Journal of August 4, 2005

8/4/05 5:30 PM A synthesis of the elements of the natural evil of the human.

What is good about man is that he respects the moral law, and what is evil about man is his willingness to consider exceptions, e.g., just this once. Not that he necessarily engages in an exception, but that he is even willing to consider an exception is evidence of an evil. This is a propensity and which may never actually appear, just as the savage, being a drunk by nature, is not aware of this until he is given alcohol. We have a propensity to evil. We have a propensity to consider exceptions to the moral law.

Now as to our make up, our structure or constitution, we are made for good things, for our animality leads to children, our rationality leads to efficiencies in terms of goals, and our morality leads us to the highest good.

Now it seems that the rationality can turn on the objects of desire, and count the respect for the moral law as one of them, and then trade one for the other in terms of importance or value. That is the problem, that we are willing to put respect for the moral law on the same level as a desire.

Now we are moving toward the question of how it is that there is an exposure, like the savage to alcohol, in order for this propensity to actualize and effect our actions, for it is certainly an evil maxim which lies at the heart of this matter, i.e., we have already accepted an evil maxim when we come to consider the question, for we know we are willing to at least consider a violation of the moral law. And so this maxim is evil and it is innate and arises, out of our evil disposition, and it infects even the best of people.

It comes somehow in the interaction among two or more people, i.e., in a society. And here I am beginning to grope a bit as I seek to put things together. We have this rationality and this affects our own actions and our actions vis a vis other, i.e., interactively, just like two materials in space from each other will begin to move (from scratch, according to Kant). And so we bring it out of each other in this sort of way. We get pushed around in the natural play of our interactions with others and we resent this and learn to defend ourselves (using our rationality also as guide) and we find some success and then go on to use that power of defense now for aggression. Something like that.

We are willing to consider a violation of the moral law. As a personal memory I remember,, about the age of 11, I guess, my friend takes me to merchant who wanted to distribute materials and he pays us a quarter or something and we got going and at the first house, as I was preparing to put one on the door step, my friend took them all and threw them under the porch and said, “we play a little and then go back and tell him we did the job” and then we’ll get our money. I have no memory, but only a break, and then my friend and I are facing the man and the says, “you guys sure finished early. Are you sure you got them out right?” and my friend assured him that we had, and I think I may have nodded, although I am fairly sure I did not say anything. That’s all. That, i suppose, will stick with me forever. I can’t believe that I did that. It was not self instigated, for my natural assumption (as a young Christian, I suppose, given my cultivation) was to do it, even as it is today. It might be a question of whether I could finish a contracted task, but not whether I wanted to or not. But evidently that evil maxim was already there and it was like I just naturally opted, out of astonishment perhaps, to be one with my friend (whom, I suppose, I was also wanting to impress in some boyish way, e.g., perhaps II wanted to be a pal).

And so it seems that there was in me a propensity to sin, i.e., to do moral evil, but which had to be drawn forth into action by something involving this other guy. I think he must have had some experience, for it certainly came out of the blue to me, but for me it was like a seduction, in a way, for it would not have occurred to me on my own,, and when it did, it came under the particular impression I wanted to convey to my playmate and my pal, and that is about all that I can say. If I had been a morally good person, as kant calls for, then I would have retrieved the sheets and declared that my friend was batty and that we needed to get started on doing the right thing. But I didn’t do that. Isn’t that amazing in a way? that I did not do that?

I was willing to subjugate the moral imperative for the sake of impressing my friend with some quality, such as “grownupness” or whatever.

Now this was obviously my own choice, for it is clear that I should have acted otherwise and thus could have, but II did not,, and so it was my choice, and yet it was also so natural that I would do this, that Ii would subjugate the moral law to an object of desire. And it arose as a result of me being in interaction with another, where one can dare but two must do.

And so there is an animality which calls for association and thus attraction and then there is rationality where wee seek to unify our desires in happiness, and this latter alone is sufficient to rule a rational human being and to make him rational. And this calls for rational interaction, but we bring our sensitivity in along with us, and lo and behold we are affected beings. We produce mutually affected desires of happiness. And then there is the moral which comes in and seeks to upset the desires of happiness as the ruler of the mind. And so while we know that we are free by means of the imperium of the moral command to duty, we also know that we are evil because of our willingness to even consider an immoral action, and treating it as anything more than illogical prattle. “Why would you even consider such a thing?”

And so this propensity is innate and natural in the sense that it comes to play in the realm of interaction among rational beings who are affected by the senses as is the human species.

It is innate as a propensity, and it is inevitable that it shall be called forth into play by the interactions with others.

