The Transcendental Aesthetic
from Kant's Critique of Pure ReasonTranslated by Philip McPherson Rudisill
some time before July 16, 2000Each sentence and paragraph is numbered by the translator.
The pages given as A or B refer to the two versions of this work given in the the Academic Edition.
No. 1
1.1 Regardless of the manner and the means whereby a recognition (Erkenntnis) may refer to objects, it remains always the envisagement (Anschauung) whereby it refers immediately to them, and it is to the envisagement that all thinking is aimed as a means. 1.2 But this takes place only to the extent the object is given; but this in turn, at least for us humans, is only possible by the mind being affected by the object in a certain way. 1.3 The capacity (receptivity) for obtaining depictions in the way that objects affect us is called sensitivity. 1.4 It is then by means of sensitivity that objects are given to us, and they alone supply us with an envisagement; but it is through the understanding that they are thought, and it is from that thinking that concepts arise.
1.5 But all thinking, be it directly or indirectly, must ultimately, by means of certain characteristics, refer to envisagements, thus, with us, to sensitivity, because there is no other way whereby objects may be given to us.
2.1 The (B 34) effect of an object upon the depictionary capacity, to the extent we are affected by it, is sensation (Empfindung) (A 20).
B34 A20 2.2 That envisagement, which refers to the object via sensation, is called empirical.
2.3 The undetermined object of an empirical envisagement is called specter (Erscheinung)
3.1 In the specter that which corresponds to sensation, I call its material; but that which entails the multiplicity of the specter being ordered in certain relationships, I call the form of the specter.
3.2 Since that, wherein the sensation can alone be ordered and positioned in a certain form, cannot itself in turn be sensation, it follows that for us the material of every specter can only be given a posteriori, but its form must already lie a priori in the mind, and thereby be subject to our consideration in isolation from all sensations.
4.1 I term all depictions pure (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing which pertains to sensation is to be found.
4.2 Accordingly the pure form of sensitive envisagements in general are to be encountered in the mind a priori, wherein all multiplicity of the specters can be looked at and seen (angeschaut) in a certain form.
4.3 This pure form of sensitivity will also itself be pure envisagement (B 35).
B35 4.4 Hence if I remove from the depiction of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, e.g., substance, power, divisibility, etc., and likewise that which belongs to sensitivity, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, (A 21) etc., then something still remains for me from this empirical envisagement, namely expansion and shape. A21 4.5 These belong to pure envisagement, which, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation, has a place a priori in the mind as a mere form of the sensitivity.
5.1 A science of all principles of sensitivity a priori would be a transcendental aesthetic.
5.2 Therefore there must be a science which made up the first part of a transcendental elementary doctrine, in contrast to that which contains the principles of pure thinking and which would be called transcendental logic.
6.1 In the transcendental aesthetic, therefore, we will first isolate the sensitivity in that we remove everything which the understanding thinks through its concept, so that nothing but empirical envisagement remains.
6.2 Secondly we will then remove from this remainder everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing now remains except a pure envisagement and the mere form of the specters, which is all the sensitivity can supply a priori.
6.3 By means of this inquiry we will see that there are two pure forms of sensitive envisagement as recognitional principles a priori, namely space and time, and it is to the exposition of these two that we now turn.
No. 2. The Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space
1.1 By means of the external sense (a property of our minds) we depict objects as apart from us and these all together in space.
This sense is fundamentally visual. We engage in experiments to calibrate other senses with this sighting. We are able to explain the movement of our limbs in space, which the blind can only feel, by reference to this visual space. Otherwise we would be as the blind and be able merely to discern the difference between a physical constraint and an ability to freely move our limbs, but not be able to explain it; for this recognition requires a visualization. 1.2 In space their shape, size and relationship to one another are determined and determinable.
We can tell by looking that something for example is round or square, and large or small, and to the left or right of our visual field or to the left or right of another object. 1.3 The internal sense, by means of which the mind itself, or its internal state, is looked upon, does not indeed give us an envisagement of the soul itself as an object; but it is still a determined form, by means of which alone the envisagement of its internal state is possible, so that everything which belongs to the internal determinations is depicted in relationships of time.
1.4 Time cannot be sighted externally, any more than space can be seen as something internal.
When we look about us we can see objects of one color or another (or some degree of gray) and located here and there and of this and that shape and size, but nothing in all that visual scene gives us the least inkling of time. Time is simply not visual. Likewise when we look about and see objects here and there, even though the sensations which make up these sightings are retinal material of our eyes and as such are within our eyes, still we cannot help but see these objects out in space apart from us. 1.5 What then are space and time?
There are four theories of space and time that Kant will contend with. Two of these are those of realism and two are illusionism. Of the former two, one, that of Isaac Newton, holds that space and time are real on their own and independent of all things which may be located in them. The other, that of Leibniz, asserts that time and space, while real enough, are not real on their own, but only as a function of real things, i.e., when God creates objects, then space and time come into existence in order for these objects to relate to each other. Kant intends to deal with these two realism theories here, for the other two, the dogmatic illusionism of George Berkeley and theoretical illusionism of René Descartes are not serious contenders, being at odds with clear recognition, and are dealt with later. 1.6 Are they actual beings?
