[B 145 A 137] V. The Constitution of every church always proceeds from some historical belief (revelation), which we can term ecclesiastical faith, and this is best established upon a Holy Scripture.

[From Kant's Religion Within The Limits Of Reason Alone, and translated by Philip McPherson Rudisill]

1.1 Actually only pure religious belief can establish a universal church, because it is only a belief of reason that can be communicated convincingly to every person.

1.2 An historical belief, on the other hand, based merely upon facts, cannot spread its influence further than the news of it can reach, dependent as it is upon circumstances of time and place and upon our capacity for making judgments concerning its credibility.

1.3 However, a particular weakness of human nature is the reason that we can never count as much on that pure belief as it actually deserves, namely to base a church on it alone.

2.1 Human beings, conscious of their incapacity to recognize extrasensory [uebersinnlicher] things, though still honoring that belief (as one which carries conviction for them in general), are still not so easily convinced that the enduring dedication to a moral course of life is all that God requires of men to be [B 146 A 138] acceptable subjects in his kingdom.

2.2 They cannot think of their obligations except as some sort of service which they are to perform for God, where it does not depend so much on the internal moral worth of the actions as rather their performance for God in order to please Him, at least by passive obedience, regardless of how morally indifferent these actions may be on their own.

2.3 People simply will not understand that whenever they perform their duty toward humans (themselves as well as others), they likewise fulfill divine commands, hence, are continually in the service of God in all their dealings, to the extent these refer to morality, and that it is simply impossible to serve God more exactly in any other way (because in the last analysis they may influence and affect creatures of this world, but not God).

2.4 Because every grand lord in the world has a special need to be honored by his subjects and to be praised through subservient relations, without which he cannot expect from them as much adherence to his commands as he thinks necessary to rule them; and furthermore, since we humans, regardless of how rational we may be, still always find an immediate pleasure at marks of esteem, we treat duty, to the extend it is simultaneous a divine commandment, as the promotion of a concern of [B 147] God rather than of men, and in this way the [A 139] concept of a God-serving religion arises, rather than that of a pure moral one.

3.1 Every religion consists in viewing God as the legislator for all our duties, and deserving of honor by all.

3.2 Concerning then the determination of religion in regard to our conduct in conformity with these duties, it is important to know how God might want to be honored (and obeyed).

3.3 But a divine, legislative will always commands either on its own, purely statutorily, or through moral laws.

3.4 In regard to the latter, every person can recognize the will of God, which is the basis of his religion, by merely thinking about it rationally.

3.5 For the concept of divinity actually arises only from the consciousness of these laws and the need of reason to assume a power which can supply to these laws the entire effect, possible in a single world and commensurate with a moral, final purpose.

3.6 The concept of a divine will, determined merely in accordance with pure moral laws, permits us to think not only merely one God, but therefore also only one religion, which is purely moral.

3.7 But if we assume statutory laws and make religion into our compliance with them, then the knowledge of religion is not possible through our own reason alone, but only through revelation.

3.8 And then, no matter if given to [B 148] each individual secretly or publicly in order to [A 140] be passed on to others though tradition or scripture, it would be an historical religion, and not a pure belief of reason.--

3.9 But even assuming there were statutory, divine laws (which would not be recognized as binding of themselves, but rather only by virtue of the revealed, diving will), it would still be the pure, moral legislation whereby not only the will of God is originally written in our hearts, the unavoidable condition of every true religion in general, but also that which constitutes such religion and, regarding which, the statutory laws can contain only the means to its promotion and propagation.

4.1 Therefore, if the question "how might God wish to be honored?" is to be answered universally for every human, considered merely as human, there is no hesitation in saying that the legislation of his will would be merely moral; for statutory legislation (which presupposes a revelation) can only be considered as provisionally binding and so not as having come, or being able to come, from every human being, hence not binding for humans in general.

4.2 Hence, "not those who say 'Lord, Lord', but rather those who do the will of God", hence it is not those seeking to please him through exaltation (or that of his embassary as a being of divine origin) [B 149] according to revealed concepts which not every human [A 141] can have.