It is also radical in the sense that it destroys the meaning of terms and we don’t know that we are immoral. In making this exception as a possibility the self of sensitivity and drives for happiness puts itself above the moral law, and presumes, like a sovereign, to rule upon its efficacity and scope. What we do is this. We clothe our evil in the trappings of good by pointing, with others, at the effect of the action as the measure of goodness, and not at the maxim which rules as the principle of all actions, and which was occasioned in brought into play by temporal conditions.

And so as long as the effect is not bad, we excuse each other, and never look into the recesses of the heart at the maxim which is called the disposition, namely this very natural bent to evil, to being willing to put it on the same level with the goals of a happiness seeking rational human. It is itself a maxim which we have taken on (as we know we can take it off and change it, and that you can only do as a voluntary act).

And so it is innate, and it is radical because we lose sight of the moral in all the dress of empirical sightings, and then we are quite moral, when actually we are following an evil maxim.

And so it is innate, and voluntary and radical (and thus as self promoting, an idea promoting itself). And all this is very voluntary. It has to be assumed as voluntary for two reasons, one: otherwise it would be an element of human character and thus not subject to change; and two: it must be, since we know that it can be changed.

Otherwise this remains a miracle, although i, like Kant, am taken by the Garden story of Genesis. I am now thinking that Adam may have willfully and knowingly violated the moral law. He did it out of love for his wife, that she might not feel alone.

Amazing man, to have been willing to violate a command of God himself out of love for another woman, that she not be alone.

Seems rather lame,, actually.

Concerning this famous story, it seems that it never would have occurred to the pair to break the law if they had not been seduced. [this ties in with the “interactive” aspects of this actual evil in human life.] And so we have to simply conjure up a demon as a being who is like God in having extraordinary power. But who bests likes to thwart God,, knowing fully the pain (like the satyr being skinned strip by strip by the God Apollo for having dared to doubt the supremacy of his voice over all other beings). This being then puts it into the head of the pair.

But now the evil has really already expressed itself in this curious way: the pair has been desirous of mitigating the pain that comes from any deprivation of desire due to the moral law, and instead of thinking of the absolute law all the time, they decided among themselves that it wouldn’t taste good anyway, and so they quit thinking about the absolute law,, since it was of no use here anyway, since there was no possible desire for this object of prohibition anyway, and so no big problem. Later the idea is broached, by this liar, this demon, that this fruit might be desirable also, and so suddenly it is seen as an object of desire, and so since all thought of the original absolute had vanished in a sort of weakness counseled by their rationality they had no reason not to eat. But then later, when they heard God, they remembered what they had done. they remember his absolute law. And so in great fear they ran from him and he had to call them out of the woods to get them to come to him.

and so the evil comes already in the substitution of the happiness consideration for the moral law, as a buttress of this law erected by rationality in the face of the pain of denial. This is the actual evil, and is an innate element of the human psyche and rationality that we tend to think this way. Since we are willing, according to our supreme, invisible maxim, to consider an immoral, it is for this reason alone that we would think any need to buttress this with anything other than sheer respect.

We don’t need a mitigation of pain in order to adhere to the moral rule, but we naturally seek it any way,, for we are beings who place the highest value upon self happiness.

The good news is really profound: since it is our own voluntary act, this taking on of the evil maxim, it is something that can be changed simply by deciding to do so, i.e., voluntarily as well.

Now Kant talks about a need for an interaction among humans in order to be certain of moral improvement. This builds on this interaction thing again.

It seems that it is almost impossible to expect moral perfection as long as you are on your own and trying to do it alone. the reason, as I think I understand, is that we mutually corrupt each other, and so many are going to be doing their natural best to corrupt you in your new determination to be righteous, and while not impossible it may be almost impossible to do it on your own. And for which reason then all morally inclined people are obligated to get into a connection of encouraging people to do the right and good thing, and of allowing them to strengthen themselves by encouraging you in the same way. This is called an ethical commonwealth and it is likely impossible except in the form of a church.

And so this is a duty to the species, to join with others of a like mind in an effort to make a more general and effective spread of moral fervor throughout land.

Every man is required by his own practical reason to join with others for a mutual good to offset and overcome a mutual evil. Now the maxim will be considered and only incidental attention to the effect. Now it is the maxim that is in focus.

And so we will be dealt with in this way by Kant in Religion. We will see our moral problem and we will find clarity of the goal of moral striving and then we will see the necessary means of the attainment of that goal by humans, namely through churches.

And finally, I guess, we will look at the structure of this church and its orientation to a love of the moral law above all else, and see how it can be corrupted if people are not careful, and how to avoid that.