Yes according to Newton, and no according to Leibniz, at least not independently of existing things. 1.7a Are they simply determinations or even relationships of things, but which would pertain to them on their own, even if they were not being looked upon,
Precisely so Leibniz would reply, namely space and time are real enough, but only contingently as a result of a world of objects created by God, and not on their own independently of this creation. This position is, of course, quite contrary to that of Newton. 1.7b or are they such which adhere only to the form of the envisagement and thus to the subjective condition of our mind, without which these predicates cannot be attributed to any thing whatsoever?
Here Kant hints at his own theory, the validity of which he intends now to prove, and both negatively by showing that neither Newton nor Leibniz, can explain common human recognition, and then also positively by showing how it is that his own theory of the ideality of space and time is able to produce this explanation. 1.8 In order to instruct ourselves about this we first want to expose the concept of space.
1.9 But what I mean with exposition is the distinct (even if not detailed) depiction of what belongs to a concept; this is a metaphysical exposition when it contains a description of the concept as given a priori.
There is considerable parallelism in Kant's treatment of space and time, so much so that I have deemed it expedient to present them in a parallel format.
2.1 1. Space is not an empirical concept which were derived from external experiences.
2.2 For in order that certain sensations be referred to something apart from me (i.e., to something in a location different from where I am located), or in order that I can depict them as apart from, and adjacent to, each other, and hence not merely as different, but as in different locations, the depiction of space must perforce already precede as the foundation.
2.3 Accordingly the depiction of space cannot be borrowed from the relationships of the external specters through experience; far rather it is only through this depiction that this external experience is made possible in the first place.
Kant reasons so: if space and time were things on their own, or if they were encased, as it were, in objects as the realists (Newton and Leibniz) would have it, then it would be impossible for us ever to have come to any notion of them, for spatial and temporal terminology and references cannot arise from an examination of things. I can see that two things are different, but I cannot see in any comparison of the two, no matter how closely and attentively I focus on them, that they are apart from each other in space, for that is merely the way that I look at the objects, and that envisagement or that way of look-see must precede in order to be able to notice such aspects. The same holds for time, namely no matter how long and intently I listen to a note of music, let us say, I can never hear in that note or sense in any way that that note follows another note or a moment of silence. Likewise when I look at two things next to each other in space, there is nothing at all in that picture which would suggest the notion of simultaneity, for that is simply not an aspect of things on their own at all.
It is important to keep in mind that Kant is merely trying to establish that we do not get our notions of time and space from experience, but rather that these notions must precede our exposure of objects in order to have experience in the first place.
3.1 2. Space is a necessary a priori depiction which is the basis for all external envisagements.
3.2 It is impossible to imagine the absence of space, although we can easily imagine no objects being present in that space.
3.3 Therefore space is the condition of the possibility of specters and not to be considered as some determination dependent upon them, and is a depiction a priori which necessarily precedes as the basis of external depictions
This might be called the anti-Leibnizian proof. According to Leibniz without created things there is no space and time, for these are merely the relationships between things (in space) or between perceptions (in time). Therefore space and time come into existence only upon the creation of things. But Kant reasons against Leibniz in this wise: if that were true, i.e., if space and time were merely determinations of existing things, then it would follow that upon imagining the absense of things we could also imagine the absense of space and time, since these are dependent upon real things. But we cannot do this, i.e., we can easily enough imagine a space adn time devoid of things, but we cannot imagine the absense of space or time.
4,1 3. Space is not a discursive concept, or, as we say, a general concept about relations of things in general, but rather a pure envisagement.
4.2 For in the first place we can only imagine a single space, and when we speak of many spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same singular space.
4.3 Furthermore these parts cannot precede this singular, all-enveloping space as though they were its component parts (wherefrom its assembly were possible), but rather can only be thought in it.
4.4 Space is essentially singular; the multiplicity in it, hence also the general concept of spaces in general, rests entirely on limitations.
4.5 From this it follows that with respect to space one envisagement a priori (which is not empirical) lies as its basis.
4.6 Accordingly all geometric principles, e.g., that in a triangle two sides are greater than the third, can never be derived from general concepts of line and triangle, but rather from the envisagement and indeed a priori and with apodictical certainty.
5.1 4. Space is depicted as an infinite, given quantity.
5.2 Now we must think every concept as a depiction which is contained in an infinite count of diverse, possible depictions (as their common characteristic), and so as containing these under itself; but no concept as such can be so thought as though it contained an infinite count of depictions in itself.
5.3 But that is precisely how space is thought (for all parts of space through infinity are simultaneous).
Therefore the original depiction of space is envisagement a priori and not a concept.
5.4 Therefore the original depiction of space is envisagement a priori and not a concept. Finally Kant notes that in the empirical way we take a concept, developed as noted above, and then are able to imagine an infinite count of objects being contained under this concept, e.g., an infinite count of different tables under the concept of table. But space is entirely different in that space, which is thought of as an infinite given, is also conceived of as containing an infinite count of things within itself. And so it is entirely a priori and not an empirical concept at alls.
No. 3 Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space
1.1 With a transcendental exposition I understand the explanation of a concept as a principle whereby the possibility of other synthetical a priori recognitions can be grasped.
1.2 For this purpose it is necessary 1. that such recognitions actually flow from the given concept and 2. that these recognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given explanatory method of this concept.
2.1 Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori.