4.3 Far rather it is those seeking to please God through a virtuous life (with respect to which each knows God's will) who will be the ones providing him with the true veneration which he demands.

5.1 But if we do not act merely as humans, but also as citizens in a divine state upon earth, and consider ourselves obligated to work for the existence of such a connection under the name of a church, then the question of how God might want to be revered in a church (as a community of God), does not seem answerable through mere reason, but rather has need of a statutory legislation, made known through revelation, hence an historical belief which we may call ecclesiastical belief in contrast to the pure religious belief.

5.2 For, with the latter, everything depends merely upon what makes up the material of the veneration of God, namely the observation of all duties, arising in a moral disposition, as his command.

5.3 But an ecclesiastical belief, as a union of many people under such a disposition to a moral communal body, has need of a public obligation, a ecclesiastical form resting on certain experiential conditions, which, on its own, is contingent and multifaceted, hence cannot be recognized as duty without a divine, statutory law.

5.4 [B 150] But the determination of this form need not for that reason be immediately seen as an [A 142] occupation of the divine legislator.

5.5 Far rather one may assume with reason that the divine will for us were to execute the rational idea of such a communal body, and, even though the humans may have sought many forms of a church with unhappy results, they still are not to cease striving for this goal through new attempts, if necessary, which best avoid the mistakes of the earlier ones; and this endeavor, while simultaneously a duty for them, is left entirely up to them.

5.6 Therefore we do not have cause to hold the laws for the establishment and form of some church directly as divinely statutory.

5.7 Far rather it is presumptuousness to consider them as such in order to remove the trouble of improving the form of the latter, or even with the usurpation of great esteem, to lay a yoke upon the crowd with ecclesiastical rules through the presumption of divine authority; with which, however, it would be just as much conceit utterly to deny that the manner of the organization of a church could not also be a particular, divine arrangement if, as far as we can see, it is in the greatest agreement with the moral religion and additionally that this could not been seen if such could have suddenly appeared without the appropriate preparatory progress of the public in religious concepts.

5.8 [B 151] Now in the doubt regarding this task, whether God [A 143] or the humans themselves founded a church, we see the bent of the latter to a religion of worship (cultus) and, because this goes back to arbitrary instructions, to the belief in statutory, divine laws under the supposition that besides the best course of living (which the human may ever take in accordance with instructions of pure, moral religion) still divine legislation, not recognizable through reason but rather requiring revelation, would have to be added; whereby we emphasize immediately the honoring of the highest being (not by means of compliance with his laws which are already prescribed to us through reason).

5.9 Now it happens in this way that humans will never consider unification into one church and the unanimity with respect to the form given to it as necessary in themselves for the promotion of the moral aspect of the religion; but rather, as they say, to serve God through ceremonies, confessions of faith in revealed laws, and observances of the prescriptions belonging to the form of the church (which still itself is a mere means); even though all these observances are fundamentally morally indifferent actions, but precisely for that reason, because they are done merely for his sake, are held for all the more pleasing to him.

5.10 Hence the ecclesiastical faith naturally* precedes the [A 144] pure religious faith in the preparation of the human for [B 152] an ethical, communal being, and Temples (sacred buildings for public religious services) were earlier than churches (assembly places for the instruction and stimulation in moral dispositions), priests (sacred administrators of devotional customs) before preachers (teachers of the pure moral religion), and it is still often the case in matters of rank and worth when wooing the crowd.

[* Morally speaking it should be the other way around.]

6.1 Now if it is once unalterably established that a statutory ecclesiastical belief is not assigned to the pure religious belief as a vehicle and means of the public union of the people for the promotion of the latter, then we must also admit that the unalterable preservation of the latter, the universal, uniform transmission, and even the respect for the revelation assumed in it can be cared for sufficiently through tradition, but rather only through a writing which itself in turn as revelation for contemporaries and later generations must be an object of high respect; for that benefits the need of the people to be certain in regard to their divine duty.

6.2 For with those who do not read it (and most especially with them), at least with those who cannot make any coherent religious concept [B 153] out of it, a holy book acquires the greatest respect, and all subtle reasoning accomplishes nothing against that peremptory [A 145] dictum which destroys all objections: it is written.

