as the greatest sacrilege to prefer life to honor and, for the sake of life, to destroy that which makes life worth living.⁴⁷²

10.1 If we are able to bring some sort of flattering of the praiseworthy into our actions, then the incentive is to some extent already mixed with self love, and therefore has some assistance from the side of sensitivity.

10.2 But we are to pursue everything solely according to holiness of duty, and to be aware that we can do precisely that because our own reason acknowledges this as its command and says that we are supposed to do that. Such a pursuit would mean an elevation, as it were, entirely beyond the sense world itself and, in that regard, is inseparable from the consciousness of the law as the incentive of a capacity which rules the sensitivity, even if not always with effect. But even so, still by means of the frequent occupation with that pursuit and with the smaller attempts of its use at the beginning, we are also given hope for its achievement so as to gradually produce in us the greatest, but pure, moral interest in that pursuit.

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⁴⁷² Kant presents this paragraph in Latin:
Esto bonus miles, tutor bonus, arbiter idem Integer; ambiguae si quango citabere testis Incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet, ut sis Falsus, et admoto dictet periuaria tauro: Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.
11.1 The method, therefore, takes the following course.

11.2 First it has to do only with making assessments with respect to moral laws into a natural occupation, one which accompanies all our own free actions as well as our observation of the free actions of others, and, as it were, a habit and which sharpens them by first asking whether the action be objective to the moral law and pursuant to that. We then distinguish the attention to that law, which merely gives to hand a basis to the obligation, from that which is obligatory in fact (*leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus*) (as, e.g., the law of that which requires the need of the human, in contrast to that which requires of me the right of the human, where the latter prescribes essential duties, but the former only externally essential duties). In this way we are taught the distinction of diverse duties, which come together in an action.

11.3 The other point calling for attention is the question as to whether the action (subjectively) also have occurred for the sake of the moral law and, therefore, have not only morality as fact, but rather also have with respect to their maxims a moral value as a disposition.

11.4 Now there is no doubt that this practice and the consciousness of a cultivation arising from that would have to gradually produce a certain interest to our reason in merely judging about the practical, even so about the laws of that reason, thus concerning morally good actions.

11.5 For we finally win an appreciation of that, the consideration of which lets us feel the expanding usage of our capacity of recognitions which especially advances that where we encounter moral correctness. The reason for this is that reason can find good only in such an order of things with its capacity for determining a priori according to principles what is supposed to happen.

11.6 Still a nature observer finally wins appreciation for objects which at the first are offensive to his senses, if he discovers the great purposefulness of its organization by means of that, and his reason in this way considers them. Accordingly Leibniz, took an insect, which he had considered painstakingly through the microscope, and carefully brought it back to its leaf, because he had found himself instructed through its appearance and had received from it a good deed, as it were.

12.1 But this occupation of judgmental power, which lets us feel our own recognitional powers, is yet not the interest in the actions and their morality itself.

12.2 It merely makes us glad to talk about such an assessment and gives a form of beauty to virtue or to the thinking manner with respect to moral laws, which form makes us marvel,
but is not yet for that reason sought for (laudatur et alget⁴⁷³). This is like everything, whose consideration effects subjectively a consciousness of the harmony of our representational forces and whereby we feel our entire recognitional capacity strengthened (understanding and power of imagination), i.e., it produces a satisfaction, which allows of communication to others. But nonetheless in this way the existence of the object remains indifferent to us, in that it is only viewed as the occasion to become aware of the layout within us of the talents beyond the animality.

12.3 But now the second exercise enters into play, namely through the lively description of the moral disposition in examples to make the purity of the will notable, at first only as the negative perfection of that, to the extent in an action as duty no incentive of the inclinations at all enters as a determination basis. In this way the apprentice is held attentive to the consciousness of his freedom, and although this renunciation is painful at the beginning, nevertheless at the same time by withdrawing the student from the incentive of even true needs, it informs him of an emancipation from the multiple dissatisfaction in which all these needs entangle him, and the mind is made receptive to the feeling of a satisfaction from other sources.

12.4 The heart still is emancipated and lightened from a burden which always presses it secretly, if in pure moral resolutions, of which examples are presented, the human discovers an internal capacity, otherwise not even known to himself, namely the internal freedom to rid himself of the impetuous intrusion of the inclinations to that degree, that none at all, not even the most beloved, have influence on a resolution, to which we now want to utilize our reason.

12.5 In a case, where I alone know that I am in the wrong, and although the frank admission of that—along with the opportunity for satisfying my conceit and even the otherwise not unjustified aversion toward the one whose right is diminished by me—greatly contradicts my self interest, it still can remove me beyond all these considerations and reveals a consciousness of my independence from inclinations and happenstance and likewise the possibility of being sufficient unto myself, which everywhere in another intention also is healthy.