2.2 But then what must the depiction of space be in order that such a recognition of it be possible? 2.3 It must originally be envisagement, for from mere concepts no proposition which goes out beyond the concept can be drawn, but this does happen in geometry (Introduction V).
2.4 But this envisagement must be a priori encountered within us, i.e., before all perception of an object, a pure, and not an empirical, envisagement.
2.5 For the geometric proposition are all together apodictic, i.e., connected with the consciousness of their necessity, e.g., space has only three dimensions; but such propositions cannot be empirical judgments or those of experience, nor concluded from such (Introduction II).
3.1 Now how can an external envisagement reside in the mind which precedes before the objects themselves, and in which the concept of the latter can be determined? 3.2 Obviously not otherwise than to the extent that it is seated in the subject and merely as its formal constitution of being affected by objects, and thereby obtaining an immediate depiction, i.e., an envisagement; hence only as the form of the external sense in general.
4.1 Therefore it is our explanation alone which makes possibility of geometry as a synthetical recognition a priori. 4.2 Any other method of explanation, which does not supply this, even if it is similar in appearance, can be distinguish by this characteristic with the greatest confidence. Finally Kant turns here to his transcendental exposition. He wants to explain how it is that certain recognitions can arise and to show that they cannot arise except in this one way. He uses the science of geometry as an example. The assertions of geometry are universal and necessary, e.g., that any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third. This information cannot arise from the concept of a triangle, for by means of the concept we are conscious merely of a three-sided figure. Likewise an empirical envisagement reveals only that this triangle and that triangle have this relationship, but not that all triangles have and must have this relationship. Therefore it is only possible for this information to arise if we have an a priori look-see, and this can arise only if space is the way that we look at things rather than something on its own.
Conclusions from the above Concepts
5.1 a. Space does not depict any property of any sort of thing on its own, nor in the relationships of things to each other, i.e., no determination of theirs which would adhere to the objects themselves if we were to abstract from all subjective conditions of the envisagement.
5.2 For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be sighted before the existence of the things to which they appertain, thus not a priori.
6.1 b. Space is nothing else than merely the form of all specters of the external sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensitivity, under which alone external envisagement is possible to us. 6.2 Now because the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily precedes all envisagements of these objects, it is easy to understand how the form of all specters must be able to precede all actual perceptions, thus a priori in the mind, and how it, as a pure envisagement, in which all objects must be determined, can contain principles of the relationships of these preceding all experience.
7.1 Accordingly we can speak of space, or extended beings, etc., only from the standpoint of a human. 7.2 If we depart from the subjective condition, according to which alone we can receive external envisagement, namely as we might be affected by objects, then the depiction of space means nothing at all.
7.3 This predicate is ascribed to things only to the extent that they appear to us, i.e., as objects of the sensitivity.
7.4 The enduring form of this receptivity, which we term sensitivity, is a necessary condition of all relationships, wherein objects may be sighted as external to us, and if we abstract from these objects, is a pure envisagement which bears the name of space.
7.5 Because we cannot make the particular conditions of sensitivity into the conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their specters, we can certainly say that space encompasses all things which might appear outwardly to us, but not all things on their own, whether they be sighted or not, or by whatever subject we might wish.
7.6 For we cannot at all judge of the envisagements of other, thinking beings, namely whether they are bound by the same conditions which limit our envisagement and which are universally valid for us.
7.7 If we add the limitation of a judgment to the condition of the subject, then the judgment is unconditioned. 7.8 The proposition that all things are next to one another in space holds true under the limitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensitive envisagement.
7.9 If I add here the condition to the concept and say that all things as external specters are next to each other in space, then this rule holds true universally and without limitation.
7.10 Accordingly our expositions teach the reality, i.e., the objectivity validity, of space with respect to everything which can be presented to us externally as an object, but at the same time teaches the ideality of space with respect to things when they are considered by reason as something on their own, i.e., without regard to the constitution of our sensitivity.
7.11 Therefore we assert the empirical reality of space (with respect to every possible external experience), but still its transcendental ideality, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we remove the condition of the possibility of any experience and assume it as something which stands as the basis to things on their own.
8.1 But apart from space there is no other subjective depiction which is referred to anything external, which could be termed a priori objective.
8.2 For from nothing else could we derive synthetical proposition a priori as we can from space. 8.3 Strictly speaking, therefore, no ideality at all can be attributed to them, even though they agree with the depiction of space to extent that they pertain merely to the subjective constitution of our mode of sensing, e.g., seeing, hearing, feeling, through the sensations of color, tone and warmth, but, since they are merely sensations and not envisagements, they do not permit any object to be recognized, much less a priori.
9.1 The intention of this remark is merely cautionary, namely to restrain us from trying to explain the asserted ideality of space through vastly inadequate examples where such [qualities] as color, taste, etc. are rightly considered not as consisting of things but rather as alterations of our subject which can even be different with different people. 9.2 For in such a case what is originally itself is only specter, e.g., a rose, would hold in the empirical understanding as a thing on its own, but which still, with respect to its color, can appear in differently in each eye.
9.3 In contrast to this the transcendental concept of the specters in space is a critical reminder that nothing at all that is sighted in space is a thing on its own, nor is space a form of things which were intrinsic to them on their own, but rather that the objects are not known by us at all, and what we term external objects are nothing more than depictions of our sensitivity, the form of which is space, but the true correlate, i.e., the thing itself on its own, is not recognized in that way at all, nor can be, but about which in experience also no questions are ever raised.