6.3 Hence also the places in such a book which are supposed to establish a point of belief are called dictums.

6.4 The definitive expositors of such a writing are likewise themselves sacred persons precisely because of this activity, and history proves that not even the most devastating revolution of a state has been able to eradicate a belief established on writings; while that based on tradition and old, public rituals falls also at the ruin of a state.

6.5 Blessed* indeed if such a book, having come into the hands of people, and in addition to the statues of the laws of the faith, should completely contain the purest, moral religious teaching which can be brought into the finest harmony with the former (as vehicles for its introduction).

[*An expression for everything wished for, or worth wishing for, which we can neither see in advance, nor produce through our effort according to laws of experience, of which we therefore, if we want to cite a reason, can adduce none other than a beneficent providence.]

6.6 In such a case it can assert an authority equivalent to revelation in aid of the purpose to be attained thereby as well as due to the difficulty in making the jump of such through the [B 154] illumination of the human race preceded thereby in accordance with [A 146] natural laws.

* * *

7.1 Now something which adheres to this comprisal of a revelatory faith.

8.1 There is only one (true) religion; but there can be any number types of faith.--

8.2 We can add to this that in many churches, separated from one another due to the diversity of their way of belief, one and the same true religion can be encountered.

9.1 Hence it is more appropriate to say (as also actually happens in usage): this person is of this or that (Jewish, Mohammedan, Christian, Catholic, Lutheran) faith, rather than that person is of this or that religion.

9.2 The latter expression should actually not even be used when addressing the larger public (in catechisms and sermons) for it is too academic and hardly understandable for him; even as the recent languages provide no equivalent work for him.

9.3 With that the common man always understands his ecclesiastical belief which is present before him, instead of religion being hidden within him and dependent upon moral [B 155] dispositions.

9.4 We honor most of them entirely too much [A 147] by saying they belong to this or that religion; for they know and require none; the statutory ecclesiastical belief being all that they understand with this word.

9.5 Even the so called disputes of religion which have so often shaken the world and splatter it with blood, have never been anything more than wrangling about ecclesiastical belief, and those suppressed did not actually complain about being hindered in adhering to their religion (for no external power can do that), but rather because of not being allowed to follow their ecclesiastical belief openly.

10.1 Now if, as it usually happens, a church presents itself as the only universal one (even though it is based upon a particular revelatory belief which, as historical, can never be demanded of everyone), then whoever does not acknowledge its (particular) ecclesiastical belief is termed an unbeliever and is extremely hated; while whoever only deviates partly from it (in nonessentials) is a errant and to be avoided as least as contagious.

10.2 If he ultimately embraces that church, but still deviates in some essential of the belief (namely what was added), he is called a [A 148] heretic,* and like an insurrectionist [B 156] is deemed punishable, as an external enemy, and is excommunicated by the church (similar to what the Romans pronounced against those who went beyond the Rubicon without the consent of the Senate).

[* The Mongolians called Tibet (according to Georgii Alphab. Tibet. Page 11) Tangut-Chazar, i.e., the land of house [A 148] residents, in order to distinguish them from themselves who lived as Nomads in the wilderness in tents, wherefrom the name of Chazaren is derived, and from this that of heretic (Ketzer); because the former were attached to the Tibetan belief (of the Lamas) which agreed with Manichiism, perhaps even originating from that and spreading into Europe with them in their invasion; and also therefore long ago heretic and manichiism were used synonymously.]

10.3 The presumed, solitary, correctness of belief of the teachers or leaders of a church concerning ecclesiastical faith is termed orthodoxy, which we can divided into despotic (brutal) and liberal orthodoxy.--

10.4 If a church which proffers its ecclesiastical belief as obligatory for all people, is called catholic, while that which defends itself against this claim (even though it often wants to exercise the same if it only could), protestant, then an alert observer will encounter many laudable examples of protestant Catholics, and, in contrast, even more, [A 149] obnoxious ones of arch catholic protestants; the former of men of an expansionary manner of thinking (even if not [B 157] pleasing to their church), and in contrast to which the latter with their very limited manner, are in clear demarcation and very unfavorably at best.