12.6 And now the law of duty, by means of the positive value which compliance with that allows us to feel, finds easier entrance through the respect for us ourselves in the consciousness of our freedom.

12.7 Upon this, if it is well based, if the human shuns nothing more than finding himself contemptuous and objectionable in the inner self evaluation in his own eyes, every good moral disposition can be now set loose. And the reason is that this is the best, indeed the single, keeper for preventing the intrusion of ignoble and corrupting incentives.

⁴⁷³ She is praised, but makes a cold covering.
13.1 With this I have only wanted to allude to the most general maxims of the instructional method of a moral education and exercise.

13.2 Since the manifold of duties would still require particular determinations of each kind of those duties and make up such a wide ranging occupation, I beg to be excused if in a writing such as this, which is only a preliminary exercise, I leave it with these basic features.
Conclusion

1.1 Two things overwhelm the mind with constantly new and increasing admiration and awe the more frequently and intently they are reflected upon: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.

1.2 Neither of these do I need to seek beyond my horizon or merely to presume as though veiled in obscurity or extravagance. I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.

1.3 The first begins from the place which I take up in the external world of our sense and expands the connection in which I stand into unfathomable magnitude with worlds beyond worlds and systems of systems, and even beyond that into the limitless times of their periodical movement and their beginning and continuation.

1.4 The second begins with my invisible self, my personality, and displays me in a world which has true infinity, but which is sensible only to the understanding, and with which (but in that way also simultaneously with all those visible worlds) I recognize myself not in merely contingent, but rather in universal and necessary, connection.

1.5 The first glance at innumerable masses of worlds destroys, as it were, my importance as an animal creature who must give back again to the planet (a mere point in the universe) the material from which it was made and after having been furnished (who knows how?) with vigorous life for a short time.

1.6 The second, on the other hand, infinitely elevates my value as an intelligence through my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animalism and even from the entire world of our senses, at least as far as can be discerned from the purposeful determination of my existence through this law, which determination is not limited to conditions and boundaries of this life, but rather goes out to infinity.

2.1 Admiration and respect can indeed stimulate inquiry, but not replace it.

2.2 Now what is to be done in order to employ this in a useful manner, and one commensurate to the sublimity of the object?

2.3 Examples may serve here as a warning, but also for imitation.

2.4 The contemplation of the world began with the most splendid outlook which human sense can present to us and which our understanding can bear to pursue in that massive scale and ended . . . in astrology!
2.5  Morals began with the most noble feature in human nature, the development and cultivation of which looks out to infinite benefits, and ended . . . with rhapsody or superstition.

2.6  So it goes with all yet raw attempts in which the most noble part of the occupation depends upon the use of reason which, unlike the use of the feet, does not discover itself by means of frequent practice. This is especially true when it concerns properties which do not permit an immediate presentation in common experience.

2.7  But after the maxim had come into play, albeit late, calling for careful reflection in advance on all steps which reason proposes to take, and to let them make their way only on the track of a previously well considered method, the evaluation of the world structure obtained an entirely different course and with this at the same time an outcome, happy beyond compare.

2.8  The fall of a stone, the movement of a sling, resolved into their elements and in that way into external forces and treated mathematically, finally yielded that clear and forever immutable insight into the structure of the world, which can hope with advancing observation only to expand itself, but never having to fear a setback.

3.1  Now in setting out on this way likewise in the treatment of the moral constitution of our nature, the example above can be suggestive, and give us hope for a similar, good success.

3.2  After all we have the examples of morally judging reason.

3.3  Now to dissect these into their elementary concepts and to undertake in repeated attempts with common human understanding a procedure similar to chemistry, but without mathematics, i.e., the separation of the empirical from the rational which might be found in them, can make both of these pure for us and, what each person can perform for himself, discernible with certitude. In this way then we prevent partly the confusion of a yet raw, unpracticed assessment, partly (which is far more needful) the exclusion of illusions of genius through which, as it tends to occur with the adoption of the sorcerer’s stone and without any methodical investigation or familiarity of nature, dreamed up treasures are promised and true ones wasted.

3.4  In short: science (critically sought and methodically introduced) is the narrow gate which leads to teachable wisdom, if with this we mean not merely what we are supposed to do, but rather what is supposed to serve teachers as indicators for the good and discernible cleaving of the way to wisdom which everyone is supposed to take, and also for securing others from false ways. This is a science whose keeper must always remain philosophy, and with whose subtle investigations the public has no part to play, though indeed with the teachings which first after such a treatment can be quite clearly evident to it.