No. 4 The Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Time
1.1 1. Time is not an empirical concept which were somehow derived from an experience.
1.2 For simultaneity or succession would not even enter into the perception if the depiction of time were not already present a priori as the basis.
1.3 Only under its presupposition can anyone imagine that something were in one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively).
2.1 2. Time is a necessary depiction preceding all envisagements.
2.2 With regard to specters in general we cannot cancel time, although we can very easily remove the specters from that time.
2.3 Time, therefore, is given a priori.
2.4 In it alone is every actuality of the specters possible.
2.5 These can vanish, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be removed.
3.1 3. Upon this a priori necessity the possibility of apodictic principles of the relationships of time or axioms of time in general is based.
3.2 Time has only one dimension; diverse times are not simultaneous, but successive (even as diverse spaces are not successive, but simultaneous).
3.3 These principles can never be drawn from experience, for this would provide neither strict universality nor apodictic certitude.
3.4 We would only be able to say that common perception teaches this, but not that it must be this way. 3.5 These principles hold as rules, by means of which experience in general is possible, and instruct us before experience and not through experience.
4.1 4. Time is not a discursive concept, or, as we say, a general concept, but rather a pure form of sensitive envisagement. 4.2 Diverse times are only parts of just this time.
4.3 But a depiction, which can only be given through a single object, is envisagement. 4.4 And the proposition that diverse times cannot be simultaneous would be not permit itself of being derived from a general concept.
4.5 The proposition is synthetic and cannot arise from concepts.
4.6 Therefore it is contained immediately in the envisagement and depiction of time.
5.1 5. The infinitude of time means nothing more than all determined quantities of time are merely limitations of one time lying as their basis.
5.2 Hence the original depiction of time must be given as unlimited.
5.3 But whereof the parts themselves and every size of an object can be depicted determinedly only though a limitation, there the entire depiction cannot have been given through concepts (for they contains only partial depictions), but rather immediate envisagement must lie as the basis.
No. 5 Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time
1.1 Here I can refer to item 3 above where, in order to be brief, I placed what is actually transcendental under the article of the metaphysical exposition.
1.2 Now I add that the concept of alteration, and with it that of motion (as alteration of location) is only possible through and in the temporal depiction; and if this depiction were not (internal) envisagement, no concept, regardless of what, could make comprehendible the possibility of an alternation, i.e., a connection of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object (for example one and the same thing being in a location and not being in that very same location). 1.3 Only in time can both contradictorily opposed determinations be encountered in one thing, i.e., successively.
1.4 Therefore our concept of time explains the possibility of so many synthetic recognitions a priori, as the general doctrine of motion demonstrates; and which is more than just a little fruitful.
No. 6 Conclusions from the above Concepts
1.1 a. Time is not something which would exist on its own, or which would adhere to things as an objective determination, and thus which would remain if we abstract from all subjective conditions of their envisagement; for in the first case it would be something which were actual even without actual objects.
1.2 But concerning the second, it could not precede before the objects themselves as a determination or order adhering to them as their condition and which would be a priori recognized and sighted through synthetical proposition.
1.3 But this latter can easily take place if time is nothing more than the subjective condition by mean so which all envisagements can take place within us. For then this form of internal envisagement can be depicted before the objects, and thus a priori. 1.4 For then this form of internal envisagement can be depicted before the objects, and thus a priori.
2.1 b. Time is nothing more that the form of the internal senses, i.e., of that looking at ourselves and our internal state.
2.2 For time can be no determination of external envisagement; it belongs neither to a shape nor position, etc.; on the contrary it determines the relationship of the depictions in our internal senses.
2.3 And precisely because this internal envisagement presents no shape, we even seek to supplement this deficiency through analogies, and we depict the temporal sequence through a line advancing without end, in which the multiplicity makes up a row which is only of a single dimension, and conclude from the properties of this line to all properties of time apart from this single one, namely that the parts of the line are simultaneous while those of the latter are always successive.
2.4 From this it becomes clear that the depiction of time is itself envisagement, because all its relationships can be expressed in an external envisagement.
3.1 c.Time is the formal condition a priori of all specters in general.
3.2 Space, as the pure form of all external envisagement, is limited as the condition a priori of merely external envisagements. 3.3 In contrast, since all depictions, whether they have external things as objects or not, still, as determinations of the mind, they belong to the internal state; but this internal state belongs under the formal condition of the internal envisagement and hence of time; and so time is a condition a priori of all specter in general and indeed the immediate condition of the internal specters (of our soul) and in that way also mediately that of the external specters.
4.1 If I can say a priori that external specters are in space and a priori determined according to the relationships of space, then I certainly can say quite universally from the principle of the internal sense: all specters in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time and necessarily in relations of time.
5.1 If we abstract from our mode of looking at ourselves internally and also, by means of this envisagement to capture all external envisagements in the depictionary power, and thus take objects as they might be on their own, then time is nothing. 5.2 It is of objective validity only with respect to the specters, because these are already things which we assume as objects of our senses; but it is no longer objective if we abstract from the sensitivity of our envisagement, hence from that depictionary manner which is peculiar to us, and speak of things generally.
6.1 Time, therefore, is simply a subjective condition of our (human) envisagement (which is always sensitive, i.e., to the extent we are affected by objects), and nothing at all independently of the subject.
6.2 Nevertheless with respect to all specters, hence also to all things which can come forth to us in experience, it is necessarily objective.
6.3 We cannot say that all things are in time, because the concept of things in general is abstracted from the manner of their envisagement, but this is the peculiar condition under which time belongs in the depiction of things.
6.4 Now if the condition is added to the concept and we hear: all things as specters (objects of the sensitive envisagement) are in time, then the principle has it’s good, objective propriety and universality a priori.
7.1 Our assertions, therefore, teach the empirical reality of time, i.e., its subjective validity with respect to all objects which might ever be given to our senses.
7.2 And since our envisagement is always sensitive, it follows that no object can ever be given to us in experience which did not belong under the condition of time. 7.3 On the other hand we deny to time every claim to absolutely reality since it then, without regard to the form of our sensitive envisagement, would adhere utterly to things as a condition or property,
7.4 Such properties, which would pertain to things on their own, can never be given to us through the senses.
7.5 t is in this, therefore, that the transcendental ideality of time consists, whereby, if we abstract from the subjective conditions of the sensitive envisagement, time is nothing whatsoever and cannot be ascribed to the objects on their own (apart from their relationship to our envisagement) neither as subsisting nor as inhering.
7.6 But this ideality cannot be compared with the surreptitious aspects of the sensations any more than can that of space, because at the same time we presuppose of the specter itself, to which these predicates inhere, that it have objective reality, which here is completely removed except to the extent that it is merely empirical, i.e., it views the object itself merely as specter; concerning which the above remark of the first section should be reviewed.
No. 7. Exposition
1.1 Against this theory, which accords time empirical, but denies it absolute and transcendental, reality, I have heard such unanimous objection by thoughtful men that I must assume that it arises naturally with every reader to whom this consideration is unfamiliar.
1.2 It goes like this: alterations are actual (which is proven by the alteration of our own depictions, even if we wanted do deny all external expecters with their alterations).
1.3 Now alterations are only possible in time; hence: time is something actual.
1.4 The reply is without difficulty.
1.5 I admit the entire argument. 1.6 Time is certainly something actual, namely the actual form of our internal envisagement.
1.7 It has, therefore, subjective reality with respect to the internal experience, e i.e., I actually have the depiction of time and my determinations in it.
1.8 It is therefore actually to be viewed not as object, but rather as the depictionary manner of myself as object.
1.9 But if I or another being could look at myself without this condition of sensitivity, then the very same determinations, which we now depict to ourselves as alternations, would render a recognition in which the depiction of time, hence then also that of alteration, would not arise at all.
1.10 Time retains its empirical reality as a condition of all our experience.
1.11 Only the absolute reality cannot be permitted to time according to what was presented above.
1.12 It is nothing other than the form of our internal envisagement.
1.13 If we were to remove from our envisagement the peculiar condition of our sensitivity, then the concept of time would vanish, and it does not adhere to the objects themselves, but rather to the subject which looks at them.
2.1 But the reason why this objection is made so unanimously, and indeed by those who otherwise have nothing illuminating to say against the doctrine of the ideality of space is this.
2.2 They hope not to be able to establish the absolute reality of space apodicticly because opposing them is idealism, according to which the actuality of external objects is not subject to a rigorous proof; but on the other hand the absolute reality of the objects of our internal sense (of myself and my state) is immediately clear through consciousness.
2.3 The former could be a mere appearance, but this latter, they maintain, something undeniably actual.
2.4 But they did not realize that both, without us challenging their actuality as depictions, still only pertain to specters which always has two sides, the one where the object is considered on its own (regardless of the manner of looking at it, but whose constitution for this reason always remains problematical); the other where the form of the envisagement of this object is considered, which must be sought not in the object on its own, but rather in the subject to whom it appears, but which still pertains actually and necessarily to the specter of this object.
3.1 Accordingly time and space are two sources of recognition from whence diverse synthetical recognitions can be created a priori, as is brilliantly exemplified in pure mathematics with regard to the recognition of space and its relationships. 3.2 In fact they are, considered together, pure forms of all sensitive envisagement and thereby make synthetical propositions possible a priori.
3.3 But this source of a priori recognitions determine their borders (that they are merely conditions of sensitivity) by being applicable to objects merely to the extent they are thought of as specters, but not as things on their own.
3.4 The former alone are the field of their validity wherefrom, if we depart, no further objective usage of them takes place.
3.5 By the way, this reality of space and time does not affect the security of the recognitions of experience, for we are just as sure of them whether the form adheres to the things on their own, or only to our envisagement of these thing in a necessary way.
3.6 In contrast those who proclaim the absolute reality of space and time, be they taken as subsisting or only as inhering, are at odds with the principle of experience itself.
3.7 For if they opt for the former (which is commonly the party of the mathematical explorers of nature), then they must assume two eternal and infinite non-things (space and time) existing of themselves which are there (still without being anything actual), only in order to embrace everything that is actual.
3.8 If we consider the second group (which includes some metaphysical teachers of nature), and space and time hold for them as relationships of the specters (next to or after each other) which were abstracted from experience, even though confused in the isolation, then they must challenge the validity of the mathematical doctrine a priori with respect to actual things (e.g., in space), or at least the apodictical certitude, in that this can never take place a posteriori, and the concepts a priori of space and time are, according to this opinion, only creatures of the imagination whose actual source must be sought in experience, from whose abstracted relationships the imagination has made something which does indeed contain the generality of that, but which cannot take place without the restrictions which nature has connected with it.
3.9 The former win this much, that they keep the field of specters open for mathematical assertions; but they stumble very much on these conditions when the understanding wants to go out beyond this field.
3.10 The second group wins indeed with respect to the latter, namely that the depictions of space and time do not stand in their way when they wish to judge of things not as specters, but rather merely with respect to the understanding; but then can provide neither for the possibility of mathematical recognitions a priori (due to the lack of any basis for a true and objectively valid envisagement a priori) nor bring the propositions of experience into any necessary agreement with those assertions.
3.11 In our theory of the true condition of these two original forms of sensitivity both difficulties are removed.
4.1 Finally that the transcendental aesthetic can contain nothing more than these two elements, namely time and space, is clear from this, because all other concepts belonging to sensitivity, even that of motion, which units both elements, presuppose something empirical.
4.2 For motion presuppose the perception of something mobile.
4.3 But in space, considered as such, there is nothing movable; hence the movable must be something which is found in space only through experience, thus be an empirical datum.
4.4 For just the same reason the transcendental aesthetic cannot count the concept of the alterable a priori amongst its data; for time itself does not alter, but rather something which is in time.
4.5 For this, therefore, the perception of some sort of existent and the succession of its determination is required, hence: experience, .
No. 8. General Remarks to the Transcendental Aesthetic
I.
1.1 First of all, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, it will be necessary to explain as clearly as possible what our opinion is with regard to the foundational make up of the sensitive recognition in general.
2.1 What we are trying to say is that all our envisagement is nothing but the depiction of specters; and the things we look at are not on their own as we see them, nor are their relationships so constituted on their own as they appear to us, and if we were to remove our subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, all the make up, all the relationships of objects in space and time, indeed even space and time themselves would vanish, for as specters they cannot exist on their own, but rather only in us. 2.2 What sort of affinity there might be with the objects on their own and isolated from all this receptivity of our sensitivity, remains thoroughly unknown to us.
2.3 We only know our manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, but which also must not be attributed to all beings necessarily, though certainly to all humans. 2.4 With this alone are we occupied. 2.5 Space and time are the pure forms of this, sensation in general the material.
2.6 The former alone can we recognize a priori, i.e., before all actual perception, and for that reason it is called pure envisagement; but this latter is what in our recognition which makes us call that a recognition a posteriori, i.e., empirical anschauung. 2.7 The former pertain utterly necessarily to our sensitivity regardless even of the mode of our sensations; the latter can be quite diverse. 2.8 If we could even develop this our envisagement to the highest degree of clarity, we still would not in that way come closer to the constitution of the objects on their own. 2.9 For in every case we would still only fully recognize our way of envisagement, i.e., our sensitivity, and this always under conditions of space and time which adhere originally only to the subject--what the objects might be on their own would never be made known to through even the most clarified recognition of their specter, which is all that is given to us.
3.1 Hence that our entire sensitivity be nothing other than the confused depiction of things which contains solely what pertains to them on their own, only under an assemblage of characteristics and partial depictions which we cannot separate clearly, is a falsification (Verfälschung) of the concept of sensitivity and of specter and one which makes the entire theory unusable and empty.
3.2 The distinction between an indistinct and a distinct depiction is merely logical and does not concern the content. 3.3 The concept of right utilized in the ordinary understanding most certainly contains exactly what the most subtle speculation can develop from it, except that on a common and practical level we are not conscious of the multiple depictions in these thoughts. 3.4 But we cannot for that reason say that the ordinary concept is sensitive and contains a mere specter, for what is right cannot appear at all; far rather its concept is situated in the understanding and it depicts a property of actions (the moral) which pertain to them on their own. 3.5 The depiction of a body in the envisagement, on the other hand, does not contain anything at all which could pertain to an object on its own, but rather concerns only the specter of something and the way in which we are affected by this something; and this receptivity of our recognitional ability is called sensitivity and always remains vastly different from the recognition of an object on its own, even though we might inspect it (the specter) down to its very foundation.
4.1 The Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, therefore, by considering the distinction of the sensitivity from the intellectual as merely logical, has directed all investigations of nature and the origin of our knowledge according to a decidedly incorrect viewpoint, for this distinction is obviously transcendental and concerns not merely the form of the distinctiveness or undistinctiveness, but rather its origin and content, such that we not only do not recognize the constitution of things on their own through the former merely unclearly, but rather not at all, and as soon as we remove our subjective constitution, the depicted object along with the properties which the sensitive envisagement attributes to it is nowhere to be encountered nor can be, for it is precisely this subjective constitution that determines the form of this object as specter.
5.1 Otherwise we tell very well about what of the specter belongs to the envisagement and adheres essentially to it and is valid for every human sense in general, and distinguish it from what pertains to the specter only accidentally by holding for a particular position or organization of this or that sense and not for the referral of the sensitivity in general. 5.2 And here we term the first recognition such as depicts the object on its own, but the second only its specter. 5.3 But this distinction is only empirical. 5.4 If we remain there (as we usually do) and do not in turn consider (as we should) this empirical envisagement as a mere specter such that nothing which could pertain to an object on its own could be encountered there, our transcendental distinction is lost and we still think we are recognizing things on their own even though everywhere (in the sense world), even down to the deepest investigation of its objects, we still have to do with nothing but sheer specters.
5.5 We do indeed term the rainbow in the sun lit rain a mere specter in contrast to the rain as the thing on its own, which is also correct to the extent we utilize this latter concept only physically as that which is determined in the universal experience under all diverse positions to the sense as being so in the envisagement and not otherwise. 5.6 But if we take this empiricality in general and ask about whether this depicts an object on its own (not the rain drops, for they, as specters, are already empirical objects) without considering the agreement of this with every human sense, then the question concerning the referral of the depiction to the object is transcendental and not only are these drops sheer specters, but also their round shape; and even the space in which they fall is nothing on its own but sheer modifications or foundations of our sensitive envisagement, and the transcendental object remains unknown to us.
6.1 The second important matter of our transcendental aesthetic is this, that it not engender favor as an appealing hypothesis, but rather that it be so certain and as indubitable as we might require of a theory which is to serve as an organon. 6.2 In order to make this certitude entirely clear we will now choose a case whereon its validity will be clear to our sight and can serve to better clarify what has been introduced in section 3 above.
7.1 Assume that space and time were objective on their on and conditions of the possibility of things on their own, then we would see first of all that both render us a priori apodictical and synthetical proposition in great number, especially space, which we now especially want to examine as an example.
7.2 Since the propositions of geometry are synthetic a priori and are recognized with apodictical certainty, I would like to inquire as to the origin of such propositions and on what supports the understanding in order that it achieve to such utterly necessary and universally valid perceptions? 7.3 There is no way other than through concepts or through envisagements, but both of which which be given either a priori or a posteriori. 7.4 The latter, namely empirical concepts, and likewise that whereon their are based, the empirical envisagement, can render no synthetical proposition except such which are also merely empirical, i.e., experiential proposition, thus can never contain necessity and absolute universality, but which still are the characteristics of all propositions of geometry. 7.5 But what would be the first and only means, namely to achieve to such realizations through mere concepts or through envisagements a priori, it is clear that no synthetical recognition at all can be achieved through mere concepts, but solely analytical. 7.6 Consider only the proposition that two straight lines cannot not in any way encompass a space, thus no figure being possible, and seek to derive that from the concept of straight lines and the number two; but also then that a figure is possible through three straight line, and seek that just as well out of these concepts. 7.7 All our endeavor is vain and we are necessitated to take refuge in an envisagement [look-see] as the geometrician also always do. 7.8 Therefore you present yourself with an object in the envisagement; but then what sort is this? is it a pure envisagement a priori, or an empirical one?
7.9 If it were the latter, then no universally valid proposition, and much less an apodictical one, could arise; for experience cannot never provide such
7.10 Therefore you must give yourself an object a priori in envisagement, and base your synthetical proposition on this. 7.11 If there were in you no capacity to look at things a priori; if this subjective condition with respect to the form were not simultaneously the universal condition a priori, under which alone the object of this (external) envisagement were itself possible; were the object (the triangle) something on its own without reference to your subject; how could you say that what were necessarily in your subjective condition for constructing a triangle would also have to pertain to the triangle on its own? 7.12 For you could not add anything new (the figure) to your concepts (of the three lines), which for that reason would also have to correspond necessarily to the object, since this is given before your recognition and not through it.
7.13 Therefore were space (and also then time) not merely a form of your looking, which contains conditions a priori, according to which alone objects could be external objects for you, which apart from these subjective conditions are nothing at all, then you could make out synthetically absolutely nothing about external objects. 7.14 It is therefore unquestionably certain and not merely possible or simply probable that space and time, as the necessary condition of all (external and internal) experience, are nothing other than subjective conditions of all our envisagement, in relationship to which, therefore, all objects are merely specters and not things given in this manner on their own, whereof then for that reason, concerning their form, much can be said a priori, but never the least about the things on their own which might be the foundations of these specters.
II
1.1 As a confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external as well as the internal sense, and hence of all objects of the senses as mere specters, the following remark can be especially appropriate, namely: everything in our recognition which belongs to envisagement (therefore excluding the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the will, which are not recognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relationships, of places in an envisagement (expansion), alteration of place (movement) and laws according to which this alteration is determined (moving powers). 1.2 But what presently be in the place, or what, apart from the alteration of place, be efficacious in the things themselves, is not given by that. 1.3 Now through mere relationships a thing cannot be recognized on its own at all; therefore we can easily judge that since nothing except relational depictions are given through the external sense, this can also contain only the relationship of an object to the subject in its depiction, and not the internality which pertains to the object on its own. 1.4 With the internal envisagement it is just the same. 1.5 Not only that in this the depictions of the external sense make up the actual material wherewith our minds are occupied, but also time, in which we position these depictions, which precedes before the consciousness of the same in experience and, as formal condition of the manner as to how they are positioned in the mind, lies as the foundation, already contains relationships of succession, simultaneity and what which is simultaneous with the succession (the enduring). 1.6 Now that which, as depiction, must precede all action of thinking something, is the envisagement, and, if it contains nothing except relationships, it is the form of the envisagement which, since it depicts nothing except to the extent something is placed in the mind, can be nothing else than the manner in which the mind is affected through its own activity, namely this positioning of its depiction, i.e., is an internal sense with respect to its form. 1.7 Everything which is depicted through a sense is to this extent always specter, and an internal sense would therefore either not be admissible at all, or else the subject, which is the object of that, would have to be depicted through itself only as specter, and not as it would judge of itself if its envisagement were merely self active, i.e., intellectual. 1.8 Here now the basis of all difficultly rests on this, how a subject could look at itself internally; but this difficulty is common to every theory. 1.9 The consciousness of one’s self (apperception) is the simple depiction of the I, and if thereby alone all multiplicity of the object were given self-activity, then the internal envisagement would be intellectual. 1.10 With humans this consciousness requires internal perception of the multiplicity which is precedingly given in the subject, and the manner whereby this is given in the mind without spontaneity, must be called sensitivity in order to maintain this distinction. 1.11 If the capacity for being conscious of the self is to seek out (apprehend) what is lying in the mind, then it must be able to affect that and only in this way can produce an envisagement of itself, but whose form, which lies precedingly in the mind as the basis, determines in the depiction of time the manner as to how the multiplicity is assembled in the mind; since it then looks at itself, not as it would immediately depict itself self-actively, but rather according to the manner as it is internally affected, consequently as it appears to itself, but not as it is.
III.
1.1 When I say that in space and time the envisagement depicts both the external objects as well as the self envisagement of the mind as they affect our senses, i.e., as they appear, that is not to say that these objects are merely illusions.
1.2 For in the specter the objects, indeed even the properties which we attribute to them, are viewed as something actually given, but with this proviso: this property pertains to the envisagemental manner of the subject in relationship to the given object to the extent the object as specter is distinguished from it as an object on its own. 1.3 Hence I do not say that bodies only seem to be apart from me or that my soul merely seems to be given in my self consciousness when I assert that the quality of space and time, conformable to which, as the condition of their existence, I place both of these (bodies and my soul), is situated in my envisagemental manner and not in these objects on their own.
1.4 It would be my own fault if I wanted to make sheer illusion out of what I count as specter.* 1.5 But this does not occur according to our principle of the ideality of all sensitive envisagements; far rather, if someone attributes objective reality to those depictionary forms then we cannot avoid everything being turned into sheer illusion. 1.6 For if we view space and time as constitutions which, with regard to their possibility, would have to be encountered in objects on their own, and neglect the absurdities in which we are then entangled, in that two infinite things, which are not substance nor something actually inhering in those substances, but which still exist and indeed which must be the necessary condition of the existence of all things, also remain even if all existing things were annihilated, we certainly cannot blame the good Berkeley for demoting bodies to sheer illusion, indeed our own existence itself would have to be transformed into mere illusion if in this way it were made dependent upon the self-existent reality of a non-thing like time, an absurdity into which no one has yet descended. Para-
graph
Note*
1. The predicates of specter can be attributed to the object itself in relationship to our senses, e.g., the red color or the scent to the<B-70> rose; but the illusion can never be attributed as a predicate to the object, and precisely because it would attribute to the object on its own what only pertains to it in relationship to the senses or generally to the subject, e.g., the two handles which some first ascribed to Saturn. B70 2. What cannot be encountered with the object on its own, but always in its relationship to the subject, is specter and therefore the predicates of space and time are quite properly applied to to the objects of the senses, and in this there is no illusion.
3. On the other hand, if I ascribe redness to the rose on its own, or the handles to Saturn, or extension to all external objects on their own without considering a determined relationship of these objects to the subject and limiting my judgment to that, it is only then that illusion arises.
IV.
1.1 In natural theology, where we must think an object which is not at all an object of envisagement, but rather which cannot even be for itself an object of sensitive envisagement, we are very careful to remove the conditions of time and space from its envisagement (for such must all its recognition be, and not thinking, which always means limitation).
1.2 But with what right can we do this if we have already made both of these into the forms of things on their own and indeed such which, as conditions of the existence of things a priori, remain even if we have removed the things themselves; for as conditions of all existence in general they would also have to be conditions of the existence also of God.
1.3 If we do not want to make them into objective forms of all things, then nothing remains but to make them into subjective forms of all our external as well as our internal envisagement which for that reason is called sensitive because it is not original, i.e., is not such through which the existence of the object of the envisagement would be given (and which, as far as we can tell, can only pertain to the original being), but rather adhere to the existence of the object, thus be only possible thereby that the depictionary capacity of the subject is affected through that.
2.1 It is also not necessary that we limit the envisagemental mode in space and time to the sensitivity of humans; it may be that all finite, thinking beings would necessarily have to agree with the human in this regard (but concerning which we cannot decide), but despite all that universality it does not cease to pertain to the sensitivity, and precisely for this reason, namely that it is derivative (intuitius derivativius) and not original (intuitius originarius), thus not intellectual envisagement, which, per the reason cited above, would apparently pertain to the original being alone, and never to a being dependent with regard to his existence as well as to his envisagement (which determines his existence with reference to given objects), although this latter remark must be counted to our aesthetical theory only as exposition and not as a basis of proof. To contact the author, please e-mail: pmr**kantwesley.com (note: the ** must be replaced by @)
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